Metacognition refers to any knowledge or cognitive process that monitors or controls cognition. We highlight similarities between metacognitive and executive control functions, and ask how these processes might be implemented in the human brain. A review of brain imaging studies reveals a circuitry of attentional networks involved in these control processes, with its source located in midfrontal areas. These areas are active during conflict resolution, error correction, and emotional regulation. A developmental approach to the organization of the anatomy involved in (...) executive control provides an added perspective on how these mechanisms are influenced by maturation and learning, and how they relate to metacognitive activity. (shrink)

Childhood obesity, linked to a sedentary lifestyle and an unbalanced diet, is one of the main problems in today’s Western societies. In this sense, the aim of the study was to analyze students’ perceived satisfaction in physical education classes with learning strategies and engagement in learning and critical thinking as determinants of healthy lifestyle habits. The study involved 2,439 high school students aged 12–18 years (M= 14.66,SD= 1.78). Structural equation modeling was conducted to analyze the predictive relationships between the study (...) variables. The results showed that teaching, teaching mastery, and cognitive development are precursors to deep thinking on the part of students, indicators of the adoption of healthy lifestyle habits. These results reflect the importance of the methodology adopted by the teacher in order to positively influence the students’ habits. (shrink)

How can we ensure that players in the National Football League receive excellent health care they can trust from providers who are as free from conflicts of interest as realistically possible? NFL players typically receive care from the club's own medical staff. Club doctors are clearly important stakeholders in player health. They diagnose and treat players for a variety of ailments, physical and mental, while making recommendations to the player concerning those ailments. At the same time, club doctors have obligations (...) to the club, namely to inform and advise clubs about the health status of players. While players and clubs share an interest in player health—both of them want players to be healthy so they can play at peak performance—there are several areas where their interests can diverge, and the divergence presents legal and ethical challenges. The current structure forces club doctors to have obligations to two parties—the club and the player—and to make difficult judgments about when one party's interests must yield to another's. None of the three parties involved should prefer this conflicted approach. We propose to resolve the problem of dual loyalty by largely severing the club doctor's ties with the club and refashioning that role into one of singular loyalty to the player-patient. The main idea is to separate the roles of serving the player and serving the club and replace them with two distinct sets of medical professionals: the Players' Medical Staff and the Club Evaluation Doctor. We begin by explaining the broad ethical principles that guide us and that help shape our recommendation. We then provide a description of the role of the club doctor in the current system. After explaining the concern about the current NFL player health care structure, we provide a recommendation for improving this structure. We then discuss how the club medical staff fits into the broader microenvironment affecting player health. (shrink)

Our article “NFL Player Health Care: Addressing Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interests and Promoting Player Trust” focused on an inherent structural conflict that faces club doctors in the National Football League. The conflict stems from club doctors’ dual role of providing medical care to players and providing strategic advice to clubs. We recommended assigning these roles to different individuals, with the medical staff members who are responsible for providing player care being chosen and subject to review and termination by a (...) committee of medical experts selected equally by the NFL and the NFL Players Association. Recognizing that the problem of structural conflict of interest is deeply entrenched and that our recommendation is a significant departure from the status quo, we invited comment from a diverse and highly qualified group of experts. There is considerable common ground among the commentators. All but one agreed with us that, despite the best intentions of upstanding professionals, there is a structural conflict of interest in the club doctors’ relationship with players, and the commentaries were generally supportive of our recommendation for change. There are also meaningful disagreements, however. Some commentators think that the proposal is on the right track but does not go far enough to reduce the structural conflict of interest, and one commentary wholly disagrees with our analysis and recommendations. (shrink)

Kentridge and Heywood (this issue) extend the concept of metacognition to include unconscious processes. We acknowledge the possible contribution of unconscious processes, but favor a central role of awareness in metacognition. We welcome Shimamura's (this issue) extension of the concept of metacognitive regulation to include aspects of working memory, and its relation to executive attention.

A key aim in biology and psychology is to identify fundamental principles underpinning the behavior of animals, including humans. Analyses of human language and the behavior of a range of non-human animal species have provided evidence for a common pattern underlying diverse behavioral phenomena: Words follow Zipf's law of brevity (the tendency of more frequently used words to be shorter), and conformity to this general pattern has been seen in the behavior of a number of other animals. It has been (...) argued that the presence of this law is a sign of efficient coding in the information theoretic sense. However, no strong direct connection has been demonstrated between the law and compression, the information theoretic principle of minimizing the expected length of a code. Here, we show that minimizing the expected code length implies that the length of a word cannot increase as its frequency increases. Furthermore, we show that the mean code length or duration is significantly small in human language, and also in the behavior of other species in all cases where agreement with the law of brevity has been found. We argue that compression is a general principle of animal behavior that reflects selection for efficiency of coding. (shrink)

