Quantitative apparatus for assessing strength of an argument was improved in the article. A probative generalisation and verification of the R.Yanal's algorithm to calculate convergent argument were proposed. The generalization obtained deals with both quantity (or number) and quality (or truth-values) of the argument's reasons.

One popular test for distinguishing linked and convergent argument structures is Robert Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test. Douglas Walton, in his comprehensive survey of possible candidates for the linked/convergent distinction, advocates a particular version of Yanal's test. In a recent article, Alexander Tyaglo proposes to generalize and verifY Yanal's algorithm for convergent arguments, the basis for Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test. In this paper I will argue that Yanal's ordinary summing equation does not demarcate convergence and so his Ordinary Summing (...) Test fails. Hence, despite Walton's recommendation or Tyaglo's generalization, the Ordinary Summing Test should not be used for distinguishing linked argument structures from convergent argument structures. (shrink)

The modern Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics describes an emergent multiverse. The goal of this paper is to provide a perspicuous characterisation of how the multiverse emerges making use of a recent account of (weak) ontological emergence. This will be cashed out with a case study that identifies decoherence as the mechanism for emergence. The greater metaphysical clarity enables the rebuttal of critiques due to Baker (2007) and Dawid and Th\'ebault (2015) that cast the emergent multiverse ontology as incoherent; responses (...) are also offered to challenges to the Everettian approach from Maudlin (2010) and Monton (2013). (shrink)

What is the highest good actually good for in Kant’s third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good’s practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with "bündiges" thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in (...) the third Critique’s moral proof for God’s existence. I show that the original meaning of "bündig," which is from the carpentry trade and has been forgotten, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant’s system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant’s proof for God’s existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant’s reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labor costs. (shrink)

This note identifies and comments on selected crucial traits of Robert Aumann’s philosophy of game theory. In doing so, it aims at carving out and expressing some notions tacitly held by many working game theorists and ideally even at triggering subsequent reflection on the philosophy of game theory in general. According to my reconstruction of Aumann’s position, sophisticated, relatively precise rules of language—an ultra-refined grammar for interactions—constitute the heart of game theory. Consequently, the heart of game theory is devoid, or (...) almost devoid, of empirical content. The final section proposes a nomenclature for lucidly discussing the relationships between theories, different types of models, and “the real world” and employs it to explicate and slightly amend Aumann’s remarks on the role of truth and fruitfulness in game theory. (shrink)

The concept of “translational bioethics” has received considerable attention in recent years. Most publications draw an analogy to translational medicine and describe bioethical research that aims at implementing and evaluating ethical interventions. However, current accounts of translational bioethics are often rather vague and seem to differ with regard to conceptual and methodological assumptions. It is not clear and scarcely analyzed what exactly “translation” in the field of bioethics means, in particular regarding goals and processes so that it is justified to (...) appeal to translational medicine. In this article, we thus explore possible analogies and disanalogies between translational medicine and translational bioethics to establish whether the often occurring reference to concepts of translational medicine in the field of bioethics can be justified by substantial analogies. We will first provide an account of different models of translational medicine. In a second step, we will propose an analytic definition that explicitly articulates the essential characteristics of “translational research” irrespective of the research field (i.e., biomedicine, bioethics). Subsequently, we will explore whether and in how far general characteristics and phases of translational research in medicine can be applied to translational research in bioethics. Based on our analyses, we will come to the skeptical conclusion that at present there are considerable conceptual disanalogies and unsolved conceptual problems that disallow using “translational bioethics” in a meaningful analogy to respective accounts in biomedicine. Nevertheless, we will demonstrate that some insights gained by the conceptual accounts of translational medicine can contribute to advance current research activities in bioethics. (shrink)

One of the vividly discussed topics in the contemporary philosophy of science (especially physics) is the opposition between realism and Anti-Realism. The supporters of the first way of thinking trust in the objective existence of realities studied by science. They consider theories as approximate descriptions of these realities (Psillos 1999, xvii), whereas their opponents do not. However, both sides base their argumentation on simplified notions of scientific theories. In this paper, we present a more general approach, which can be coined (...) as “Theoretical Physics Realism” (TPR). It is based on the detailed reconstruction of the polysystemic nature of physical theories. The consequences of this reconstruction for understanding the genuine relationship between theories and experiments in studying the realities are indicated. The paper distinguishes between abstract (general) and domain-dependent theories and appeals to specific physical theories together with their application domains rather than to general speculations. (shrink)

Does natural science give us reason to believe that mathematical statements are true? And does natural science give us reason to believe in some particular metaphysics of mathematics? These two questions should be firmly distinguished. My argument in this chapter is that a negative answer to the second question is compatible with an affirmative answer to the first. Loosely put, even if science settles the truth of mathematics, it does not settle its metaphysics.

It is argued that Weyl’s theory of gravitation and electricity came out of ‘mathematical justice’: out of the equal rights direction and length. Such mathematical justice was manifestly at work in the context of discovery, and is enough to derive all of source-free electromagnetism. Weyl’s repeated references to coordinates and gauge are taken to express equal treatment of direction and length.

