Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We (...) conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect. (shrink)

The role of judgments of beauty in scientific theory evaluation is the subject of significant debate in contemporary philosophy of science. This book advances that debate by broadening its scope. In Judgments of Beauty in Theory Evaluation, the author argues that judgments of beauty are a justified part of theory evaluation of all sorts: not only scientific theory evaluation, but also philosophical theory evaluation. The author argues for this thesis by providing an account of beauty—inherited from Kant and Mothersill—on which (...) the distinctive nature of judgments of beauty is that they are unprincipled, yet possible. The author then analyzes two important methods of theory evaluation—reflective equilibrium and simplicity—and argues that these methods require making judgments of beauty so understood. Finally, the author argues that these methods of theory evaluation are not anomalies, but that they point to a deeper lesson about the nature of theorizing and the necessity of using judgments of beauty to evaluate systems, like theories. This conclusion has implications for the debate in philosophy of science over judgments of beauty, but also prompts a reckoning in philosophy itself over the use of judgments of beauty in philosophical theory evaluation. (shrink)

Form should follow function but often technical aspects of function dictate form. Form fitting and shape hugging are concepts we associate with a comfy jumper or a well cut suit or dress not with hard wearable technology. How many of the objects we buy are going to transition from worn to unworn? It is not until we have to wear something or are subjected to technology for medical reasons that we realise how uncomfortable some of it is. This paper addresses (...) the issues of form and function in relation to the growing world of unwearables. (shrink)

This article situates Roger Scruton in the tradition of Christian Platonism. It begins by revisiting Scruton’s reluctance to pursue theological speculation as it has been traditionally practised in...

This is an essay at the intersection of metaethics and the history of contemporary analytic philosophy. It explores the relationships between Allan Gibbard’s mature quasi-realist expressivism and (i) three non-naturalistic varieties of what I call “non-inflationary realism” and (ii) moral fictionalism. Moral or normative realism is frequently (if mistakenly) taken to involve certain existence-affirming external assumptions about the metaphysical status of substantive normative thought and discourse. The non-inflationary realists seek to embrace moral or normative objectivity and truth without any distinctly—as (...) they see it, “inflated”—moral or normative ontology. This position, along with a shared emphasis on the primacy of substantive moral or normative thought and discourse, brings them very close to Gibbard, and so to what it is tempting to treat as a strikingly different metaethical account. Focusing on the non-inflationary realists Ronald Dworkin, T.M. Scanlon, and Derek Parfit, I examine similarities among their views, and between each of these views and Gibbard’s. I argue that the non-inflationary realist project should be understood as including the work not only of these figures, characteristically seen as among its paradigmatic representatives, but also, crucially, that of Gibbard. They all agree that our moral or normative claims purport to state normative truths and that such claims are capable of being true or false and that when true they do not depend on the particular standpoint anyone happens to take. Our moral or normative thoughts can be characterized as beliefs. We can have moral knowledge. There are substantive moral and normative facts. These facts are not reducible to non-normative facts. Normative concepts cannot be analyzed in purely naturalistic terms; and normative facts do not depend on any robustly existent truth-makers. Focusing on these shared commitments enables me to home in on the apparent differences that nonetheless remain. They differ in significant respects, for instance, about whether—and, if so, to what extent—we can make any meaningful external (non-substantive) judgments about the moral or normative and about whether there is a role for property-based explanations that minimalism about the normative fails to capture. By investigating these and other differences, I shed light on what is at stake in giving an adequate account of our moral and normative thought and talk. I pursue this aim further by considering why it might seem that quasi-realist expressivism was a form of normative fictionalism or error theory—though it is not. I attempt here to clear up confusions stemming from common assumptions associated with terms like “realism,” “cognitivism,” or “fictionalism” with respect to morality or normativity. I distinguish some differences in the ways in which normative properties can be understood by non-inflationary realists and the roles they can play in explaining normativity. I underscore the implausibility of treating the moral domain as completely autonomous. And I attempt to offer suggestions regarding some conceptual options that remain to be further explored. I maintain that Gibbard makes explicit otherwise unacknowledged implications of Scanlon’s or Dworkin’s accounts, implications regarding deep differences between normative or moral and other domains, implications which might help explain the uneasiness that prompts Scanlon and Dworkin to resist Gibbard’s account and that pushes Parfit toward what seems to be a sort of intermediate position between non-inflationary and more ontologically committed realism. Non-inflationary realism forces us to rethink metaethics in interesting and promising ways. (shrink)

