Un consensus avait établi depuis longtemps que les premiers chrétiens se seraient essentiellement réunis dans des maisons privées. Cela a été récemment mis en cause notamment par l’étude d’Edward Adams de 2016 (première édition 2013). Notre contribution vise à soumettre cette nouvelle hypothèse à une analyse critique, mettant notamment en évidence les multiples avantages qu’offraient les espaces d’habitations privés pour les premières communautés chrétiennes. On ne saurait pourtant en déduire que la pratique cultuelle aurait simplement transformé l’espace profane de la (...) maison romaine en espace sacré. Il faut plutôt considérer que ces communautés se voyaient elles-mêmes comme un « espace sacré », transcendant ainsi tous les espaces socio-culturels préexistants. (shrink)

It is often assumed that we are only blameworthy for that over which we have control. In recent years, however, several philosophers have argued that we can be blameworthy for occurrences that appear to be outside our control, such as attitudes, beliefs and omissions. This has prompted the question of why control should be a condition on blameworthiness. This paper aims at defending the control condition by developing a new conception of blameworthiness: To be blameworthy, I argue, is most fundamentally (...) to deserve to feel guilty. Being blamed by someone else is not necessarily harmful to the wrongdoer. The blame might not be expressed, or the wrongdoer might not care. But to blame oneself necessarily involves suffering. This conception of blameworthiness explains why the control condition should obtain: We are morally blameworthy for A only if A was under our control because to be blameworthy is to deserve to feel guilty, to feel guilty is to suffer, and one deserves to suffer for A only if A was under one’s control. (shrink)

In the final parts of Piketty’s Capital and Ideology, he presents his vision for a just and more equal society. This vision marks an alternative to contemporary societies, and differs radically both from the planned Soviet economies and from social democratic welfare states. In his sketch of this vision, Piketty provides a principled account of how such a society would look and how it would modify the current status of private property through co-managed enterprises and the creation of temporary ownership (...) models. He also sets out two principles for when inequalities are just. The first principle permits inequalities that are beneficial to the worst-off, while the second permits inequalities that reflect differences in people’s choices and ambitions. This article identifies a tension between Piketty’s two inequality-permitting principles. It also argues that the procedural limits on how decisions are made within the enterprises of participatory socialism might create inequalities not permitted by the guiding distributive principles of participatory socialism. This tension points to the need for either further changes in firm structure and ownership, an even more progressive taxation scheme, or an egalitarian ethos reflected in citizens’ choices in their everyday lives under participatory socialism. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking centre stage in economic growth and business operations alike. Public discourse about the practical and ethical implications of AI has mainly focussed on the societal level. There is an emerging knowledge base on AI risks to human rights around data security and privacy concerns. A separate strand of work has highlighted the stresses of working in the gig economy. This prevailing focus on human rights and gig impacts has been at the expense of a closer (...) look at how AI may be reshaping traditional workplace relations and, more specifically, workplace health and safety. To address this gap, we outline a conceptual model for developing an AI Work Health and Safety (WHS) Scorecard as a tool to assess and manage the potential risks and hazards to workers resulting from AI use in a workplace. A qualitative, practice-led research study of AI adopters was used to generate and test a novel list of potential AI risks to worker health and safety. Risks were identified after cross-referencing Australian AI Ethics Principles and Principles of Good Work Design with AI ideation, design and implementation stages captured by the AI Canvas, a framework otherwise used for assessing the commercial potential of AI to a business. The unique contribution of this research is the development of a novel matrix itemising currently known or anticipated risks to the WHS and ethical aspects at each AI adoption stage. (shrink)

