What belongs to quantum theory is no more than what is needed for its derivation. Keeping to this maxim, we record a paradigmatic shift in the foundations of quantum mechanics, where the focus has recently moved from interpreting to reconstructing quantum theory. Several historic and contemporary reconstructions are analyzed, including the work of Hardy, Rovelli, and Clifton, Bub and Halvorson. We conclude by discussing the importance of a novel concept of intentionally incomplete reconstruction.

A paradigmatic shift in the foundations of quantum mechanics is recorded, from interpreting to reconstructing quantum theory. Examples of reconstruction are analyzed, and conceptual foundations of the information-theoretic reconstruction developed. A concept of intentionally incomplete reconstruction is introduced to mark the novel content of research in the foundation of quantum theory. ‡Many thanks to Lucien Hardy, Jeff Bub and Bill Demopoulos for their comments. This research was supported through the ANR grant ANR-06-BLAN-0348-01. Part of this research was held at the (...) Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics. Research at Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics is supported in part by the Government of Canada through NSERC and by the Province of Ontario through MRI. †To contact the author, please write to: CEA-Saclay, 91191 Gif-sur-Yvette, France; e-mail: alexei[email protected]. (shrink)

The journal Biosemiotics was envisioned by its founding editor, Marcello Barbieri, as a major periodical for interdisciplinary papers that integrate biology and semiotics. Since 2008 the journal has published 21 issues, including special issues on crucial problems such as the semiotics of perception, origins of mind, code biology, biohermeneutics, biosemiotic analysis of information and chance. The impact factor of the journal does not fully describe the significance of this journal, because the discipline of biosemiotics is young and remains in its (...) early phase of growth. As the new editorial team of Biosemiotics, we would like to express our gratitude to Dr. Barbieri for his excellent job as an editor, and ensure the readers that we are equally committed to maintain high standards and the scientific rigor of published papers. At the end of 2014 we reorganized the editorial board of the journal based on the credential and former activity of prospective members. The cu .. (shrink)

This essay offers a comparative analysis of the notion of trust in Hegel and Confucius. It shows that Hegel’s two senses of trust depend upon his theory of recognition and recognitive struggle. The competitive thrust of Hegel’s account of trust, it argues, introduces a series of problems that cannot be adequately resolved within his theory, since it presupposes the kinds of trusting relations—self-, intersubjective- and world-trust—that it purports to explain. This essay then turns to the Confucian notions of xin 心 (...) and li 理 to address the problems in the Hegelian account. It concludes by outlining the Confucian account’s salience for critical social theory. (shrink)

We argue that the Rawlsian social contract argument advanced for stakeholder theory by R. Edward Freeman, writing alone and with William M. Evan, fails in three main ways. First, it is true to Rawls in neither form, nor purpose, nor the level of knowledge (or ignorance) required to motivate the veil of ignorance. Second, it fails to tailor the veil of ignorance to the fairness conditions that are required to solve the moral problem that Freeman and Evan set out to (...) solve (whereas Rawls’s own use of the device surely tailors the veil of ignorance to the problem of designing a just social order). Third, the argument, considered apart from its claimed Rawlsian pedigree, fails to bolster the stakeholder theory because it fails to demonstrate the rationality of adopting the institutional rules that Freeman and Evan favor. (shrink)

In contrast to the traditional relational semiotics, biosemiotics decisively deviates towards dynamical aspects of signs at the evolutionary and developmental time scales. The analysis of sign dynamics requires constructivism to explain how new components such as subagents, sensors, effectors, and interpretation networks are produced by developing and evolving organisms. Semiotic networks that include signs, tools, and subagents are multilevel, and this feature supports the plasticity, robustness, and evolvability of organisms. The origin of life is described here as the emergence of (...) simple self-constructing semiotic networks that progressively increased the diversity of their components and relations. Primitive organisms have no capacity to classify and track objects; thus, we need to admit the existence of proto-signs that directly regulate activities of agents without being associated with objects. However, object recognition and handling became possible in eukaryotic species with the development of extensive rewritable epigenetic memory as well as sensorial and effector capacities. Semiotic networks are based on sequential and recursive construction, where each step produces components that are needed for the following steps of construction. Construction is not limited to repair and reproduction of what already exists or is unambiguously encoded, it also includes production of new components and behaviors via learning and evolution. A special case is the emergence of new levels of organization known as metasystem transition. Multilevel semiotic networks reshape the phenotype of organisms by combining a mosaic of features developed via learning and evolution of cooperating and/or conflicting subagents. (shrink)

