" Au bas de la statue d'Auguste Comte, place de la Sorbonne, à Paris, on pouvait lire récemment - et peut-être le peut-on encore : "Ni Comte ni Sponville". Ce graffiti exprime à sa manière l'un des grands défis de la philosophie française de cette fin de siècle, à savoir celui de sa popularité. Car la philosophie est désormais au centre de la vie publique : elle trône dans les cafés, se fait une place dans l'entreprise et s'installe même dans (...) les cabinets privés. Mais ce qui ne laisse pas d'étonner, c'est l'écho qu'elle rencontre auprès d'un grand public avide de lectures philosophiques. Il convient de s'interroger sur cet engouement, ou plutôt d'interroger les philosophes à ce sujet, eux qui sont sans doute les mieux placés pour y répondre. " Précédés d'une introduction à l'œuvre des auteurs interviewés, les six entretiens réunis dans ce livre font le point à la fois sur la pensée de chacun d'eux et sur la situation générale de la philosophie française actuelle. Bien qu'on n'ait dans aucun sens affaire ici ni à une école ni à une improbable " pensée 98 ", il se dégage quand même de ces rencontres l'image d'une philosophie qui a renoué avec la vie, qui est arrivée à reformuler, à nouveaux frais, les questions de la philosophia perennis et qui a rétabli le dialogue avec son temps. (shrink)

Cet article vise à montrer l’extrême proximité entre ces deux mathématiciens-philosophes que furent Gian-Carlo Rota et Gilles Châtelet disparus la même année. Au moins quatre points communs les relient : une philosophie romantique radicale ; une rigueur intellectuelle exemplaire ; une vision affine de la recherche mathématique ; une révolte intérieure exécrant tout sensus communis.This text shows the great proximity between two mathematicianphilosophers, Gilles Châtelet and Gian-Carlo Rota who both died in the same year 1999. There are at least four (...) common points amongst themselves: a radical romantic philosophy; an exemplary intellectual rigor; a great affinity in their vision of mathematical research; an inmost rebellion against all common sense. Quest’articolo tende a mostrare l’estrema prossimità tra due matematici-filosofi che furono Gian-Carlo Rota e Gilles Châtelet che ci hanno lasciato lo stesso anno. Ci sono almeno quattro punti comuni che le legano: una radicale filosofia romantica; un rigore intellettuale esemplare; una visione affine della ricerca matematica; una rivolta intima che esecra ogni senso comune.This article is in French. (shrink)

Cet article tente d’utiliser la méthode phénoménologique afin de proposer une description de la nausée à partir d’une perspective dynamique, à rebours des analyses traditionnelles fondées sur la contingence. Il s’agit de voir que la nausée doit être pensée à partir d’une distinction entre motricité et mobilité subjectives résultant d’une transformation de la motion en locomotion. Étant en mouvement sans se mouvoir, le sujet y est susceptible de saisir en même temps le monde extérieur et l’habitacle de son véhicule comme (...) le sol immobile sur fond duquel seulement sa mobilité sera possible. La nausée sera alors l’expérience de la perte de notre appartenance par sa propre démultiplication. (shrink)

Les investigations phénoménologiques de Patočka ne prennent leur sens que si elles sont rattachées à un dilemme coextensif à la phénoménologie elle-même. Il est en effet possible d’affirmer que la phénoménologie trouve son sens originaire dans une révolte contre l’univocité de l’être, et ceci dès sa fondation par Husserl. Sa critique du psychologisme et du naturalisme n’a qu’un sens profond : montrer qu’être ne signifie pas partout la même chose, ce que Husserl s’emploie à faire en distinguan...

