Bibliography of A. A. Fraenkel (p. ix-x)--Axiomatic set theory. Zur Frage der Unendlichkeitsschemata in der axiomatischen Mengenlehre, von P. Bernays.--On some problems involving inaccessible cardinals, by P. Erdös and A. Tarski.--Comparing the axioms of local and universal choice, by A. Lévy.--Frankel's addition to the axioms of Zermelo, by R. Mantague.--More on the axiom of extensionality, by D. Scott.--The problem of predicativity, by J. R. Shoenfield.--Mathematical logic. Grundgedanken einer typenfreien Logik, von W. Ackermann.--On the use of Hilbert's [epsilon]-operator in scientific (...) theories, by R. Carnap.--Basic verifiability in the combinatory theory of restricted generality, by H. B. Curry.--Uniqueness ordinals in constructive number classes, by H. Putnam.--On the construction of models, by A. Robinson.--Interpretation of mathematical theories in the first order predicate calculus, by T. Skolem.--The elementary character of two notions from general algebra, by R. Vaught.--Foundations of arithmetic and analysis. Axiomatic method and intuitionism, by A. Heyting.--On rank-decreasing functions, by G. Kurepa.--On non-standard models for number theory, by E. Mendelson.--Concerning the problem of axiomatizability of the field of real numbers in the weak second order logic, by A. Mostowski.--Non-standard models and independence of the induction axiom, by M. O. Rabin.--Sur les ensembles raréfiés de nombres naturels, par W. Sierpinski.--Philosophy of logic and mathematics. Remarks on the paradoxes of logic and set theory, by E. W. Beth.--Logique formalisée et raisonnement juridique, par R. Feys.--Im Umkreis der sogenannten Raumprobleme, von H. Freudenthal.--Process and existence in mathematics, by H. Wang. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 148-168, March 2022.

Cette traduction inedite de l'oeuvre principale d'Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) apporte des contributions fondamentales a divers champs de la connaissance. Disciple de Husserl, Reinach propose une interpretation du monde social qui engage la phenomenologie sur le terrain des actes sociaux et des experiences individuelles qui les accompagnent, afin d'isoler les structures a priori qui sont au principe meme du droit positif. Le travail de Reinach s'inscrit egalement dans un champ d'analyse philosophique et linguistique centre sur les enonces dits performatifs, baptises (...) tels par Austin quelques decennies plustard. (shrink)

Adolf von Harnack auf schloss Elmau, von J. Müller.--Briefe Adolf von Harnacs an Johannes Müller.--Leben und erkennen, von A. Harnack.

"Well over one half of this brilliant new Monograph constitutes a major sequel to Professor Grunbaum's highly influential 1984 book The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique, which was labeled "magisterial" by Frank J. Sulloway, and "the most important book ever written on Freud's status as a scientist" by J. Allan Hobson. The importance of the present Monograph lies in the extent to which the author now goes beyond that earlier volume to offer new original ideas on fundamental themes." "Validation (...) in the Clinical Theory of Psycho-analysis: A Study in the Philosophy of Psycho-analysis contains Adolf Grunbaum's new basic critique of the psychoanalytic theory of transference in its role of an etiologic theory; it turns out that etiologic transference interpretations rest on fallacious causal inferences from so-called "meaning connections" between mental states: moreover, just these unsound inferences are the stock-in-trade of the "hermeneutic" reconstruction of psychoanalysis, which charges Freud with a "scientistic self-misunderstanding."" "This volume joins the issue with Marshall Edelson's defenses of the investigative viability of the single-subject case study method. As a spin-off from the import of the serious placebo challenge to psychoanalysis, this Monograph presents the author's widely recognized new account of the placebo concept across all of medicine and psychotherapy. Whereas Foundations of Psychoanalysis objected that Freud's dream theory was evidentially ill-founded, the burden of the present book is to give two new basic reasons for presuming the theory to be false. It also develops the import of the author's appraisal of psychoanalytic theory for the scrutiny of Freud's triadic psychology of religious belief in theism." "Since Sir Karl Popper's most detailed charge of pseudoscience against psychoanalysis in 1983 could not be examined for inclusion in the 1984 book, the present monograph shows in what ways it is wide of the mark as an incoherent diagnosis of the scientific liabilities of psychoanalytic theory. In addition, four important papers that had antedated Foundations by a few years and were scattered over diverse publications have been updated and integrated with the other chapters herein."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