The aim of this article is to give students a small sense of what metamathematics is—that is, how one might use mathematics to study mathematics itself. School or college teachers could base a classroom exercise on the letter games I shall describe and use them as a springboard for further exploration. Since I shall presuppose no knowledge of formal logic, the games are less an introduction to Gödel's theorems than an introduction to an introduction to them. Nevertheless, they show, in (...) an accessible way, how metamathematics can be mathematically interesting. (shrink)

A core tenet of Bayesian epistemology is that rational agents update by conditionalization. Accuracy arguments in favour of this norm are well known. Meanwhile, scholars working in quantum probability and quantum state estimation have proposed multiple updating rules, all of which look prima facie like analogues of Bayesian conditionalization. The most common are Lüders conditionalization and Bayesian mean estimation (BME). Some authors also endorse a lesser-known alternative that we call retrodiction. We show how one can view Lüders and BME as (...) complementary rules, and we give expected accuracy and accuracy dominance arguments for both. By contrast, we find that retrodiction is accuracy-dominated, at least on many measures of accuracy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Necessity and Essence Naming and Reference Rules and Meaning Conclusion References.

Can we have a posteriori knowledge of modal facts? And if so, is that knowledge fundamentally a posteriori, or does a priori intuition provide the modal component of what is known? Though the latter view seems more straightforward, there are also reasons for taking the first option seriously.

Metaphors involve immense explanatory power and positive impact predominantly in the scientific education and popularization. Still the use of metaphors in science might be a double-edged sword. Introduction of the computer metaphor to many scientific fields in the last century resulted in reductionist approaches, oversimplifications and mechanistic explanations in science as well as in humanities. In this short commentary we developed further the computer metaphor by prof. Noble and the illusions this metaphor led to in genetics, linguistics and consequently DNA (...) linguistics. (shrink)

L’argument ontologique de l’existence de Dieu n'est pas seulement un argument de l’existence de Dieu. C’est la réflexion de la pensée sur ses propres conditions, fondements et limites. Cet essai examine cette auto-réflexion de la pensée, en particulier en ce qui concerne la version kantienne de la preuve ontologique. Il affirme que l’argument ontologique consiste en la dépotentialisation de la pensée par elle-même.

The standard $\mathbb{U}(1)$ “gauge principle” or “gauge argument” produces an exact potential A=dλ and a vanishing field F=d 2 λ=0. Weyl (in Z. Phys. 56:330–352, 1929; Rice Inst. Pam. 16:280–295, 1929) has his own gauge argument, which is sketchy, archaic and hard to follow; but at least it produces an inexact potential A and a nonvanishing field F=dA≠0. I attempt a reconstruction.

Christianity has understood the environment as a gift to nurture and steward, a book of divine revelation disclosing the divine mind, a wild garden in need of cultivation and betterment, and as a resource for the creation of a new Eden. This Cambridge Companion details how Christianity, one of the world's most important religions, has shaped one of the existential issues of our age, the environment. Engaging with contemporary issues, including gender, traditional knowledge, and enchantment, it brings together the work (...) of international scholars on the subject of Christianity and the Environment from a diversity of fields. Together, their work offers a comprehensive guide to the complex relationship between Christianity and the environment that moves beyond disciplinary boundaries. To do this, the volume explains the key concepts concerning Christianity and the environment, outlines the historical development of this relationship from antiquity to the present, and explores important contemporary issues. (shrink)

Alexander's views on universals are, it seems, quite important in the history of western philosophy. When Boethius gives in his second commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge his solution to the problem of universals as he conceived it, he claims to be adopting Alexander's approach. If true, this means that the locus classicus for all western medieval thinkers on this topic is really a rendering of Alexander's teaching. Alexander commented Aristotle’s statement in his On the Soul “The universal (...) animal either is nothing at all or is posterior if it exists”, and this commentary has been translated into Arabic several times in the classical period. In this study the anonymous Arabic translations of Alexander’s commentary has been translated into English. (shrink)

This article describes a qualitative inquiry into the historical reception of Flemish television fiction broadcast by the monopolistic Flemish broadcaster BRT between 1953 and 1989. This is a relatively homogeneous period, both in terms of broadcasting policies and fiction output. What do viewers remember of this period? Can patterns be discerned in these memories, and if so, why? To answer these questions, this research uses semi-structured interviews with older viewers. First, the article discusses the particular problems of this method, mostly (...) ‘faulty’ memory and nostalgic reinterpretation. Then, the findings are presented, reflecting on processes of memory formation. One clear finding concerns the selective and homogeneous nature of memories; the same few serials are remembered in similar ways by most, leading to clichéd memories of the past. (shrink)

The article provides a reply to critical remarks made during the discussion about creativity and scientific knowledge. The authors propose to consider their concept of creativity not as antagonistic or incommensurable with the alternative, but rather co-existing through the complementarity principle. Responding to a comment about the socio-cultural conditionality of a particular cognitive situation, the authors question whether globalization seriously influence this matter in science. They support the statement about the importance of the interaction between science and art, science and (...) philosophy as an opportunity to consider scientific problems from the outside, in an unusual way. Regarding the comment about serendipity, the authors note that in certain cases we need exactly epistemological randomization, since we cannot consciously induce serendipity. In conclusion, thanks are expressed to all participants in the discussion. (shrink)