The first book ever published to survey waste as a building material. Focusing on the projects, this book gives readers the tools they need to grasp the language and forms of a new architectural language and offers scientific and non-biased overviews to ensure credibility in the environmental science and engineering communities.

On multiple occasions, Theodor W. Adorno turned to Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West as a resource for the critical anatomy of a capitalist society in which laissez-faire liberalism was being overtaken by an authoritarian coordination of the political and the economic. This article revisits Spengler’s reactionary prophecies about late capitalist civilization in light of Adorno’s arguments. It explores a dimension of Spengler’s thought insufficiently addressed in Adorno’s writings and resonant with our present moment, namely the claim that an (...) emergent “Caesarism” would be helmed by figures like Cecil Rhodes, entrepreneurial Übermenschen spawned by racial imperialism. (shrink)

Insofar as the so-called new theory of reference has come to be acknowleged as the leading theoretical paradigm in semantic research, it has been widely accepted that proper names directly refer to their designation. In advancing some of the most convincing arguments in favour of this view of names, S. Kripke has however left somehow undecided what the role of context is in determining which is the direct referent for a name. According to one interpretation of his thought, context has (...) only an external task in allowing one to simultaneously select a name and a given referent for it. Although this interpretation is the most faithful to Kripke's own intentions, there is another possible interpretation of what he says, according to which context more significantly permits one to determine a given referent at a time for one and the same name1. This different interpretation of the role of context is not marginal for the purpose of semantics, since it generates two distinct theoretical conceptions of what a proper name is. According to the former, the 'idiosyncratic' conception, proper names are individuated (at least) by their form and bearer. According to the latter, the 'linguistic' conception, they are individuated by their morphology only: i.e., by their being (syntactically) unstructured strings of letters. The two conceptions prove to be substantially different when homonyms are called into play. Insofar as both the Greek philosopher and the famous shipowner are called "Aristotle", we have two distinct, albeit homonymous, names for the idiosyncratic conception but only one name (as applied to two distinct individuals) for the linguistic conception2. In what follows, I will first sketch one of the most recent attempts to support for the idiosyncratic view, namely the one which traces back to Kaplan [1990] theory of words, and recall its merits over its cognate idiosyncratic theories. I will then try to give an argument in favour of the linguistic conception, by pointing out how the latter.... (shrink)

Cultural evolution researchers use transmission chain experiments to investigate which content is more likely to survive when transmitted from one individual to another. These experiments resemble oral storytelling, wherein individuals need to understand, memorize, and reproduce the content. However, prominent contemporary forms of cultural transmission—think an online sharing—only involve the willingness to transmit the content. Here I present two fully preregistered online experiments that explicitly investigated the differences between these two modalities of transmission. The first experiment (_N_ = 1,080 participants) (...) examined whether negative content, information eliciting disgust, and threat-related information were better transmitted than their neutral counterpart in a traditional transmission chain setup. The second experiment (_N_ = 1,200 participants) used the same material, but participants were asked whether or not they would share the content in two conditions: in a large anonymous social network or with their friends, in their favorite social network. Negative content was both better transmitted in transmission chain experiments and shared more than its neutral counterpart. Threat-related information was successful in transmission chain experiments but not when sharing, and finally, information eliciting disgust was not advantaged in either. Overall, the results present a composite picture, suggesting that the interactions between the specific content and the medium of transmission are important and, possibly, that content biases are stronger when memorization and reproduction are involved in the transmission—as in oral transmission—than when they are not—as in online sharing. Negative content seems to be reliably favored in both modalities of transmission. (shrink)

DIVA sophisticated theoretical reconsideration of Latin American studies, critiquing past work and proposing new frameworks for the discipline./div.

This paper will study the Hanian critique of technology and dataism, as well as its implications. For this purpose, we will investigate the Heideggerian bases on which his thought is based, which show the modern essence of technology as a current stage of the metaphysics of presence. It will then be shown how the Hanian thesis accepts these premises in order to present dataism as an intervening agent in our horizons of understanding, as well as an element of contemporary systems (...) of control. Despite the value of this contribution, which challenges the alleged neutrality of technology, its adherence to the Heideggerian thesis prevents us from conceiving of other modes of uncovering and unfolding the poietic facet of technique. (shrink)

