"Al-Farabi of Baghdad (c. 870-950) is the first major representative of the medieval Arabic Aristotelianism which came to influence the Christian West so profoundly. In the Islamic world his writings on logic set the pattern for the future and virtually created Islamic philosophy. He is also important as a witness to the study of Aristotle in late antiquity, demonstrating a knowledge of Galen and the exegetical tradition of Porphyry. This translation is based on a fresh study of the Arabic manuscripts. (...) An introduction and notes make this intriguing document accessible to all for whom it contains important matter.Classicists, historians of philosophy and logic, medievalists, Arabists, students of Islamic thought."--. (shrink)

Ukrainian translation of al-Farabi’s treatise.

Resumo: O artigo trata da retórica na Antiguidade e na Idade Média a partir da perspectiva de onze filósofos – Platão e Aristóteles, Cícero, Sêneca e Quintiliano, a Retórica a Herênio, Agostinho, Marciano Capela e Isidoro de Sevilha, Bernardo de Claraval e Ramon Llull. Oferece, ainda, um extrato por nós traduzido da Retórica nova do filósofo catalão, a primeira tradução para a língua portuguesa.: This article deals with rhetoric in Antiquity and Middle Ages from the perspective of eleven philosophers: Plato, (...) Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Quintilian, the unknown author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Saint Augustine, Martianus Capella, Isidore of Seville, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Ramon It also offers an extract translated by us from Llull’s Retorica nova. (shrink)

Harmonization between science and religion in al-Fārābī’s thought is an important topic in addressing the challenges of paradigm differences between the two in modern society. This research aims to explore al-Fārābī’s views on the integration of spiritual values and scientific rationality and their relevance to contemporary challenges. Using a qualitative method based on a literature study, this research analyzes al-Fārābī’s works as well as supporting literature that discusses the relationship between science and religion. The results show that al-Fārābī viewed science (...) and religion as two different paths that lead to the same goal, which is the highest human happiness. Science provides rational knowledge to understand the physical world, while religion offers moral guidance to live life. In al-Fārābī’s view, the two complement each other, with science playing a role in revealing the nature of reality and religion providing ethical and spiritual meaning. This research emphasizes that al-Fārābī’s thoughts are relevant in the context of holistic education, ethical development in science and technology, and dialogue between science and religion. This approach can serve as a foundation for moral and rational value-based policies, creating a balance between intellectual progress and social responsibility. Thus, the harmonization of science and religion not only addresses the conflict between the two but also contributes to the construction of a just society with integrity. This research proposes that such integration can be a comprehensive solution to global issues such as technological ethics, climate change, and pluralism. (shrink)

The discourse surrounding Islamic philosophy has garnered significant attention among scholars, highlighting a multitude of benefits and limitations related to its authenticity and its position as an essential component of Islamic cultural legacy. Some believe that Islamic philosophy is simply a reinvention of Greek philosophical concepts, thus undermining its credibility. Conversely, proponents advocate the integration of Greek philosophical principles with Islamic tenets as a synthesis rather than a simple replication. This article aspires to delve into these diverse perspectives by analyzing (...) the historical transformation of Islamic philosophy, with a spotlight on its initial periods, particularly stressing the impact of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 951 CE), a significant figure in Islamic philosophy who synthesized Greek philosophical ideas, notably those of Aristotle and Plato, to construct a unique Islamic philosophical framework. Through a qualitative conceptual analysis, this article evaluates the authoritative dimensions and philosophical disputes between Aristotle and Plato, particularly concerning ontology and epistemology, while accentuating al-Fārābī’s endeavors to harmonize their philosophical positions. This article suggests that al-Fārābī engaged in a critical examination of both Plato's and Aristotle’s perspectives on universal truth and human cognition, which ultimately led him to incorporate their philosophies into a unique Islamic framework. (shrink)

Al-Fbb al-f, is apparently the first person to maintain that existence, in one of its senses, is a second-order concept [mal th]. As he interprets Metaphysics d] has two meanings, second-order being as truth'' (including existence as well as propositional truth), and first-order being as divided into the categories.'' The paronymous form of the Arabic word mawjd] distinct from their essences: for al-Kindd of all things. Against this, al-Fburr thinks that Greek more appropriately expressed many such concepts, including being, by (...) particles rather than nouns or verbs; he takes Metaphysics r's title can mean both Book of Particles'' and Aristotle's Metaphysics.''. (shrink)

