I have conducted a similar investigation on a text by a different author. The results of this investigation, which was performed on a text passage of 100,000 letters, are presented in the following tables from which one can see how and to what extent the limit theorems of the calculus of probability actually become evident.

Articles, on metaphysics, originally published in Siḷumiṇa, weekly Sinhalese newspaper and written by Ven. Baḷangoḍa Ānandamaitreya.

Context: The theory of radical constructivism offers a tool for the evaluation of knowledge in general: especially with regard to its epistemic and ontological character. This applies in particular to knowledge that is non-cognitive, such as, e.g., ethical convictions. Problem: What impact can radical constructivism have on the topic of ethics? Specifically, how can ethical issues be resolved within a radical-constructivist epistemic approach? Method: I extend the theory of radical constructivism to include also items of non-cognitive knowledge. This makes it (...) possible to discuss ethical issues, which are non-cognitive, in a constructivist epistemic and ontological perspective. Some arguments against this conception of “strictly personal ethics” are discussed. Results: Radical constructivism is neutral on ethical issues, and thus cannot be invoked to endorse any particular ethical position. However, this causes no problem for the theory: the individual knower will construct her own ethical values and convictions, as part of her store of non-cognitive knowledge, in interaction with her environment (including other individuals. Hence ethical values cannot be argued in cognitive terms; and this elevates the knower into a position of personal responsibility with respect to ethical issues. Constructivist content: I focus on the role played by radical constructivism in the approach to cognitive vs. non-cognitive knowledge. The construction of knowledge (of any kind) emerges as a strictly personal enterprise. For instance, in the context addressed here, constructed non-cognitive knowledge forms a basis for the individual knower’s ethical position. (shrink)

Classification is one of the distinctive features of Paralympic sport. Despite the existence of classification rules and a well-defined classification process, some Paralympic athletes intentionally misrepresent their abilities to classifiers in order to be allocated to a lower performing competition class, in which they secure an unfair advantage over other athletes. Such deception undermines the integrity of the competition by exploiting a vulnerability in the classification process. Such manipulation is hard to mitigate and harder still to prove that an athlete (...) had; intentionally misrepresented their abilities or; failed for innocent reasons to make maximum efforts during the classification or; had acted under coercive pressure from others in their entourage or environment. These challenges are compounded in the case of Paralympic athletes that have an intellectual impairment or who are accompanied by a parent/guardian who acts as a proxy, rendering evaluations as to responsibility even more complex. This article presents a conceptual analyses of intentional misrepresentation of abilities in Paralympic sport, and the differentiation of responsibility for offence thereupon, as stipulated in the draft of the International Standard for Intentional Misrepresentation, accompanying the new 2025 Athlete Classification Code (IPC, Citation2024). Drawing on philosophical and legal analysis we (i) set out existing shortcomings associated with Paralympic classification; (ii) articulate the range of potential intentional misrepresentational acts with respect to classification manipulation; and (iii) articulate the range of negative effects on the integrity of Paralympic sport. (shrink)

Description from a book review by J. G. Beebe-Center: "Mr. Allen's book develops in detail the view that pleasure and unpleasure are essentially manifestations of the progression and thwarting of impulses. Part one is a brief summary of the principal theories of feeling. Part two is devoted to "sensory" or "bodily" pleasure and unpleasure. These forms of feeling, it is argued, 'depend on an analogue of conation existing in the organism, a nisus to maintain, or to carry out to the (...) full extent, the functioning proper to the bodily system.' Part three -- the piece de resistance (about half the book) -- deals with the relation of pleasure and unpleasure to the main instincts. Parts four, five and six take up a number of classical problems: the relation of pleasure and unpleasure to sensation, their relation to desire, the relativity of feelings, the qualitative variety of feelings, and the psychology of values. The author shows throughout a rare combination of historicophilosophical sophistication and of first-hand familiarity with the modern experimental literature.". (shrink)