We have revised the problem of the motion of a heavy symmetric top. When formulating equations of the Lagrange top with the diagonal inertia tensor, the potential energy has more complicated form as compared with that assumed in the literature on dynamics of a rotating body. This implies the corresponding improvements in equations of motion. Using the Liouville’s theorem, we solve the improved equations in quadratures and present the explicit expressions for the resulting elliptic integrals.

Critics attack normative ethical stakeholder theory for failing to recognize the special moral status of shareholders that justifiesthe fiduciary duties owed to them at law by managers. Stakeholder theorists reply that there is nothing morally significant about shareholders that can underwrite those fiduciary duties. I advance an argument that seeks to demonstrate both the special moral status of shareholders in a firm and the concomitant moral inadequacy of stakeholder theory. I argue that (i) if some relations morally requirefiduciary duties, and (...) (ii) the shareholder-manager relation possesses the features that make fiduciary duties morally necessary to thoserelations, then (iii) stakeholder theory is morally lacking. (shrink)

We give reasons for the importance of old narratives, including myths, in ethical thinking about science and technology. On the example of a legend about creating artificial men we explore the side effects of having too much success and the problem of intermediate social status of bioengineered artefacts.

Fine-tuning arguments are a frequent find in the literature on quantum field theory. They are based on naturalness—an aesthetic criterion that was given a precise definition in the debates on the Higgs mechanism. We follow the history of such definitions and of their application at the scale of electroweak symmetry breaking. They give rise to a special interpretation of probability, which we call Gedankenfrequency. Finally, we show that the argument from naturalness has been extended to comparing different models of the (...) physics beyond the Standard Model and that naturalness in this case can at best be understood a socio-historic heuristic. (shrink)

Focusing on Walter Benjamin's earliest pieces dedicated to school reform and the student movement, this article traces the basic critical approaches informing his mature thought back to his struggle to critically implement and transform the theory of concept formation and value presentation developed by his Freiburg teacher, Heinrich Rickert. It begins with an account of Rickert's work, specifically of the concept of Darstellung (presentation) and its central role in Rickert's postmetaphysical theory of historical research (which he characterizes as exclusively concerned (...) with the Kantian quid juris). It shows that Rickert develops a speculative but practical theory of value recognition, which nevertheless leaves the status of value itself undetermined. Contra Rickert, Benjamin returns to the ignored quid facti, or origin of value, and shows that a metacritical, postmetaphysical approach such as Rickert's ultimately limits possible experience rather than grounding it. This basic insight, it is argued, is the cornerstone of Benjamin's concept of critique. (shrink)

In this paper we study generic complexity of undecidable problems. It turns out that some classical undecidable problems are, in fact, strongly undecidable, i.e., they are undecidable on every strongly generic subset of inputs. For instance, the classical Halting Problem is strongly undecidable. Moreover, we prove and analog of the Rice theorem for strongly undecidable problems, which provides plenty of examples of strongly undecidable problems. Then we show that there are natural super-undecidable problems. i.e., problem which are undecidable on every (...) generic (not only strongly generic) subset of inputs. In particular, there are finitely presented semigroups with super-undecidable word problem. To construct strongly- and super-undecidable problems we introducea method of generic amplification (an analog of the amplification in complexity theory). Finally, we construct absolutely undecidable problems, which stay undecidable on every non-negligible set of inputs. Their construction rests on generic immune sets. (shrink)