Adolescence is recognised as a turbulent period of human development. Along with the physical changes of puberty, adolescents undergo significant transformations in the way they think, act, feel and perceive the world. The disruption that is manifest in their behaviour is upsetting and often incomprehensible to the adults surrounding them. In _The Adolescent Psyche_ Richard Frankel shows how this unique stage of human development expresses through its traumas and fantasies the adolescent's urge towards self-realization. The impact of contemporary culture (...) on the lives of young people has resulted in an increasing number of adolescents being referred for psychotherapy and psychiatric treatment. Successful outcomes are often difficult to achieve in clinical work with clients of this age-group. The advice and guidelines which Frankel provides will be welcomed by psychotherapists, parents, educators and anyone working with adolescents. (shrink)

This paper offers a refutation of P. Duhem's thesis that the falsifiability of an isolated empirical hypothesis H as an explanans is unavoidably inconclusive. Its central contentions are the following: 1. No general features of the logic of falsifiability can assure, for every isolated empirical hypothesis H and independently of the domain to which it pertains, that H can always be preserved as an explanans of any empirical findings O whatever by some modification of the auxiliary assumptions A in conjunction (...) with which H functions as an explanans. For Duhem cannot guarantee on any general logical grounds the deducibility of O from an explanans constituted by the conjunction of H and some revised non-trivial version R of A: the existence of the required set R of collateral assumptions must be demonstrated for each particular case. 2. The categorical form of the Duhemian thesis is not only a non-sequitur but actually false. This is shown by adducing the testing of physical geometry as a counterexample to Duhem in the form of a rebuttal to A. Einstein's geometrical articulation of Duhem's thesis. 3. The possibility of a quasi a priori choice of a physical geometry in the sense of Duhem must be clearly distinguished from the feasibility of a conventional adoption of such a geometry in the sense of H. Poincare. And the legitimacy of the latter cannot be invoked to save the Duhemian thesis from refutation by the foregoing considerations. (shrink)

Womit beschäftigt sich die medizinische Wissenschaft? Ich verstehe ja natürlich nichts davon, aber sie beschäftigt sich doch mit dem Menschen. Und die Juristerei, die Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung? Auch mit dem Menschen.