Although entrepreneurial intention has been widely studied using cognitive models, we still lack entrepreneurial vocation and, therefore, lack disruptive innovations. Entrepreneurship scholars have some understanding of the reasons underlying this weakness, although there is much room for improvement in our learning concerning how to promote entrepreneurship among university students, especially in the transformed context of digital technologies. This paper focuses on the early stages of start-up, and in particular seeks to evaluate what role social and psychological factors play in the (...) development of entrepreneurial intentions. Drawing on network theory, we consider the impact of social networks on entrepreneurial intention. Specifically, we analyze the influence of two types of social networks: face-to-face and online social networks, with the latter proving especially important in digital transformations. In addition, based on affective congruency theory, we relate affect with entrepreneurial intention. Particularly, we evaluate the influence of positive and negative dispositional affectivity on the formation of entrepreneurial intentions. Finally, since affect and emotions can also be related with social relationships, we analyze whether dispositional affectivities influence entrepreneurial intention through the mediation effect of social networks. Using structural equation modeling, we confirm the impact of both online and face-to-face social networks, as well as positive dispositional affectivity on entrepreneurial intention for 589 higher education students in Spain. However, negative dispositional affectivity is not seen to influence entrepreneurial intention. Furthermore, both face-to-face and online social networks are influenced by positive dispositional affectivity. Moreover, these two types of networks can even partially mediate the relationship between positive dispositional affectivity and entrepreneurial intention. Positive dispositional affectivity can thus influence entrepreneurial intention in two different ways: directly and indirectly through both face-to-face and online social networks. This study provides further insights and adds to the literature on affect, social networks, and entrepreneurial intention. From a broader perspective, we also contribute to the literature on disruptive innovations by explaining how the development of entrepreneurial intentions would have positive consequences for university students vis-à-vis achieving these disruptive innovations. (shrink)

Widespread conceptions of practical reasoning confront us with a choice between its practicality and its objectivity: between its efficacious, world-changing character and its accountability to objective rational standards. This choice becomes unnecessary, I argue, on an alternative view embodied by the thesis that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. I lay bare and challenge the assumptions underlying the rejection of that thesis and outline a defense of its picture of practical reasoning against common objections. On such a picture, (...) practical reasoning provides a principle not externally imposed upon an action but rather constitutive of it. (shrink)

It is not uncommon for multiple clinical trials at the same institution to recruit concurrently from the same patient population. When the relevant pool of patients is limited, as it often is, trials essentially compete for participants. There is evidence that such a competition is a predictor of low study accrual, with increased competition tied to increased recruitment shortfalls. But there is no consensus on what steps, if any, institutions should take to approach this issue. In this article, we argue (...) that an institutional policy that prioritises some trials for recruitment ahead of others is ethically permissible and indeed prima facie preferable to alternative means of addressing recruitment competition. We motivate this view by appeal to the ethical importance of minimising the number of studies that begin but do not complete, thereby exposing their participants to unnecessary risks and burdens in the process. We then argue that a policy of prioritisation can be fair to relevant stakeholders, including participants, investigators and funders. Finally, by way of encouraging and helping to frame future debate, we propose some questions that would need to be addressed when identifying substantive ethical criteria for prioritising between studies. (shrink)

For a theory T, we study relationships among IΔ n +1 (T), LΔ n+1 (T) and B * Δ n+1 (T). These theories are obtained restricting the schemes of induction, minimization and (a version of) collection to Δ n+1 (T) formulas. We obtain conditions on T (T is an extension of B * Δ n+1 (T) or Δ n+1 (T) is closed (in T) under bounded quantification) under which IΔ n+1 (T) and LΔ n+1 (T) are equivalent. These conditions depend (...) on Th Πn +2 (T), the Π n+2 –consequences of T. The first condition is connected with descriptions of Th Πn +2 (T) as IΣ n plus a class of nondecreasing total Π n –functions, and the second one is related with the equivalence between Δ n+1 (T)–formulas and bounded formulas (of a language extending the language of Arithmetic). This last property is closely tied to a general version of a well known theorem of R. Parikh. Using what we call Π n –envelopes we give uniform descriptions of the previous classes of nondecreasing total Π n –functions. Π n –envelopes are a generalization of envelopes (see [10]) and are closely related to indicators (see [12]). Finally, we study the hierarchy of theories IΔ n+1 (IΣ m ), m≥n, and prove a hierarchy theorem. (shrink)

