This chapter contains section titled: Introduction A Characterization of Economic Analysis of Law Normativity Preference and Obligation Concluding Remarks Note References.

Analyses of complex entities such as bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, and firms typically personify them. A strong conception of personification requires that these entities have rational interests, rational beliefs, and rational normative judgments. On one account of personification, such personified rationality should be aggregate rationality : the interests, beliefs, and normative judgments should depend only on the interests, beliefs, and judgments of the individuals who constitute the complex entity. I argue that aggregate rationality is too strong a normative requirement to impose (...) on courts and legislatures. Key Words: collective rationality • personification • adjudication • doctrinal paradox. (shrink)

“I would prefer not”HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET (1853), reprinted in THE PIAZZA TALES 32, 48 (London, Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1856). Scholars have recently challenged the claim in classical deterrence theory that law influences behavior only through the expected sanction imposed. Some go further and argue that law may also “shape preferences,” changing people’s wants and values. In this Article, we analyze existing claims that criminal and civil law alter preferences and conclude that (...) none suggest that the law shapes preferences. We first clarify this preference-shaping claim by elaborating the structure of rational choice theory generally and “preference” in particular. We then investigate three mechanisms of legal influence suggested by the preference-shaping literature: (1) the “serious harm” mechanism; (2) the “social norm” mechanism; and (3) the “self-improvement” mechanism. We then show that each of these mechanisms operates by changing the agent’s beliefs about the attributes or consequences of her choice options rather than by changing her preferences. (shrink)

Constitutional political economy addresses four questions: the causal question: What explains the constitutional institutions we observe? the consequential question: What consequences do constitutional institutional have? the ideal question: What constitutional institutions does justice require? and the design question: What constitutional institutions are best for a polity given the constraints imposed by its current situation? Answers to the ideal and design questions require a theory of behavior that predicts how individuals will behave within constitutional institutions. Analysts usually assume that this theory (...) of behavior corresponds to the explanatory theory developed to answer the second, consequential question. This essay argues that the assumption of rational self-interested behavior as the basis for a behavioral theory is not justified. (shrink)

This essay investigates consequentialist reasoning in law. It begins with a brief exposition of the structure of consequentialist reasoning. It then turns to the role of consequentialist reasoning in two aspects of legal decision-making. Legal officials must reason both about ends and about the choice of means to achieve those ends. Legal instrumentalism, however, takes many forms, and different forms identify different officials to engage in the task of reasoning consequentially to choose means. The essay then considers the difficulties posed (...) by the fact that legal decision-makers choose policies or institutions that structure the outcomes they hope to achieve. Finally, the essay considers the role that consequentialist reasoning may play in choosing ends. (shrink)

This essay disentangles the complex relations between economic logic and legal logic. It distinguishes economic logic as a social process from economic logic as economic reasoning; economic reasoning to explain behavior from economic reasoning to evaluate behavioral outcomes; and legal reasoning in judicial contexts from legal reasoning in other contexts such as legislation and legal enforcement or compliance. It then argues first that economic logic as the logic of social processes deepens our understanding of how law develops and how it (...) influences behavior. But the essay argues second that economic logic plays at best a limited role in the logic of legal reasoning for two reasons. Much legal reasoning seeks to identify the goals we should and do pursue while economic logic takes such goals as given. Further, the instrumental role of economic logic will vary with the institutional context in which legal reasoning occurs. (shrink)

The United States, unlike most developed countries, continues to use the marital couple as the taxable unit for its income tax. This continued use of the marital unit— like its original establishment —rests on cultural preferences. This Article suggests that the roles of marriage, religion and taxation in America are essential factors in America’s retention of the marital unit. Part I examines the distinctive contribution marriage — especially the traditional single-earner breadwinner marriage — makes to the political life of the (...) country. Part II explores the similar role of religion. Part III describes some congressional efforts over the past two decades to aid, ostensibly, married couples through the income tax. Part IV concludes that although these actions have not been the most effective or efficient means of helping married couples, they nevertheless serve an important expressive purpose. Tax has been the arena for many political issues since the founding of the nation. Consequently, congressional actions and rhetoric regarding the income tax’s "marriage penalty" reinforce the marital unit/joint return and reaffirm — even if only symbolically — a national commitment to marriage as instrumental to American democracy. (shrink)

This handbook offers a deep analysis of the main forms of legal reasoning and argumentation from both a logical-philosophical and legal perspective. These forms are covered in an exhaustive and critical fashion, and the handbook accordingly divides in three parts: the first one introduces and discusses the basic concepts of practical reasoning. The second one discusses the main general forms of reasoning and argumentation relevant for legal discourse. The third one looks at their application in law as well as at (...) the different areas of legal reasoning. The handbook’s division in three parts reflects its conceptual architecture, since legal reasoning and argumentation are considered in relation to the more general types of reasoning. (shrink)

