George Molnar came to see that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lay in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. Molnar set about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remained, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Humean assumptions. He succeeded in producing something both highly focused and at the same time wide-ranging. He showed both that the notion of (...) a power was central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems.Molnar's account of powers is as realist as any that has so far appeared. He shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend for their existence on their manifestations. Nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. Molnar thus appropriates the notion of intentionality, from Brentano, and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. He offers a persuasive case for there being some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, he does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, his final position is dualistic.This is contemporary metaphysics of the highest quality. It is a work that was almost complete when its author died. It has been edited for publication by another specialist in the subject, Stephen Mumford, who has also provided an introduction that will allow non-specialists to become acquainted with the issues. David Armstrong, one of the greatest living metaphysicians and personal friend of George Molnar, has provided a Foreword. (shrink)

David Katz was an experimental psychologist who worked in the early years of psychology as an independent science. He performed many experiments on color vision and touch by means of what he called the “phenomenological method.” He claimed to have learned the method by attending Husserl’s lectures on phenomenological philosophy while the latter was teaching at Göttingen. However the method that Katz actually used was “description with an attitude of disciplined naiveté”. Consequently, while such a method was known as “phenomenological” (...) at the time Katz was working, the nomenclature reflects a historically dated meaning of phenomenology and not the sense of phenomenological method that Husserl developed later in his career. Katz’s method was actually qualitative and empirical. It was not phenomenological according to Husserl’s complete, mature philosophy. (shrink)

Historically, when psychology broke away from a philosophical mode of scholarship it strove to become a natural science. This meant that it largely imitated the concepts and practices of the natural sciences which included the use of abstract terms to designate many of its phenomena with the consequence that psychology is often more abstract and generic than it ought to be. Husserl has emphasized the role of the life-world as the ultimate basis of all knowledge and a serious consideration of (...) its role implies that psychology’s manner of labeling its phenomena should be less abstract and closer to the way the phenomena are experienced in the lifeworld. If so, this means that psychology’s primary data should be physiognomies or the expressive characteristics intrinsic to objects and situations. However, the complexities involved in the perception of physiognomies create difficulties for the practice of science. It is suggested that certain Husserlian phenomenological contributions concerning categorial modes of experiencing could be helpful in meeting scientific criteria. (shrink)

Discusses the phenomenological foundations for qualitative research in psychology which operates out of the intersection of phenomenological philosophy, science, and psychology; challenges long-standing assumptions about the practice of grounding the science of psychology in empiricism and asserts that the broader philosophy of phenomenological theory of science permits more adequate psychological development"--Provided by publisher.

This article points out the criteria necessary in order for a qualitative scientific method to qualify itself as phenomenological in a descriptive Husserlian sense. One would have to employ description within the attitude of the phenomenological reduction, and seek the most invariant meanings for a context. The results of this analysis are used to critique an article by Klein and Westcott , that presents a typology of the development of the phenomenological psychological method.

Students from a small, private, religious college and a large, public university completed questionnaires asking their perceptions of academic dishonesty at their institution. The questionnaires used a 5-point Likert scale to determine whether the students felt it was acceptable to cheat for a specific reason such as plagiarizing or copying homework both using and not using technology. Between fall 2005 and fall 2013, 1792 usable questionnaires were collected using similar methodology, questionnaires and respondents to control for possible extraneous variables. An (...) analysis of the data provides indications that student acceptance of many types of academic dishonesty has decreased over the past 9 years. (shrink)

Recently, a book was published, the sole purpose of which was to discourage researchers from using the scientific phenomenological method. The author had previously been critical of nurses who had used the scientific phenomenological method but in the new book he goes after the originators of different methods of scientific phenomenological research and attempts to criticize them severely. In this review I defend only the scientific phenomenological method that is strictly based upon the thought of Edmund Husserl. Given the entirely (...) negative project of only critiquing phenomenologically grounded scientific research, one would expect the author to be sensitive to the cautions historians and philosophers of science speak about when one attempts to criticize concepts and procedures that belong to a different research community. Paley, an empiricist, uses empirical criteria to criticize phenomenological work.Moreover, given the entirely negative project of critiquing phenomenologically grounded scientific research one would expect the author to be knowledgeable about phenomenology and the innovative research practices used by a new research community. However, the author has only a thin, superficial understanding of phenomenology. One gets the impression that he only reads phenomenology in order to critique it. He displays an outsider’s understanding of it which means that his criticisms of it are faulty because he does not know how to think and dwell within the phenomenological framework; he does not understand “discovery-oriented” research and he keeps judging such research according to criteria from the “context of verification” perspective which are the wrong criteria for “discovery-oriented” research; he denigrates and reduces nursing research strategies because he interprets them to be based on pragmatic motivations only. He does not even grant that nurses can have authentic scientific motivations for seeking phenomenologically based methods; he uses unfair rhetorical strategies in the sense that he uses strategies himself that he criticizes when others use them. The review below documents what has been summarized here. (shrink)

