The aim of this paper is to prove strengthenings of three theorems appearing in Jensen [1].

When studying science contexts, scholars typically position charismatic authority as an adjunct or something that provides a meaning-laden boost to rational authority. In this paper, we re-theorize these relationships. We re-center charismatic authority as an interpretive resource that allows scientists and onlookers to recast a professional conflict in terms of a public drama. In this mode, both professionals and lay enthusiasts portray involvement in the scientific process as a story of suppression and persecution, in which only a few remarkable figures (...) can withstand scrutiny and take on challengers with dignity. Description and elaboration of these figures and the folklore surrounding them sets in motion the interpretive processes by which some actors become charismatic leaders and others charismatic followers within science, ultimately providing alternative symbolic resources for an embattled research agenda to accrue legitimacy. To illustrate, we use the case of Arthur Jensen – a deceased intelligence researcher and the intellectual father to contemporary texts like The Bell Curve – and the circles of hero worship that admirers inside and outside academia have created to praise him. Using this perspective to study Jensen and his admirers demonstrates how the perennial race and intelligence debates gain a kind of symbolic power, unrelated to their scientific merit or racist appeal, which enables such debates to thrive and persist in the public sphere. More generally, our approach identifies contemporary processes by which scientific ideas can gain public authority even when their intellectual merit has been deemed dubious. (shrink)

Jordi Fernandez has recently offered an interesting account of introspective justification according to which the very states that (subjectively) justify one's first-order belief that p justify one's second order belief that one believes that p. I provide two objections to Fernandez's account.

Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first‐order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assume (...) constructive “norms of practical reasoning” which yield particular truths without assuming them. But philosophers often mistakenly assume that only “formal” norms of reasoning could fulfill this role. The paper describes a further possibility: norms of reasoning can be “situation‐specific” and yet retain truth‐independent authority. Though we might doubt whether such norms can be independently defended, we should not doubt the possibility or coherence of constructivism about practical reasons. (shrink)

This paper suggests that “systemic risk” has a distinctive kind of moral significance. Two intuitive data points need to be explained. The first is that the systematic imposition of risk can be wrongful or unjust in and of itself, even if harm never ensues. The second is that, even so, there may be no one in particular to blame. We can explain both ideas in terms of what I call responsibilities of “Collective Due Care.” Collective Due Care arguably precludes purely (...) aggregative cost-benefit decision-making and requires one kind of “precautionary” attitude in public choice. (shrink)

This article critically re-reads György Márkus’s seminal Marxism and Anthropology in light of its recent reissue with an introduction by Hans Joas and Axel Honneth. Joas and Honneth problematically identify the normative source of Márkus’s position as an a-historical and extra-natural account of the human. In fact, when the human essence is thought as natural while also historical, developing new powers and needs through changing strategies of socially organized work, Marx’s materialist conception of history can be used to generate a (...) critique of social organizations, relations, and structures that constrain rather than promote such development. Such constraint on developing powers can be read as ‘alienation’ from the human essence. Márkus’s work develops this reading of Marx in a textually sensitive way, but his analysis of alienation in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 focuses on the individual when such analysis could in fact be profitably extended to apply to groups and the species as whole. (shrink)

People tend to be biased and irrational about politics. Should this constrain what our normative theories of democracy can require? David Estlund argues that the answer is ‘no’. He contends that even if such facts show that the requirements of a normative theory are very unlikely to be met, this need not imply that the theory is unduly unrealistic. I argue that the application of Estlund’s argument to political irrationality depends on a false presupposition: mainly, that being rational about politics (...) is something people could easily do if they tried. Since the empirical evidence shows that being rational about politics is actually quite difficult, Estlund’s argument comes up short. Moreover, I argue that the argument cannot plausibly be extended to insulate normative theories of democracy from facts about political irrationality because of the need for constraints of realism to explain the crucial role that appeals to (reasonable) disagreement play within such theories. (shrink)

The fact that philosophy is systematic—that philosophical issues are thoroughly interconnected—was a commonplace among nineteenth century idealists, then neglected by analytic philosophers throughout much of the twentieth century, and has now finally started to get some renewed attention. But other than calling attention to the fact, few philosophers have tried to say what it consists in, or what its implications are. -/- I argue that the systematicity of philosophy has disastrous epistemological implications. In particular, it implies philosophical skepticism: philosophers are (...) rationally prohibited from believing any philosophical thesis. The argument goes by way of a new principle that connects inquiry with what is rational to believe. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between my argument and other, more well-trodden arguments for philosophical skepticism. (shrink)

