This book defends an interpretation of Peirce’s philosophical work as forming a systematic whole, emphasizing his empiricist epistemology and explaining the roots of his thought in earlier empiricist and common sense philosophers. In particular, the book develops the connections between Peirce, Reid, and the British empiricists, and provides focused analyses of Peirce’s accounts of experience, habit, perception, semeiosis, truth, and ultimate ends.

Whether in Plato’s Sophist or in Quine’s “Plato’s Beard,”1 the representation of unreal or non-existent objects is usually presented as a puzzle. How is it that we can think and talk coherently about things that do not exist or are not real, given that thinking and talking about such things seem to involve relations between things that exist and things that don’t exist? Uriah Kriegel articulates the problem most generally as the following inconsistent triad:One can think of non-existents.One cannot bear (...) a relation to non-existents.Thinking of something involves bearing a relation to it.2Each of these propositions is difficult to reject. Experience and introspection seem to... (shrink)

On Peirce’ view, we can perceive many things commonly thought not to be perceptible—or thought to be ‘abstract’—including but not necessarily limited to (some) generals or universals, habits or law-like properties, modal properties, and semeiotic properties (sign relations). My contention turns on his arguments in ‘Some Consequences’ that ‘no cognition of ours is absolutely determinate’, his mature account of perception, particularly his criteria for what counts as perception and what does not, his analysis of the predication of concepts (i.e. his (...) pragmaticism), his claims in the 1903 Harvard lectures that we directly perceive Thirdness, and his realism about generals, habits, modalities, and sign relations. (shrink)

Locke characterizes sensitive knowledge as knowledge of the existence of external objects present to the senses, and in terms of an ‘assurance’ that falls short of the certainty of intuition and demonstration. But it is unclear how this fits with his general definition of knowledge, as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, and it is unclear how that assurance can amount to knowledge, rather than amounting to mere probability (which he contrasts with knowledge). Some contend that Locke (...) does not regard sensitive knowledge as genuine knowledge, but only honourifically calls it knowledge. In contrast, I argue that Locke holds that sensitive knowledge is knowledge, though he takes the conditions for it to be very different from the conditions for intuitive and demonstrative knowledge. It is not the assurance alone which Locke thinks qualifies sensitive knowledge as such: it is also the fact that the assurance arises from the actual employment of the senses upon external objects, and the fact that the senses do not generally deceive us, which he thinks qualifies sensitive knowledge as genuine knowledge. That there is a (tacit) form of externalism in Locke's account of sensitive knowledge is the main thesis of this paper. (shrink)

Most specialists agree that Peirce upholds his abstract definitions of reality and truth simultaneously and consistently with his pragmatist clarifications of those concepts. But some might assume that his pragmatist clarifications (the third grade of clearness) restrict the extensions of abstract definitions (the second grade of clearness), such that anything real must both be independent of what anyone thinks about it, per the abstract definition, and be an object of the would-be “final opinion”, per the pragmatist clarification. I call this (...) reading Interpretive Dependence of the second grade of clearness on the third grade. In contrast, on Interpretive Independence, which I defend here, a concept can have a different extension on the second grade than it has on the third grade, such that it could be true, in a purely abstract sense, that there are realities that can never be known (metaphysical realism). “True” here must also be interpreted only according to an abstract definition, namely, one which Peirce endorses in 1906 and which, I argue, is a deflationary definition. Interpretive Independence not only allows Peirce to explain the intuitive appeal of metaphysical realism, while at the same time rejecting it, it also allows him to explain how there can be truths about fictional objects and truths in pure mathematics. (shrink)

What exactly are Peirce’s views about the a priori?1Though the term “a priori” and others derived from it do not occur in Peirce’s writings very frequently, they occur often enough to motivate the above question. Their best known appearance is in his “The Fixation of Belief ”, in which he famously rejects the “a priori method” in favor of the “scientific method”. Of course, we cannot take this rejection alone as sufficient evidence that his philosophy is incompatible with any claim (...) to a priori knowledge or justification, since what he opposes as the a priori method is not necessarily representative of all theories having a positive role for the a.. (shrink)

The use of participatory methods has become increasingly popular in agricultural research and development and natural resource management. A range of approaches are being used at the grassroots level in order to involve local citizens and groups in projects. Many of these activities remain peripheral and isolated from conventional development agencies and policies. However, recent efforts are evolving to link participatory approaches into wider planning and policy-making processes and to increase the influence of such methods in resource management initiatives. Main (...) lessons from these innovative participatory experiences in addressing policy issues for sustainable development are summarized. (shrink)

A Book Review of J. Aaron Simmons and Bruce Ellis Benson's The New Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction.