In his commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric al-Fārābī harmonizes Plato and Aristotle in terms of philosophic education by ordering Aristotle’s eight logical works onto Plato’s famous image of the cave. He represents the way out of the cave with Aristotle’s four logical works of ascent and the return into the cave through Aristotle’s four logical works of the descent. Al-Fārābī’s image of ascent and descent also alludes to Socrates’ conception of protreptic education in Book VII of the Republic. In essence, protreptic (...) education consists in the Socratic art that freely turns the soul from the images and political interpretations of things to being itself. In this essay I argue that for al-Fārābī the four logical works of ascent guide the soul to free itself from its habituations so as to contemplate real beings, particularly the good of one’s own soul and the souls of one’s fellow citizens. Yet the ruler needs to use the arts of “descent,” as demonstrated by Thrasymachus, in order to rule the city well. The way of Socrates consists of the logical methods used to come to possess knowledge of being, while the way of Thrasymachus comprises the methods of persuasion to habituate citizens and protect the philosophic quest for the truth. Al-Fārābī, I conclude, combines the way of Socrates and the way of Thrasymachus in order to show that both ways are useful and necessary for good governance. (shrink)

During the years 800-1200 A.D., Arabic scholars studied many of the works of Greek philosophy, and recorded their interpretations. Significant Arabic interpretations of Aristotle's Prior Analytics, the key work of his logical Organon, however, have remained largely unavailable in the West. The recent discovery of several Arabic manuscripts in Istanbul revealed the “Short Commentary on Prior Analytics” by the medieval Arabic philosopher al-Farabi. Nicholas Rescher here presents the first translation of this work in English, and supplements this with an informative (...) introduction and numerous explanatory footnotes. (shrink)

This article proposes a reconstitution of the philosophical tenor of al-Fb al-Mawdayyira). It is shown that this work is not only a response to book VI of John Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem, but that its real issues can only be grasped in the context of the author's metaphysical system. Although, for al-Fbī, genuine demonstrations proceed from the cause to the caused, thus following the order of being, it will be explained how he also admits a strictly physical proof of the simple (...) fact, independently of its cause, and that the physical demonstration of the eternity of the world pertains to this type of proof. This physical proof is specifically directed against the Kindian doctrine of creation. (shrink)

Al-Farabi understands politically useful images to be good imitations of essences, and also effective means of persuasion for geographically and historically situated communities. Such images, moreover, are what constitute the virtuous religions of virtuous cities. At play in al-Farabi’s account of images is thus a relationship between image, religion, truth, and history, and one that brings with it certain implications for how we understand the nature of the human being. We are creatures of truth, of the grasping of essences, and (...) hence of universals, and yet we are differently persuaded by images depending upon our geography and our history. And since historically diverse images can imitate the same universal essences, many different religions can nevertheless be “true,” and hence can function in such a way as to orient geographically and historically specific people toward happiness. Al-Farabi’s account of images is thus at the heart of his political theory of religion, and provides the basis for his affirmation of religious pluralism in relation to the virtuous city. The following essay considers the relationship between images and religious pluralism in al-Farabi’s political writings, and shows as well that it implies a correlating theory of the human being. (shrink)

The primary goal of this paper is to read al-Fārābī’s Kitāb al-shiʿr [Book of poetry] between the lines. Though it touches upon his other treatises on poetry and poetics, i.e., Risāla fī qawānīn ṣināʿat al-shuʿarāʾ [Essay on the rules of the art of the poets] and Qawl al-Fārābī fī al-tanāsub wa-l-taʾlīf [al-Fārābī’s saying on harmony and composition), it does so only in passing. Emphasizing the primacy of mimesis (muḥākat) in al-Fārābī’s discussion of poetics, this paper demonstrates how poeticity (shiʿriyya), according (...) to al-Fārābī, goes beyond being a mere “textual” or “oral” quality to even encompass various human actions and activities. In doing so, it also underscores how al-Fārābī’s definition(s) of mimesis is not reducible to comparison, simile, metaphoror even the extended metaphor. (shrink)