Good-willed or morally worthy action is one that is morally right non-accidentally: as she performs it the agent is, in some way, responsive to its rightness. Several recent accounts have analyzed good-willed action in terms of a composition of right action plus some requirements on the agent’s psychological condition, but tend to leave unexamined the direction of conceptual dependence between right action and good-willed action. I argue that significant difficulties arise when right action is taken as primary and intelligible independently (...) of good-willed action, often relying on the standard causalist picture of agency. Inspired by Aristotle’s notion of virtuous action and Kant’s treatment of action from duty, I sketch an alternative view in which the idea of mere rightness is conceptually dependent on that of a good-willed self-conscious action done for reasons. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 Aristotle distinguishes between virtuous action and acting virtuously: a virtuous action counts as virtuously performed if done with knowledge, chosen for its own sake, and from a stable character. Since the ‘same’ action can be performed virtuously or non-virtuously, interpreters have concluded that these ‘agential conditions’ are indifferent incidental features with no bearing on the virtuous character of the action. I propose that they are instead ‘perfections,’ i.e., constitutive features of virtuous action as such, admitting of (...) degrees. Unlike the alternative interpretation, my proposal fully harmonizes with three important Aristotelian doctrines: that action from virtue is prior to action merely in conformity with virtue; that character virtue is a perfection of human beings; and that practical life is not properly characterized in transitive, productive terms. My proposal still allows for a generic sense of ‘sameness’ in which the ‘same’ action may be virtuously or non-virtuously performed. (shrink)

Aristotle famously distinguishes between merely doing a virtuous action and acting in the way in which a virtuous person would. Against an interpretation prominent in recent scholarship, I argue that ‘acting virtuously,’ in the sense of exercising a virtue actually possessed, is prior to ‘virtuous action,’ understood generically. I propose that the latter notion is best understood as a derivative abstraction from the former, building upon a reading of a neglected distinction between per se and coincidentally just action in Nicomachean (...) Ethics 5, and thus shed light on the meaning and philosophical significance of the priority of acting from virtue. (shrink)

Logic and philosophy of logic have increasingly become areas of research and great interest in Latin America and Spain, where significant work has been done and continues to be done in both of these fields. The goal of this volume is to draw attention to this work through a collection of original and unpublished papers by specialists from Latin America and Spain. Some of the papers are of importance for set-theory and model theory. They cover topics such as the foundations (...) of paraconsistency, the use of paraconsistent logic as a basis for set-theory, and the methodological aspects in both the justification of new axioms in set theory and the formalization of pre-theoretic notions. Other papers are related to epistemic logic. They deal with the issues of abduction and the choice of the simplest hypothesis, the definition of group probability, and the nature of explanation and understanding in such logic. There are also papers on logical paradoxes, the semantics of names, and the nature of relations. Max A. Freund is Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the University of Costa Rica and the National University of Costa Rica. He is co-author of the book Modal Logic its syntax and semantics, as well as the author of Judicial Logic, and of a forthcoming book The Logic of Sortals. Max Fernandez de Castro is Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the Autonomous Metropolitan University of Mexico. He is the author of the book Quine y la Ontologíaa and co-author of the books Lógica Matemática I: lógica proposicional, intuicionista y modal, Lógica Matemática II: clásica, intuicionista y modal, Teoría de Conjuntos, Lógica y Temas Afines I. Marco Ruffino is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Campinas and the editor of Manuscrito, the Brazilian international journal for Analytic Philosophy. He has many publications, in important philosophical journals, in the philosophy of language, of logic, and of mathematics; in the history of analytic philosophy, and on Frege and Wittgenstein. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A NOTE ON THE RELATION OF PACIFISM AND JUST-WAR THEORY: IS THERE A THOMISTIC CONVERGENCE? 1 GABRIEL PALMER-FERNANDEZ Youngstown State University Youngstown, Ohio FOR CENTURIES, the moral analysis of war began with a consideration of a set of principles which together form the doctrine of the just-war and with a rejection of pacifism. However, several recent studies by Catholic moralists argue that pacifism and just-war theory have much in (...) common and converge in at least one morally important way-namely, they share a presumption against violence. In this note I want to consider whether or not classical just-war theory gives us reason to accept this claim. I will give evidence against it, and suggest that the "original just-war question," as James Turner Johnson calls it, does not begin with aprohibitive presumption or some equivalent constraint on action. If we are to speak of a presumption in classical just-war theory, it is that justice be done for the sake of the common good. Up to very recent times, those Christian denominations which Ernst Troeltsch called the "church-type" (Lutheran, Anglican, Calvinist, and Roman Catholic) upheld a " two-tiered " or "double" morality. A "vocational" pacifism was required of clerical ranks, and the individual Christian was obligated to take up arms for the sake of the common good. For example, prior to the Second Vatican Council, Roman Catholic teaching on war rejected conscientious objection to all war (i.e., pacifism) as an option for Catholics. Manuals of moral theology prior to Vatican 1 I wish to acknowledge the very helpful and detailed comments provided by Richard B. Miller to an earlier version of this paper. 247 248 GABRIEL PALMER-FERNANDEZ II did prohibit the soldier from fighting in an unjust war and made room for subjective doubt about the justice of a particular war. But the consensus among Catholic theologians was both wide and deep. Pacifism for individual Christians did not have any moral-theological justification. It was, in fact, a grave moral error. In spite of this, Vatican II called for a " completely fresh reappraisal of war." 2 The policy of obliterating whole cities enacted during World War II, coupled with the development of nuclear and other indiscriminate weapons of destruction (e.g., incapacitating gases, biological weapons, etc.) and the instability of superpower relations, created an unprecedented condition for which traditional teachings on war seemed woefully inadequate, if not morally dangerous. A new, more far-reaching perspective was needed. And this was to allow for individuals the pacifist option as a second and complementary moral doctrine alongside traditional teaching on war.3 As the American Catholic bishops said in their pastoral letter on war and peace : 2 Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, in A. Flannery, 0.P., ed., Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Collegeville, Minn. : Liturgical Press, 1975), par. 80. 3 This development in contemporary Roman Catholic teaching on war and peace has been challenged with considerable force by George Weigel in what has become one of the most controversial studies on the subject. In Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), Weigel advances several arguments which are meant to correct what he insists is a failure among Catholic ethicists in the U.S. to develop their tradition, and, indeed, an abandonment of their heritage. " At the level of moral theory," Weigel maintains, "the two classic positions [just-war theory and pacifism] are not reconcilable. The attempt to merge them... tends to corrupt both traditions. Pacifists end up making judgments on military strategy and tactics, and just-war theorists are held accountable to arguments they previously declined to accept.... The net result is to bifurcate morality and politics, and to abandon attempts to apply the tradition of reason to the limit case of the use of armed force in the defense of values-which is precisely the result Murray most feared in his strictures against moralism" (251). For David Hollenbach's rebuttal, see his review essay, "War and Peace in American Catholic Thought: A Heritage Abandoned? " Theological Studies 48 (1987) : 711-727... (shrink)