Offers a compelling vision of how to achieve and conduct a liberal but democratic society through the ideal of Neutrality--between people and ideas of the good--and using the tool of Neutral dialogue.

Crowdfunded microfinance provides financial resources to impoverished entrepreneurs across the globe based on online appeals describing the entrepreneur’s values and venture potential and is considered a key player in the ethical finance movement. Despite knowledge that the content of the appeals impacts funding success, little is known regarding the role of religious expression, which is common and consequential in socially-oriented contexts. We leverage role congruity theory to address a theoretical tension concerning the effects of religious expression on crowdfunded microfinance funding (...) outcomes. Religious expression is associated with perceptions of trustworthiness, rule-following, and ethicality—qualities that would suggest an entrepreneur would likely avoid opportunist behavior and repay the loan. However, appeals to a higher power may be incongruent with the role of an entrepreneur to the extent that such expression communicates a lack of proactiveness and self-reliance. We use a two-study design to help resolve this tension. Our field study incorporating 253,130 loans from Kiva reveals that religious expression negatively influences funding, particularly for women. Our experiment using 1,795 individual loan assessments shows that the negative influence of religious expression is attenuated when individual lenders exhibit higher levels of religiosity. Post hoc analysis suggests campaigns can mitigate the negative impact of religious expression by being careful to also include aspects highlighting an entrepreneurial orientation. Overall, our work extends prior research suggesting that language tied to ethical or virtuous behaviors is generally not rewarded by lenders as using such language may make the applicant appear inconsistent with role of a stereotypical entrepreneur. (shrink)

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant attempts to argue a priori from the indefinite divisibility of space to the indefinite metaphysical divisibility of matter. This is one type of argument from the continuity of space—purportedly established by Euclidean geometry—to the continuity of matter. I compare Kant's argument to parallel reasoning in Du Châtelet, whose work he knew. Both philosophers appeal to idealism about matter in their reasoning, yet also face difficulties in explaining why continuity, though not some other (...) properties from geometry, applies to matter. Both also risk inconsistency in adopting potentialist accounts of material parts, while also committing to realism about infinitesimals. An important difference between them is that Du Châtelet deploys at least three definitions of continuity; only one of these, amounting to indefinite divisibility, is shared with Kant. (shrink)

Newton certainly regarded his second law of motion in the Principia as a fundamental axiom of mechanics. Yet the works that came after the Principia, the major treatises on the foundations of mechanics in the eighteenth century—by Varignon, Hermann, Euler, Maclaurin, d’Alembert, Euler (again), Lagrange, and Laplace—do not record, cite, discuss, or even mention the Principia’s statement of the second law. Nevertheless, the present study shows that all of these scientists do in fact assume the principle that the Principia’s second (...) law asserts as a fundamental axiom in their mechanics. (For what that second law asserts, we rely on Newton’s own testimony.) Some, like Varignon and Hermann, assume the axiom implicitly, apparently unaware that any assumption is being made, while others, like Maclaurin and Euler, assume the axiom explicitly, apparently unaware that the assertion assumed is the second law as Newton himself understood it. But in every case these scientists employ the principle asserted by the Principia’s second law fundamentally, unaware that they should be citing Neutonus, Prin., Phil. Nat. Math., Lex II. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to summarise and justify critical comments I have been making over several decades about research on consciousness by philosophers, scientists and engineers. This includes (a) explaining why the concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (P-C), in the sense defined by Ned Block, is semantically flawed and unsuitable as a target for scientific research or machine modelling, whereas something like the concept of "access consciousness" (A-C) with which it is often contrasted refers to phenomena that can be described (...) and explained within a future scientific theory, and (b) explaining why the "hard problem" is a bogus problem, because of its dependence on the P-C concept. It is compared with another bogus problem, "the 'hard' problem of spatial identity" introduced as part of a tutorial on semantically flawed concepts. Different types of semantic flaw and conceptual confusion not normally studied outside analytical philosophy are distinguished. The semantic flaws of the "zombie" argument, closely allied with the P-C concept are also explained. These topics are related both to the evolution of human and animal minds and brains and to requirements for human-like robots. The diversity of the phenomena related to the concept "consciousness" as ordinarily used makes it a polymorphic concept, partly analogous to concepts like "efficient", "sensitive", and "impediment" all of which need extra information to be provided before they can be applied to anything, and then the criteria of applicability differ. As a result there cannot be one explanation of consciousness, one set of neural associates of consciousness, one explanation for the evolution of consciousness, nor one machine model of consciousness. We need many of each. I present a way of making progress based on what McCarthy called "the designer stance", using facts about running virtual machines, without which current computers obviously could not work. I suggest the same is true of biological minds, because biological evolution long ago "discovered" a need for something like virtual machinery for self-monitoring and self-extending information-processing systems, and produced far more sophisticated versions than human engineers have so far achieved. (shrink)

