Comprehending the messages of Qurʾān in terms of the relationship between occasions (sīra) and revelation has a profound influence on determining the contextual purpose and shades of meanings. Establishing such relationship necessitates dating sūras and verses. Although there are some oral transmissions (riwāya) that verses 12, 45, 47 and 77 were revealed in Madīnah, and some weak transmissions date this sūra as Medinan, this sūra is unanimously regarded as Meccan. Like many Meccan verses, not only the order of revelation and (...) causality of verses but also the content of the script do not provide concrete evidence about whether the whole sūra was sent down at once or revealed piece by piece or the date of the revelation. In this regard, in studies carried out on the dating of Sūrat Yāsīn, the dating of this sūra is established on the basis of the dates of the sūras coming before or after Yāsīn since they apparently have more definite datings. In recent studies done on the nuzūl order, Sūrat Yāsīn is dated on the basis of a time frame before the emigration to Abyssinia (615-616) in terms of Sūrat Maryam and Ṭāhā, or Muhammed’s return from Ṭāif and his Ascension (Isrāʾ) (620) in terms of Sūrat al-Jinn. The dating of the sūra covers a time span of 4 to 5 years and points out two discrete occasions of revelation. With this reason, there is a need for further studies to be carried out on dating Qurʾānic sūras, especially within the specific context of Sūrat Yāsīn. Traditional Islamic studies dispute the chronological order of the sūra, offering various chronological orderings for the sūra: 31, 36, 37, 39, 40 and 41. In the first part of this study, such variations and their causes are tentatively established and determining the precise chronology and listing of the sūra was attempted. Based on the analysis of the variations in the disputed ordering of the sūra, it has been found to be caused by five different reasons. When such discrepancies are accounted for and conflicts are resolved, the conclusion was reached that in almost all riwāyas, sūrat Yāsīn can be dated as the 41st chapter (sūra). In the second part of the study, on the basis of the discourse analysis of the sūra, new arguments to date the chronology of the sūra were put forward. These are; a- Because of their obstinacy, unbelievers will not heed the warnings directed at them (36/11), b- The speeches of unbelievers should not grieve Prophet Muhammad (36/76), c- The use of the word Rahmān the Most Gracious (36/11, 15, 23, 52), d- In return for conveying the message of Allah, prophets do not ask people for any wage (36/21), e- Regarding Qurʾān as book of poetry and calling Muhammad a poet (36/69), f- The possibility of recreation and reviving bones (36/78). Such arguments presented in a – f usually refer to events happening in Mecca and in particular the second part or the end of Meccan period, yet there is no exact date. g- Based on the phrase “al-Fulq al-Mashhūn”, the fact that sūrat Yāsīn should be dated after the emigration to Abyssinia (615-616) presents strong evidence that it was revealed after sūrat Maryam, though this is still not enough to give an exact date. h- In sūrat Yāsīn, in phenomenon of (a man coming from the farthest part of the City) (36/20), two names (Hazrat Abū Bakr and el-Hāris b. Abī Hāla) and two dates (month of Dhu al-Qiʿdah/April 5 – May 4, 615 and three days after Shawwal 15/February 27, 617) are mentioned in Sīra for the purpose of consolation and encouragement. In the third part of the study, in the chronological ordering of sūrat Yāsīn, information regarding the dating of sūras coming before and after Yāsīn are evaluated based on their similarity with Yāsīn in terms of discourse and diction. In nuzūl orderings, when riwāyas regarding dating sūrat al-Qamar, Ṣād and al-Jinn coming before Maryam and Ṭāhā are analysed, events happening during 7th or 10th year after emigration were observed. In addition, there were close connections between the discourse and diction of Yāsīn with those of Ḥavāmīm sūras. This brings to the mind the possibility that some sūras might be listed in the wrong place because of the vagueness of the piecemeal character of the Qurʾānic revelation and its effects on riwāyas. Based upon the findings and inferences in the first three sections of this study, sūrat Yāsīn was determined to be the 41st chapter (sūra) of Qurʾān. The dating of sūrat Yāsīn presented some difficulties especially while trying to date it according to the interrupted revelation order approach, and considering it together with Sūrat Maryam and Ṭāhā. However, listing sūrat Yāsīn on the basis of uninterrupted revelation order along with Sūrat al-Jinn, the previous sūra and Ḥāmīm sūras is found to be a more coherent strategy since it gives priority to the succession of two sūras. (shrink)

In terms of Arabic philology, the concept of reason performs the function of bonding and is a key to terms such as wisdom, goodness, duty, and autonomy. By using the reason in its proper place, morality that regulates the self (nafs) emerges. The reason, which is seen as the source of spiritual values, has given human beings the quality of being the subject of trust (amana). In Islamic Wisdom, human beings are distinguished from animals by the characteristics of carrying the (...) Trust and having morality. Morality is not a factual but a spiritual value produced by the self. Thus, having reason also requires being moral. Reason, which is related to both matter and meaning, must move in parallel like a clock with morality, which is related to ideas and deeds. The unity of reason and morality is like the two boat oars that must be pulled in order to navigate the boat at the sea. The disruption of this balance leads to the disruption of the order. Islamic wisdom emphasizes that when this dual plane is well established, order and dynamism arise, and when it is disrupted, chaos and stagnation occur. In this paper, the unity of reason and morality relationship in Islamic wisdom is discussed. (shrink)