On September 8, 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making to revise the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, widely known as the “Common Rule.” The NPRM proposes several changes to the current system, including a dramatic shift in the approach to secondary research using biospecimens and data. Under the current rules, it is relatively easy to use biospecimens and data for secondary research. This approach systematically facilitates secondary research with (...) biospecimens and data, maximizing the capacity for substantial public benefit. However, it has been criticized as insufficiently protective of the privacy and autonomy interests of biospecimen and data sources. Thus, the NPRM proposes a more restrictive regime, although more so for biospecimens than data. Both the status quo and the NPRM's proposal are critically flawed. (shrink)

Research investigating female gaming is relatively scarce, and past research has demonstrated that men are more likely to be problematic gamers. Few studies have focused on female gamers in community samples, and those that have been published have mainly collected data qualitatively in Europe. There is case study evidence suggesting clinicians are increasingly treating problem female gamers. The aim of this study is threefold: (i) to establish an international female gamer profile, (ii) to determine predictors associated with perceived internet gaming (...) disorder (IGD), and (iii) to identify those who are potentially at risk of developing gaming addiction and its characteristics by applying a quantitative approach. A cross-sectional online survey was applied through international gaming forums recruiting 625 female gamers, assessing sociodemographics, gaming devices used and play genres, and a set of questionnaires on gaming (e.g., problem online gaming [e.g., the nine-item short-form scale to assess IGD: IGDS9-SF], female stereotypes [e.g., sex role stereotyping scale], and psychological symptoms [e.g., Symptom CheckList-27-plus]). Female gamers from all continents reported the use of all videogames, especially popular online games using computers and consoles. The proportion of gamers with potential IGD was one per cent. Regression analyses identified several risk factors for increased scores on the IGDS9-SF, namely having achievement and social motivations, embodied presence and identification with the avatar, hostility and social phobia together with negative body image, playing Multiplayer Online Battle Arena, Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, and First-Person-Shooter games. Findings contribute to filling the gap in knowledge on female gaming, to aid in the applicability of problematic gaming measurements in female gamers, especially those who are at risk of problematic gaming. The purpose of this study is to enhance the validity of the current measures to diagnose problem gaming appropriately in both genders. (shrink)

The use of social media as a recruitment tool for research with humans is increasing, and likely to continue to grow. Despite this, to date there has been no specific regulatory guidance and there has been little in the bioethics literature to guide investigators and institutional review boards faced with navigating the ethical issues such use raises. We begin to fill this gap by first defending a nonexceptionalist methodology for assessing social media recruitment; second, examining respect for privacy and investigator (...) transparency as key norms governing social media recruitment; and, finally, analyzing three relatively novel aspects of social media recruitment: the ethical significance of compliance with website “terms of use”; the ethics of recruiting from the online networks of research participants; and the ethical implications of online communication from and between participants. Two checklists aimed at guiding investigators and IRBs through the ethical issues are included as appendices. (shrink)