al-Fārābi was well aware that ecumenism can easily convert to tyranny if a certain city–state attempts to impose its laws outside its territory. State legislation depends on specific cultural and historical factors which deprives it from being universal because culture and history could not unite different nations in an ecumenical state. Legislation has to be built on universal premises, e.g. on philosophy, so as to serve the needs of a global state. Philosophy is the bond which unites humans and communities, (...) while religion and legislation are disruptive factors. Despite the fact that in our days there are different philosophies, philosophy encourages dialogue, not hatred. As a result, al-Fārābi was right when he founded his ecumenical state on philosophy. Consequently, philosophers ought to persuade the citizens through rational arguments, dialectic, symbols and religion so as to accept the existence of an ecumenical state. The goal of this state is the supreme good, understood as the theoretical living. Al-Fārābi’s ecumenism is a means for the perfection of human beings and societies and not simply for the augmentation of wealth, as it is seen today. Al-Fārābi dreams of an anthropocentric ecumenical state. I support that this should be the form of modern ecumenism. While modern scholars have strong objections to the governing of philosophers, we should agree that philosophy is the appropriate universal language. The persistence on power and other divisive factors, such as religion or tradition, is doomed to fail. (shrink)

RésuméCet article vise à présenter et à discuter le sophisme de transfert et de substitution d'al-Fārābī (d. 950-1 CE) dans son peu étudié « Sur les topoi trompeurs » (Kitāb al-amkina al-muġalliṭa), ainsi que la critique d'Averroès (d. 1198 CE), selon laquelle al-Fārābī aurait violé l'airmation d'Aristote sur l'exhaustivité de sa liste de sophismes. La première moitié de cet article présente le traité d'al-Fārābī et ses innovations par rapport aux Sophistici elenchi d'Aristote. La deuximème partie se concentre sur la critique (...) d'Averroès dans son soi-disant commentaire intermédiaire (talḫīṣ) sur les SE d'Aristote et discute la validité de ses arguments contre al-Fārābī. Comme notre analyse finale le montrera, la critique d'Averroès ne tient pas suffisamment compte de l'indépendance du traité d'al-Fārābī par rapport au SE d'Aristote, de sa négligence à l’égard de l’étude de la tromperie et de la contre tromperie dialectique, et de son accent particulier sur les sciences démonstratives. À la lumière de l'innovation d'al-Fārābī, son « Sur les topoi trompeurs»s'avère être un ouvrage d'une grande originalité qui s'appuie sur un large éventail de textes sources. (shrink)

v. 1. Arabic text -- v. 2. English translation.

We reconstruct as much as we can the part of al-Fārābī's treatment of modal logic that is missing from the surviving pages of his Long Commentary on the Prior Analytics. We use as a basis the quotations from this work in Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides, together with relevant material from al-Fārābī's other writings. We present a case that al-Fārābī's treatment of the dictum de omni had a decisive effect on the development and presentation of Ibn (...) Sīnā's modal logic. We give further evidence that the Harmonisation of the Opinions of Plato and Aristotle was not written by al-Fārābī. (shrink)

The concept of ‘‘certitude” is central in Arabic discussions of the theory of demonstration advanced by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics. In the Arabic tradition it is ‘‘certitude,” rather than ‘‘knowledge”, that is usually identified as the end sought by demonstrations. Al-Fārābī himself devotes a short treatise, known as the Conditions of Certitude, to determining the criteria according to which a subject can claim to have absolute certitude of any proposition. In this article the author traces the roots of the (...) concept of certitude to the Arabic translation of the Posterior Analytics. She then offers a close reading of the text of al-Fārābī's Conditions and its parallels in his Epitome of the Posterior Analytics. She argues that the identification of certitude as a cognitive state distinct from knowledge enabled al-Fārābī to introduce a number of interesting and sometimes problematic innovations into Arabic epistemology. Foremost amongst his positive innovations is the recognition that contingent as well as necessary propositions allow for an attenuated form of certitude, and the introduction of reliabilism into the justification of claims to certitude. But al-Fārābī is also one of the first philosophers to articulate explicitly the idea that certitude must include an element of ‘‘knowing that one knows,” a controversial principle that tends to undermine both al-Fārābī’s reliabilism and his efforts to loosen some of the strictures in traditional Aristotelian epistemology. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to identify the forms of being of science in the philosophy of the Muslim thinker Abū Naṣr Muhammad al-Fārābī, who lived in the 9th–10th centuries. In this regard, the article first addresses the problem of the origin of science. The enumeration of sciences is manifested in al-Farabi’s research as “divine science,” that is, metaphysics and individual sciences, with a Muslim specificity. Science as a process of cognition is an ascent from the imperfect to the (...) perfect. The First Cause (the First Being) of everything is the absolute perfection. It is also a deity and the “cause” of the origin of sciences. The comprehensive encyclopedism of al-Farabi’s predetermined science is a kind of worldview. In this context, he distinguished between the science of language, logic, mathematics, physics, metaphysics, and civil science, which explains the essence of real happiness. Only members of the ideal community (“the inhabitants of a virtuous city”) are able to achieve happiness. Therefore, the study of sciences in totality creates the respective “virtuous” worldview. (shrink)