Erken dönemlerden itibaren fıkhî meseleler üzerindeki tartışmalar, bir yönteme bağlı kalınarak icra edilmiştir. Tartışmalarda belirli soru ve cevap türlerine başvurulmuş, soruların tertibine özen gösterilmiştir. Bu sayede taraflar kendi görüşlerinin doğruluğunu, karşıt görüşün yanlışlığını çelişkiye düşmeden ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır. Bu çalışmada ilk olarak cedelden ve cedelin fıkha tatbikinden bahsedilmiş, sonrasında münâzaracı kimlikleriyle meşhur olan Hanefî fakihi Kudûrî ile Şâfiî fakihi Ebu’t-Tayyib et-Taberî arasında geçtiği rivayet edilen talâka dair bir münâzara inceleme konusu edilmiştir. Bu münâzarada, muhâlea ile boşanılan kadına, kadının iddeti esnasında (...) tekrardan ricî talâk yapılabileceğini savunan Kudûrî ile bu durumda talâkın geçersiz olacağını söyleyen Taberî’nin karşılıklı istidlal ve itirazları yer almaktadır. Bu tartışmanın temelini Kudûrî’nin muhâlea yapılan kadını ricî talâkla boşanan kadına kıyas etmesi oluşturmaktadır. Taberî bu kıyasın illetine yönelik mutâlebe, itirâz ve muâraza türü sorulara başvurmuş, Kudûrî ise kendi illetinin sıhhatini savunmaya çalışmıştır. Yer yer tartışma kurallarına atıfların yapılması yönüyle de önemli olan bu münâzara incelenirken, cedelin fıkha tatbikine dair kısımda zikredilen bilgilerin pratikte nasıl uygulandığına işaret edilmiştir. (shrink)

Every science examines the personal accidents of the subject, which it determines as its subject, and the sciences differ from each other in this aspect. However, sciences offer the principles that they prove themselves through the use of other sciences. Sciences take and use the principles of other sciences that they will need, but they do not have to prove these principles in themselves. On the contrary, they entrust this proof to the sciences from which they took their principles. While (...) examining the sources of fiqh and the method of making judgments from these sources, the method of fiqh uses the principles set forth in other sciences in the problems it encounters. One of the sciences in which the method of fiqh takes principles is kalām. Actually, the science of kalām provides principles to all other sciences with the conception of God and the world it reveals. One of these principles is the indeterminist understanding of the world, in other words, the theory of ʽādah (custom). The theory of custom, produced in the tradition of Ahl al-Sunnah Kalām, is a theory that cancels causality and makes all effects in the world peculiar to Allah. According to this theory, Allah operates the universe according to the laws of physics, which are named custom. However, this theory makes it possible for Allah, if He wills, to do extraordinary acts that are described as humanly extraordinary. Since the Fiqh and its Methodology, which is assisted by the science of kalām, is a science that is expected to judge according to the apparent, it seems to be contrary to his identity to make judgments by using the possibilities of the theory of custom. However, like the situation of a person who becomes a Muslim at the last moment of prayer, sometimes things get so tight that it becomes very difficult to judge according to outward appearance. Well, did the methodists look at the outward appearance and decide that this person is not responsible for the prayer of the aforementioned time, or did they come to a different conclusion by using the possibilities of the theory of custom. (shrink)

Ibn al-ʻArabī, 1165-1240.; Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam; criticism and interpretation; Islamic philosophy; early works to 1800.

In the history of philosophy, philosophers have defined philosophy based on their own perspectives. This situation shows that it is a difficult and meaningless endeavor to put forward an understanding of philosophy that has clear boundaries and is accepted by everyone. However, despite these differences in definitions, there are some common points. Perhaps the most important of these common points is that philosophy is a stance, a positioning activity in the face of truth. In this positioning, William James tried to (...) find the moderate path between the currents of rationalism and empiricism and took a stance based on concrete differences in life. Like the empiricists, he tried to keep people's relations with facts alive, but at the same time, he did not exclude religion by adopting a rationalist attitude. However, James argued that abstract concepts cannot have meaning unless they find their counterpart in life. According to James, a life based only on abstract principles would not be qualified. In this study, I will try reconciling William James’ attitude towards abstract principles with practical life. (shrink)

The epistemic basic structure of a society consists of those institutions that have the greatest impact on individuals’ opportunity to obtain knowledge on questions they have an interest in as citizens, individuals, and public officials. It plays a central role in the production and dissemination of knowledge and in ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate this knowledge. It includes institutions of science and education, the media, search engines, libraries, museums, think tanks, and various government agencies. This article identifies (...) two demands of justice that apply specifically to the institutions that belong to it. First, the epistemic basic structure should serve all citizens fairly and reliably. It should provide them with the opportunity to acquire knowledge they need for their deliberations about the common good, their individual good, and how to pursue them. Second, the epistemic basic structure should produce and disseminate the knowledge that various experts and public officials need to successfully pursue justice and citizens need to effectively exercise their rights. After arguing for these duties, I discuss what policies follow from them and respond to the worry that these duties have illiberal implications. (shrink)