Cet article se donne pour tâche l’examen de la fécondité conceptuelle d’une réduction paradigmatique souvent effectuée par les études en phénoménologie contemporaines de la danse : la réduction du mouvement dansé aux _kinesthèses_ par lesquelles il devrait être immédiatement vécu. Nous entendrons montrer, au contraire, que les kinesthèses ne permettent pas de rendre compte du mouvement vécu parce qu’elles le transforment en un vécu de mouvement demeurant extérieur au sujet qui le vit. Cette critique nous amènera ensuite à repenser conjointement (...) le mouvement dansé comme véritable sujet de la danse et le corps dansant comme déposé par ce mouvement en lequel il est pris. (shrink)

This second volume of Ordo V , in the Amsterdam edition of the Latin texts of Erasmus, comprises theological treatises presenting the first half of Erasmus’ commentaries on eleven Psalms. The commentaries explain the Psalms, offering the priests and parishioners material for their preaching.

This volume of essays studies the problem of transition in economics from a historical perspective. It uses historical ideas and theories in a modern context to examine economic thought. It aims to show that social and historical context are important when considering economic transitions.

Charles Darwin’s theory of species evolution by means of natural selection is known largely because of the impact it had on biology and other natural sciences in general; this is hardly a surprising fact. Thus, it could strike certain readers –those accustomed to a philosophical discourse– as odd to speak of “Darwinian ethics.” However, Darwin’s theory of evolution has not been unknown to other areas and disciplines of thought, philosophy among them. Just as with other ‘destroyers’ of the ideas (...) present in their time –such as Nietzsche or Freud–, the impact of Darwin’s thought was felt as a deadly blow to some of the staple ideas and suppositions he weld concerning human life, nature and our place in it. Therefore, it is certainly relevant to discuss, as philosophers, the possibility of an ethic that is purely based on Darwin’s ideas. With this in mind, what I intend to do in the following article is to offer a brief exposition of Darwinian ethics, its main aspects as well as some of the problems and criticisms it has faced since its inception. It would certainly not be possible to speak of one single approach to Darwinian ethics; on the contrary, the theory has been reviewed and reinterpreted a great number of times, and not only by Darwin himself but also by many subsequent thinkers. Among these new reinterpretations, it has come to my attention the one offered by Darwinian metaethics, and to this approach I personally subscribe. Next I will consider diverse positions regarding the issue of Darwinian ethics, and will try to explain why metaethics offer the correct approach to it. (shrink)

BackgroundPhysical activity is known to improve mental health, and is regarded as safe and desirable for uncomplicated pregnancy. In this novel study, we aim to evaluate whether there are associations between maternal physical activity during pregnancy and neonatal brain cortical development.MethodsForty-four mother/newborn dyads were included in this longitudinal study. Healthy pregnant women were recruited and their physical activity throughout pregnancy were documented using accelerometers worn for 3–7 days for each of the 6 time points at 4–10, ∼12, ∼18, ∼24, ∼30, (...) and ∼36 weeks of pregnancy. Average daily total steps and daily total activity count as well as daily minutes spent in sedentary/light/moderate/vigorous activity modes were extracted from the accelerometers for each time point. At ∼2 weeks of postnatal age, their newborns underwent an MRI examination of the brain without sedation, and 3D T1-weighted brain structural images were post-processed by the iBEAT2.0 software utilizing advanced deep learning approaches. Cortical surface maps were reconstructed from the segmented brain images and parcellated to 34 regions in each brain hemisphere, and mean cortical thickness for each region was computed for partial correlation analyses with physical activity measures, with appropriate multiple comparison corrections and potential confounders controlled.ResultsAt 4–10 weeks of pregnancy, mother’s daily total activity count positively correlated (FDR corrected P ≤ 0.05) with newborn’s cortical thickness in the left caudal middle frontal gyrus (rho = 0.48, P = 0.04), right medial orbital frontal gyrus (rho = 0.48, P = 0.04), and right transverse temporal gyrus (rho = 0.48, P = 0.04); mother’s daily time in moderate activity mode positively correlated with newborn’s cortical thickness in the right transverse temporal gyrus (rho = 0.53, P = 0.03). At ∼24 weeks of pregnancy, mother’s daily total activity count positively correlated (FDR corrected P ≤ 0.05) with newborn’s cortical thickness in the left (rho = 0.56, P = 0.02) and right isthmus cingulate gyrus (rho = 0.50, P = 0.05).ConclusionWe identified significant relationships between physical activity in healthy pregnant women during the 1st and 2nd trimester and brain cortical development in newborns. Higher maternal physical activity level is associated with greater neonatal brain cortical thickness, presumably indicating better cortical development. (shrink)