This study deals with Dominicus Gundissalinus’s discussion on metaphysics as philosophical discipline. Gundissalinus’s translation and re-elaboration of al-Fārābī’s Iḥṣā’ al-ʿulūm furnish him, in the De scientiis, a specific and detailed procedure for metaphysical analysis articulated in two different stages, an ascending and a descending one. This very same procedure is presented by Gundissalinus also in his De divisione philosophiae, where the increased number of sources –in particular, Avicenna– does not prevent Gundissalinus to quote the entire passage on the methods of (...) metaphysical science from the Iḥṣā’ al-ʿulūm, with some slight changes in his Latin translation. The analytical procedure herein proposed becomes an effective ‘metaphysical programme’ with regards to Gundissalinus’s onto-cosmological writing, the De processione mundi. The comparative analysis of this treatise with the procedure received by al-Fārābī shows Gundissalinus’s effort to follow and apply this metaphysical programme to his own reflection, in a whole different context from al-Fārābī’s and presenting doctrines quite opposed to the theoretical ground on which al-Fārābī’s epistemology is based, like ibn Gabirol’s universal hylomorphism. Nevertheless, thanks to the application of the ‘metaphysical programme’, one can effectively claim that Gundissalinus’s metaphysics is, at least in the author’s intentions, a well-defined metaphysical system. In appendix to this article the three Latin versions of al-Fārābī’s discussion on metaphysics are reported, e.g., Gundissalinus’s quotations in De scientiis and De divisione philosophiae, and Gerard of Cremona’s translation in his De scientiis. (shrink)

Politics is among the most important concepts of al-Fārābī’s philosophy. For him, real happiness can only be achieved in a virtuous society and a virtuous society appears only in a regime led by the first chief. The most important feature of the first chief is that he communicates with the Active Mind. Religion is considered by al-Fārābī as the regime and life style implemented by the first chief in a virtuous society. This study tries to present how al-Fārābī perceives religion (...) philosophically and what is the need for religion in terms of making the laws required in the social life. From this point of view, we tried to reach the aspects of the relationship between religion and law. Furthermore, metaphysical foundation of laws and the role of the philosopher and prophet at the point of law-making were the other issues addressed. The features of the laws which will lead to this supreme goal and by whom they should be made as well as how they can be implemented and changed within the historical process were addressed. The place of Islamic law (fiqh) in the virtuous society was another aspect of the subject that was investigated. (shrink)

This third volume of Classical and Medieval Logic Texts shows that Arabic philosophy and especially Arabic logic--which up to now has fared rather badly--can be made fascinating. To do this requires a marvelous blend of erudition, clarity and a firm grasp of basic issues. Zimmermann offers us this unusual combination in his lively introduction to two carefully translated texts of the most famous Arabic logician.

