"The French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche popularized the doctrine of occasionalism in the late seventeenth century. Occasionalism is the thesis that God alone is the true cause of everything that happens in the world, and created substances are merely "occasional causes." This doctrine was originally developed in medieval Islamic theology, and was widely rejected in the works of Christian authors in medieval Europe. Yet despite its heterodoxy, occasionalism was revived starting in the 1660s by French and Dutch followers of the philosophy (...) of René Descartes. Since the 1970s, there has been a growing body of literature on Malebranche and occasionalism. There has also been new work on the Cartesian occasionalists before Malebranche - including Arnold Geulincx, Geraud de Cordemoy and Louis de la Forge. But to date there has not been a systematic, book-length study of the reasoning that led Cartesian thinkers to adopt occasionalism, and the relationship of their arguments to Descartes' own views. This book expands on recent scholarship, to provide the first comprehensive account of seventeenth century occasionalism. Part I contrasts occasionalism with a theory of divine providence developed by Thomas Aquinas, in response to medieval occasionalists; it shows that Descartes' philosophy is compatible with Aquinas' theory, on which God "concurs" in all the actions of created beings. Part 2 reconstructs the arguments of Cartesians - such as Cordemoy and a Forge - who used Cartesian physics to argue for occasionalism. Finally, it shows how Malebranche's case for occasionalism combines philosophical theology with Cartesian metaphysics and mechanistic science"--. (shrink)

This paper is the first of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some scholars ? including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber ? take Descartes to be a `partial' Occasionalist, who thinks that God alone is the cause of all natural motion. Contra this interpretation, I agree with literature that links Descartes to the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. This paper surveys this literature, and argues that it has failed to provide an interpretation of Descartes's view that both distinguishes (...) his position from that of his later, Occasionalist followers and is consistent with his broader metaphysical commitments. I provide an analysis that tries to address these problems with earlier `Concurentist' readings of Descartes. On my analysis, Occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. As I read him, Descartes thinks that bodies have active causal powers that are partly grounded in their intrinsic natures. But I argue ? pace a recent account by Tad Schmaltz ? that Descartes also thinks that God immediately causes all motion in the created world. On the picture that emerges, Descartes's position is both continuous with, and a subtle departure from, the Thomisitic theory of divine concurrence. (shrink)

84 B. ζῆν τε οῐεται οὕτω δεῖν … καὶ… ἀϕικομένη ἀπάλλαττεσθαι. Surprise has been expressed at this nominative after οἲεται δεῖν. Cf. Magna Moralia II. xi. 31, οὐκοἲ ονται δεῖν αὐτοι ϕιλεῖν ἀλλ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνδεεστέρων οἲονται δεῖν αὐϒοῖ ϕιλεῖσθαι. Herodian Hist. I. X. 4, ῲήθη δεῖν μέϒα τι δράσας κατορθῶσαι. Isocrates ix. 30, οὐΧ ἠϒήσαϒο δεῖν χωρίον καταλαβὼν και τὸ σῶμα ἐν ἀσϕαλείᾀ καταστήσας περιιδειν.… Either such phrases were so common that οἲομαι δεῖν came to be thought of as (...) a single word, in which δεῖν did not count, or else this use comes from adding δεῖν superfluously to a primitive use of οἲομαι with an infinitive. It is of course common enough to say οἲομαι ϕιλεῖν in good Attic for ‘I think fit to love.’ I should prefer the latter hypothesis myself: οῐομαι is properly to ‘carry’ or ‘bear’ so οἲομαι ϕιλείν is ‘I propose to love,’ and then δεῖν was added, especially when οἲομαι had come to mean ‘I think.’ There is a good instance of the primitive use of οἲω in Odyss. xix. 312, ῶδʹἀνὰ θυμὸν οἲεται surely this is simply ‘it is borne in upon my mind,’ ‘je suis porté à croir’. Anyhow οἲομαι or ἡ ϒοῦμαι δειν may be followed by a nominativeand infinitive. (shrink)

It seems to have been assumed that Lucretius elides final s promiscuously, as Ennius does, at any part of the line. The following statement of facts will show that the truth is very different: I take all cases where the reading appears certain. He has twenty-eight such elisions at the end of the fifth foot, including the emended ii. 623, 975, 986, v. 1410; ten at the weak caesura of the fifth foot, including the emended iii. 198, 1016, v. 949, (...) 1106. But except in these two positions the elison is quite rare and exceptional. I will begin the exceptions by giving a peculiar group: ii. 5, omm' sit. 458, omnibu' sunt , 1079, aliquoiu' siet , iv. 493, coloribu' sint, 1152, corpori' sunt, 1268, opu' sunt, v. 456, minoribu' sunt, 1445, priu' sunt; all these are from the first four feet, but evidently to Lucretius a combination like opu' sunt is very different from, say, opu' fit. Indeed, I take it that opusit was to him just one word like necessest; the following s in sit and sunt helps, perhaps, and so the solitary instance in Catullus is before s; at any rate, this group is obviously exceptional. There remain only two elisions at the end of the fourth foot, iv. 1035 and the emended vi. 972; two at the end of the second foot, immutabili' in i. 591, and immortalibu' in v. 53, both due to correctors and both words of a form which is rare at the opening of a line; one in weak fourth caesura, iii. 905; one at end of first foot, i. 978. You will hardly believe me, but those are all. (shrink)

Callimachus Aitia 82–85. I cannot quite get this right to my satisfaction, but it must have been something like:ΠλΧS0009838800019261_inline1σεΨΜλ.