In other work, I have explored what is political about intrafamilial violence. I claimed that intrafamilial violence is political not only because it involves violating human rights but, more fundamentally, because social structures contribute to its explanation. Exploring what is political about intrafamilial violence allows us to identify two crucial features. First, the structural explanation suggests that the political community’s social practices contribute to the broader context that gives meaning to intrafamilial violence as a tool for control. Accordingly, it is (...) not just the offender but the political community that should also be called to account. Second, it shows that intrafamilial violence, as a tool for control, undermines not just the body but the social power of the victim while simultaneously empowering the offender. This paper examines these features in more detail and shows their importance for criminal law theory, namely, as reasons for justifying criminalising intrafamilial violence. (shrink)

We characterize the sets of all Π2 and all equation image theorems of IΠ−1 in terms of restricted exponentiation, and use these characterizations to prove that both sets are not deductively equivalent. We also discuss how these results generalize to n > 0. As an application, we prove that a conservation theorem of Beklemishev stating that IΠ−n + 1 is conservative over IΣ−n with respect to equation image sentences cannot be extended to Πn + 2 sentences. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag (...) GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim. (shrink)

People tend to overestimate emotional responses to future events. This study examined whether such affective forecasting errors occur for feelings of regret, as measured by self-report and subsequent decision-making. Some participants played a pricing game and lost by a narrow or wide margin, while others were asked to imagine losing by such margins. Participants who experienced a narrow loss reported more regret than those who imagined a narrow loss. Furthermore, those experiencing a narrow loss behaved more cautiously in a subsequent (...) gambling task. Thus, the study provides self-report and behavioral evidence for a reversal of the affective forecasting phenomenon for feelings of regret. (shrink)

This paper investigates the status of the fragments of Peano Arithmetic obtained by restricting induction, collection and least number axiom schemes to formulas which are $${\Delta_1}$$ provably in an arithmetic theory T. In particular, we determine the provably total computable functions of this kind of theories. As an application, we obtain a reduction of the problem whether $${I\Delta_0 + \neg \mathit{exp}}$$ implies $${B\Sigma_1}$$ to a purely recursion-theoretic question.

It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the (...) target object in the test phase. For a more accurate comparison of these two accounts, the present study tested the true-belief default with adults. Four experiments measuring eye movements and response inhibition revealed that adults do not have an automatic tendency to respond to the false-belief question according to their own knowledge and the true-belief response need not be inhibited in order to correctly predict the protagonist's actions. The positive results observed in the control conditions confirm the accuracy of the various measures used. I conclude that the results of this study undermine the true-belief default view and those models that posit mechanisms of response inhibition in false-belief reasoning. Alternatively, the present study with adults and recent studies with children suggest that participants' focus of attention in false-belief tasks may be key to their performance. (shrink)