Despite its position in an introductory work to logic, the account of continuity presented by Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī in his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Categories is apparently even less accessible to the beginner than Aristotle’s original. This is in part because Al-Fārābī integrated elements of the accounts of continuity in Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics into an account mainly derived from Aristotle’s Categories. While Al-Fārābī’s account chiefly follows Aristotle’s Categories 6 in describing a continuous object that can be divided into parts with (...) a shared boundary, it borrows the terminology of limits from Physics 5 and the notion of quantity as divisible into its parts from Metaphysics 5.13. In doing so, Al-Fārābī defines continuity using a notion of a limit without determining whether or not it was part of the continuous quantity. This definition could also accommodate atomists, since it would work even if the limit were an atom or several atoms that were part of the continuous object. The broadness of this definition is probably intended to allow students of logic who may have atomist tendencies to accept the account of quantity in the categories tradition, even though they may not be ready to reject atomism until after studying physics. (shrink)

This article provides a reading of al-Fārābī's (d. 950) thought on the soul in the context of the theory of perfection. Although al-Fārābī's theory of the soul has been the subject of various studies and the importance of the subject of perfection in al-Fārābī's philosophy has been revealed, how this subject pervades al-Fārābī's narrative and philosophy in general has not been shown in detail through texts with a phenomenological approach. With phenomenological approach here, the article aims (...) to analyze the problem through al-Fārābī's lens in reference to his texts. This article seeks to contribute to the literature to show how the issue of perfection is embedded in the theory of the soul and the classification of sciences. For this purpose, issues such as the theory of degrees, which permeate the whole of al-Fārābī's philosophy, are also examined in the context of the idea of perfection and tajawḥur.The article's main problem is determining how al-Fārābī's approaches in the theory of the soul are shaped through the idea of perfection. In this con-text, the main argument of the article is as follows: Al-Fārābī combines the material and immaterial aspects of the soul by emphasizing the concept of substantialization (tajawḥur) in his theory of the soul and constructs a theory that should be called the dynamic theory of the soul. The claim put forward in this study is that the idea of perfection is a theory that affects the whole of al-Fārābī's philosophy and should be the basis for the interpretation of al-Fārābī's philosophy. Although this issue has been analyzed from different perspectives, this study's main problem is showing how the idea of perfection permeates the theory of the soul and how it affects al-Fārābī's preferences. In this respect, a close reading of al-Fārābī's texts on the subject has been conducted to justify this claim. While this reading is carried out in the context of the soul's relation with matter and its perfection through the sciences, the issue of happiness as the soul's ultimate goal is left out due to its complexity that would require a separate study.In this framework, the study first shows how al-Fārābī constructs the idea of substantialization (tajawḥur). Subsequently, the article focuses on the description of substantialization through the intellect. Al-Fārābī's explanations in the context of the concept of ḳuwwa are also examined in terms of the role this critical concept plays in the process of substantialization of the soul and intellect. This is because al-Fārābī interprets the Aristotelian meaning of the concept of potentiality by explaining this concept in a way that regulates the soul's transformation processes. This study emphasizes that al-Fārābī's interpretation is shaped within the framework of his dynamic theory of the soul.Al-Fārābī grounds the process of the soul's coming into existence in terms of being an intermediate being between material and immaterial existence. This justification is important in terms of observing al-Fārābī's position vis-à-vis dualist and materialist conceptions of human beings. Al-Fārābī adopts neither a fully dualist nor a fully materialist approach. The point emphasized in this study is that this approach gives al-Fārābī's theory of the soul a dynamic character. On the other hand, al-Fārābī clearly emphasizes that intellectual perfection is realized through the sciences. In this respect, the substantialization of the soul through the intellect also manifests itself as a scientific perfection. For al-Fārābī, the science of logic constitutes the dynamo of the perfection of the faculty of thinking. In this respect, al-Fārābī's classification of sciences is based on the idea of perfection. (shrink)

This paper examines al-Fārābī's logical thought within its Arabico-Islamic historical background and attempts to conceptualize what this background contributes to his logic. After a brief exposition of al-Fārābī's main problems and goals, I shall attempt to reformulate the formal structure of Arabic linguistics (AL) in terms of the ontological and formal characteristics that Arabic logic is built upon. Having discussed the competence of al-Fārābī in the history of AL, I will further propose three interrelated theses about al-Fārābī's (...) logic, in terms of which I will attempt to redefine it: the logico-linguistic conception, the project of logicization, and nuclear logic. The final question that will arise is how Aristotle's logic could be built upon AL, which has a nature contrary to logic. The present paper also contributes to examining our traditional research habits in Arabic studies. (shrink)