We discuss nonmonotonic reasoning in terms of consequence relations and corresponding operators. Based on the matrix consequence that gives the monotonic case, we define a restricted matrix consequence that illustrates the nonmonotonic case. The latter is a generalization of the relation of logical friendliness introduced by D. Makinson. We prove that any restricted single matrix consequence, although it may be nonmonotonic, is always weakly monotonic and, in the case of a finite matrix, the restricted matrix consequence is very strongly finitary. (...) Further, by modifying the definition of logical friendliness relation formulated specifically in a proof-theoretic manner, we show a possibility of obtaining other reflexive nonmonotonic consequence relations, for which a limited result towards finitariness is proved. This leads to numerous questions about nonmonotonic consequence relations in the segment between the monotonic consequence relation based on intuitionistic propositional logic and logical friendliness. (shrink)

Pragmatics, i.e., a system of values (or goals) in agent behavior, marks the boundary between physics and semiotics. Agents are defined as systems that are able to control their behavior in order to increase their values. The freedom of actions in agents is based on the distinction between macrocharacters that describe the state or stage, and micro-characters that are interpreted as memory. Signs are arbitrarily established relations between micro- and macro-characters that are anticipated to be useful for agents. Three kinds (...) of elementary signs (action, perception, and association) have been developed in agents via evolution and learning to support useful and flexible behaviors. The behavior of agents can be explained, predicted, and modified using the optimality principle, according to which agents select those actions that are expected to increase their value. However, agents may select actions based on their own model of the world, which have to be reconstructed in order to predict their behavior. Pragmatics in agents can be induced, learned from individual experience or natural selection, or adopted. (shrink)

In this paper, we concentrate on finite quasivarieties (i.e. classes of finite algebras defined by quasi-identities). We present a motivation for studying finite quasivarieties. We introduce a new type of conditions that is well suited for defining finite quasivarieties and compare these new conditions with quasi-identities.

The main topic of this paper is the investigation of generalized amalgamation properties for simple theories. That is, we are trying to answer the question of when a simple theory has the property of n-dimensional amalgamation, where two-dimensional amalgamation is the Independence Theorem for simple theories. We develop the notions of strong n-simplicity and n-simplicity for 1≤n≤ω, where both “1-simple” and “strongly 1-simple” are the same as “simple”. For strong n-simplicity, we present examples of simple unstable theories in each subclass (...) and prove a characteristic property of strong n-simplicity in terms of strong n-dividing, a strengthening of the dependence relation called dividing in simple theories. We prove a strong three-dimensional amalgamation property for strongly 2-simple theories, and, under an additional assumption, a strong -dimensional amalgamation property for strongly n-simple theories. In the last section of the paper we comment on why strong n-simplicity is called strong. (shrink)

Two trends have emerged in recent work from the Frankfurt School: the first involves a reconsideration of immanent critique’s basic commitments and viability for critical social theory, while the second involves an effort to introduce temporal considerations for social interaction into critical theorizing to help make sense of the phenomenon of social acceleration. This article contributes to these ongoing discussions by investigating whether social systems theory, in which temporal relations play a primary role, can be integrated with immanent critique. If (...) such a synthesis were successful, it would promise to unify two distinct forms of social theorizing that have often been taken to be orthogonal or incommensurate since the debate between Luhmann and Habermas in the 1970s. The investigation proceeds in three parts: first, the article delineates immanent critique’s conditions of success; second, using these conditions, it identifies potential points of contact between social systems theorizing and immanent critical forms of analysis, while exemplifying these commonalities via a case study; finally, the article argues that, although immanent critique is not a strict method of analysis or investigation, its success conditions preclude social systems theory on the grounds that the latter approach cannot anchor itself within the context of analysis in the way ‘immanent critique’ requires. (shrink)

Quantum technologies can be presented to the public with or without introducing a strange trait of quantum theory responsible for their non-classical efficiency. Traditionally the message was centered on the superposition principle, while entanglement and properties such as contextuality have been gaining ground recently. A less theoretical approach is focused on simple protocols that enable technological applications. It results in a pragmatic narrative built with the help of the resource paradigm and principle-based reconstructions. I discuss the advantages and weaknesses of (...) these methods. To illustrate the importance of new metaphors beyond the Schrödinger cat, I briefly describe a non-mathematical narrative about entanglement that conveys an idea of some of its unusual properties. If quantum technologists are to succeed in building trust in their work, they ought to provoke an aesthetic perception in the public commensurable with the mathematical beauty of quantum theory experienced by the physicist. The power of the narrative method lies in its capacity to do so. (shrink)