Genomics research is regularly appropriated in social and political contexts to publicly legitimize unjust and malicious political views, policies, and actions. In recent years, there have been high‐profile cases of mass shooters, public intellectuals, and political insiders using genomics findings to convince audiences that deadly force and coercive policies against racial minorities are warranted. To create a just genomics, geneticists must consider what makes their research so attractive and adaptable for the legitimization of unjust ends and what they can do (...) to counter such appropriations. We offer insights and recommendations drawing from our research into the many ways online white nationalist and far‐right political movements mobilize genetics research to promote their racist, sexist, antisemitic, and homophobic views. First, geneticists should identify and change routine research practices that feed eugenic thinking. Second, geneticists should adopt creative extra‐scholarly communication efforts to counter the use of their field's research that occurs in nonscholarly spaces. Third, we identify permissive epistemological and professional practices within the genetics field that have enabled such unjust appropriations to thrive, and we recommend strategies for institutional reform. (shrink)

This anthology discusses important issues surrounding environmental law and economics and provides an in-depth analysis of its use in legislation, regulation and legal adjudication from a neoclassical and behavioural law and economics perspective. Environmental issues raise a vast range of legal questions: to what extent is it justifiable to rely on markets and continued technological innovation, especially as it relates to present exploitation of scarce resources? Or is it necessary for the state to intervene? Regulatory instruments are available to create (...) and maintain a more sustainable society: command and control regulations, restraints, Pigovian taxes, emission certificates, nudging policies, et cetera If regulation in a certain legal field is necessary, which policies and methods will most effectively spur sustainable consumption and production in order to protect the environment while mitigating any potential negative impact on economic development? Since the related problems are often caused by scarcity of resources, economic analysis of law can offer remarkable insights for their resolution. Part I underlines the foundations of environmental law and economics. Part II analyses the effectiveness of economic instruments and regulations in environmental law. Part III is dedicated to the problems of climate change. Finally, Part IV focuses on tort and criminal law. The twenty-one chapters in this volume deliver insights into the multifaceted debate surrounding the use of economic instruments in environmental regulation in Europe. (shrink)