The theory of prophet hood, based on a competent imagination, is one of the original contributions of al-Farabi to Islamic thought. The purpose of this article is to examine the imaginative power that underlies the prophet's law-making in al-Farabi's political thought. In our research, we have concluded that the prophet can put the universal truths in the form of laws only with the representation ability of a competent imaginary. Emanation, overflowing from the separate intellects that form the supralunary world, also (...) constructs the sublunary world through the imagination of the prophet. In this system, the power of imagination is a central faculty that embodies and organizes the imaginary from Active Mind and makes it accessible to all levels of people. Without the imagination that transforms the reasonable into sensible forms, it is not possible to put laws and to deliver them to people. In order to be in contact with the higher principles, the prophet must also have a competent mental faculty. Finally, in our study, the connection of the imaginary, which represents the emanation coming from the Active Mind, with the intellect faculty in this context is also questioned in terms of law-making. (shrink)

This article is about the place of kalām (theology) within the general structure of al-Fārābī's metaphysics. In this framework, the article consists of two parts. The first part examines the position of metaphysics within the framework of al-Fārābī's idea of perfection. In the second part, a close reading of al-Fārābī's al-Ibāna ʿan ġarażi Arisṭuṭālīs fī kitābi mā baʿda al-ṭabīʿa is made and al-Fārābī's approach to the theoretical aspect of theology within the theory of milla is analyzed. (...) Since al-Fārābī's theories of perfection and meaning are the theories that affect a major part of his philosophy, the article shows the effects of these two theories on al-Fārābī's analysis of metaphysics without examining their general position in al-Fārābī's philosophy. In this framework, the article examines the idea that al-Fārābī's metaphysics should be evaluated in view of the background of his theories of perfection and meaning, based on the secondary literature on the subject. As evidence for this claim, al-Fārābī's description of the philosophical sciences as the steps of intellectual perfection is shown in the article. The article emphasizes that al-Fārābī's evaluations of the relationship between kalām and metaphysics are based on the theory of perfection. A close reading of the relevant passages in Taḥṣīl al-saʿāda, Treatise on Intellect (Risāla fi-l ‘aql), and Kitāb al-Ḥurūf shows how al-Fārābī's theories of perfection and meaning form the background of his analysis of metaphysics through the philosopher's arguments. On the other hand, the article shows how al-Ibāna might be understood within al-Fārābī's metaphysical construct by showing the extensions of the theories of perfection and meaning in this work. For al-Fārābī, metaphysics, which constitutes the last step of intellectual perfection, is also the highest science. This process is indicated by the concept “al-naẓar al-ilāhī” (divine thinking/thought). In this framework, kalām cannot gain the title of metaphysics because it is a science that does not emerge in the course of intellectual perfection. In this article, this approach is justified by considering the relevant passages in al-Ibāna. Al-Fārābī's distinction between the science of divine oneness (tawḥīd) and metaphysics in this work has been a subject of debate among scholars. Regarding what al-Fārābī meant by the definition of universal knowledge, the article emphasizes that the relationship of metaphysics with the theories of perfection and meaning influenced al-Fārābī's approach to universal knowledge. In the last part of the article, al-Fārābī’s theory of milla is considered in the context of the theory of meaning. For this aim, the article suggests that al-Fārābī’s idea of milla as a copy or similitude of philosophy makes the science of kalām an intermediate science that acts between the verbal and the philosophical areas of meaning. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that Ibn Bāǧǧa’s commentaries on al- Fārābī’s logical writings reveal a perpetuation of al-Fārābī’s logic in Andalusia and that they also assist us in the recognition of the nature and achievement of this logic. Ibn Bāǧǧa’s Introduction or Eisagoge is a commentary on al-Fārābī’s introductory Letter and the Five Aphorisms, as well as subsequent logical treatises of al-Fārābī. Ibn Bāǧǧa, in agreement with al-Fārābī, presents logic as consisting of five syllogistic arts, (...) rhetoric, poetry, dialectic, sophistry and demonstration. These arts are constituted by both the form and matter of logic, the matter referring to the five syllogistic arts in which the form of logic is employed. Ibn Ḫaldūn later testifies to this comprehensive account of the five syllogistic arts articulated primarily by al-Fārābī but also in some measure by Ibn Sīnā, and says that, by his time, this account of the syllogistic arts had been replaced by a more limited a... (shrink)