Before taking this book with the seriousness which at least parts of it deserve, it is necessary to dispose of a criticism which is basically frivolous but has already been made too often to be ignored. “Contemporary British Philosophy”—the title conjures up the names that everyone is currently bandying about ; and then you find with a jolt that you are being served with fare by such cooks as Ewing, Findlay, Kneale, Mabbott, Price, and—of all people—Paton. People, clearly, who (...) for the most part wouldn’t even pretend to be “contemporary” in the ordinary use of this word, and who indeed in these very papers subject the real “contemporary” philosophers to endless sniping and sharp-shooting. Almost the only contributor one can imagine wishing to be thought “contemporary” is Ryle; and even he—well, did Freud really think of himself as a Freudian? Ayer might be put up as another exception, but that would be shallow— there's no one so completely and hopelessly out of date as the conductor of the bandwagon that's just gone past. Even from the point of view of crass physical age, the baby of this bunch , works out at about 43. (shrink)

Here I propose to undertake a brief survey of the statements of the argument given by these proponents, formulating and qualifying as I go what seems to me a sound version of it, capable of withstanding both Ayer's criticism and others that I have developed. There must be additional ways in which the same or similar points can be expressed. Another review of Kant, Paton, Taylor, and Kenner would no doubt produce a somewhat different result. All that is claimed (...) here is that the argument advanced in this paper is sound and that it was suggested by certain statements of theirs. (shrink)

The fourth volume of Professor Guthrie’s History, dealing with Plato’s life and with eighteen of his dialogues, is as welcome as its three predecessors. In keeping with the nature of a history of this sort, the picture of Plato’s life and thought presented here is judicious and non-controversial in its outlines. There are many helpful references both to the ancient and to the modern literature, and a vast amount of information is transmitted with surprising painlessness. For the facts of Plato’s (...) life, Guthrie relies on the traditional sources, especially on Epistle VII, the authenticity of which he accepts. His reconstruction is, therefore, itself quite traditional; little direct attention is given to Ryle’s attempt to undermine that view. The volume covers the following dialogues, listed here in the order of their presentation: Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, Gorgias, Menexenus, Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus, and Republic. No section is devoted in this volume to the first Alcibiades; Guthrie is noncommittal on its authenticity. The Cratylus and the Timaeus are also passed over because of difficulties in dating them. Somewhat questionable is the inclusion of the Phaedrus: Guthrie argues that it belongs among the middle dialogues, mainly on account of his view that the method of collection and division does not constitute a major discontinuity in Plato’s way of doing dialectic. On the question of Plato’s development, Guthrie follows most contemporary scholars in rejecting the unitarian view, according to which Plato held the theory of Forms, essentially unrevised, throughout his life. Rather, he leans towards the idea that the theory of Forms emerged out of Socrates’ concern with definition, bloomed in the middle dialogues, and came to be more critically examined in Plato’s later works. Guthrie deals with each dialogue separately: he examines each dialogue’s date, characters, and setting, presents a useful summary, and discusses a number of philosophically interesting questions. The section devoted to the Republic is a monograph in its own right and combines summary and discussion. The great virtues of this book are its level tone, its painstaking presentation of alternative views, and its scope. Though not always conclusive in its discussions of specific philosophical issues, it is a true labor of love, and unlikely to be superceded, as a reference work, in the near future.—A.N. (shrink)

Author's answers to questions on Buddhist philosophy, posed to him by some foreign scholars.