One of the interesting and occasionally controversial aspects of Dennett’s career is his direct involvement in the scientific process. This article describes some of Dennett’s participation on one particular project conducted at MIT, the building of the humanoid robot named Cog. One of the intentions of this project, not to date fully realized, was to test Dennett’s multiple drafts theory of consciousness. I describe Dennett’s involvement and impact on Cog from the perspective of a graduate student. I also describe the (...) problem of coordinating distributed intelligent systems, drawing examples from robot intelligence, human intelligence, and the Cog project itself. (shrink)

The question of whether AI systems such as robots can or should be afforded moral agency or patiency is not one amenable either to discovery or simple reasoning, because we as societies constantly reconstruct our artefacts, including our ethical systems. Consequently, the place of AI systems in society is a matter of normative, not descriptive ethics. Here I start from a functionalist assumption, that ethics is the set of behaviour that maintains a society. This assumption allows me to exploit the (...) theoretical biology of sociality and autonomy to explain our moral intuitions. From this grounding I extend to consider possible ethics for maintaining either human- or of artefact-centred societies. I conclude that while constructing AI systems as either moral agents or patients is possible, neither is desirable. In particular, I argue that we are unlikely to construct a coherent ethics in which it it is ethical to afford AI moral subjectivity. We are therefore obliged not to build AI we are obliged to. (shrink)

Just what forms do (or should) our cognitive attitudes towards scientific theories take? The nature of cognitive commitment becomes particularly puzzling when scientists' commitments are) inconsistent. And inconsistencies have often infected our best efforts in science and mathematics. Since there are no models of inconsistent sets of sentences, straightforward semantic accounts fail. And syntactic accounts based on classical logic also collapse, since the closure of any inconsistent set under classical logic includes every sentence. In this essay I present some evidence (...) that there really was a substantial cognitive commitment to OQT, and that some of its characteristics have a simple and straightforward explanation in terms of a model based on a form of paraconsistent logic. (shrink)

That perception and action share abstract representations is a key insight into the organization of intelligence. However, organizing behavior requires additional representations and processes which are not “early” sensing or “late” motion: structures for sequencing actions and arbitrating between behavior subsystems. These systems are described as a supplement to the Theory of Event Coding (TEC).

Scientific inquiry is typically focused on particular questions about particular objects and properties. This leads to a multiplicity of models which, even when they draw on a single, consistent body of concepts and principles, often employ different methods and assumptions to model different systems. Pluralists have remarked on how scientists draw on different assumptions to model different systems, different aspects of systems and systems under different conditions and defended the value of distinct, incompatible models within science at any given time. (...) Paraconsistentists have proposed logical strategies to avoid trivialization when inconsistencies arise by a variety of means. Here we examine how chunk and permeate, a simple approach to paraconsistent reasoning which avoids heterodox logic by confining commitments to separate contexts in which reasoning with them is taken to be reliable while allowing ‘permeation’ of some conclusions into other contexts, can help to systematize pluralistic reasoning across the boundaries of plural contexts, using regional climate models as an example. The result is a kind of unity for science—but a unity achieved by the constrained exchange of specified information between different contexts, rather than the closure of all commitments under some paraconsistent consequence relation. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is Paraconsistency? Motives for Paraconsistency The Sources of Trivialization A Natural Taxonomy for Paraconsistent Logics Paraconsistent Logics Current Issues.

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 61 Heft: 1 Seiten: 84-106.

Acknowledgements -- Some notes on terminology -- Introduction -- Early feminist thought -- Liberalism and beyond : mainstream feminism in the nineteenth century -- The contribution of Marx and Engels -- The vote and after : mainstream feminism in the United States and Britain from the late nineteenth century to the Second World War -- Left-wing feminism in Britain and the United States -- Marxist feminism in Germany and Russia -- Feminism after the second World War -- Liberalism and beyond (...) : feminism and equal rights from the 1960s -- Radical feminism and the concept of patriarchy -- Radical feminism : patriarchy in private and public life -- Marxist and socialist feminism from the 1960s -- Theoretical developments : postmodern feminisms and beyond -- Theoretical developments : postcolonial feminism, black feminism and intersectionality -- Western feminist theory in the twenty first century : developments in liberal and socialist thought -- Western feminism in the twenty first century: continuities, challenges and change -- Conclusions: feminist political theory today -- Bibliography -- Index. (shrink)

Looks at how the case for evolution developed over time, covering Darwin and the Beagle, heredity and natural selection, DNA, and man's place in the natural world.