In comparing it with the mechanistic and vitalistic views, the author seeks to make clear the nature of holistic causality, referring toDonnan's equations as an example.Holistic causality is essentially dimensional simplification. A complex system which forms a whole must be described in the first instance autonomo-phenomenologically, and if possible mathematically. Thereafter it is simplified into other wholes of less dimensionality, through progressive elimination of its higher dimensions, and so on until there remain over constituents no longer showing „wholeness”. These are (...) called „atoms” in the general sense. In holistic thought we do not begin with the atom; it is found at the end of the process of simplification.All unitary systems which lie between the atoms — the ultimate terms of holistic simplification, no longer showing wholeness — and the highest world-whole which we call the universe, are relative wholes. Each of these unitary systems is a complete whole only with respect to those systems of lower dimension into which it can itself be simplified. On the other hand it is itself a partial whole in relation to the wholes of higher dimension to which it is subordinated. Accordingly all these systems are at the same time complete wholes and partial wholes.It follows from this principle, as indeed theDonnan equations show, that theoretical biology can be simplified into the complementary domain of theoretical physics, but that it is quite impossible to „deduce„ the principles and theorems of theoretical biology from those of theoretical physics, as all mechanistic doctrines maintain.L'auteur, en discutant les points de vue mécanistes et vitalistes, cherche à définir la causalité holistique tout en se référant aux équations deDonnan, qu'il prend comme exemple.La causalité holistique est essentiellement une simplification dimensionnale. Un système complexe, constituant une totalité, doit être décrit avant tout de façon autonomo-phénoménologique et — si possible — de façon mathématique. Ensuite il est simplifié de manière à former d'autres totalités de dimensionalité inférieure par suite de l'élimination progressive de ses dimensions supérieures et ainsi de suite jusqu'à ce qu'il n'en reste plus que les parties ne formant plus totalité. Celles-ci s'appellent „atomes” dans le sens propre du mot. Dans le holisme on ne commence pas par l'atome, qu'on trouve au contraire à la fin de la simplification.Tous les systèmes constituant une totalité et se trouvant entre les atomes en tant que restes de la simplification holistique, qui ne possèdent plus un caractère de totalité, et d'autre part la totalité mondiale la plus élevée, appelée Univers, sont des totalités relatives. Tout système constituant de cette façon une totalité, ne forme une totalité complète que pour ceux-là des systèmes de dimensions inférieures dans lesquels il peut être simplifié lui-même; par contre il constitue lui-même un membre-totalité pour les totalités de dimensions supérieures auxquelles il est luimême subordonné. Ainsi tous ces systèmes sont en même temps membres-totalités et totalités complètes.Il s'ensuit de ce principe, que, comme le démontrent aussi les équations deDonnan, la biologie théorique peut bien être simplifiée dans les domaines qui lui sont complémentaires de la physique théorique, mais qu'il est complètement impossible de dériver les principes et les théorèmes de la biologie théorique de ceux de la physique théorique, comme le prétendent toutes les doctrines mécanistes. (shrink)

Natural selection in the sense of Darwin always means physical propagation (positive case) or disappearance (negative case) of living organisms due to differential reproduction. If one concentrates on this simple materialist principle, one arrives at a much better method of discerning true selection processes from largely nonrandom processes of internal rearrangement (somatic mutations) and reorganisation (operant learning).

A tension between the professions' pursuit of autonomy and the public's demand for accountability has led to the development of codes of ethics as both a foundation and guide for professional conduct in the face of morally ambiguous situations. The profession as an institution serves as a normative reference group for individual practitioners and through a code of ethics clarifies, for both its members and outsiders, the norms that ought to govern professional behavior. Three types of codes can be identified (...) — aspirational, educational and regulatory. All codes serve multiple interests and, as a consequence, perform many functions, eight of which are discussed. The process of developing a code of ethics is assessed because of the role it plays in gaining consensus on professional values and ethical norms. After discussing some of the weaknesses in current approaches to professional self-regulation, several new private and public initiatives are proposed. (shrink)

Although there are numerous and significant differences between the theories of scientific growth and change proposed by Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan, they all hold that specific scientific theories should be viewed as constitutive of more comprehensive theories. Kuhn calls those more general theories ‘paradigms’, Lakatos labels them ‘research programmes’ and Laudan refers to them as ‘research traditions’. They all argue that scientists are much more willing to give up the specific theory within a given research programme rather than the programme (...) itself, and that individual theories should be viewed as attempts to increase the overall explanatory power of the more general theories, since the ultimate concern of the scientist is with the success of the general rather than the specific theory. When a basic theory or research programme is confronted with severe criticism, proponents attempt to protect the hard core or central elements of their programme through the invention of auxiliary hypotheses. Good auxiliary hypotheses adequately answer the objections for which they are designed, and suggest new avenues of research. In 1928, Arthur Holmes provided proponents of continental drift theory with an auxiliary hypothesis which afforded them a badly needed account of the forces responsible for continental drift. Although Holmes' proposal was not ultimately correct, it was the first plausible alternative offered by an exponent of the continental drift research programme. (shrink)

Spinoza resolves the tension between reason and revelation by granting reason complete authority and autonomy in all philosophical and natural matters, and by denying revelation any claims to knowledge. Despite this dramatic partisanship, he attempts to make this solution attractive to believers by creating a hermeneutic that allows a limited claim to knowledge for revelation. This article attempts to explain how he arrived at this strategy and why he believed it would succeed.