This article examines the anatomy and circuitry of skills that, like reading, calculating, recognizing, or remembering, are common abilities of humans. While the anatomical areas active are unique to each skill there are features common to all tasks. For example, all skills produce activation of a small number of widely separated neural areas that appear necessary to perform the task. These neural areas relate to internal codes that may not be observed by any external behavior nor be reportable by the (...) performer. There is considerable plasticity to the performance of skills. Task components can be given priority through attention, which serves to increase activation of the relevant brain areas. Attention can also cause reactivation of sensory areas driven by input, but usually only after a delay. The threshold for activation for any area may be temporarily reduced by prior activation . Skill components requiring attention tend to cause interference resulting in the dual tasks effects and unified focus of attention described in many cognitive studies. Practice may change the size or number of brain areas involved and alter the pathways used by the skill. By combining cognitive and anatomical analyses, a more general picture of the nature of skill emerges. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Priming and Narrative Habits in the Phenomenological InterviewReflections on a Study of Tourette SyndromeThe author reports no conflicts of interest.In "Dimensions, Not Types: On the Phenomenology of Premonitory Urges in Tourette Syndrome," Lisa Curtis-Wendlandt and Jack Reynolds provide new insights into some of the experiences characteristic of Tourette syndrome (TS). Their study is an excellent example of applied phenomenology (Burch, 2021), combining philosophy and qualitative research methods to illuminate (...) experiences that have often been mischaracterized in the existing literature. In their study, they focus on what is commonly referred to as a "premonitory urge" (PU): the "anticipatory urge that is often thought to precede the onset of the motor and phonic tics that are part of Tourette Syndrome" (Curtis-Wendlandt & Reynolds, 2024, p. 26). They ask not only whether PU is a necessary feature of TS, but also whether the very concept of PU accurately portrays the experiences and behaviors that it's intended to refer to. They point out that existing scales used to assess PU, for example, seem to implicitly narrow the relevant experiences by assuming that they are a) always negative and b) always internal, or inwardly focused (Curtis-Wendlandt & Reynolds, 2024, 26). Curtis-Wendlandt and Reynolds question these in-built assumptions about PU, suggesting that they may provide an overly narrow depiction that misses the genuine diversity of experiences that precede the onset of a motor or phonic tic.To explore these phenomena in more detail, they conducted a study intended to elicit fresh descriptions of these experiences. They interviewed 12 teenagers with a diagnosis of TS about their experiences of ticcing and tic suppression. Using the micro-phenomenological method (Petitmengin, 2006), they asked participants to reflect on a specific tic or tic suppression event and to recall the event in detail. Throughout the interview, [End Page 43] they asked open-ended questions about sensory, cognitive, or affective experiences surrounding the event. Through these interviews, they were able to generate rich descriptions of these experiences and investigate how these descriptions differed from standard accounts in the existing literature.Curtis-Wendlandt and Reynolds provide a detailed account of how they designed their phenomenological study, both philosophically and empirically. However, there is an important aspect of their method that they discuss only in a cursory or implicit way, which is what I want to focus on here. Throughout their study, they were concerned that participants might simply parrot back well-worn medicalized characterizations of PU. Such characterizations risk simplifying or even occluding key aspects of the participants' experiences that might be difficult to reflect upon or describe. However, despite stressing the importance of eliciting fresh descriptions, Curtis-Wendlandt and Reynolds provide only glimpses of how the interviews actually unfolded and what kinds of techniques they used to elicit these descriptions.In my experience, it is quite common to hear phenomenological psychologists and psychiatrists express concern that people may simply repeat common psychiatric or medicalized characterizations of their condition, rather than genuinely reflect upon and describe their first-person experiences. The philosophical assumption is that we all fall back on culturally sedimented language and terminology when describing our experiences. Someone who has spent extended periods of time interacting with psychiatrists and other healthcare professionals, for example, is likely to have picked up common ways of describing their condition—ways that may have helped them receive a diagnosis or obtain treatment. There is nothing inherently wrong with falling into these culturally sedimented characterizations. They facilitate everyday communication through a shared language and terminology. But phenomenologists are often concerned that this kind of culturally sedimented language covers over or obscures the phenomenon or experience they are trying to investigate. For example, if a psychiatrist has often described their patient's depressed mood as "sadness," then that patient may be likely to self-describe their mood as sadness in an interview setting. It might, in fact, be the case that their mood is best described as sadness. But it could also be the case that their mood would be more accurately described as, for instance, a sense of emptiness or feeling deep despair. The challenge is therefore to know whether someone's self-description is... (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, (...) and I shall aim at a specification of the content of memories that is in accordance with those aspects of them. (shrink)

Training animals such as apes, gray parrots, or dolphins that communicate via arbitrary symbols with humans has revealed astonishing mental capacities that may have otherwise gone unnoticed. Albeit bats have not yet been trained to communicate via symbols with humans, we are convinced that some species, especially captive Pteropodid bats (“flying foxes”), show the potential to master this cognitive task. Here, we briefly review what is known about bats’ cognitive skills that constitute relevant prerequisites for symbolic communication with humans. We (...) focus on social learning in general, trainability by humans, associative learning from humans, imitation, vocal production learning and usage learning, and social knowledge. Moreover, we highlight potential training paradigms that could be used to elicit simple “symbolic” bat-human communication, i.e., training bats to select arbitrary symbols on a touchscreen to elicit a desired behavior of the human caregiver. Touchscreen-proficient bats could participate in cognition research, e.g., to study their numerical competence or categorical perception, to further elucidate how nonhuman animals learn and perceive the world. (shrink)

Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are ‘token-reflexives’, in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able (...) to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account (...) to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer's grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer's grounds for other premises in the argument. I shall then propose (...) a way of fixing both arguments. The solution involves substituting the view that desires have no objects with the view that we have a desire to have desires. The latter view, I shall argue, can do the grounding work that the former does in Schopenhauer's arguments but, unlike it, the view that we desire to desire is consistent with Schopenhauer's grounds for the rest of premises in those arguments. (shrink)

The article examines the process of niche standardization in medical research as an example of democratizing strategies implemented in industry-funded science. I argue that niche standardization can lead to undesirable epistemic and ethical consequences, if the various goals of research are not properly aligned. I examine two examples: the case of Sarafem, approved for the treatment of premenstrual dysphoric disorder in women, and the case of BiDil, approved for exclusive use in African Americans for the treatment of congestive heart failure. (...) I conclude by cautioning against the unqualified support of democratizing strategies in industry-funded research. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a (...) positive view. According to this view, when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that caused the very memory experience that she is having. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to clarify the notion of explanation by computer simulation in artificial intelligence and cognitive science. My contention is that computer simulation may be understood as providing two different kinds of explanation, which makes the notion of explanation by computer simulation ambiguous. In order to show this, I shall draw a distinction between two possible ways of understanding the notion of simulation, depending on how one views the relation in which a computing system that performs (...) a cognitive task stands to the program that the system runs while performing that task. Next, I shall suggest that the kind of explanation that results from simulation is radically different in each case. In order to illustrate the difference, I will point out some prima facie methodological difficulties that need to be addressed in order to ensure that simulation plays a legitimate explanatory role in cognitive science, and I shall emphasize how those difficulties are very different depending on the notion of explanation involved. (shrink)