Comparative religious ethics is a complicated scholarly endeavor, striving to harmonize intellectual goals that are frequently conceived as quite different, or even intrinsically opposed. Against commonly voiced suspicions of comparative work, this essay argues that descriptive, comparative, and normative interests may support rather than conflict with each other, depending on the comparison in question, and how it is pursued. On the basis of a brief comparison of the early Christian Augustine of Hippo and the early Confucians Mencius and Xunzi on (...) the topic of "human nature," this paper advocates a particular account of comparative religious ethics, and argues for the complexity of the idea of "human nature." Different elements of this family of concerns are central to religious ethics generally, and to theories and practices of moral development and personal formation specifically. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8.4 (2001) 317-322 [Access article in PDF] On Wolfgang Blankenburg, Common Sense, and Schizophrenia Aaron L. Mishara Introduction In its increasing openness to neuroscience (Cowan, Harter, and Kandel 2000) and other of its neighboring disciplines, mainstream biological psychiatry has allowed psychopathology, philosophy, and philosophical approaches to psychopathology to play an increased role in current research interests. Given this new openness, and the acknowledgment of (...) the severity of one of psychiatry's most debilitating, costly, and intractable disorders, 1 the translation of W. Blankenburg's 1969 article concerning the psychopathology of common sense does not merely serve historical interest. It is an exceptional example of a not well-known trend in German- and French-speaking psychiatry to apply philosophical phenomenology and existentialism to psychopathological research. This trend, which reached a peak in the late 1950s and was strong well into the 1970s, has dwindling, but nevertheless, current representatives in Heidelberg and Zurich and is scattered in a few other places in Europe, Japan, the United States, and South America. The view of the Zeitgeist—which may sound astonishing, even antiquated to contemporary readers—was highly ambitious: Conceptual approaches, such as philosophical ("transcendental") phenomenology, were expected to supply knowledge about the structure of consciousness and its disturbance in various mental disorders.Following the lead of Binswanger and Szilasi, who viewed schizophrenia as an "experiment of nature" that enables us to view underlying processes otherwise hidden to "natural, everyday consciousness," Blankenburg believed that it may be possible to map the formal properties of the psychopathology of schizophrenia—precisely in the loss of common sense—as a disturbance to the basic organization of conscious experience. Any attempt to summarize this rather abstract and complex approach in a brief commentary would be ill advised. In passing, rather, I will remark that such efforts could have profound relevance to the current research of schizophrenia and its underlying neurobiology. This research has gradually acknowledged the importance of taking the patient's subjective experience of the disorder into account (Mishara, Parnas, and Naudin 1998). In this commentary, I will first give an account of the biographical and clinical reasons that led Blankenburg to turn to the problem of common sense and its relevance for schizophrenia. I will then explore what implications [End Page 317] his work may have for more recent findings concerning schizophrenia. Blankenburg's Intellectual Development Born in 1928, W. Blankenburg, the son of a Lufthansa pilot who pioneered transatlantic commercial flights, began his studies in Freiburg im Breisgau in 1947. While at Freiburg, Blankenburg heard lectures in philosophy given by E. Fink (the former assistant to Husserl) and Max Mueller, and in psychology, by R. Heiss and others. After three years, Blankenburg turned to the study of medicine, producing a dissertation in 1956 on an application of Daseinsanalysis (Heidegger and Binswanger) to a case of paranoid schizophrenia. Binswanger wrote the forward to the publication. Between 1956 and 1958, Blankenburg studied internal medicine in Heidelberg with the accomplished phenomenologist of bodily experience (Leibphaenomenologer) and student of V. von Weizsaecker Herbert Pluegge. He spent one semester in Goettingen where he attended lectures by the ontological philosopher Nicolai Hartmann, who provided for Blankenburg a more useful approach to the problem of nature and natural science than Heidegger's primary emphasis on the question of Being. During his Freiburg years, Blankenburg attended small seminars led by Heidegger in the Schwarzwald forest. (Heidegger had been forbidden to teach after the end of World War II.) Blankenburg recalls that the participants would sit on logs in an open field as if to invoke Heidegger's concept of the clearing (Lichtung) of Being. While not entirely sympathetic with Heidegger's philosophy, Blankenburg learned to carefully "listen"—as Heidegger would repeatedly emphasize—to language, not merely poetic or philosophical language, but the language of the patients he would meet in clinical practice.During this time, Blankenburg heard lectures by W. Szilasi, the philosopher-scientist who held Husserl's and Heidegger's chair in the department of philosophy. Szilasi collaborated with the phenomenological psychiatrist, L. Binswanger. Their effort to apply concepts from Husserl's... (shrink)

