This paper aims to connect two debates about the relation among language, reasoning and thought that belong to different theoretical and disciplinary fields, but that are closely linked. On the one hand, the philosophical debate about logical pluralism. And, on the other hand, the linguistic debate around the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. We propose a hypothesis compatible with a version of logical pluralism and linguistic relativism that makes it possible to explain the differences between thoughts expressed in different languages. This hypothesis, at (...) the same time, supports the possibility of understanding and even translating different logical and linguistic variants. From a position akin to logical expressivism, we claim that there exists a proto-logic underlying all natural languages. The minimal logical operators proper of this proto-logic can be made explicit in a precise way in different formal systems. This gives rise to logical pluralism. We also offered an empirically informed philosophical argument in favor of this hypothesis. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a formal reconstruction of the classical argument for fatalism set forth by Aristotle in On Interpretation 9. From there, I expose two different formal solutions for avoiding the unwanted conclusion based on the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s rejection of the Principle of Bivalence: On the one hand, Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic and, on the other hand, supervaluation semantics. I also address some criticisms made against these two proposals. To finish, I remark on some alternative interpretations of (...) Aristotle’s intentions maintaining that the Stagirite philosopher rejected fatalism without abandoning the Principle of Bivalence. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este trabajo pretende relacionar dos debates emparentados sobre cómo la lógica y el lenguaje influyen sobre el pensamiento. Existe un eje de discusión en relación a si hay una pluralidad de lógicas o un único sistema lógico como criterio de evaluación para cualquier contexto de razonamiento. En lingüística, el debate surgido a partir de las interpretaciones fuertes y débiles de la hipótesis Sapir-Whorf ha centralizado la discusión en torno al grado de influencia o determinación del lenguaje sobre el pensamiento. (...) Desde perspectivas y marcos teórico-conceptuales diferentes, lógica y lingüística delimitan y problematizan un campo de indagación y reflexión. El artículo, desde una mirada transdisciplinar, pretende dar cuenta y postular vasos comunicantes entre estos debates atendiendo a los matices de cada enfoque, así como proponer una hipótesis propia sobre la problemática planteada. ABSTRACT This paper aims to relate two debates about how logic and language influence thought. There is an axis of discussion about whether there exists a plurality of logic or a single logical system as an evaluation criterion for any reasoning context. In linguistics, the debate arising from the strong and weak interpretations of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has centralized the discussion around the degree of influence or determination of language on thought. From different perspectives and theoretical-conceptual frameworks, logic, and linguistics delimit and problematize a field of inquiry and reflection. The article, from a transdisciplinary perspective, intends to account for and postulate communicating vessels between these debates, considering the nuances of each approach. It also seeks to propose its own hypothesis on the problem raised. (shrink)

This paper advocates for the normative role of logic in reasoning. I offer a response, anchored in an externalist perspective, to two fronts of attack against the normativity thesis, namely Harman’s sceptical challenge and the accusation of naturalistic fallacy. On the one hand, I rework dialogical bridge principles and show that such principles satisfy adequacy criteria to deal with Harman’s challenge. On the other hand, I argue that it is possible to derive normative consequences from logical facts. This is because (...) argumentative interactions among agents involve the acceptance of constitutive rules that entail obligations. Hence, since logical rules can be seen as constitutive of the social practice of reasoning, they create prescriptions for reasoning. Bridge principles make those obligations and prohibitions explicit. (shrink)

En este artículo, abordo la disputa entre normativismo y descriptivismo centrándome en el problema del arbitraje. Para esto, propongo acercar a esta disputa la discusión sobre el problema del colapso que se ha dado recientemente en el marco de la filosofía de la lógica. Mi propuesta sostiene, por un lado, que el razonamiento humano, en cuanto práctica social, es una actividad esencialmente normada y, por otro lado, que los sistemas formales que se toman de referencia en la psicología del razonamiento (...) son el resultado de diversos procesos de equilibrio reflexivo. Esto permite defender el rol normativo de los sistemas formales como estándar para el razonamiento humano. Además, sostengo que la adecuación de un sistema formal está signada por los contextos específicos de razonamiento. Así, defiendo un pluralismo normativo respecto de los sistemas formales de inferencia en el marco de los estudios empíricos sobre el razonamiento humano. (shrink)