Life has semiotic nature; and as life forms differ in their complexity, functionality, and adaptability, we assume that forms of semiosis also vary accordingly. Here we propose a criterion to distinguish between the primitive kind of semiosis, which we call “protosemiosis” from the advanced kind of semiosis, or “eusemiosis”. In protosemiosis, agents associate signs directly with actions without considering objects, whereas in eusemiosis, agents associate signs with objects and only then possibly with actions. Protosemiosis started from the origin of life, (...) and eusemiosis started when evolving agents acquired the ability to track and classify objects. Eusemiosis is qualitatively different from protosemiosis because it can not be reduced to a small number of specific signaling pathways. Proto-signs can be classified into proto-icons that signal via single specific interaction, proto-indexes that combine several functions, and proto-symbols that are processed by a universal subagent equipped with a set of heritable adapters. Prefix “proto” is used here to characterize signs at the protosemiotic level. Although objects are not recognized by protosemiotic agents, they can be reliably reconstructed by human observers. In summary, protosemiosis is a primitive kind of semiosis that supports “know-how” without “know-what”. Without studying protosemiosis, the biosemiotics theory would be incomplete. (shrink)

Applied ethicists say little about résumé embellishment. Presumably, this is so because résumé embellishment seems obviously wrong; an instance of ordinary lying, familiar moral prohibitions against which cover the case completely. Analysis of résumé embellishment merely as ordinary lying overlooks its collective action aspects. Taking account of those aspects and their implications, I argue on consequentialist grounds that, given some plausible background conditions, a limited form of résumé embellishment is morally permissible. This outcome is a particular instantiation of a more (...) general principle about how one ought to act when participating in a morally valuable co-ordinative practice. I conclude by identifying implications for how employers ought to use résumés in hiring decisions. (shrink)

We deal with monotone structural deductive systems in an unspecified propositional language \ . These systems fall into several overlapping classes, forming a hierarchy. Along with well-known classes of deductive systems such as those of implicative, Fregean and equivalential systems, we consider new classes of unital and weakly implicative systems. The latter class is auxiliary, while the former is central in our discussion. Our analysis of unital systems leads to the concept of Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra which, under some natural conditions, is (...) a free algebra in a variety closely related to the deductive system in focus. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article contributes to methodological debates in contemporary critical theory regarding the scope and features of immanent critique. I spell out the philosophical commitments presupposed by this approach to criticism and identify its basic features by comparing it with more recognizable argumentative or interpretative strategies. This comparison yields three immanent-critical requirements – for inherence, contradiction, and access – which bring into relief the heuristic and ampliative character of immanent criticism. Yet, these requirements also imply that “immanent critique” is not (...) a method in any strict sense, since they are multiply interpretable and hence generative of distinctive critical comportments. (shrink)

We start by remarks on the scientific and societal context of today's theoretical physics. Major classes of models for physics to be explored at the LHC are then reviewed. This leads us to propose an LHC timeline and a list of potential effects on theoretical physics and the society. We then explore three conceptual questions connected with the LHC physics: symmetry (and symmetry breaking), effective field theory, and fine tuning.

Alexei V. Samsonovich, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 49 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400083.