Dies ist der erste Teil einer zweibändigen Studie zur Genese unseres heutigen, vom Anspruch her den chronologischen Verlauf der gesamten Menschheitsgeschichte strukturierenden „Epochen“-Systems. Der Band skizziert zunächst die geistesgeschichtlichen Prämissen. Von der rudimentären paläolithischen Zeiteinteilung führt er über die ältesten schriftlich dokumentierten Ordnungsversuche in den sumerischen bzw. ägyptischen „Königlisten“, griechische und römische Autoren, Petrarca, Bruni und Vasari bis zu Cellarius, der am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts die Drei-Zeitalter-Distinktion „Antike-Mittelalter-Neuzeit“ zum zentralen chronologischen Gliederungsprinzip der Weltgeschichte erhob. Anschließend stehen die drei klassischen, (...) von Pyrrhon, Polybios bzw. Ptolemaios entwickelten „Epoché“-Konzepte sowie deren Auftauchen und Rezeption im lateinischen Europa im Fokus. Sodann wird die erstaunlich spät, nämlich erst nach Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts einsetzende Transformation der „Epoché“ zur fundamentalen historiographischen Ordnungskategorie thematisiert. Schließlich verfolgen wir anhand zahlreicher Autoren sowie der kontemporären Lexikographie ihren auf Latein wie in den relevanten europäischen „Volkssprachen“ (Englisch, Französisch, Deutsch, Spanisch, Portugiesisch, Italienisch) stattfindenden Divulgationsprozeß. Dabei erweist sich der Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts erneut als Wasserscheide. Der erste Band endet deshalb an dieser Stelle, der zweite wird dann die weitere Entwicklung von 1700 bis zur Gegenwart analysieren. This is the first part of a two-volume study of the genesis of our modern-day system of epochs, which claims to structure the chronology of the entire history of mankind. The volume sets out by sketching the intellectual premises. It leads from the rudimentary Palaeolithic division of time via the oldest attempts at structuring to have been documented in written form, through to the Sumerian and Egyptian “King Lists”, to Greek and Roman authors, to Petrarch, Bruni, and Vasari, and finally to Cellarius, who in the late 17th century introduced the distinction between the three epochs of “Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Modern Era” as the basic chronological principle of organising the history of the world. This is followed by a closer look at the three classical concepts of “Epoché” as defined by Pyrrhon, Polybios and Ptolemaios, respectively, as well as their surfacing and reception in Latin Europe. Not until the second half of the 16th century, which is an astonishingly late point in time, can the transformation of “Epoché” into a fundamental category of historiographic structuring be detected. Finally, by studying numerous writers as well as the contemporary lexicography, we will outline the process of divulgation that took place both in Latin as well as in the relevant European “vernaculars” (English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian). In the process, the late 17th century again proves to be a kind of divide. As a consequence, volume one ends here; a second volume (forthc.) will analyse the further development to the present day. (shrink)

Wir hoffen nicht zu Unrecht, mittels der Erziehung das zukünftige Lebensglück unserer Kinder günstig beeinflussen zu können. Strittig bleibt jedoch, wie umfangreich dieser Einfluss zu denken ist und wie begründet unsere Erziehungshoffnungen diesbezüglich sind. In der Antike wurde das Glück als launisch und nicht vorhersehbar betrachtet. Weitgespannte Hoffnungen galten deshalb als trügerisch; und der Einfluss der Erziehung für eine bessere Zukunft wurde tendenziell eher skeptisch beurteilt. Die Neuzeit rückt ihre Erziehungshoffnungen dagegen in die Nähe der Erfüllbarkeit. Der moderne Mensch entdeckt (...) seine Gestaltungskraft für eine bessere Zukunft; und die professionalisierte Erziehung dient ihm als effektives Mittel, sich eben diese Zukunft verfügbar zu halten. Als Tugend dürfte die Hoffnung des Pädagogen darum wesentlich irgendwo _zwischen_ der Verzweiflung und der Vermessenheit der Erziehung liegen, und also _zwischen_ einem zu radikalen Glücksskeptizismus einerseits und der zu optimistischen Vorstellung einer einflussreichen Glücksmaschinerie andererseits. Eben darum muss ihr konkretes Maß aber in jeder Situation prinzipiell neu verhandelt werden. (shrink)