A collection of essays on civil religion in modern political philosophy, exploring the engagement between modern thought and the Christian tradition.

Adolf Reinach was a German phenomenologist and legal theorist. This is a previously-unpublished translation of Reinach’s 1905 dissertation for his PhD earned under Theodor Lipps at the University of Munich, which was published as “Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht” , and reprinted in Adolf Reinach, Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe [Collected Works: Critical Edition], Karl Schuhmann & Barry Smith, eds., 2 vols. , pp. 1–43.

Der Philosoph Adolf Lasson blickt auf einen der wichtigsten Vertreter des Deutschen Idealismus: Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Lasson diskutiert Fichtes Lehre und ordnet sie in die Denkströmungen der Zeit ein. Im Fokus seiner Arbeit steht jedoch Fichtes Verhältnis zu Kirche und Staat, das er kritisch hinterfragt. Sorgfältig bearbeiteter Nachdruck der Originalausgabe von 1863.

According to the biopsychosocial model, developed by the late Dr. George Engel, how physicians approach patients and the problems they present is very much ...

"Well over one half of this brilliant new Monograph constitutes a major sequel to Professor Grunbaum's highly influential 1984 book The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique, which was labeled "magisterial" by Frank J. Sulloway, and "the most important book ever written on Freud's status as a scientist" by J. Allan Hobson. The importance of the present Monograph lies in the extent to which the author now goes beyond that earlier volume to offer new original ideas on fundamental themes." "Validation (...) in the Clinical Theory of Psycho-analysis: A Study in the Philosophy of Psycho-analysis contains Adolf Grunbaum's new basic critique of the psychoanalytic theory of transference in its role of an etiologic theory; it turns out that etiologic transference interpretations rest on fallacious causal inferences from so-called "meaning connections" between mental states: moreover, just these unsound inferences are the stock-in-trade of the "hermeneutic" reconstruction of psychoanalysis, which charges Freud with a "scientistic self-misunderstanding."" "This volume joins the issue with Marshall Edelson's defenses of the investigative viability of the single-subject case study method. As a spin-off from the import of the serious placebo challenge to psychoanalysis, this Monograph presents the author's widely recognized new account of the placebo concept across all of medicine and psychotherapy. Whereas Foundations of Psychoanalysis objected that Freud's dream theory was evidentially ill-founded, the burden of the present book is to give two new basic reasons for presuming the theory to be false. It also develops the import of the author's appraisal of psychoanalytic theory for the scrutiny of Freud's triadic psychology of religious belief in theism." "Since Sir Karl Popper's most detailed charge of pseudoscience against psychoanalysis in 1983 could not be examined for inclusion in the 1984 book, the present monograph shows in what ways it is wide of the mark as an incoherent diagnosis of the scientific liabilities of psychoanalytic theory. In addition, four important papers that had antedated Foundations by a few years and were scattered over diverse publications have been updated and integrated with the other chapters herein."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

On the old story about early modern philosophy, Descartes is a “rationalist” who devalues the senses, and Berkeley an “empiricist” who rejects this. Berkeley plays into this story in his Notebooks, where he writes: “in vindication of the senses effectually to confute wt Descartes saith in ye last par. of the last Med: viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsly than truely”. But when we turn to this “last par.,” we find Descartes maintaining that “my senses report the truth (...) much more frequently than not”. In this paper, I draw on recent commentary to outline Descartes' positive account of sensation. I then look carefully at Berkeley's account of the same, in particular, by considering his distinction between human and divine perception and his account of the laws of nature. In so doing, I suggest that there are noteworthy parallels between Descartes' and Berkeley's accounts with respect to the function of sensation and the ways in which sensations can fulfill this function. I conclude by sketching some ways in which this understanding of Berkeley can illuminate some aspects of Berkeley scholarship. (shrink)