The paper is primarily devoted to Nietzsche’s account of cruelty, which represents an indispensable key to understanding Nietzsche’s genealogical project in many of its essential aspects. This study is complemented by parallels with two other outstanding intellectual figures of the late nineteenth century: Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch. Dostoevsky wrote that “civilisation has made mankind if not more bloodthirsty, at least more vilely, more loathsomely bloodthirsty.” Nietzsche went a step further in this assessment: not only does civilisation not (...) make us immune to cruelty, but it must itself be seen to emerge directly from cruelty at every significant step it has taken. What brings Nietzsche close to Masoch, on the other hand, is the fact that these historical or even prehistorical developments that have shaped humankind and civilisation are not only related to cruelty, but must be observed as various forms of the internalisation (“spiritualisation”, “deification”) of cruelty. The core of the study is devoted to analyses of different forms and aspects of Nietzsche’s concept of the internalisation of cruelty (in relation to power-relations, subject-object relations, mutations of pleasure, and perversions). (shrink)

This essay is part of a project that has set out, as one of its primary objectives, to observe perversions as important indicators of broader changes and developments within society. Both of the momenta I follow in this study meet all the requirements for such an inquiry. The first development to be examined is what I will call the decline of pornography. At a time when all of society is increasingly becoming pornographic in so many ways, it sounds strange to (...) talk about the decline of pornography. And yet pornography as a genre is, I believe, losing ground to something else – to a distinctly different system of unfolding sexuality and its economic exploitation. The second development to be discussed is the rise of masochism. In this context, I will analyse certain reports that show that, especially since the outbreak of the pandemic COVID-19, the number of people practicing masochistic “heavy play” has increased significantly. It appears that in a period when one would expect people to be dreaming of the lifting of restrictions, freedom, or whatever, many have chosen to undertake the cruel path of “servitude”. Eventually, I will show that these two developments are essentially connected, probably even consubstantial. (shrink)

The article is primarily a study of Nietzsche’s unpublished fragments from the period spring-autumn 1881, in which Nietzsche first developed his thought of the “eternal recurrence of the same.” In the article, I attempt to accomplish two goals: the first goal is to explain Nietzsche’s theses on the eternal recurrence, which at that time were still remarkably clear and coherent. And the second goal is to try to find in these same theses an explanation for their future silence. In other (...) words, the article examines the relationship between Nietzsche’s theses that he developed in 1881 and his book _Thus spoke Zarathustra_, which, in Nietzsche’s own words, relies on these theses as their “grounding thought,” but nevertheless never fully reveals them. Both lines of inquiry lead to the conclusion that the core of Nietzsche’s introduction of the idea of eternal recurrence is his concept of _Einverleibung_ or embodiment. Indeed, the analysis shows that Nietzsche’s main concern with the thought of eternal recurrence was not to set forth its clear articulation within consciousness, but rather to construct it in such a way that it could become an unconscious instinct capable of gradually displacing the “embodied mistakes” that dominate our thinking from within itself. (shrink)

The article is foremost dedicated to Nietzsche’s account of cruelty, which represents one of the central focuses of Nietzsche’s genealogical polemic, if not its very foundation. This close reading is complemented by drawing parallels with two other outstanding intellectual figures of the nineteenth century, in whom cruelty plays no less a role. These two authors – one could say that together with Nietzsche they form a kind of cruel trio from the European East – are the writers Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky (...) and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, the latter of whom is also the inventor of a particular genre of erotic discourse characterised by ‘tyranny, cruelty and, above all, the infidelity of a beautiful woman,’ which inspired Krafft-Ebing to name a type of perversion after Masoch. The paper shows that the affinity between the authors lies not only in the fact that cruelty is one of the key themes in all three of them, but that the connection between them – and thus perhaps the beginning of an era characterised, as Alain Badiou said, by an intellectual fascination with cruelty – needs to be sought in the idea of the internalisation of cruelty, which Nietzsche in particular considered to be one of the fundamental driving forces of civilisation. (shrink)