Some things are reasons for us to perform certain actions. That it will spare you great pain in the future, for example, is a reason for you to go to the dentist now, and that you are already late for work is a reason for you not to read the next article in the morning paper. Why are such considerations reasons for or against certain actions? Constructivism offers an intriguing answer to this question. Its basic idea is often encapsulated in (...) the slogan that reasons are not discovered but made by us. This book elaborates the constructivist idea into a fully fledged account of practical reasons, makes its theoretical commitments explicit, and defends it against some well-known objections. It begins with an examination of the distinctive role that reason judgements play in the process of practical reasoning. This provides the resources for an anti-representationalist conception of the nature of those judgements, according to which they are true, if they are true, not because they accurately represent certain normative facts, but because of their role in sound reasoning. On the resulting view, a consideration owes its status as a reason to the truth of the corresponding reason judgement and thus, ultimately, to the soundness of a certain episode of reasoning. Consequently, our practical reasons exhibit a kind of mind-dependence, but this does not force us to deny their objectivity. (shrink)

In this paper we develop what we can describe as a “dual two-sided” cut-free sequent calculus system for the non-classical logics of truth lp, k3, stt and a non-reflexive logic ts which is, arguably, more elegant than the three-sided sequent calculus developed by Ripley for the same logics. Its elegance stems from how it employs more or less the standard sequent calculus rules for the various connectives and truth, and the fact that it offers a rather neat connection between derivable (...) sequents and validity in comparison to the calculus developed by Ripley. (shrink)

In book 3 of ‘De anima’, Aristotle distinguishes between sensations and feelings. On the level of sensation, we merely register that something is so and so; feeling, by way of contrast, takes that so and so to be agreeable or disagreeable. Emotion has to be distinguished from both sensation and feeling. One cannot have a sensation or feeling without noticing it. But others may be the first to realize that somebody is jealous or envious. Hence emotions like jealousy or envy (...) are not, and are not like, sensations or feelings. Feelings and emotions share an evaluative stance towards the world. But they differ in the way they relate to reason. (shrink)

Opera is a paradoxical genre. For it seems self-defeating to create an illusion of reality by means of the theatrical apparatus if the art form’s central mode of expression, lavish singing in all kinds of circumstances, defies realism anyway. A solution to the paradox is implied by the 18th century turn of European philosophy of art from mimēsis to aisthēsis. In terms of aesthetics, reality is no longer an object of imitation but rather the impact upon and presence for a (...) consciousness – that are actually heightened by singing. Of course we remain aware that to deal with everything in the mode of singing is in a way surreal. But then the simultaneous production and suspension of illusion turns out to be not a fault of art; rather it features as one of its peculiar achievements. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 6 Seiten: 1084-1108.

The chapter presents an application of Scenic-Narrative Microanalysis to a videotaped conflict situation in a Berlin primary school. The analysis is limited to the presented video material, not involving any additional information. SNMA uses the video spectators’ reactions as a tool to identify significant moments in the video and to find a consensual hypothesis on the presumed group dynamics of class and teacher that can be linked to the field of attention research in school pedagogy. Necessary adaptations of the SNMA (...) method to documentary video material are discussed. (shrink)

Despite the reasonable explanatory power of existing models of consumers’ ethical decision making, a large part of the process remains unexplained. This article draws on previous research and proposes an integrated model that includes measures of the theory of planned behavior, personal norms, self-identity, neutralization, past experience, and attitudinal ambivalence. We postulate and test a variety of direct and moderating effects in the context of a large scale survey study in London, UK. Overall, the resulting model represents an empirically robust (...) and holistic attempt to identify the most important determinants of consumers’ support for the fair-trade movement. Implications and avenues for further research are discussed. (shrink)

The role that the desire for self‐worth plays in international relations has become a prominent topic in contemporary political theory. Contemporary accounts are based on the notion of national self‐worth as a function of status; therefore, the desire for national self‐worth is seen as a source of anxiety and conflict over status. By contrast, according to Christian Wolff, there exists a duty to take care that both one's own and other political communities deserve to be esteemed. In his view, this (...) duty is grounded in the duty of self‐perfection because the qualities for which communities deserve to be esteemed are those that promote the self‐perfection of individuals. From this perspective, he argues that duties of esteem toward political communities should not be seen as an outcome of power relations but rather as an outcome of the fulfillment of functions of the law of peoples. Wolff's line of argument draws attention to the possibility that anger over a violation of the desire for honor could be mistaken for an expression of specific culture‐specific sensitivities, while what really may be expressed is a diverging interpretation of the implications of dependence in international relations. (shrink)