1. Philosophy, or the nature of philosophical knowledge, is defined as darsana, which means "seeing" or "vision." Seeing is, perhaps, the best instance of what we mean by "direct experience"; in this sense, Indian philosophy is "empirical." Its empiricism is, however, an "empiricism without limits." I shall not discuss here whether "seeing," "hearing," etc., are instances of immediate experience, or of mediate knowledge. If we see with the eyes, or through them, it may be argued that seeing and hearing, etc., (...) are instances of mediate knowledge. But the motive in defining the nature of philosophical knowledge as darsana or "vision" is that Indian philosophy distrusts abstract reasoning or knowledge. Philosophy is not, according to Indian philosophy, primarily a "theory" about reality but an experience of reality: an experience verified or verifiable. The Vedänta is the "end" of knowledge in the sense that knowledge ends in experience: in direct realization. This is the meaning of the Vedäntic statement: we cannot know Brahman but we can be Brahman. The nature of ultimate reality is atarkyam, "non-logical," as the Upanisads say. This does not mean that logic should not be used as a method or that logical knowledge has no use. Logical knowledge gives knowledge of "existence" in some sense, e.g., if I say, "No statement is true," then, this statement is, at least, true: therefore it exists. Whereas philosophy as darsana is an intuition of the existent and not of existence. In a certain sense, there is no problem for Indian philosophy of the reality and proof of the external world. The Katha Upanisad says that the senses are "pierced outwards"; "therefore, they see external objects": tasmät parang pasyati. But why the expression "external world" if there is not another world in some sense? However this may be, it is an historical fact that, in its quest for the Real, Indian thought changed from the objective to the subjective method: its search for the reality of the objective universe was through its search for the inner essence of man's being. The Katha Upanisad speaks of seeing "with eyes turned within": ävratta çaksu. The conception of philosophy as darsana corresponds to Plato's definition of the Dialectic as "the eye of the soul": "not implanting eyes, for they exist already, but giving them a right direction which they have not." Philosophy as darsana is the sight of "those who have eyes to see," though not the sight of "those who see only what they want to see." Darsana as defined is "discovery": there is in it, or through it, an unveiling of Reality. Darsana is a perceptual or "intuitive" situation in which the existent is beheld "face to face"; pratyagätänamaiksat: "beheld the Atman face to face": but this relation of "face to face" cannot properly be described as an "encounter," if this means seeing another. (shrink)

The problems of the tolal energy and quasilocalenergy density or an isolated spherically symmetric static system in general relativity (GR) are considered with examples of some exact suintions. The field formulation of GR dereloped earlier hy L. P. Grishchuk. el al. (1984). in ihe framework of which all the dynamical fields, including the gravitation field, are considered in a fixed background spacetime is used intensively. The exact Schwarzschild and Reissner Nordstrom solutions are investigated in detail, and the results are compared (...) with those in the recent work by J. D. Brown and J. W. York. Jr. (1993) as well as discussed with respect to the principle of nonlocalization of the gravitational energy in GR. Those examples are illustrative and simple because the background is selected as Minkowski spacetime and, in fact, the field configurations are studied in the framework of special relativity. It is shown that some problems of the Schwarzschild solution which are difficult to resolve in the standard geometrical framework of GR are resolved in the framework of the field formulation. (shrink)

To the Article Indication, Classes, Numbers, Validation, by A. N. White-head, Vol. XLIII, N.S., No. 171. Some misprints in the symbolrm of my article mast, I fear, make the whole unintelligible, apart from the following corrections. The proofs arrived from across the Atlantic on the day when I was overtaken by a dangerous illness which has incapacitated me for work during three months. Thus there has been no opportunity for autho-'s proof-corrections. I am obliged to the courtesy of the Editor (...) for the belated insertion of these corrigenda:— P. 286. Def. I, replace () by (3) P. 286. Def. II, replace 1st occurrence of p q by p g. P. 286. Def. III, replace Ec! x p by Ec x p. P. 286 Def. IV, replace p by p. P. 286 Four lines below, replace Ec! x Ec ! x by Eo x Ec! x P. 287. Lines 2 and 4, replace () by (). P. 287. Def. VIII, replace () by (). P. 287. Last line but one, replace o by 2, P. 291. Def. XXIII, replace (S) by (S). P. 292. Def. XXVII, end of 2nd line, replace xy by y. P. 292. Def. XXVIII, replace (c) by (c) P. 292. Def. XXVIII, replace c by c. P. 292. Def. XXIX, replace (1, 0) by , c). P. 292. Def. XXIX, replace (u + cm, v + c1) by (u + cm, v + c1). P. 293. Def. XXXI, replace (x) by (x). P. 293. Line 8, replace by . P. 293. Def. XXXIV, replace (x) by (x). P. 294. Lines 1 and 5, replace by Q. (shrink)

For a long period, no attention was paid in our literature to the circumstance that space and time, as fundamental forms of the existence of matter, cannot be reduced to the characteristics of space and time as viewed in physics. Nor was the fact taken into consideration that sociohistorical being is no less real than the existence of physical things, that the activity of human society is no less objective than the physical interactions of the material world.