That fat animals are bad breeders was well known to the ancients; Aristotle insists upon it several times. S0009838800017511_inline2 is, as Dr. Hunt observes, an epithet of the willow in Homer, but the explanations he quotes from Hesychius do not look very satisfactory; the willow was thought to ‘lose its fruit’ because it was supposed never to produce seed at all. Hence S0009838800017511_inline3 means ‘barren willows,’ and so Cercidas means ‘barren fat,’ i.e., fat which prevents a man from breeding.

ποιετ Heyler ' e libris suis scripsit pro S0009838800018528_inline1 says Hertlein. Neither verb looks very satisfactory; Julian probably wrote S0009838800018528_inline2. The Celts tested, or were fabled to test, the legitimacy of children by throwing them into the Rhine; cf. Nonnus, Diunysiaca, xlvi. 54–62.

It is plainly absurd to wish that Odysseus, who has been on Phrygian soil these ten years, should perish in the future before he even treads upon it. Paley gets some sense by supplying ‘as a conqueror or permanent settler,’ but obviously we have no right to supply all that: nor indeed would any Greek poet have ever said such a thing as έπí γâν îχνος βαλεîν ώς νικŵν or εìσαεí. See also Mr. Porter's note in C.Q. XI. 160. My (...) explanation may be hazardous, but such as it is it would be somewhat as follows: In the first place, it is notorious that in early Greek poetry the optative, present and aorist, is used in constructions which in strict Attic require imperfect or aorist indicative. I need say nothing of Ȅνθα ŵεν αѷт àπÓλοιτο and the like. But consider optatives after εì Not only does Homer use εì with present optative instead of indicative, e.g. B 780 ώς εȉ τε νέμοιτο, ۸ 467 ώς έȉ β ςιώατο X 411 ώς έί δμύχοιτο, ψ 274 εȉ νȗν άεθλεύοιµεν but he even does at least once so use aorist optative for indicative, a fact which I have not seen noticed, κ 416 ώς εί ίκοατο ‘as if they had come.‘ At N 343 ôς is substituted for εί in the sentence μάλα κε θρασυκρδιςεȉ ηôς ȍϚ τότε ηθήσειεƲ = ήν άν ός έγήθσεν. And the important point for my purpose is that this use of ει with present optative is occasionally found in Attic, as everybody knows. (shrink)

The Myrmidons going out to war are compared to a pack of wolves going to drink after they have devoured a deer; see the following lines; they are not like wolves which ‘are devouring’ it. Hence δπτουσιν looks wrong, and is probably a corruption of δΨουσιν, the old aorist subjunctive; this being taken for a future would infallibly be altered. In any case Ψ and πτ are not infrequently confused; thus in 161 λπτοντες is a variant for λΨοντες.

Sandrine Roux's L'Empreinte cartésienne addresses what she describes as one of the "persistent problems" in philosophy, namely, the mind-body problem raised by Descartes's substance dualism. Her book carefully lays out the various puzzles, both real and perceived, raised by Descartes's theory of humans as a mind-body union. She distinguishes clearly between the way these problems are understood by Descartes, and the way they were seen by some of his seventeenth-century followers, especially the occasionalists, Louis de La Forge, Géraud de Cordemoy, (...) and Malebranche. And she tries to orient the Cartesian mind-body problem with respect to theories in contemporary philosophy of mind.The first two parts are... (shrink)

Inde Venus uaria produdt sorte figurasmaiorumque refert uoltus uocesque comasque,1225 quandoquidem nilo magis haec de semine certofiunt quam facies et corpora membraque nobis.1227 et muliebre oritur patrio de semine saeclummaternoque mares existunt corpore creti….

Mr. Richards is justified in saying that S0009838800006017_inline1 is here indefensible, but he does not much mend matters by reading S0009838800006017_inline2. Iocasta may have been a paragon of all the virtues, but what has that to do with it? No, the real correction is S0009838800006017_inline3. ‘ To whom should I tell even greater things than this rather than to thee ?’.