The infamous “Sydney Tar Ponds” are well known as one of the largest toxic waste sites of Canada, due to almost 100 years of steelmaking in Sydney, a once beautiful and peaceful city located on the east side of Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia. This article begins with a contextual overview of the Tar Ponds issue including a brief introduction and history and summaries of the effects on the earth, the people, and the biotic community (animals and vegetation). Then the (...) authors talk about the STS analysis approach, namely, a discussion of six systems to indicate what has been brought to the earth and mankind by technology and modern industry. The remaining part of the article describes the difficulties confronting China, some of which are similar to the ones Canada faces as a result of the Tar Ponds contamination, and summarizes some of the experiences at Tar Ponds and the lessons China can learn from Tar Ponds. (shrink)

Creating Public Value in Practice: Advancing the Common Good in a Multi-Sector, Shared-Power, No-One-Wholly-in-Charge World brings together a stellar cast of thinkers to explore issues of public and cross-sector decision-making within a framework of democratic civic engagement. It offers an integrative approach to understanding and applying the concepts of creating public value, public values, and the public sphere. It presents a framework and language for opening a constructive conversation on what governments, businesses, nonprofits, and citizens can achieve in a democracy (...) that honors a broad range of public values. Public officials, scholars, and citizens alike are engaged in an intense debate about the proper purpose, role, and size of government. In the midst of this debate is a growing concern that important public values are ignored by government reform efforts. This book explores the different definitions of public value and approaches to public value creation, discernment, measurement, and assessment. The text helps clarify the issues and demonstrates how the meaning of public value is intimately related to how it is theorized, operationalized, and measured. The book examines the many alternatives for recognizing, measuring, and assessing public value and addresses the pros and cons of each approach. The result is a contribution to the ongoing dialogue about the virtues and limitations of a focus on the public sphere, public values, and how to create public value in the context of developing and implementing policies, programs, projects, and plans that ideally boost confidence in public institutions. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a paraconsistent reasoning strategy, Chunk and Permeate. In this, information is broken up into chunks, and a limited amount of information is allowed to flow between chunks. We start by giving an abstract characterisation of the strategy. It is then applied to model the reasoning employed in the original infinitesimal calculus. The paper next establishes some results concerning the legitimacy of reasoning of this kind - specifically concerning the preservation of the consistency of each chunk (...) and concludes with some other possible applications and technical questions. (shrink)

In his most recent work, the contemporary philosopher Roger Scruton has turned his attention to religion. Although a religious sensibility ties together his astonishingly prodigious and dynamic output as a philosopher, poet and composer, his recent exploration of religious and theological themes from a philosophical point of view has excited a fresh response from scholars. This collection of writings addresses Scruton's challenging and subtle philosophy of religion for the first time. The volume includes contributions from those who specialize in the (...) philosophy of religion, the history of thought and culture, aesthetics, and church history. The collection is introduced by Mark Dooley, author of two books on Scruton, and includes a response to the writings from Scruton himself in which he develops his idea of the sacred and the erotic and defends the integrity of his work as an attempt to give a sense of the Lebenswelt (or 'lifeworld'): how humans experience the world. He argues that religion emerges from that experience and transforms us from beings bound by causal necessity into persons who acknowledge freedom, obligation and right. A unique and fascinating collection of writings that sheds light on this hitherto unexplored aspect of Roger Scruton's philosophy. (shrink)

The term embodiment identifies a theory that meaning and semantics cannot be captured by abstract, logical systems, but are dependent on an agent’s experience derived from being situated in an environment. This theory has recently received a great deal of support in the cognitive science literature and is having significant impact in artificial intelligence. Memetics refers to the theory that knowledge and ideas can evolve more or less independently of their human-agent substrates. While humans provide the medium for this evolution, (...) memetics holds that ideas can be developed without human comprehension or deliberate interference. Both theories have profound implications for the study of language—its potential use by machines, its acquisition by children and of particular relevance to this special issue, its evolution. This article links the theory of memetics to the established literature on semantic space, then examines the extent to which these memetic mechanisms might account for language independently of embodiment. It then seeks to explain the evolution of language through uniquely human cognitive capacities which facilitate memetic evolution. (shrink)