Spurred by a severe shortage of cadaveric organs, there has been a marked growth in living organ donation over the past several years. This has stimulated renewed interest in the ethics of this practice. The major concern has always been the possibility that a physician may seriously harm one person while trying to improve the well-being of another. As Carl Elliott points out, this puts the donor's physician in a difficult predicament: when evaluating a person who volunteers to donate an (...) organ, “a doctor is in the position of deciding not simply whether a subject's choice is reasonable … but whether he [the doctor] is morally justified in helping the subject accomplish it.”1 This question has become even more difficult since the introduction of living donor operations that are more risky than living kidney donation and the suggestion that volunteers at added risk may sometimes be acceptable.2 So, how can we decide when the risk is too much? (shrink)

That death is not a welfare issue appears to be a widespread view among animal welfare researchers. This paper demonstrates that this view is based on a mistaken assumption about harm, which is coupled to ‘welfare’ being conceived as ‘welfare at a time’. Assessments of welfare at a time ignore issues of longevity. In order to assess the welfare issue of death, it is necessary to structure welfare assessment as comparisons of possible lives of the animals. The paper also demonstrates (...) that excluding the welfare issues of being deprived of life from the ethical assessment of killing distorts the ethical considerations. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of the philosophy of Adam Smith by examining the place of history and the role of impartiality in his philosophy. A brief introduction to Smith and his writings is followed by discussions of impartiality and Smith’s engagement with the philosophical role of history and the historian. The section that follows focuses on Smith’s discussion of rights as providing a connection between his moral theory and history via the role of the impartial spectator. The chapter concludes (...) with a brief description of Smith’s history of moral systems. Throughout the chapter tries to show unified philosophical commitments in Smith’s range of writings. (shrink)

I am an historian in a country in which it is not only impossible to say what the future will be, but in which the past itself—as someone put it—is susceptible to change. This country is currently going through an unprecedented crisis that has turned both its material and political as well as spiritual life upside-down. The crisis, the roots of which stretch back over decades, has made life virtually unbearable for many of its citizens. Yet for the historian, and (...) for the philosopher and sociologist, this crisis affords an unusual opportunity. As a result of the earthquakes that have shaken the former Soviet Union, formerly hidden layers of history—and the forces that underpin them—have been revealed. Such cases do not often arise. To a scholar endeavoring to discover the secret springs of unfolding events, Russia represents a gigantic and unique “laboratory.” Although it is easier to judge the extent of a cataclysm, to comprehend its deeper import, after the event, this does not relieve the contemporary—who participates in historical events—of the duty of trying to understand, to the extent possible, the nature of the changes taking place. (shrink)

This chapter presents a general account of the speculative and practical moral philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland. It gives particular attention to three topics: the Scottish insistence that moral philosophy is an empirical, or ‘experimental’, science, grounded in what might now be called a phenomenology of the moral life, and intimately connected with the other elements of the ‘science of man’; the project of combining Hutchesonian moral sense theory with a Butlerian faculty of conscience; and the attempt to combine an empirical (...) and broadly anti-rationalist moral philosophy—a moral philosophy that had a central place for the concept of virtue, with a natural jurisprudence taken from Grotius and, especially, Pufendorf. Particular attention is paid to the practical moral philosophy which was the focus of much of the teaching of moral philosophy in Scotland. (shrink)

Surfers both cooperate and compete around a scarce natural resource – ocean waves suited for surfing – often with a fraught mix of motives and feelings, pro-social and anti-social. Much as surfers constantly adapt to a dynamic wave environment, their pro- and anti-social motives readily mix and shift, based on their interpretation of quickly changing context. What we learn from surfers is something materialistic focus on self-interest and realities of scarcity or abundance might de-emphasize or miss: a culture of interpretation (...) and reasoning (e.g. ‘localism’) is as important in the formation of shifting pro- and anti-social attitudes as the material reality of wave scarcity or abundance itself. (shrink)

Marilyn McCord Adams argues that God’s goodness to individuals requires God to defeat horrendous evils; it is not enough for God to outweigh these evils through compensatory goods. On her view, God defeats the evils experienced by an individual if and only if God’s goodness to the individual enables her to integrate the evil organically into a unified life story she perceives as good and meaningful. In this essay, we seek to apply Adams’s theodicy of defeat to a particular form (...) of suffering. We argue that God’s goodness to individuals requires that God defeat the suffering to which a range of disabilities can give rise. (shrink)

This paper attempts an analysis of Eusebius' polemical construction of Greek identity in his fifteen-book apologetic text, the Praeparatio Evangelica (written c. 315 c.e.). In particular, I argue that to limit Greek identity in this text to a religious position fails to appreciate the ethnic nature of Greekness for Eusebius and hence misconstrues his argument. If we attend to the ethnic vocabulary in the Praeparatio, Eusebius' argumentation can be better analyzed. His argument is then shown to center upon a polemical (...) retelling of Greek origins and a hostile portrayal of key Greek forefathers. (shrink)

In earlier work we proposed an account of information grounded in counterfactual conditionals rather than probabilities, and argued that it might serve philosophical needs that more familiar probabilistic alternatives do not. Demir [2008] and Scarantino [2008] criticize the counterfactual approach by contending that its alleged advantages are illusory and that it fails to secure attractive desiderata. In this paper we defend the counterfactual account from these criticisms, and suggest that it remains a useful account of information.