Solidarity within bioethics is increasingly being recognized as an important means of improving health for all. Its contribution seems particularly relevant when there are injustices or inequalities in health and different individuals or groups are disadvantaged. But the current context of ecological collapse, characterized mainly by a loss of biodiversity and ecosystem decline, affects global health in a different way to other factors. This scenario creates new challenges, risks and problems that require new insights from a bioethical perspective. I, therefore, (...) propose an argument in favor of ecological solidarity. The aim of this article is to re-define this concept, outlining which causes should incite action through ecological solidarity and who should be the main recipient of it. To this end, I discuss what the background for practicing ecological solidarity might be: an intrinsically altruistic motivation to attempt to be a better person or a forced response to a political obligation. Finally, by way of example, I argue for rewilding as an effective, practical strategy through which ecological solidarity can be applied in the belief that building ecological solidarity supports a number of key interdependencies and ensures ethical care for the health of the planet. (shrink)

The problem of epistemic bootstrapping requires explaining, in a principled manner, why a subject who engages in bootstrapping fails to know the conclusion of her reasoning. Existing proposed solutions to the problem provide unsatisfactory explanations regarding the bootstrapper's ignorance. This paper puts forward a novel solution and argues that it satisfactorily explains the ignorance of the bootstrapper, while avoiding the difficulties that other proposals face. Section 1 explains what epistemic bootstrapping is, defines the problem it poses for a theory of (...) knowledge, and outlines the basic desiderata demanded of any acceptable solution to the problem. Section 2 explicates the proposal I defend throughout the rest of the paper. Here, I contend that the wrong−making feature of bootstrapping which ultimately explains the bootstrapper's ignorance is a failure to use an independent source in checking the accuracy of the reports of a given source. I call this explanation the “Independence proposal.” Section 2 also argues that the phenomenon of bootstrapping is broader than is usually assumed; there are cases of bootstrapping that do not fit the superficial structure of the prototypical cases discussed in the literature, and any good proposal should apply to these as well. Section 3 argues that the independence proposal does better than other current proposals in fulfilling the desiderata identified in Section 1. Section 4 sums up the central contributions of the paper. (shrink)

Ensuring that clinical trials, once launched, successfully complete and generate useful knowledge is an important and indeed ethically imperative goal, given the risks and burdens borne by research participants. Since there are insufficient willing research participants to power all the trials that are currently undertaken,1 addressing underenrolment will require prioritisation decisions that reduce the number of trials competing for participants. While there are multiple levels at which research priority-setting can and does take place, competition between trials often plays out in (...) real time at the institutional or site level, where complex decisions must be made about how to manage overlapping trials in ways that balance different considerations, including the risk of non-completion. We sought to explore what research institutions in particular might ethically do to mitigate the risk that competition between trials will contribute to recruitment shortfalls. Against this backdrop, we appreciate the thoughtful replies to our article and are especially encouraged that all three respondents acknowledge the importance and indeed necessity of setting research priorities in ways that respect the rights and interests of various parties. The key question raised by the commentaries primarily concerns not whether research prioritisation should take place but rather how it is best accomplished. In what follows, we clarify our argument in the original article, and then focus on several points raised in the commentaries regarding the role of institutions in research priority-setting. Our approach is animated by the risk that competition between clinical trials for the same population of participants can be a cause of underenrolment when there are insufficient participants to meet the statistical needs of all open studies. In such situations, one or more of the competing studies will fail to meet recruitment targets, reducing their statistical ability to answer the research question. There are strong ethical reasons to avoid …. (shrink)

Here we study polysemy as a potential learning bias in vocabulary learning in children. Words of low polysemy could be preferred as they reduce the disambiguation effort for the listener. However, such preference could be a side-effect of another bias: the preference of children for nouns in combination with the lower polysemy of nouns with respect to other part-of-speech categories. Our results show that mean polysemy in children increases over time in two phases, i.e. a fast growth till the 31st (...) month followed by a slower tendency towards adult speech. In contrast, this evolution is not found in adults interacting with children. This suggests that children have a preference for non-polysemous words in their early stages of vocabulary acquisition. Interestingly, the evolutionary pattern described above weakens when controlling for syntactic category (noun, verb, adjective or adverb) but it does not disappear completely, suggesting that it could result from a combination of a standalone bias for low polysemy and a preference for nouns. (shrink)