Along with the legal opinions, the juristic proofs presented to underpin these legal opinions also occupy an important place in uṣūl al-fiqh. Thus, scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh strived to propound the proofs indicating the relevant theoretical principles in an apparent and definite way. As a result, the disputed and undisputed proofs ranked among al-adilla al-shar‘iyya have been abundantly addressed in the classical uṣūl al-fiqh works. However, although it is not mentioned as a part of legal sources in the uṣul literature, (...) there has been another proof subjected to legal reasoning (istidlāl): the practice of the companions. In this study, “the practices of the companions” is used in the contextual meaing of the verbal and practical positions of the entire companions or some of them on a specific topic of uṣūl al-fiqh. By this definition, the concept of the practice of the companions is separated from the concepts of qawl al-ṣaḥābī, ʿamal ahl al-Madīnah and the ijmāʿ al-ṣaḥābah. As a matter of fact, the concept of qawl al-ṣaḥābī signifies an opinion narrated from a single companion and neither supported nor opposed by other companions, and subjected to use of legal inference for obtaining practical legal rulings. In return, the concept of the practice of the companions signifies the position that the companions hold on a topic of uṣūl al-fiqh and does not stipulate the conditions that it must be an opinion of a single companion and be neither supported nor opposed by other companions. In addition, as being related to the legal theoretical issues and not restricted to a certain region, the concept of the practice of the companions is distinct from the ‘amal ahl al-Madīnah. Likewise, it also differed from the ijmāʿ al-ṣaḥābah because the latter concept indicates the consensus of all companions on a practical legal ruling whereas the practice of the companions amounts to both the consensus of the companions and their individual opinions on the matters of uṣūl al-fiqh. Having said that, the concept of the practice of the companions has some overlaps with the qawl al-ṣaḥābī and ijmāʿ al-ṣaḥābah. It is observed in the Hanafi tradition of uṣūl al-fiqh that the practices of the companions are presented as a proof of many principles of uṣūl al-fiqh. This is because of the fact that the companions have a significant role as being the first practitioners of the revelation and the leading figures of the tradition of fiqh. Due to these significant roles of the companions, a central position is given to their interpretation method of the divine text and the technique of issuing legal opinions in determination of theoretical principles. In this study, I examine the impact of the practices of the companions on the Hanafi legal theory focusing on the work of al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090), al-Uṣūl, and try to identify how Hanafi legal theory was grounded, departing from, overall or particular, companions’ practices. This study consists of two main parts. First, I provide the conceptual framework by analyzing the concepts of the companion and the companions’ practice. Second, I discussed the theoretical issues rested evidentially on the companions’ practice. Hence, this study excludes the instances of qawl al-ṣaḥābī, ijmāʿ al-ṣaḥābah and the companions’ practice if they are not resorted in proving the uṣūl al-fiqh principles. This work deals with issues on which theoretical principles grounded in reference to the practice of the companions under the headings; Kitāb, Sunnah, qıyās, naskh and alfāz. When instances of the companions’ practice are in abundance in a case, I just focus on the highly representative ones and shortly refer to the others. In the conclusion part, I provide the consequences achieved by this research and some final remarks on the topic. (shrink)

This essay analyzes key aspects of Heidegger’s critique of the picture (Bild) based on an objection to world-pictures as well as a negative understanding of two other related concepts: Gestell and Vorstellen (representation). The restrictive frames of world-pictures, Heidegger claims, must be opposed by instances of thinking and language use associated with poiesis. For him, the revelation of the world in poiesis results in a subject-less experience of things and words, akin to the experience of art and literature, and presumably (...) outside the representational hold of pictures. I argue against Heidegger’s repudiation of the picture by underscoring the inescapability of Vorstellen. Heidegger’s world may be seen as a world-picture as well as a particular system of representation that we associate with affective uses of language, i.e., a literary system similar to the one discussed by Wolgang Iser. (shrink)

Seemingly a minor part of L’Imaginaire, Sartre’s literary examples therein are of great significance especially in the way they highlight the implicit yet crucial role of linguistic signs and words in his psychology of the image. While commenting on the act of reading a novel, he views literary words practically as images, endowing them with both an affective and representative status and illustrating the word-image through the figure of a drawing or dessin. The novel’s word-images or dessins solve an important (...) problem in his phenomenology: in order to represent, they do not need an original perception as other, more typical images do. While the dessin suggests the opportune possibility of representation without presentation, it also introduces ambiguity in meaning, running counter to Sartre’s demand that linguistic signification be clear and transparent. Sartre attempts to contain such ambiguity by ascribing the image-like, representative use of words to poetry in What’s Literature? but I argue that the dessin indeed allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the linguistic sign and representation that covers both poetry and prose. (shrink)