Die meisten Systematiker, vergleichende Anatomen und Paläontologen ziehen es vor ihr Material, so weit es möglich ist, in allmählich abgestuften Serien zu ordnen. Dass solche Reihen dem Gange der Evolution wirklich entsprechen, ist nach der Erfahrung der Genetiker unwahrscheinlich. Vor zwanzig Jahren hat schonMorgan darauf hingewiesen, dass man die verschiedenen erblichen Typen vonDrosophila der Flügelform und auch der Augenfarbe nach in allmählich abgestuften Reihen ordnen könne, dass aber nichts dafür spräche, dass solche Reihen phylogenetische Bedeutung haben. Für die Haarfarbe vonMus (...) musculus undMus wagneri kommt Verfasser zum gleichen Schluss. Wenn man schwarz und weiss als Extreme einer Farbenserie annimmt, so kann genetisch der Übergang von schwarz zu weiss in einem Sprung gemacht werden oder aber mittels einer Serie von neun Abstufungen, die teilweise rückläufig sind. Wenn man die Wildfarbe, schwarz-agouti, als Ausgangspunkt annimmt, so wird Melanismus mit einem einzigen Sprung, Albinismus aber entweder mit einem Sprung oder mittels einer Reihe von Zwischenfarben erreicht. Für solche Reihen von Zwischenfarben gibt es dann noch verschiedene Möglichkeiten. Die abgestuften Typenserien stellen daher keine Entwicklungsserien dar, wenn nicht festgestellt ist, dass sie chronologische Serien sind. Dass man sich einfach mit ihrer Aufstellung zufrieden zu geben pflegt, erschwert das Studium der Evolution.La plupart des systématistes, d'anatomistes comparatives et de paléontologistes préfèrent autant que possible à classer leurs objects dans des séries graduées. L'expérience de généticistes rend invraisemblable que de telles séries représentent le cours de l'évolution.Morgan a démontré, il y a vingt ans, que les différents types héréditaires deDrosophila se laissent classer dans des séries graduées d'après la forme des ailes et d'après la couleur des yeux. Pourtant, toute indication manque que ces séries ont une importance phylogénétique. L'auteur arrive à la même conclusion quant à la couleur des poils deMus musculus et deMus wagneri. Si l'on admette que noir et blanc sont les extrêmes d'une série de couleurs, la transition de noir à blanc peut être le résultat d'un seul changement génétique; ou bien elle peut être l'effet d'une série de neuf changements dont quelques uns reviennent sur leurs pas. Si l'on prend la couleur noire-agoutie de la souris sauvage comme point de départ, le mélanisme est obtenu par un seul changement génétique. L'albinisme peut être obtenu par une de plusieurs séries de couleurs intermédiaires ou bien par un seul changement génétique. Les séries graduées des types peuvent représenter l'évolution seulement au cas qu'elles sont en même temps des séries chronologiques. L'habitude de se contenter de les reconnaître partout empéche plutôt l'étude de l'évolution. (shrink)

Concentrating on the thought of Canada's major scientists, philosophers, and clerics - men such as William Dawson and Daniel Wilson, John Watson and W.D. LeSeur, G.M. Grant and Salem Bland - A Disciplined Intelligence begins by reconstructing the central strands of intellectual and moral orthodoxy prevalent in Anglo-Canadian colleges on the eve of the Darwinian revolution. These include Scottish common sense philosophy and the natural theology of William Paley. The destructive impact of evolutionary ideas on that orthodoxy and the major (...) exponents of the new forms of social evolution - Spencerian and Hegelian alike - are examined in detail. By the twentieth century the centre of Anglo-Canadian thought had been transformed by what had become a new, evolutionary orthodoxy. The legacy of this triumphant intellectual movement, British idealism, was immense. It helped to destroy Protestant denominationalism, provide the philosophical core of the social gospel movement, and constitute a major force behind the creation of the United Church of Canada. Throughout the nineteenth century and continuing into the twentieth, however, the moral imperative in Anglo-Canadian thought remained a constant presence. (shrink)

This book derives from a 1993 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Knowledge, Teaching, and Wisdom. The Institute took place at the University of California, Berkeley, and was co-directed by Keith Lehrer and Nicholas D. Smith. The aims of the Institute were several: we sought to reintroduce wisdom as a topic of discussion among contemporary philosophers, to undertake an historical investigation of how and when and why it was that wisdom faded from philosophical view, and to ask how (...) contemporary epistemological theories might apply to the obviously related subjects of teaching and wisdom. In recruiting participants, Lehrer and Smith put the greatest emphasis on those with professional interests in epistemology and the history of philosophy, of the ancient Greeks especially ancient Greek philosophy (because in the writings all three subjects of the Institute were explicitly related and discussed). But in addition to these two groups, some effort was made also to include others, with academic specializations in a variety of fields other than epistemology and the history of philosophy, to ensure that a broad perspective could be achieved in our discussions. To an obvious extent, the papers in this book reflect the recruitment emphases and variety. They also testify to the extent that the Institute managed to bring life to our subjects, and to raise very old questions in a contemporary context. (shrink)

An argument is a conceptual instrument through which a certain logical f order between propositions can be seen to exist. But does an argument show that a proposition is true? It does, if by ‘that’ you mean that the proposition can be seen to follow through the instrument of a valid argument which employs true premises. But when we wonder whether to believe that a proposition is true we do not always wonder whether or not the proposition follows logically from (...) other propositions. We want to know f whether the proposition is in itself true, whether or not it follows from another proposition or series of propositions. That a proposition is true f may be a fact, whether or not the machinery of reason has succeeded in focusing our attention on its truth by extracting its truth from other true premises. (shrink)

William of Malmesbury's Regesta Regum Anglorum is one of the great histories of England, and one of the most important historical works of the European Middle Ages. Although its focus is national, its scope encompasses most of Western Europe and beyond, providing a full-scale account of the First Crusade. Apart from its formidable learning, it is characterized by narrative skill and entertainment value - with topics including unpowered flight and Henry I's zoo. This edition in the Oxford Medieval Texts series (...) is the first modern translation and edition. A full historical introduction is supplied in Volume II. (shrink)

There are many people in the world who want to be Somebody. Let us describe someone as Somebody who comes to believe that, in one or more respects, he or she is a special or significant person and who succeeds, through whatever means, in acquiring some sort of reputation and some sort of fame. People want to become Somebody because they believe that unless they succeed in that respect they will turn out to be a mere mediocrity, or worse still, (...) to be thought of as a mere mediocrity. People want to leave some sort of mark in this world before they die. They do not want their passage through this world to be utterly ineffectual. This, I think, is the seed from which the ideal of being Somebody emerges. (shrink)

Contributed papers chiefly with reference to India; presented at the conference held on Dec. 3-5, 2009, at KLS Institute of Management Education and Research, Belgum, India.

The validity of the double effect doctrine is examined in euthanasia and abortion. In these two situations killing is a method of treatment. It is argued that the doctrine cannot apply to the care of the dying. Firstly, doctors are obliged to harm patients in order to do good to them. Secondly, patients should make their own value judgments about being mutilated or killed. Thirdly, there is little intuitive moral difference between direct and indirect killing. Nor can the doctrine apply (...) to abortion. Doctors kill fetuses as a means of treating the mother. They also kill them as an inevitable side effect of other treatment. Drawing a moral distinction between the direct and the indirect killing gives counterintuitive results. It is suggested that pragmatic rules, not ethics, govern practices around euthanasia and cause it to be more restricted than abortion. (shrink)