In a recent paper on ‘The Many as One’, Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager look at an issue that we take to be of great importance in political theory. How far should groups in public life try to speak with one voice, and act with one mind? How far should public groups try to display what Ronald Dworkin calls integrity? We do not expect the many on the market to be integrated in this sense. But should we (...) expect integration among the many in the legislature, for example, or among the many on the courts? We agree with Kornhauser and Sager about a number of their claims but think that they miss out on important detail and do not achieve a fully general perspective on the issues raised. Our own contribution is in three sections. We address, first, the nature of the integrity challenge; second, the range of cases in which the challenge arises; and third, the question of whether public groups should be designed and required to meet that challenge. (shrink)

Cost-benefit analysis is a widely used governmental evaluation tool, though academics remain skeptical. This volume gathers prominent contributors from law, economics, and philosophy for discussion of cost-benefit analysis, specifically its moral foundations, applications and limitations. This new scholarly debate includes not only economists, but also contributors from philosophy, cognitive psychology, legal studies, and public policy who can further illuminate the justification and moral implications of this method and specify alternative measures. These articles originally appeared in the Journal of Legal Studies. (...) Contributors: - Matthew D. Adler - Gary S. Becker - John Broome - Robert H. Frank - Robert W. Hahn - Lewis A. Kornhauser - Martha C. Nussbaum - Eric A. Posner - Richard A. Posner - Henry S. Richardson - Amartya Sen - Cass R. Sunstein - W. Kip Viscusi. (shrink)

ConclusionTo paraphrase marjorie Kornhauser’s famed observation, a taxcollection system for revenue only is a chimera. If, for the American woman, tax collection were only, and only ever, about revenue, then they would have constantly and consitently collect it from us. When we did not have what they say we should have, then they would penalise us. The fact of the matter is, that when they do collect it from us, it is, more often than not, because they have been (...) successful in their efforts to help us sustain ourselves in an image which they have created. One problem with self-assessment is that exemplary penalties are allowed; indeed, arede rigeur. The latest example of a feminine image which spurrerd the American tax collector to action is the Leona Helmsley equation of consumption—plus—feminine equals “ off with her head”. If only for this reason, self assessment demands to be, as Handelman and Green might argue, politicised with the feminine voice. (shrink)

Since it was first published, Quantum Field Theory in a Nutshell has quickly established itself as the most accessible and comprehensive introduction to this profound and deeply fascinating area of theoretical physics. Now in this fully revised and expanded edition, A. Zee covers the latest advances while providing a solid conceptual foundation for students to build on, making this the most up-to-date and modern textbook on quantum field theory available. -/- This expanded edition features several additional chapters, as well as (...) an entirely new section describing recent developments in quantum field theory such as gravitational waves, the helicity spinor formalism, on-shell gluon scattering, recursion relations for amplitudes with complex momenta, and the hidden connection between Yang-Mills theory and Einstein gravity. Zee also provides added exercises, explanations, and examples, as well as detailed appendices, solutions to selected exercises, and suggestions for further reading. (shrink)

Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the (...) latter its own theoretical development along the line of recent work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mongin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scattered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specific method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic, first by briefly connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and axiomatizing the ‘general logic’ built in this framework. (shrink)

Judgment aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of barely judgments of preference. The theory derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, which List and Pettit turned into an impossibility theorem – the first of a long list to come. After mentioning this formative stage, the paper restates what is now regarded as the “canonical theorem” of judgment aggregation theory. The last part of paper (...) discusses how judgment aggregation theory connects with social choice theory and can contribute to it; it singles out two representative applications, one to Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the other to the group identification problem. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate a logic for modelling individual and collective acceptances that is called acceptance logic. The logic has formulae of the form \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\rm A}_{G:x} \varphi$$\end{document} reading ‘if the agents in the set of agents G identify themselves with institution x then they together accept that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\varphi}$$\end{document} ’. We extend acceptance logic by two kinds of dynamic modal operators. The first (...) kind are public announcements of the form \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${x!\psi}$$\end{document}, meaning that the agents learn that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\psi}$$\end{document} is the case in context x. Formulae of the form \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${[x!\psi]\varphi}$$\end{document} mean that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\varphi}$$\end{document} is the case after every possible occurrence of the event x!ψ. Semantically, public announcements diminish the space of possible worlds accepted by agents and sets of agents. The announcement of ψ in context x makes all \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\lnot\psi}$$\end{document} -worlds inaccessible to the agents in such context. In this logic, if the set of accessible worlds of G in context x is empty, then the agents in G are not functioning as members of x, they do not identify themselves with x. In such a situation the agents in G may have the possibility to join x. To model this we introduce here a second kind of dynamic modal operator of acceptance shifting of the form \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${G:x\uparrow\psi}$$\end{document}. The latter means that the agents in G shift (change) their acceptances in order to accept ψ in context x. Semantically, they make ψ-worlds accessible to G in the context x, which means that, after such operation, G is functioning as member of x (unless there are no ψ-worlds). We show that the resulting logic has a complete axiomatization in terms of reduction axioms for both dynamic operators. In the paper we also show how the logic of acceptance and its dynamic extension can be used to model some interesting aspects of judgement aggregation. In particular, we apply our logic of acceptance to a classical scenario in judgment aggregation, the so-called ‘doctrinal paradox’ or ‘discursive dilemma’ (Pettit, Philosophical Issues 11:268–299, 2001; Kornhauser and Sager, Yale Law Journal 96:82–117, 1986). (shrink)