Four research strategies currently employed by mainstream psychologists in researching the experiences and behaviors of human subjects are criticized for diminishing the presence of subjectivity. Two perspectives that tend to exaggerate subjectivity are also criticized. A balanced approach to subjectivity is offered that: acknowledges a theoretical perspective that recognizes that there are invisible or nonsensorial characteristics of subjectivity that have to be theoretically appropriated, and that emphasizes the intersubjective dimension as being critical for properly assessing a balanced approach to human (...) subjectivity. A subject-dependent perspective that can efface its own interests is the attitude that is required for the achievement of objectivity. (shrink)

In spite of the constant disdain of conservatives for utopias, they continued the Greek tradition of reflection on the good regime. The good regime for Oakeshott contained the possibility of a decent life and freedom, potentially resulting in conflicts. For him the good regime does not prevent fights, but it provides some solution to settle them. This logic involves the need for enforcement. The authority for many people on the Right seems to be a plausible and convenient solution for the (...) problem of conflicts, emerging from freedom. For Oakeshott, too, authority is a keystone of good order. What is more, authority—just like Sittlichkeit/tradition/practice—is a sui generis reality. It cannot be rationally created, but it can be demolished. (shrink)

La Dictio 17 (= 239 Vogel) di Ennodio è una controuersia in cui il declamatore si scaglia contro un figlio che non ha provveduto al mantenimento del padre anziano tanto da provocarne la morte. L’argomentazione è rafforzata da esempi di animali, aquile e lupi, che, a differenza dell’accusato, si prendono cura dei genitori. Nell’esempio delle aquile è sfruttato un tema ampiamente diffuso nella tradizione esegetica biblica; in particolare, Ennodio dimostra strette consonanze con la versione di questo motivo che si legge (...) in Paolino di Nola (Carm. 24 Hartel). Più oscuro rimane l’esempio dei lupi che in genere sono contraddistinti da ferocia e rapacità, mentre in Ennodio dimostrano una singolare benevolenza verso i genitori. Anche in questo caso si propongono alcuni precedenti biblici che possono aver influenzato la loro caratterizzazione positiva nella controuersia ennodiana. Una lettura della Dictio 17 in chiave soltanto allegorica è da evitare, ma la scelta di questi esempi animali, connotati in modo fortemente cristiano, permette di pensare a un’interpretazione su più livelli, retorico, morale e spirituale. (shrink)

This Chapter aims to present a very preliminary exploration of the role and functioning of some ‘leading ideas’ that represent the most consistent attempts to balance freedom of scientific research with the need to protect participants and the community as a whole. To this end, we searched two databases, a scientific and a legal one, for some keywords (Freedom of research, Precautionary principle, Risk-based approach, Responsible research and innovation), to check the consistency of their presence and evolution over time. Without (...) aiming to in-depth investigate the precise connotations of each term and the context in which they are used from time to time, the core idea is to provide a very first quantitative exploration, which lays the foundations for further future investigation. (shrink)

The author explains that his background was in experimental psychology but that he wanted to study the whole person and not fragmented psychological processes. He also desired a non-reductionistic method for studying humans. Fortunately he came across the work of Edmund Husserl and discovered in the latter’s thought a way of researching humans that met the criteria he was seeking. Eventually he developed a phenomenological method for researching humans in a psychological way based upon the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. (...) This article briefly describes the method. (shrink)