This article explores the differences between Marcel Gauchet and Charles Taylor with respect to their theories of secularization. It starts by looking at their resemblances; it continues by distinguishing a two-fold difference in their approach. The variation within their similar methodologies is examined, and then the consequences of these divergent definitions of religion are investigated. We focus on four themes: the role of the Axial religions, the significance of Incarnation and Reformation, the significance of Christianity as the ‘religion of (...) the departure from religion’, and the possibility of religious ‘conversion’. Taylor's and Gauchet's views on the future of religion diverge as a function of their different interpretations of ‘fulfilment’ and ‘hunger for meaning’. (shrink)

Taylor's political proposal is based on a particular way of explaining human action. The modern ideal of authenticity is used to underline the role of responsibility in personal agency. Aristotelian prudence or phronesis is considered one of the best interpretations of practical reason for completing the ideal of authenticity because it includes the distinction among goods and their influence in everyone's life. The contemporary notion of horizon is an aid for understanding the role of cultural frames and dialogical exchange in (...) the construction of personal identity. (shrink)

Abstract In The Descent of Man (1879), Charles Darwin proposed a speculative evolutionary explanation of extended benevolence—a human sympathetic capacity that extends to all nations, races, and even to all sentient beings. This essay draws on twenty-first century social science to show that Darwin’s explanation is correct in its broad outlines. Extended benevolence is manifested in institutions such as legal human rights and democracy, in behaviors such as social movements for human rights and the protection of nonhuman animals, and (...) in normative attitudes such as emancipative values and a commitment to promote the rights or welfare of animals. These phenomena can be substantially explained by cultural evolutionary forces that trace back to three components of what Darwin called the human “moral sense”: (1) sympathy, (2) our disposition to follow community rules or norms, and (3) our capacity to make normative judgments. Extended benevolence likely emerged with “workarounds,” including political ideologies, that established an inclusive sympathetic concern for sentient life. It likely became as widespread as it is now due to recently arisen socio-economic conditions that have created more opportunities for people to have contact with and take the perspective of a broader cross-section of humanity, as well as other species. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a classical (...) or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

Ada Neschke-Hentschke est décédée en juillet 2013 dans sa maison de La Laupie (Drôme), en pleine santé, alors qu’elle s’apprêtait à sortir pour aller écouter un concert. Elle avait en 2006 pris sa retraite de l’Université de Lausanne, où elle occupait depuis 1991 la chaire de Philosophie antique, après avoir enseigné plusieurs semestres comme professeur invitée par le Centre de recherche philologique à l’Université Charles de Gaulle/ Lille 3 et en 1989-1990 à Louvain-la-Neuve, dans la chaire...

In The Descent of Man, Charles Darwin proposed a speculative evolutionary explanation of extended benevolence—a human sympathetic capacity that extends to all nations, races, and even to all sentient beings. This essay draws on twenty-first century social science to show that Darwin’s explanation is correct in its broad outlines. Extended benevolence is manifested in institutions such as legal human rights and democracy, in behaviors such as social movements for human rights and the protection of nonhuman animals, and in normative (...) attitudes such as emancipative values and a commitment to promote the rights or welfare of animals. These phenomena can be substantially explained by cultural evolutionary forces that trace back to three components of what Darwin called the human “moral sense”: sympathy, our disposition to follow community rules or norms, and our capacity to make normative judgments. Extended benevolence likely emerged with “workarounds,” including political ideologies, that established an inclusive sympathetic concern for sentient life. It likely became as widespread as it is now due to recently arisen socio-economic conditions that have created more opportunities for people to have contact with and take the perspective of a broader cross-section of humanity, as well as other species. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the impact that Lamarckian evolutionary theory had in the scientific community during the period between the advent of Zoological Philosophy and the publication Origin of Species. During these 50 years Lamarck’s model was a well known theory and it was discussed by the scientific community as a hypothesis to explain the changing nature of the fossil record throughout the history of Earth. Lamarck’s transmutation theory established the foundation of an evolutionary model introducing a new way to research (...) in nature. Darwin’s selectionist theory was proposed in 1859 to explain the origin of species within this epistemological process. In this context, Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology and Auguste Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive appear as two major works for the dissemination of Lamarck’s evolutionary ideology after the death of the French naturalist in 1829. (shrink)

