Empowerment, an already central concept in public health, has gained additional relevance through the expansion of mobile health (mHealth). Especially direct-to-consumer self-testing app companies mobilise the term to advertise their products, which allow users to self-test for various medical conditions independent of healthcare professionals. This article first demonstrates the absence of empowerment conceptualisations in the context of self-testing apps by engaging with empowerment literature. It then contrasts the service these apps provide with two widely cited empowerment definitions by the WHO, (...) which describe the term as a process that, broadly, leads to knowledge and control of health decisions. We conclude that self-testing apps can only partly empower their users, as they, we argue, do not provide the type of knowledge and control the WHO definitions describe. More importantly, we observe that this shortcoming stems from the fact that in the literature on mHealth and in self-testing marketing, empowerment is understood as a goal rather than a process. This characterises a shift in the meaning of empowerment in the context of self-testing and mHealth, one that reveals a lack of awareness for relational and contextual factors that contribute to empowerment. We argue that returning to a process-understanding of empowerment helps to identify these apps’ deficits, and we conclude the article by briefly suggesting several strategies to increase self-testing apps’ empowerment function. (shrink)

While the value of early detection of dementia is largely agreed upon, population-based screening as a means of early detection is controversial. This controversial status means that such screening is not recommended in most national dementia plans. Some current practices, however, resemble screening but are labelled “case-finding” or “detection of cognitive impairment”. Labelled as such, they may avoid the ethical scrutiny that population-based screening may be subject to. This article examines conceptualizations of screening and case-finding. It shows how the definitions (...) and delimitations of the concepts (the _what_ of screening) are drawn into the ethical, political, and practical dimensions that screening assessment criteria or principles are intended to clarify and control (the _how_ of screening, how it is and how it should be performed). As a result, different conceptualizations of screening provide the opportunity to rethink what ethical assessments should take place: the conceptualizations have different ethico-political implications. The article argues that population-based systematic screening, population-based opportunistic screening, and case-finding should be clearly distinguished. (shrink)

Although self‐testing apps, a form of mobile health (mHealth) apps, are often marketed as empowering, it is not obvious how exactly they can empower their users—and in which sense of the word. In this article, I discuss two conceptualisations of empowerment as polar opposites—one in health promotion/mHealth and one in feminist theory—and demonstrate how both their applications to individually used self‐testing apps run into problems. The first, prevalent in health promotion and mHealth, focuses on internal states and understands empowerment as (...) an individual process. However, this version of empowerment has been accused of paternalism and responsibilisation. The second, feminist version considers structural conditions and foregrounds collective, political change, whose realisation is not obviously attainable for an individually used app. By pointing out the flaws of the positions that focus on either internal states or external conditions, and by engaging with theory from critical phenomenology, I argue that the interplay between them is where empowerment can take place. I propose to formulate empowerment in phenomenological terms as a shift in being‐in‐the‐world and discuss how this conceptualisation of empowerment would avoid the criticism of previous empowerment narratives while being realisable by self‐testing apps. (shrink)

Wearable robots and exoskeletons are relatively new technologies designed for assisting and augmenting human motor functions. Due to their different possible design applications and their intimate connection to the human body, they come with specific ethical, legal, and social issues, which have not been much explored in the recent ELS literature. This paper draws on expert consultations and a literature review to provide a taxonomy of the most important ethical, legal, and social issues of wearable robots. These issues are categorized (...) in wearable robots and the self, wearable robots and the other, and wearable robots in society. (shrink)

Research on mobile health (mHealth) applications has investigated how such technologies contribute to a responsibilisation of users/patients. This literature largely focuses on the individual responsibilities constructed by the apps and the neoliberal environments that enable the positioning of the user as responsible. With this focus, this scholarship is less attentive to the role of social relations in responsibilisation. In this article, I demonstrate how relational responsibilities are constructed in the communication of a North American self-testing app for “early changes in (...) cognition”. Through an analysis of qualitative expert interviews and images on the app’s web presence, I show how social relations are, in fact, mobilised in the construction of the responsibilities to support the user in the test situation, to take the test for the sake of others, and to make others take the test. Based on this analysis, I argue that the role of social relations should receive more attention in the literature on responsibilisation, because they lead to additional, sometimes gendered responsibilities that a focus on individual responsibilities would miss. (shrink)

Following the growing economic relevance of mobile health (mHealth) and the increasing global prevalence of dementia, self-testing apps for dementia and mild neurocognitive disorder (MCD) have been developed and advertised. The apps’ promise of a quick and easy tool has been criticized in the literature from a variety of angles, but as we argue in this article, the celebratory characterization of self-testing also stands in disbalance to the various kinds of fears that may be connected to taking the test. By (...) drawing on Sara Ahmed’s phenomenological theory on emotions and by referring to illustrative experiences from two users with a particular dementia self-testing app, we explore four dimensions of fear derived from phenomenology: performative, ontological, embodied, and temporal dimensions. We argue that fear (1) motivates one to take the self-test and to try to take control over one’s health; (2) is shaped by and shapes the ways in which we make sense of ourselves and others as cognitively deficient; (3) constructs and is constructed by our differently embodied presence in the world; and that (4) testing makes a fearful future self as cognitively deficient more tangible. In outlining these different dimensions of fear, this article expands the understanding of the meaning of experiencing self-testing in comparison to the mostly quantitative literature on this topic. (shrink)