The article draws attention to a certain multi-layered parallel between Nietzsche and Badiou’s theory of the event, which the author argues Badiou evaded by a kind of strategic relocation. The article does not focus so much on (and certainly not against) Badiou’s philosophy, but attempts to assess the possible implications of this relocation for Badiou’s interpretation of Nietzsche. In the first part of the article, the key concepts of Badiou’s account of Nietzsche are introduced, such as “archi-politics”, “antiphilosophy”, and the (...) “event Nietzsche”. Later, it is shown that, despite some fundamental differences, there is a strong resemblance between some key concepts of Badiou’s theory of the event, especially those related to the notion of “intervention”, and some concepts found in Nietzsche. Finally, the paper focuses on the problem of the “death of God”, which is somehow absent in Badiou’s interpretation, even though the term itself resonates strongly in various aspects of Badiou’s philosophy. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the questions of whether, to what extent, and in what ways the implications of the rapid development of artificial intelligence are changing the nature of one of the fundamental philosophical questions, “What does it (even) mean to understand?” It draws on two sources in particular: Hinton’s explanation of the technological development and functioning of deep neural networks and Nietzsche’s deconstruction of human understanding based on his key concept of “embodied errors.” In doing so, it reveals a (...) series of unexpected parallels, relating in particular to the notion of micro- evolution and the function of error in the processes underlying “thinking” and “intelligence.” The paper therefore draws certain parallels and demarcation lines between human understanding and the “learning” procedures of digital neural networks. At the same time, it addresses the question of what it means for the interpretation of human understanding that, for the first time in history, understanding is faced with a real, existing antithesis, represented by intelligent systems which, although they do not understand, are capable of performing the tasks of understanding, and capable of replacing understanding. (shrink)

The article examines the relation between Nietzsche’s and Hegel’s concepts of nothing and negativity. Both concepts have to be understood as two radical answers to the metaphysical constitution of reality. Namely, if metaphysics constitutes reality through the exclusion of nothing from being, then for Hegel it is actually impossible to recognize reality if it hasn’t been understood in its equality with negation, or in other words, if being hasn’t been beheld in its sameness with nothing. On the other hand, the (...) essence of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics lies exactly in the accusation that metaphysics remains unable not to think of being as nothing. There are several reasons for this incapacity, the crucial aspect can however only be grasped through an analysis of Nietzsche’s "double affirmation" as an answer to Hegel’s "negation of negation". (shrink)

The article takes as its venture-point the thesis that – whilst speaking of Nietzsche’s critique of objectivity – it is impossible to avoid the following fundamental problem: according to Nietzsche, objectivity and criticism are two facets of the same tendency that the “philosophy of the future” will have to overcome in the higher form of the philosophical “creation of new values”. From this perspective, it also becomes possible to explain Nietzsche’s decision to focus his critique in an attempt to intervene (...) against what he calls Rangverschiebung, the “shift in rank ordering,” of the relationship between philosophy and science. Namely, by doing so, he immediately positioned the philosophical critique on a terrain that does not allow for the critique to follow its spontaneous tendency towards the ideal of objectivity. The first part of the article addresses the epistemological aspect of Nietzsche’s critique of objectivity, i.e. it explains why Nietzsche rejected all philosophical criteria of the foundation of objective understanding. The second part, by contrast, explains how it is possible, according to Nietzsche, to intervene against the ongoing process of the “shift in rank ordering” within the relationship between philosophy and science, which ultimately leads to a harmful complete monopolisation of truth by the ideal of scientific objectivity. (shrink)

Prispevek se osredotoča na vprašanja, ali, do katere mere, in na kakšne načine, implikacije pospešenega razvoja umetne inteligence spreminjajo naravo enega temeljnih filozofskih vprašanj, ≫kaj (sploh) pomeni razumeti?≪ Opira se zlasti na dva vira: na Hintonovo pojasnjevanje tehnološkega razvoja in delovanja globokih nevronskih mrež in Nietzschejevo dekonstrukcijo človeškega razumevanja, ki temelji na njegovem ključnem konceptu ≫utelešenih zmot≪. Pri tem, odkrije serijo nenadejanih vzporednic, ki se nanašajo zlasti na pojem mikroevolucije in na funkcijo zmote v delovanju procesov, ki tvorijo podlago ≫mišljenja≪ (...) in ≫inteligence≪. Prispevek torej potegne določene paralele in demarkacijske linije med človeškim razumevanjem in postopki ≫učenja≪ digitalnih nevronskih mrež. Obenem pa se ukvarja z vprašanjem, kaj za razlago človeškega razumevanja predstavlja dejstvo, da je slednje, prvič v zgodovini, soočeno z realno obstoječo antitezo, ki jo predstavljajo inteligentni sistemi, ki so, čeravno ne razumejo, sposobni opravljati naloge razumevanja in sposobni razumevanje nadomestiti. (shrink)