Exploramos las tensiones entre narración y materia en la obra de David Lynch. Partiendo de algunas investigaciones recientes -especialmente los trabajos de Català Domènech y Pacôme Thiellement-, proponemos una aproximación al problema de la materia lyncheana que tome como metodología el análisis formal del discurso. Comenzaremos preguntándonos por el uso mismo de la materia que el director aplica en sus creaciones en relación con el aura benjaminiana. En segundo lugar, propondremos un recorrido cronológico que nos permita explorar cómo ha sido (...) la evolución en su manejo de los materiales a partir de tres posibles etapas: el aprendizaje de los códigos artísticos pretéritos -tanto en lo que toca a la herencia de las bellas artes como al reciente pasado cinematográfico-, la paulatina quiebra de los mismos mediante el recurso del video digital o la cita postmoderna, y finalmente, el replanteamiento de sus propias imágenes en un contexto postdigital. (shrink)

Discussion of the relations between ethics and aesthetics has tended to focus on issues concerning judgement: for example, philosophers have often asked whether, or to what extent, ethical considerations of one sort or another should inform aesthetic verdicts. Much less discussed, however, have been the relations between these two domains in their practical aspects. In this paper, I try to defuse a cluster of reasons for believing that practical competence in the ethical domain and practical competence in the aesthetic domain (...) must be understood as importantly, or structurally, distinct from one another. (shrink)

McCullough et al. present a compelling case that anger-based revenge is designed to disincentivize the target from imposing costs on the vengeful individual. Here I present a contrast between revenge motivated by anger and revenge motivated by hatred, which remains largely unexplored in the literature.

The philosophical career of Josiah Royce is defined in part by his relationship with G. H. Howison. Biographically speaking, this assertion recalls the mythic tale of how Royce received his appointment at Harvard after James “forgot” about Howison.2 Philosophically speaking, however, Howison’s interchange with Royce concerning his philosophical conception of God in the 1895 debate held at Berkeley was a crucial intersection of these two philosophers that set the directions for their future work. It was a chance for Howison to (...) “get it on,” in the words of John McDermott,3 with Royce, in a philosophical bout for the championship title of American Idealism. Royce welcomed the opportunity to return to his alma mater... (shrink)

Research regulations around the world do not impose any limits on the risks to which consenting adults may be exposed. Nonetheless, most review committees regard some risks as too high, even for consenting adults. To justify this practice, commentators have appealed to a range of considerations which are external to informed consent and the risks themselves. Most prominently, some argue that exposing consenting adults to very high risks has the potential to undermine public trust in research. This justification assumes that (...) it is not the magnitude of the risks themselves which raises concern, but the way in which the public might respond to them. This justification thus depends on the possibility that the public will find out about the risks and respond to them in the specified way. Like the other proposed external justifications, it thereby fails to offer a reason to think that exposing consenting adults to very high risks is problematic in itself. In the present paper, we describe and endorse a different justification. Rather than appealing to external factors, we argue that limits on risks for consenting adults trace to internal limits on informed consent, to limits on the things consent can and cannot make ethically permissible. In doing so, we aim to provide a firmer conceptual basis for the view that some research risks are unacceptably high, no matter how the research is conducted. (shrink)

This volume covers the major traditions of thought from Philo to Levinas and, since Jewish philosophy has occurred in broader environments, non-Jewish thinkers who have had an important influence on Jewish philosophy are also included.

History was a continuous cycle driven by the gods. Societies began by being small, impoverished, and insignificant, then became great, then proud and decadent, and finally were overthrown by a different small, impoverished people, with the cycle beginning anew. Herbert's historical universe in Dune is bound within a series of ever repeating cycle. Herbert's themes about human action, fatalism versus free will, and the repetition of religious motifs across vast distances of space and time. Greek mythology and tragedy appear on (...) the very first page of Dune with the use of a single word: Atreides. Much like in the Dune series, History emerged in the ancient Greek world by combining mythology, epic narrative, and tragedy. The Golden Path is the death of the constant cycles of imperialism and the freeing of humanity from constantly repeating old mistakes. (shrink)

When a new girl arrives at school, Kirsten is jealous, completely forgetting how scared and lonely she felt the year before when she was the new girl in school. Gives instructions for making a friendship pillow like those made in the 1850s.