The following Review Essay, inspired by Tracy Isaacs’ new book, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, connects the philosophical literature on group agency with recent trends in international criminal law. Part I of the Essay sketches out the relevant philosophical positions, including collectivist and individualist accounts of group agency. Particular attention is paid to Kornhauser and Sager’s development of the doctrinal paradox, Philip Pettit’s deployment of the paradox towards a general argument for group rationality, and Michael Bratman’s account of shared (...) or joint intentions. Part II then analyzes, with cautious support, Isaacs’ two-level solution, which entails both individual and collective moral responsibility. Under this view, collective moral agency is a real phenomenon, though the existence of the collective neither obviates nor eliminates the moral responsibility of the individuals from which it is composed. My own evaluation of the proposed solution concentrates on Davidson’s Principle of Charity and whether behavior interpretation requires viewing such agents in particular ways so as to maximize rationality. By analogy to the distinctive rationality of long-term plans, where the rationality of an individual act can only be understood relative to its place in the rationally justified long-term plan of a single individual, I also consider the rationality of individual acts whose rationality can only be understood relative to the group endeavors of which they are a part. Finally, Part III traces some implications of the two-level solution for legal doctrine, in particular the role of collective organizations in the recent jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court. For example, I note that the ICC has recently become more and more focused on the role played by goal-oriented collectives, especially with regard to the plan or policy requirement for crimes against humanity and, in the context of modes of liability, indirect liability for crimes committed through an organization. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate a logic for modelling individual and collective acceptances that is called acceptance logic. The logic has formulae of the form $A_{Gx} \phi $ reading 'if the agents in the set of agents G identify themselves with institution x then they together accept that φ'. We extend acceptance logic by two kinds of dynamic modal operators. The first kind are public announcements of the form x!ψ, meaning that the agents learn that ψ is the case in (...) context x. Formulae of the form [x!ψ]φ mean that φ is the case after every possible occurrence of the event x!ψ. Semantically, public announcements diminish the space of possible worlds accepted by agents and sets of agents. The announcement of ψ in context x makes all ¬ψ-Worlds inaccessible to the agents in such context. In this logic, if the set of accessible worlds of G in context x is empty, then the agents in G are not functioning as members of x, they do not identify themselves with x. In such a situation the agents in G may have the possibility to join x. To model this we introduce here a second kind of dynamic modal operator of acceptance shifting of the form G:x↑ψ. The latter means that the agents in G shift (change) their acceptances in order to accept ψ in context x. Semantically, they make ψ-worlds accessible to G in the context x, which means that, after such operation, G is functioning as member of x (unless there are no ψ-worlds). We show that the resulting logic has a complete axiomatization in terms of reduction axioms for both dynamic operators. In the paper we also show how the logic of acceptance and its dynamic extension can be used to model some interesting aspects of judgement aggregation. In particular, we apply our logic of acceptance to a classical scenario in judgment aggregation, the so-called 'doctrinal paradox' or 'discursive dilemma' (Pettit, Philosophical Issues 11: 268-299, 2001; Kornhauser and Sager, Yale Law Journal 96: 82-117, 1986). (shrink)

Concept of ethics in Ādi-Granth, Sikh canon.

On the theory of Teilhard de Chardin, P.

В книге продолжается обсуждение тем, представленных в труде "Психология нравственности", изданном в 2010 году. Авторы обсуждают пути решения проблем и преодоления переживаемого нашим обществом глубокого нравственного кризиса.

Estudio sistemático sobre la imagen y sus complejas relaciones con el lenguaje verbal, partiendo de una crítica al logocentrismo en su vertiente racionalista -que reduce el conocimiento y el pensamiento al discurso lingüístico- para desembocar en una teoría de la representación. El autor sostiene que la imagen va más allá de la representación al tornarse presencia, basándose en el examen de pensadores clásicos y teóricos actuales que han abordado cuestiones afines. Propone una teoría de la imagen que no se ciñe (...) sólo a lo visual, sino que reconoce las dimensiones no visuales de lo imaginal: "el principal objetivo de este libro es contribuir a la construcción de una filosofía de la imagen. Hoy en día es ya una necesidad urgente contar con un aparato conceptual que nos permita afrontar las distintas modalidades de lo imaginal, que aparecen en ámbitos tan diversos como la intimidad psicológica, la ciencia, la filosofía, la comunicación masiva, la religión, la educación, la propaganda o el arte". (shrink)