At the end of the twenty-eighth chapter of the eighth book of the Natural History Aristotle says: S0009838800018425_inline1, and goes on to narrate a strange story of the method employed to procure the hybrid. Though the details are entirely fabulous, it has not been doubted that the Indian dog was a real animal. In de Generatione Animalium 746a34 he says more cautiously S0009838800018425_inline2 What then was this creature ? Sundevall declines to commit himself. Aubert and Wimmer think perhaps a jackal, (...) for they hold that the θxs1F7Dς of Aristotle was no jackal. But apart from other considerations there is not the slightest reason for saying that θxs1F7Dς does not mean a jackal in Aristotle as much as in other authors; if some of his statements about it are not true, no more are most of his statements about the lion. Yet this absurd notion that the ‘Indian dog’ was perhaps a jackal is adopted in the Berlin Index 419a15. If we look to India for a dog really foreign to the Greeks we are of course at once confronted with the genus Cyon, familiar to all readers of the Jungle Books as the Red Dog; accordingly our problematical Indian has been identified also with this. One would not think that anybody who had ever seen a specimen of Cyon would dream of calling it a cross between a dog and a tiger. It is true, however, that Aristotle believed that the Laconian hound was descended from a cross between dog and fox , and that the ancients were very reckless in making guesses of this kind; so the Arabs say that the cheetah is a ‘breed between the lion and the pard’! (shrink)

This must be the right reading, not ζυγγxs22EFν for the next line begins with a vowel, and by Headlam's canon the final dactyl must be pure. Compare also 291: S0009838800019091_inline1.

Daphnis has taunted Aphrodite with Anchises; he goes on to Adonis as a still greater disgrace. ‘Fair is Adonis also,though he is only a shepherd, not even an oxherd.’ xs22EFπεxs22EF is common enough in this sense in latish writers, or we may supply an ellipse : ‘I mention Adonis, because—’ Then the reference to his hunting is also intended to vex her; Daphnis speaks ironically, as if he did not know that Adonis was killed while hunting.

Heracles had gone to Arcadia to fetch the Erymanthian boar; when he had just returned he heard of the voyage of Argo, and, hastily depositing the boar at Mycenae, departed to join Jason without the knowledge of Eurystheus. λυρκήιον Αργος άμείψας is supposed to mean ‘having come to Lyrceian Argos’. But, first, άμείβω Αργος ought not to mean ‘I come to Argos’; άμείβω and άμείβομαι alike mean either change or pass or leave; enter they do not mean. The lexica quote (...) passages as meaning enter which do not mean any such thing; Θύρας or βαλόν άμείβω is ‘I pass’ the door or threshold, πόλιν έκπόλεως άμείβω or άμείβομαι is ‘I change one city for another,’ άμείβομαι έρκοςόδότων ‘I pass the hedge of the teeth,’ and so on. Until I see an instance of it I shall not believe that πόλιν άμείβω can mean merely I enter or come to a city. Nor can we take it to mean pass in this place, because the road from Arcadia to Mycenae does not pass Argos. Secondly, what is Lyrceian Argos ? Whether a river or a mountain be implied by Lyrceian, it is not a Greek expression; we do not speak of Hymettian Athens or Cephisian Athens, of Cithaeronian or Asopian Thebes or Boeotia. There is indeed found the expression Πηλιωτιν 'Ιωλκόν in Euripides, Medea 484, and the scholiast on iv. 131 says that Τιτνίδος Αίης means Aea of the river Titen, referring to Eratosthenes as his authority for the river, but no one else knows anything about it, and it is more than probable that Mr. Mooney is right in regarding it with suspicion. (shrink)

This study offers a new account of the development of Cartesian Occasionalism. The doctrine of Occasionalism - most famously advocated by Nicolas Malebranche - states that God alone is the cause of every event, and created substances are merely "occasional causes." In the years following René Descartes' death in 1650, several of his followers -- including Arnold Geulincx, Gerauld de Cordemoy and Louis de la Forge - argued for some version of this thesis. My study builds on recent scholarship about (...) these first Cartesian Occasionalists, the motives that led them and Malebranche to adopt Occasionalism, and the connections between Occasionalism and the views of Descartes. I analyze the doctrine of Occasionalism, and examine its relationship to Descartes' philosophy. I argue that Descartes' views in physics and metaphysics are consistent with the claim that corporeal substances have intrinsic causal powers, and reply to arguments by Gary Hatfield, Janet Broughton and Daniel Garber that purport to show otherwise. I examine how Occasionalism relates to several proposed problems with Descartes' claim that the human mind causally interacts with the human body, and argue that Occasionalism is not the "natural" solution to these problems. I conclude by canvassing the arguments of the earliest Cartesian Occasionalists. I argue Cartesian Occasionalism was neither an ad hoc solution to the mindbody problem, nor a logical consequence of Descartes' own views, but rather an attempt to extend and better systematize Cartesian philosophy. (shrink)

Activators of RNA polymerase II transcription possess distinct and separable DNA‐binding and transcriptional activation domains. They are thought to function by binding to specific sites on DNA and interacting with proteins (transcription factors) binding near to the transcriptional start site of a gene. The ability of these proteins to activate transcription is a highly regulated process, with activation only occurring under specific conditions to ensure proper timing and levels of target gene expression. Such regulation modulates the ability of transcription factors (...) either to bind DNA or to interact with the transcriptional machinery. Here we discuss recent advances in our understanding of these mechanisms of transcriptional regulation in yeast. (shrink)