The article is devoted to the well-known dispute between R. Carnap and W.V.O. Quine on the meaning of statements with names of abstractions, which also revealed their disagreements on the more general question of the nature of the dependence of ontology on the choice of language of knowledge. According to Quine, the choice of language carries with it certain ontological commitments – judgments of existence that must be true for anyone who appropriately uses the language in question. The language of (...) abstractions (using appropriate names and indications) is widely used not only in philosophy and everyday communication, but also in the sciences, including natural sciences. The names of abstractions (or, alternatively, quantification by corresponding entities) cannot be completely excluded from science, as Carnap, in particular, points out. He also considers it wrong to attribute to a scientist with empiricist views the belief in the existence of something that he, as an empiricist, is not ready to consider existing. In his view, the choice of language (framework) does not carry any ontological obligations: it determines what should be the correct answer to the so-called internal questions of the theory but does not affect metaphysical questions. Carnap interprets meaningful statements about abstractions as analytical truths, while Quine believes that most references to abstractions are removable from the language of science, and those that are not removable create additional ontological obligations, which, however, for some reason say nothing about reality itself. But why this is so, if the theory implicating them claims to describe reality, is not clear. This debate about the role of judgments about abstractions in scientific knowledge gave rise to a whole branch of metaphysical and ontological research, best known as metaontology. The main parties in this dispute are realists, who interpret irreducible abstractions as part of reality and denotations of certain names, and anti-realists, who, as a rule, deny the connection of statements with such names with reality, treating them as pseudo-statements or something similar. The solution to the problem, which is proposed in this article, consists in abandoning the belief, widespread both in philosophy and in everyday thought, which can be generally called “The theory of reference” and which consists in the fact that the contribution of names and certain other types of expressions to communication is their denotations. If we assume that names have no denotations at all and their semantic contribution to statements is only their senses or something similar, then the names of abstractions in this respect will be no different from other types of names. In this case, it would be no need to either assume that they designate some “Platonic” entities in order for some statements with them being true, nor interpret these judgments as pseudo-statements or as truths of some special kind that are not related to reality. The interpretation of statements with such names and their evaluation will not pose any special problem for the empiricist with this approach. (shrink)

Functional information means an encoded network of functions in living organisms from molecular signaling pathways to an organism’s behavior. It is represented by two components: code and an interpretation system, which together form a self-sustaining semantic closure. Semantic closure allows some freedom between components because small variations of the code are still interpretable. The interpretation system consists of inference rules that control the correspondence between the code and the function (phenotype) and determines the shape of the fitness landscape. The utility (...) factor operates at multiple time scales: short-term selection drives evolution towards higher survival and reproduction rate within a given fitness landscape, and long-term selection favors those fitness landscapes that support adaptability and lead to evolutionary expansion of certain lineages. Inference rules make short-term selection possible by shaping the fitness landscape and defining possible directions of evolution, but they are under control of the long-term selection of lineages. Communication normally occurs within a set of agents with compatible interpretation systems, which I call communication system. Functional information cannot be directly transferred between communication systems with incompatible inference rules. Each biological species is a genetic communication system that carries unique functional information together with inference rules that determine evolutionary directions and constraints. This view of the relation between utility and inference can resolve the conflict between realism/positivism and pragmatism. Realism overemphasizes the role of inference in evolution of human knowledge because it assumes that logic is embedded in reality. Pragmatism substitutes usefulness for truth and therefore ignores the advantage of inference. The proposed concept of evolutionary pragmatism rejects the idea that logic is embedded in reality; instead, inference rules are constructed within each communication system to represent reality, and they evolve towards higher adaptability on a long time scale. (shrink)

“The world of life which is comprised of the lithosphere, the hydrosphere and the atmosphere”: this definition of the biosphere is not complete since it does not express the determining influence of living organisms on its composition, on its structure and on the processes of its continuing evolution. The part of living matter in the biosphere is relatively small (about 0.25%), but this part has a considerable influence on its structure.The biosphere should be considered as the universal source of all (...) food products without exception. Mankind's ability to feed itself depends on the productivity of this biosphere in the first place. Moreover, its condition determines not only the quantity but also the quality of nourishment. The problem is a critical one today because of the increasing pollution of the biosphere by products poured into it by various human activities. (shrink)

We define an appropriate analog of the Morley rank in a totally transcendental homogeneous model with type diagram D. We show that if RM[p] = α then for some 1 ≤ n < ω the type p has n, but not n + 1, distinct D-extensions of rank α. This is surprising, because the proof of the statement in the first-order case depends heavily on compactness. We also show that types over (D,ℵ₀)-homogeneous models have multiplicity (Morley degree) 1.