In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach (...) does not mean to buy an ontologically deflationary approach, according to which we have to accept all the intentional objects there apparently are. Being metaphysically deflationary on intentionalia rather means that from the ontological point of view one must really allow only for those intentionalia for which one is entitled to say that there are such things; typically, for which an ontological proof is available. From metaphysical schematism plus conditional, or partial, ontological committment to intentionalia, further interesting consequences follow. First, this theoretical combination allows one to deal with the ‘too-many entities’ problem (may one fail to accept an ontological proof for an entity of a given kind if she thinks that the entity we would have to be committed to is an entity of another kind?). Second, it allows one to deal with the ‘genuinely true report’ problem (how is it that if we exercise mindreading with respect to a somehow deluded person, we want our reports to come out as really, not merely fictionally, true?). (shrink)

Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the thought (...) is true in virtue of the identity, or nature, of such a thought. More particularly, for us intentionality will again be a relation, yet a relation of ontological dependence of the thought on its intentional object; specifically, the relation for the thought of being constituted by its object. Moreover, we will try to show that if intentionality is such a constitutive relation for the thought that has it, certain metaphysical consequences ensue. First, an objectual thought, a thought whose content basically consists in its intentional object, is nothing but that object in a certain cogitative modality, or, which is the same, as playing a certain motivational role for the subject entertaining the thought itself (at a certain time). Second, if an objectual thought is nothing but an intentional object in a cogitative modality, such a thought, not only as a type, but also as a token, is an abstract entity. More specifically, an objectual thought-type, an abstract object par excellence, is indeed instantiated by objectual thought-tokens which are again abstract particulars, yet of a specific kind: namely, tropes of a relational sort depending for their existence on their bearers (and possibly also on their temporal location). (shrink)

This essay follows Jean-Luc Nancy’s meditation on whether it is possible for thought to stand before the untenable in the present predicament and his call to confront the alló, the irreducibly other. It looks into Martin Heidegger’s considerations regarding the refusal of world and the possibility of its reversal. It discusses Catherine Malabou on two kinds of outside for philosophy and her privileging of the decolonial outside, which she uses to critique Reiner Schürmann’s position on the possibility of justice. Against (...) Malabou, it then examines Schürmann’s understanding of justice in a Nietzschean vein, and it concludes with a reflection on nihilism and its other side with a view to establish Schürmann’s fundamental position. (shrink)

There are close similarities between the Weihrauch lattice and the zoo of axiom systems in reverse mathematics. Following these similarities has often allowed researchers to translate results from one setting to the other. However, amongst the big five axiom systems from reverse mathematics, so far $\mathrm {ATR}_0$ has no identified counterpart in the Weihrauch degrees. We explore and evaluate several candidates, and conclude that the situation is complicated.

A filosofia política de Philip Pettit realiza a leitura normativa da matriz republicana de pensamento político. Na sua construção historiográfica e normativa do significado do republicanismo é reafirmada a centralidade da liberdade como não-dominação. Pettit mantém o intuito de releitura da cidadania republicana como sendo inclusivista e que possui o cunho de realidade política em sua notória preocupação com a condição social dos cidadãos. O republicanismo apregoa que a liberdade como não-dominação é o princípio necessário para avaliação de qualquer organização (...) social e política. Esse princípio não se constitui como valor apriorístico da teoria política porque as relações não-dominadas serão compreendidas em suas diferentes formas e contextos. No âmbito social, ela exigirá que as relações entre indivíduos sejam justas e que não haja motivo para que se tenha medo ou deferência perante as diferenças econômicas ou sociais. A liberdade como não-dominação poderá oferecer os recursos sociais necessários para que não se tenha as relações assimétricas de capacidade de influência e escolha na sociedade política. No âmbito político, a liberdade republicana será representada pela capacidade dos cidadãos de influenciar e direcionar as decisões dos representantes políticos. Por isso, iremos abordar os elementos políticos necessários para a contenção da dominação pública. No âmbito político democrático, a oportunidade de participação política, a discussão das desvantagens sociais e políticas e as formas de contenção da dominação pública serão mecanismos para a diminuição da dominação pública. O exercício da contestação e o controle popular podem ser os mecanismos políticos para a saída da forma minimalista de compreender a ação política como realização das preferências individuais e significa a possibilidade de realização do ideal de bem comum pelo procedimento discursivo de formação da opinião e da vontade política. O debate e a contestação se constituem como o ambiente para o entendimento sobre as normas comuns que alicerçam a comunidade política. Nesse sentido, o modelo republicano de democracia prioriza o exercício dos direitos básicos políticos como sendo a ferramenta para a formação da vontade política. Além disso, ele salienta a atitude contestatória dos cidadãos perante as formas injustificadas de desigualdades de tratamento. A democracia republicana possibilita o compartilhamento dos direitos políticos entre os cidadãos e incentiva que eles exerçam o controle popular sobre as decisões governamentais. Palavras-chave: Republicanismo. Democracia. Contestação. Philip Pettit. (shrink)