Empiricism had dominated scientific activities for about three centuries but beginning with the 20th Century a new philosophy, phenomenology, began to develop and certain scientists who conducted research with humans began to turn to phenomenology as the basis for their scientific work rather than empiricism. What was known as the Utrecht School in Holland just after World War II, psychologists at Duquesne University during mid-twentieth century, pedagogists in Canada at about the same time and nurses later in the twentieth century (...) all began to base their research on phenomenological philosophical principles rather than on empiricism. Certain philosophers criticized the approach of these scientists and offered their own praxis based directly on phenomenological philosophy. However, one of the members of the Duquesne University’s group strongly criticized the evaluation of his approach by the philosophers and demonstrated the significant errors of their criticism. The psychologist then clarified his scientific phenomenological approach toward psychological phenomena and emphasized the role of the phenomenological epoche’ and reduction for Husserlian scientific phenomenology. (shrink)

Phenomenology is a philosophy and it will always remain one. However, philosophies are also foundations for sciences and thus far in the West some form of empiricism or other has been the primary foundation for all sciences. Phenomenological philosophy has been developing for about a century now and is mature enough to serve as a basis for a science, especially the human sciences. This article articulates how phenomenological philosophy can serve as a foundation for the science of phenomenological psychology and (...) it indicates how its key concepts are better able to clarify and develop a proper understanding of human reality in a rigorous scientific way. (shrink)

While it is heartening to see that more researchers in the field of the social sciences are using some version of the phenomenological method, it is also disappointing to see that very often some of the steps employed do not follow phenomenological logic. In this paper, several dissertations are reviewed in order to point out some of the difficulties that are encountered in attempting to use some version of the phenomenological method. Difficulties encountered centred on the phenomenological reduction, the use (...) of imaginative variation and the feedback to subjects. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 8, Edition 1 May 2008. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:SOME DOGMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF PAUL F. KNITTER'S UNITARIAN THEOCENTRISM PAUL D. MOLNAR St. John's University Jamaica, New York EACTIONS TO Paul Knitter's No Other Nanie? vary from criticizing his "unitarian theocentrism" 1 and his sliding away from "creedal Chrisitology" 2 to unequivocail endorsement of his" less Christocentric approach to a theo1ogy of religions;" 3 this shows the challenge Knitter poses to current dogmatics. This 1arHcile w1ll explore three critical (...) dogmatic issues related to Knitter's non-normative ChristoJogy. First, can the idea that Jesus is one savior among others be defonded froni within the Christian-Catholic 1tradition without yie1ding the truth of Christology? Second, if "Jesus remains universailly normativ ;e " for Christians while " other revelations or rev;ea:lers might also be universaUy normative," then does this not p:vomote some form of docetic Christology and lead to a unitarianism, exduded by the naiture of the God revealed in Christ? Third, on the basis of " l'eligious experience " Knitter olaims to perceive an" evolution from ecolesiocentrism to chrfatocentrism to theocentrism" and finally to "soteriooentrism." 4 Is there 1!1ea1ly such an evolution? And if there is noit, oan those who de- ~end the tradition succeed by arguing from experience and praxis rather than from revelation and faith? 5 Moreover, if 1"Review Symposium: Paul Knitter's No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of OMistian Attitudes toward the World Religions," in Horizons 13 (1986): 116-135. This is the view of Daniel Sheridan, p. llS. 2 This is the view of Denise Carmody. Ibid., p. 122. s This is the view of William Cenkner. Ibid., p. 127. 4 Ibid., pp. 133-34. 5 Denise Carmody, e.g., believes that we should stress praxis more than 449 450 PAUL D. MOLNAR we think the tradition should not be defended, have we not ceased to think about theological truth? Rather, have we not made divinity itself indis:tingiuishab1e from our human experiences and praxis at the outset? And does this not open the door to both polytheism allJd pantheism? By making God hut noit Christ normative, Knitter's " nonnormati ¥e" Christology re-1transiates the truth of Jesus' oonsubstantiality with the Father into the content of a myth, an experienice or a vailue judgment having no re1ality in itseH.6 It then defines :reveiLation and salvation.aocording to a unitarian view of God. While Knitter denies this,7 his reasoning aictuaUy is unitarian: In my proposed model, Jesus remains universally normative, but I am asking whether Christians can recognize that other revelations or revealers might also be universally normative. Could there be a complementary uniqueness among the religious traditions of the world? To try to answer that question, 'intellectual conversion;... is a requisite. But it will have to be an intellectual conversion that walks more than' the way to Nicea and Chalcedon'... only on the basis of the praxis of authentic dialogue-grounded in intellectual, moral, and religious conversion-can we know the unique~ ness of Christ.8 doctrine without relativizing Christ. Thus, for her, Rahner's Christology does not mean " that Christians cannot be open to the Buddha or Lord Krishna," Ibid., p. 126. The problem is that this very thinking already relativizes Christ. 6 Even theologians who do not intend the radical views of John Hick run a similar risk by beginning Christology from below in the manner of Paul Knitter. Cf., e.g., Edward L. Krasevac, O.P., "' Christology From Above' And 'Christology From Below '," The Thomist, 51 (1987) : 299-306, arguing that "Christological faith is an apostolic faith that has its origins in a historical process which began with the public ministry of our Lord...." (p. 300) causes us to ask what makes Christology true? Is it "the actual apostolic process " (306) or is it Jesus as the Lord who is and remains the sole foundation and validation for faith in any age? Does this approach not leave the door open to the kind of evolution which Knitter claims to have discovered in Christianity, which then enables him to move beyond Jesus as the only Lord and Savior? 1 Review Symposium, Horizons, p. 131. s Ibid., p. 133. KNITTER'S UNITARIAN THEOCENTRISM 451 Here the ha:.sis... (shrink)