In this paper we continue the study of the theories IΔ n+1 (T), initiated in [7]. We focus on the quantifier complexity of these fragments and theirs (non)finite axiomatization. A characterization is obtained for the class of theories such that IΔ n+1 (T) is Π n+2 –axiomatizable. In particular, IΔ n+1 (IΔ n+1 ) gives an axiomatization of Th Π n+2 (IΔ n+1 ) and is not finitely axiomatizable. This fact relates the fragment IΔ n+1 (IΔ n+1 ) to induction (...) rule for Δ n+1 –formulas. Our arguments, involving a construction due to R. Kaye (see [9]), provide proofs of Parsons’ conservativeness theorem (see [16]) and (a weak version) of a result of L.D. Beklemishev on unnested applications of induction rules for Π n+2 and Δ n+1 formulas (see [2]). (shrink)

La genealogia de la moral de Nietzsche, resulta extremadament pertinent per una epistemologia del bé relativa a les incisions institucionals sobre part de la població del Raval. Primer, sobre Raval s’haurien dut a terme tot tipus d’abusos, com destruccions d’habitatges i de trama urbana, així com persecucions o expulsions de població, pel bé del barri o de la ciutat. Si això és així, es pot afirmar que les convergències institucionals en aquest punt es sustenten en una epistemologia interessada. Segon, el (...) pathos de la distància definit per Nietzsche, així com l’assumpció per part de les noves ideologies urbanístiques del primitiu paper de la “casta sacerdotal”, permetrien actualitzar la crítica envers “el civisme”, entès aquest, com l’expressió més recent i efectiva de les cultures de control. I tercer, aquesta epistemologia interessada, permetria reclamar la noció marxiana de lluita de classes per interpretar un crònic i generalitzat menyspreu sobre una part important de la població més irredempta d’un dels barris més convulsos d’Europa. (shrink)

The context of accelerated climate change, environmental pollution, ecosystems depletion, loss of biodiversity and growing undernutrition has led human societies to a crossroads where food systems require transformation. New agricultural practices are being advocated in order to achieve food security and face environmental challenges. Cultivated meat has recently been considered one of the most desired alternatives by animal rights advocates because it promises to ensure nutrition for all people while dramatically reducing ecological impacts and animal suffering. It is therefore presented (...) as one of the fairest means of food production for the coming decades, according to utilitarian arguments. However, food security, environmental concerns and animal welfarism guided by a short-term utilitarianism could have techno-optimism bias and could result in some forms of oppression such as anthropocentrism. I argue that there are still deep-rooted moral issues in food systems that are not addressed primarily by lab-grown meat, mainly derived from a loss of sovereignty. Food practices developed in high-tech labs with artificial interventionism constrain the ability of living entities (that are used as food) to flourish on their own terms. This paper aims to explore how sovereignty entitlements for humans and nonhumans are often overlooked by advocates of cultivated meat and the moral challenges it may pose. Accordingly, a more than utilitarian approach framed by ecological and republican justice is proposed here to shed light on some pitfalls of food chains based on cellular agriculture. (shrink)

Resumen: En este ensayo desarrollo una crítica al modelo de justicia multicultural de Will Kymlicka, con el propósito de establecer las bases para el desarrollo de un multiculturalismo crítico. El argumento se ordena de la siguiente forma. En la primera sección analizo la teoría de los derechos especiales de Kymlicka e identifico el valor liberal central al que estos responden, la autonomía individual. En la segunda sección examino el fundamento igualitarista de la suerte de su teoría de los derechos especiales. (...) En la tercera sección elaboro una crítica general a la justicia multicultural liberal desarrollando un argumento para politizar los reclamos de los pueblos indígenas para el acceso a su cultura. Argumento que el trato justo de las minorías indígenas requiere reconocer su autodeterminación política.: In this essay I develop a critique of Will Kymlicka’s model of multicultural justice, with the purpose of laying down the foundations for a critical multiculturalism. The argument is ordered in the following way. In the first section I analyse Kymlicka’s theory of special rights and identify the central liberal value to which they respond: individual autonomy. In the second section I examine the luck egalitarian foundations of Kymlicka’s theory of special rights. In the third section, I elaborate a general critique to liberal multicultural justice, developing an argument to politicize the claims of indigenous peoples to access to their culture. Basically I argue that the just treatment of indigenous minorities requires recognizing their political self-determination. (shrink)

The proper relationship between phenomenology and naturalism has reemerged as a pressing issue following interdisciplinary developments in the cognitive sciences. Most solutions opt for a naturalized phenomenology, rather than a phenomenological naturalism. This article takes up the latter approach, confronting the implications of Merleau-Ponty's reformulation of Husserl's paradox of subjectivity. I argue that Merleau-Ponty's formulation—which I term “the paradox of madness”—reveals a deep, ontological contingency in what Husserl took to be necessary transcendental structures of consciousness and world, revealing that these (...) transcendental structures are in fact embedded in and contaminated by the very world they constitute and disclose. (shrink)