The use of algorithmic prediction in insurance is regarded as the beginning of a new era, because it promises to personalise insurance policies and premiums on the basis of individual behaviour and level of risk. The core idea is that the price of the policy would no longer refer to the calculated uncertainty of a pool of policyholders, with the consequence that everyone would have to pay only for her real exposure to risk. For insurance, however, uncertainty is not only (...) a problem – shared uncertainty is a resource. The availability of individual risk information could undermine the principle of risk-pooling and risk-spreading on which insurance is based. The article examines this disruptive change first by exploring the possible consequences of the use of predictive algorithms to set insurance premiums. Will it endanger the principle of mutualisation of risks, producing new forms of discrimination and exclusion from coverage? In a second step, we analyse how the relationship between the insurer and the policyholder changes when the customer knows that the company has voluminous, and continuously updated, data about her real behaviour. (shrink)

For María Zambrano all forms of knowledge are articulated from tradition, because what is essential is located in the past, as if it were a question of a substratum per se which is always known and transmitted. Wisdom increases by accumulation: knowledges add up, they become part of a ..

Las interpretaciónes de la física cuántica de Everett-DeWitt hablan de una multiplicidad de mundos físicamente coexistenrtes. Éstas imaginativas reacciones a los problemas conceptuales de la mecánica cuántica estándar forman una família de propuestas de “universos múltiples” que, sin pleno éxito, han sido tachadas de incoherentes.Everett-DeWitt interpretations of quantum physics speak of a multiplicity of physically coexisting worlds. These imaginative reactions to the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics form a family of physicalist “many-worlds” proposals that have been variously dismissed as (...) “incoherent”, so far without full success. A renewed charge by Hilary Putnam now seems to pose deeper trouble for PMW. In a recent paper, he seizes on “Schrödinger’s cat” situations to expose how PMW relativization of actuality and basic combinatorics jointly ruin probabilistic talk. Putnam focuses on confirmation and luck. His case against PMW is thought-provoking but also questionable, or so I suggest in this paper. First I argue that, as presented, Putnam’s charge doesn’t go through. I then consider his argument proper. According to Putnam, experimental DeWittians must count themselves as “lucky” in a seriously incoherent sense. I consider his take on “luck” and deny that defenders of PMW need to so regard themselves. Although extravagant, their position cannot be fruitfully dismissed as incoherent on metascientific grounds. Indeed it attests to the way science rationally helps the imagination to grow. (shrink)

Although both belong to the domain of the nonexistent, there is an ontological distinction between ficta and possibilia. Ficta are a particular kind of abstract objects, namely constructed abstract objects which generically depend on authors for their subsistence. Moreover, they are essentially incomplete entities, in that they are correlates of finite sets of properties. - On the other hand, possibilia are concrete objects. Being a possible object is indeed being an entity that might have existed, that is, that might have (...) been involved in the causal order. Besides, as an object existent in this sense may legitimately be qualified as complete, the incompleteness which pertains to possible objects is contingent, in that it regards them only with respect to the possible worlds in which they do not exist. This ontological distinction has a semantic correlate: whereas names for possibilia are full-fledged directly referential terms, names for ficta are synonymous with de facto rigid descriptions of a complex sort. (shrink)

A new theory of identity statements is put forward which appeals to a basic distinction between two notions of identity, i.e. strict and loose identity. The former is the traditional necessary relation of an object with the object itself, whereas the latter is a contingent relation of reduction of some (at least two) possible unactual objects to a possible actual object. By appealing to strict identity, one can maintain that some tokenings of identity sentences express a semantic content which is (...) both knowable apriori only and a necessary proposition. By appealing to loose identity instead, one can maintain that other tokenings of identity sentences express a semantic content which is both knowable a posteriori only and a contingent proposition. (shrink)