In adapting Husserl’s philosophical phenomenological method to conduct research in psychology I included Husserl’s two methodical steps, the epochē and the reduction, as part of the scientific procedure. Zahavi objected to my use of those steps. This article is a response to his objections and it is a reaffirmation of the necessity of the epochē and reduction for Husserlian phenomenological psychological research. A description of Husserl’s acknowledged types of psychology and a description of his transcendental phenomenology are also presented along (...) with two outlines of how Husserlian phenomenological research could be conducted. (shrink)

This chapter gives a broad description of the nature of properties and explains the foundations of metaphysics. It provides general statements about properties and how they describe parts of a metaphysical environment. These properties are used to develop the theory of causal powers. The chapter also attempts to address the ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’ of nominalism and realism, including selective realism and its properties. The chapter also introduces conceptual distinctions such as derivative-basic, first-order-higher-order, simple-complex, essential-necessary-accidental, extrinsic-intrinsic, and transferable-non-transferrable. Secondary definitions are (...) also given. (shrink)

In this article the phenomonelogical approach to qualitative research is compared with certain other qualitative approaches following other paradigms. The thesis is that a deepened understanding of phenomenological philosophy can provide the alternative framework that many of these authors have been seeking. The comparison with other approaches is made in terms of theoretical and methodical consistency. Theoretically, the argument is that the situation known as "mixed discourse" exists because practitioners have not sufficiently freed themselves from the criteria and practices of (...) traditional paradigms in which most qualitative researchers have been trained. The shift from the collection of numerical data to linguistic data takes place without appropriate shift in theoretical context. This state of affairs should be overcome in order to strengthen qualitative research. On the other hand, many qualitative researchers carry on practices that seem to be analogous to phenomenological prescriptions which are explicitly usually misunderstood or resisted when stated directly and generically. Thus, greater theoretical clarity and consistency as well as deeper reflection or better utilization of imaginative possibilities still seem to be called for in order to bring better theoretical conceptualization and more consistent practices to qualitative research. (shrink)

Technology-based assessment offers unique possibilities for collecting data about students’ cognitive development and using this data to provide students and teachers with feedback to improve learning. The aim of this study was to show how the psychological dimension of learning can be assessed in everyday educational practice through technology-based assessment in reading, mathematics and science. We analyzed three related aspects of the assessments: cognitive development, gender differences and vertical scaling. The sample for the study was drawn from primary school students (...) in Grades 1–8 (aged 7 to 14) in Hungary. There were 1500 to 2000 students in each grade cohort. Online tests were constructed from 1638 items from the reading, mathematics and science domains in the eDia system. The results confirmed empirically that the disciplinary, application and psychological dimensions of learning can be empirically distinguished. Students’ cognitive development was the most steady (and effective) in mathematics where the greatest development happened in the first years of schooling. Path models suggested that the psychological dimension of learning can be predicted at a moderate level based on students’ level of school knowledge consisting of the disciplinary and application dimensions of learning as latent constructs. The predictive power was almost the same in both of the dimensions. Generally, girls developed faster in the psychological dimension of reading, mathematics and science learning; however, the size of gender differences varied by age and domain. This study (1) provides evidence that the psychological dimension of learning can be made visible even in an educational context and (2) highlights the importance of the explicit development of the psychological dimension of learning during school lessons, and (3) shows that there are gender differences in the developmental level of the psychological dimension of learning in favour of girls, but it varies by grade and domain. (shrink)

