This paper describes and argues for the inclusion of a modified form of Venn diagrams in critical thinking courses and textbooks. The modified Venn Diagrams, it is argued, are easier to learn as they more clearly show the meanings of inclusion and exclusion, easier to use when solving problems (including those found on LSAT exams), are often included in LSAT preparatory material, and students tend to have a more thorough understanding of the concept of logical possibility after having used modified (...) Venn diagrams. (shrink)

The first century B.C. poet Lucretius put forth an argument for why death is not bad for the person who has died. This argument is commonly referred to as Lucretius’s “symmetry argument” because of its assumption that the period before we were born is symmetrical to the period after we die. Jeremy Simon objects to the symmetry argument, claiming that the two periods are not relevantly symmetrical: being born earlier than we actually are born would not guarantee us more life, (...) whereas extending our lifespan past the time we actually would die would guarantee us more life. Simon believes this difference between the two time periods also explains why it is reasonable for people to wish for a later death but not for an earlier birth. We raise several objections to Simon’s response. Our main objection is that insofar as people do not wish for an earlier birth, it is not because they fear losing more life, but rather is a result of being concerned about losing what is important about life, namely its unique content. (shrink)

In “Justice at the Margins: The Social Contract and the Challenge of Marginal Cases” (Southern Journal of Philosophy, 55.1), Nathan Bauer and David Svolba appeal to a concept of recognition found in social contract theory to argue that all humans, including humans who lack certain unique cognitive abilities, so‐called marginal cases, have rights that nonhuman animals lack. The main reason is that we can recognize ourselves in all humans, but not in nonhuman animals. I argue (i) that it is unclear (...) that we can recognize ourselves in certain types of marginal cases, such as corpses and embryos; (ii) that Bauer and Svolba’s reason for why we cannot recognize ourselves in nonhuman animals is questionable; and (iii) if we can recognize ourselves in any types of marginal cases, then we should be able to recognize ourselves in nonhuman animals. (shrink)