After preparing the way with comments on evanescent quantities and then Newton’s interpretation of his second law, this study of Proposition II (Book I)— Proposition II Every body that moves in some curved line described in a plane and, by a radius drawn to a point, either unmoving or moving uniformly forward with a rectilinear motion, describes areas around that point proportional to the times, is urged by a centripetal force tending toward that same point. —asks and answers the following (...) questions: When does a version of Proposition II first appear in Newton’s work? What revisions bring that initial version to the final form in the 1726 Principia? What, exactly, does this proposition assert? In particular, what does Newton mean by the motion of a body “urged by a centripetal force”? Does it assert a true mathematical claim? If not, what revision makes it true? Does the demonstration of Proposition II persuade? Is it as convincing, for example, as the most convincing arguments of the Principia? If not, what revisions would make the demonstration more persuasive? What is the importance of Proposition II, to the physics of Book III and the mathematics of Book I? (shrink)

The ‘hard problem’ is hard because of the special epistemological status of consciousness, which does not, however, preclude its scientific investigation. Data from phenomenologically trained observers can be combined with neurological investigations to establish the relation between experience and neurodynamics. Although experience cannot be reduced to physical phenomena, parallel phenomenological and neurological analyses allow the structure of experience to be related to the structure of the brain. Such an analysis suggests a theoretical entity, an elementary unit of experience, the protophenomenon, (...) which corresponds to an activity site in the brain. The structure of experience is determined by connections between these activity sites; the connections correspond to temporal patterns among the elementary units of experience, which can be expressed mathematically. This theoretical framework illuminates several issues, including degrees of consciousness, nonbiological consciousness, sensory inversions, unity of consciousness and the unconscious mind. (shrink)

Principia (Book 1, Sect. 6), Newton's Lemma 28 on the algebraic nonintegrability of ovals has had an unusually mixed reception. Beginning in 1691 with Jakob Bernoulli (who accepted the lemma) and Huygens and Leibniz (who rejected it and offered counterexamples), Lemma 28 has a history of eliciting seemingly contradictory reactions. In more recent times, D.T. Whiteside in 1974 gave an “unchallengeable counterexample,” while the mathematician V.I. Arnol'd in 1987 sided with Bernoulli and called Newton's argument an “astonishingly modern topological proof.” (...) This disagreement mostly stems, we argue, from Newton's vague statement of the lemma. Indeed, we identify several different interpretations of Lemma 28, any one of which Newton may have been intending to assert, and we then test a number of proposed counterexamples to see which, if any, are true counterexamples to one or more of these versions of the lemma. Following this, we study Newton's argument for the lemma to see whether and where it fails to be convincing. In the end, our study of Newton's Lemma 28 provides an answer to the question, Who is right: Huygens, Leibniz, Whiteside and the others who reject the lemma, or Bernoulli, Arnol'd, and the others who accept it? (shrink)

Why do states who are committed to the principle of civilian immunity and the protection of non-combatants end up killing and injuring large numbers of civilians during their military operations? Bugsplat explains this paradox through an in-depth examination of five conflicts fought by Western powers since 1989.

Medical ethical thought, imbued with the idealism of traditional medicine, has always grappled with the problem of translating abstract principles into actions that do not violate the sensibilities of the patient or the physician. The problem of translation is minimal for the family physician engaged in routine conversations with patients and their family members. This conversation — staying with details, maintaining the union of values and facts, reflecting without detaching or distancing — suggests a model of ethical reasoning and problem-solving (...) that warrants serious attention. (shrink)

Use of quantum probability as a top-down model of cognition will be enhanced by consideration of the underlying complex-valued wave function, which allows a better account of interference effects and of the structure of learned and ad hoc question operators. Furthermore, the treatment of incompatible questions can be made more quantitative by analyzing them as non-commutative operators.

Despite societal expectations that graduate students in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines integrate broader impacts into their professional activities, few of them actually receive any formal training in this area. This paper describes a graduate seminar entitled “Broader Impacts of Natural Sciences on Society” taught at the University of Florida in 2006 and 2008. In addition to course goals, recruitment, expectations, format, content, and outcomes, this paper describes challenges and recommendations for others who might want to teach a (...) similar course. (shrink)

. The author argues, by analyzing the logic implicit in scientific and religious statements, that these two kinds of statements belong to different universes of discourse. Religious statements are not admissible into scientific discourse and scientific statements are not admissible into religious discourse. This separation of discourse into universes of discourse is based on validity conventions which legislate different kinds of truth criteria for statements in different universes.