The investigation of concept of “true” and “false” has long privileged in contemporary philosophy apophantic truth, that is, the truth of dicta (sentences or propositions). To which entities, though, beyond dicta, the predicate ‘true’ pertains? This paper sheds a light on the less frequently investigated cases where we speak of a truth of things, or res. We say, for instance, that a 17 euros banknote is not a true banknote, or that a true soldier ought to be brave. The paper, (...) thus, distinguishes, beside the concept of de dicto (apophantic) truth, the concept of de re truth and two of its subspecies: eidological truth and idiological truth. (shrink)

From the phenomenological perspective, intentionality is an important concept for understanding consciousness. The idea was introduced into psychology by Brentano in the 19th century who got it from Scholasticism. Husserl modified its meaning and made it a key concept in his philosophy. This paper shows one way in which intentionality can help clarify psychological phenomena.

Convergences between phenomenological psychology (PP) and behaviorism include opposition to dualism between the physical world and mental representations, and between a real visible man and an "inner" man with conscious states of which he alone is aware. Additionally, both views favor cautious use of theories, especially those which utilize hypothetico-deductive methodology, and a careful, descriptive, rather than inferential approach to behavior. Behaviorism and PP also share opposition to physiological reductionism. The 2 viewpoints diverge regarding their understanding of science. PP is (...) more sensitive to the difference between natural and human phenomena and contends that the latter cannot be adequately dealt with by means of the scientific approach applicable with the former. Rather, a broader and more naively descriptive approach must be adopted. A further difference is that PP accepts intentionality in man's viewpoint of the world while behaviorism accounts for man strictly in terms of external relations. Finally, the phenomenologist is more likely to eschew the language of control in describing man and, instead, emphasize a careful description of the meanings man imposes on his world. (shrink)

L’autore presenta lo sviluppo del proprio metodo a partire dal background psicologico sperimentale da cui proviene e dal quale ha preso le distanze, a partire dal desiderio di studiare l’essere umano con un approccio globale, un metodo scientifico non frammentario. L’incontro con la filosofia di Edmund Husserl ha connotato questo suo percorso, in essa egli ha scoperto un approccio che rendesse possibile la ricerca sui fenomeni umani proprio con i criteri che andava inseguendo. Il metodo di ricerca che ha quindi (...) elaborato si basa sul lavoro di Husserl e di Merleau-Ponty. L’articolo descrive brevemente questo metodo.The author explains that his background was in experimental psychology but that he wanted to study the whole person and not fragmented psychological processes. He also desired a non-reductionistic method for studying humans. Fortunately he came across the work of Edmund Husserl and discovered in the latter’s thought a way of researching humans that met the criteria he was seeking. Eventually he developed a phenomenological method for researching humans in a psychological way based upon the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. This article briefly describes the method. (shrink)

U clanku autori se bave militantnim potencijalom koncepta avangarde. Pojavljujuci se u politici i umetnosti u prvoj polovini 19. veka i nastojeci da unisti gotovo celokupnu tradiciju 'burzoaskog' prosvetiteljstva, politicka i umetnicka avangarda nikada nije bila sposobna da se oslobodi svojih korena u vojnickom nacinu razmisljanja. Njena prava sustina je lezala u stvaranju bojnih polja u svakoj oblasti javnog zivota gde je postojala sansa da se unisti gradjansko drustvo - njegova politika, njegova umetnost, njegov nacin razmisljanja, njegova civilizacija. U ime (...) jos necuvene slobode, ona je sirila nasilje i sejala totalitarino seme po sprzenoj zemlji. A na kraju je nisu pobedili njeni mnogobrojni neprijatelji zato jer je postala zrtva vlastite destruktivnosti. (shrink)

knj. 1. Francuska, Rusija (SSSR), Engleska, SAD -- kn. 2. Skaninavija, Nemačka, Austrija.