Voltaire historien de la philosophie. De l'Antiquité au Grand Siècle Renan Laruc, Porphyre de Tyr, héros voltairien; Marc-André Nadeau, Défense et critique de Montaigne dans les Lettres philosophiques; Véronique Le Ru, Voltaire, lecteur de Descartes; Gerhardt Stenger, Un philosophe peut en cacher un autre: Malebranche et Spinoza dans Tout en Dieu; Lorenzo Bianchi, Voltaire lecteur et critique de Bayle; Miguel Benitez, Locke, Voltaire et la matière pensante; Claire Fauvergue, Voltaire et l'idée d'automate. Voltaire et la philosophie des Lumières Debora Sicco, (...) Voltaire champion de Chastellux contre Montesquieu ; Marie Leca-Tsiomis, Voltaire, philosophe selon Diderot; Sévérine Denieul, Casanova lecteur et critique de Voltaire; Main Sandrier, Lectures athées de Voltaire: la duplicité du philosophe; Rodrigo Brandào, Job, Voltaire et Kant ou deux perspectives sur la souffrance et le mal; Linda Gil, Condorcet éditeur de Voltaire: une lecture dialogique dans les OEuvres complètes. Voltaire philosophe: histoire, morale et politique Jean Goldzink, Déisme et récits voltairiens ; Maria das Graças de Souza, Voltaire philosophe de l'histoire: autour de l'Essai sur les moeurs; Vladimir de Oliva Mota, Les fondements transcendants de la morale chez Voltaire; Maria Laura Lanzillo, La philosophie politique de Voltaire. De sa théorie de l'État à sa conception de la tolérance; Baldine Saint Girons, Voltaire et l'autocritique de la philosophie. La postérité philosophique de Voltaire Alain Sager, Voltaire à la lumière du concept d'ironie chez Kierkegaard; Guillaume Métayer, Voltaire philosophe, via Nietzsche? La préhistoire de l'épistémè; Danilo Bilate, Les "nouvelles Lumières" et l'attitude voltairienne chez Nietzsche; Abderhaman Messaoudi, Voltaire philosophe. Les enjeux d'une réévaluation."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13(3), 2014), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and argue (...) that whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards ‘internal realism’, he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress – the claim that multiple subjects inhabit the same world. We explore Peirce’s pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi’s manipulation-based enactivist realism to a richer, inquiry-based enactivist realism. We explore how this realism’s pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism. (shrink)

Une intuition commune et tenace veut que notre discours moral renvoie à une réalité indépendante de nos jugements, lesquels peuvent ainsi être dits vrais ou faux. Des objections tout aussi communes soulignent que cette conception est mal adaptée au discours de la science, conduit au dogmatisme et néglige la dimension pratique de la moralité. La «querelle du réalisme» moral reprend au niveau philosophique ces intuitions et porte ce débat au plan de l’argumentation rationnelle. Le présent ouvrage fournit quelques pièces importantes (...) de cette querelle qui, même si elle parcourt la philosophie occidentale depuis ses débuts, connaît un renouveau dans le cadre de la tradition dite «analytique», en même temps qu’elle renouvelle celle-ci de l’intérieur tant les considérations ontologiques et métaphysiques qu’elle implique ont. (shrink)