While the trade of human organs are illegal and widely condemned, a black market flourishes. Estimates indicate that 10% of kidney transplants from living donors involve illegal payments to the kidney seller. This paper presents a typology for approaches aimed at curtailing the black market in human organs. The policies are evaluated from two perspectives: their ethical permissibility and their expected efficiency in ending and minimizing the trade in human organs. To end or minimize organ trading, we must reduce the (...) organ shortage in order to reduce demand for organs, alleviate poverty to reduce the supply of organs, and disincentivize brokers and medical facilitators through a concerted effort to reduce the profit rate of the international organ trade. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 4 Heft: 1-2 Seiten: 3-22.

This commentary compares the P-FIT model with psychometric and developmental models of intelligence and shows that there are isomorphisms and divergences between them. All three models involve some common dimensions, but the P-FIT model lacks many of the dimensions of the other models. Then we point to research that can lead to the integration of brain models with cognitive-developmental models.

Die Alchimie setzte Menschen statt Gotter zu Herren der Verwandlung ein. Zuletzt sind auch Wissenschaft und Technologie auf sie gestossen. Was geschieht mit Verwandlung in diesem neuen, entzaubernden Zugriff?

Die Krise des Glaubens in der Neuzeit hat den Erfahrungsbegriff zu einem wichtigen Mittel der christlichen Selbstdeutung werden lassen. Mit diesem Begriff sollen der Wesenskern und das Kriterium des Christlichen erfasst werden. Eine Untersuchung der drei wichtigsten Grundmodelle, repräsentiert durch Schleiermachers unmittelbare Erfahrung in Anschauung und Gefühl, Rahners transzendentale Erfahrung und Swinburnes perzeptiven Ansatz, zeigt aber, dass der neue Begriff zu Verengungen in der theoretischen und praktischen Architektur des Christentums führt. Statt das Christentum durch eine isolierte, einheitliche Erfahrungskonzeption zu stützen, (...) erscheint es daher sinnvoller, den Erfahrungsbegriff selbst auf traditionelle Weise am Kriterium der Liebe Maß nehmen zu lassen. So wird es möglich, eine Vielfalt von religiös relevanten erfahrungsartigen Phänomenen zusammenzuführen, und gleichzeitig bleibt deren Strukturierung aus der Mitte der christlichen Religion gewahrt.As consequence of the modern crisis of faith, the concept of religious experience has risen to an important instrument of Christian self-interpretation. Experience can even acquire the role of a criterion of religion. However, an analysis of the three most influential models, Schleiermacher's immediate experience, Rahner's transcendental experience and Swinburne's perceptual approach, shows that the new concept conflicts with traditional theoretical and practical architecture of Christianity. Instead of founding the Christian faith on isolated and uniform concepts of experience, it seems more appropriate to take refuge to the traditional criterion of love. A broader variety of phenomena can be bound together as genuine religious experiences by that rule and remain at the same time dependent to the central source of the Christian religion. (shrink)

There is much disagreement among many commentators of Hannah Arendt's work about whether her contributions to politics and philosophy contain a clandestine version of decisionism or, by contrast, represent an explicit attempt to break away from the elements of voluntarism, arbitrariness, and irrationality, which are considered to be inherent to any theory of the decision. Despite the many disagreements that set apart these two interpretations of Arendt, however, there is a common presupposition that both share. They are in agreement concerning (...) the decision: it is a threat and a vice, intrinsically dangerous and potentially totalitarian in nature, which ought to be expelled from any theory of politics with a normative content. As a result, the terms of the debate pertain solely to whether Arendt was a (crypto-) decisionist and not to the nature and evaluation of the decision as such. This paper argues, contrary to Arendt's critics, that although elements of a theory of the decision can be found scattered throughout many of her writings, she was nonetheless unswerving in her opposition to decisionism. But unlike her defenders, it also argues that had Arendt built on these elements to elaborate a systematic theory of the decision, she would have avoided many of the flaws and inconsistencies that plague her concept of politics. (shrink)