Resumo Tambor de Mina é o nome da religião afro-brasileira no Maranhão e na Amazônia estabelecida a partir de São Luís desde meados do século XIX. Existem duas casas fundadas por africanos que se continuam: a Casa das Minas Jeje, de origem daomeana e a Casa de Nagô, iorubana de onde derivam a maioria dos terreiros de Mina recentes e atuantes. Trata-se de religião muito ritualizada e discreta, envolvida em segredos e mistérios cuja mitologia é pouco comentada e os rituais (...) muito desenvolvidos. As religiões afro-brasileiras se caracterizam pela realização de festas com transe, danças e comidas que atraem muitos participantes. A comida é bastante para oferecer a todos e distribuir as sobras. A fartura nas festas maiores constitui um dos elementos de prestígio das casas. O texto baseia-se em entrevistas com líderes de um terreiro antigo e de duas casas recentes, sobre comida de santo nas festas. Na linguagem de Mauss o sacrifício constitui obrigação que estabelece uma comunicação entre o mundo sagrado e o profano. O preparo e o consumo da comida de santo permitem conhecer aspectos do sincretismo e dos simbolismos nos rituais. Palavras-chave : Religiões afro-brasileiras; comida de santo; sincretismo; festas; ritual.Tambor de Mina is the name of the Afro-Brazilian religion in Maranhão and Amazon established in São Luís (capital of Maranhão state) since the mid-nineteenth century. There are two matrix-houses founded by Africans: Casa das Minas Jeje , a Dahomean origin house and Casa de Nagô , originally Yoruba and from which most of the Tambor de Mina 's houses come from. It is a very ritualized and discrete religion, involved in secrets and mysteries whose mythology is not frequently commented upon and its rituals are highly developed. Afro-Brazilian religions are characterized by the performance of parties with trance, dance and food which attract many participants. Food is enough to be offered to everyone and have the remains distributed. The abundance of food during the bigger festivities constitutes a prestige element to the houses. According to Mauss, sacrifice is an obligation that establishes communication between sacred and profane. The preparation and consumption of holy feast food allow us to know aspects of syncretism and symbolisms in rituals Keywords : Afro Brazilian religions; holy feast food; syncretism; festivals; ritual. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Resumo O Reinado de Nossa Senhora do Rosário (também conhecido como Congado), manifestação católica, típica dos negros, festa popular e importante no Estado de Minas Gerais funda-se em uma narrativa mítica em torno da Santa de mesmo nome e constitui o imaginário de seus devotos. Compreender como esta religiosidade mítica foi constituída no Brasil é o objetivo desse artigo. Os dados são partes integrantes de tese de doutoramento que adotou a teoria da complexidade (...) (Morin), a psicologia profunda (Jung, Campbell, Bachelard), a antropologia do imaginário (Durand) e a antropologia da festa (Duvignaud) com seus principais expoentes em diálogo com outros autores, como referenciais teóricos. A mithopoiésis (Ferreira Santos) aqui entendida como a elaboração de sentidos dada pelos congadeiros à sua própria vida orientada pelo fundo mítico de Nossa Senhora do Rosário, se tornou a metodologia mais adequada para o estudo. Os resultados encontrados possibilitaram a construção de novos conhecimentos sobre as comunidades afrodescendentes, ampliando a nossa compreensão sobre a sociedade brasileira, e sobre nós mesmos. Palavras-chave: congado; mito; imaginário; festa.Nossa Senhora do Rosário's Reign (also known as Congado), Catholic manifestation, typicaly of black people, popular and important party in the State of Minas Gerais is founded on a mythical narrative about the Saint of the same name and establishes the imagination of its devotees . Understanding how this mythical religion was established in Brazil is the purpose of this article. The data is part of the doctoral thesis which adopted the theory of complexity (Morin), depth psychology (Jung, Campbell, Bachelard), anthropology of the imaginary (Durand) and anthropology of the party (Duvignaud) with their main representatives in dialogue with other authors, as theoretical reference. The mithopoiésis (Ferreira Santos) here is understood as the elaboration of senses given by the Congadeiros to their own lives, guided by the mythical background of Nossa Senhora do Rosário has become the most appropriate methodology for the study. The results allowed the construction of new knowledge about the afro-descendent communities, enlarging our understanding of the Brazilian society, and ourselves. Key words: congado ; myth; imaginary; party. (shrink)

There are many mean and nasty things to say about mean and nasty talk, but I don't plan on saying any of them. There's a specific problem about slurring words that I want to address. This is a semantic problem. It's not very important compared to the real-world problems presented by bigotry, racism, discrimination, and worse. It's important only to linguistics and the philosophy of language.

RESUMO: Tomando por base o ensaio Über das Studium der griechschen Poesie, este trabalho tem por objetivo investigar o conceito de imitação no pensamento do jovem Friedrich Schlegel. Além de explicitar dois usos distintos do conceito - que aparece ora como imitação do real, ora como imitação dos antigos - pretende-se identificar oscilações e tensões terminológicas que possam esclarecer a postura filosófica do autor, frente à profunda crise de legitimidade, que, naquela época, atinge a concepção da arte como imitação da (...) natureza. É intenção mostrar que, embora reconheça os aspectos negativos que a má aplicação do modelo clássico provoca na produção e na teoria da arte moderna, Schlegel também propõe um sentido positivo, à luz do qual a imitação pode ser harmonizada com os princípios filosóficos basilares de uma estética idealista de feição kantiana. ABSTRACT: On the basis of the essay Über das Studium der griechschen Poesie, this work intends to investigate the concept of imitation in the thought of the young Friedrich Schlegel. In addition to pointing out two different uses of this concept - which appears either as imitation of the real or as imitation of the ancients - it is our aim to identify alternations and terminological tensions that might illuminate the author's philosophical position regarding the deep legitimacy crisis which, at the time, hounded the concept of art as imitation of nature. It is our intention to show that, although Schlegel did recognize the negative effects of the thoughtless employment of the classical model on the theory and practice of modern art, he also put forward a positive sense in which imitation could be harmonized with the founding philosophical principles of an idealist Kantian-like aesthetics. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende situar a candente questão das teologias índias no tempo atual e o desafio essencial do reconhecimento da alteridade indígena e dos direitos que acompanham essa singularidade. Inicia-se com a reflexão sobre as controvérsias que envolvem o tema das teologias índias no contexto eclesial contemporâneo. A seguir, discute-se o difícil aprendizado que envolve a tomada de consciência dos povos indígenas como “povos distintos”. Nota-se na atual conjuntura da Igreja católica romana um particular embaraço nesse delicado campo, e (...) uma tendência a entender a diversidade religiosa como momento passageiro ou conjuntural. A questão da alteridade ganha uma peculiar atualidade para a teologia cristã, que vem provocada a ampliar o seu campo de compreensão. Tal aprendizado envolve a ampliação do olhar e também o resgate de valores que são fundamentais, e que nem sempre estão presentes no repertório cristão, como o resgate da espiritualidade terrenal desses povos indígenas. A vida espiritual expressa pela teologia índia revela-se “cosmoteândrica”. Nos rituais andinos celebra-se uma grande comunhão que integra a comunidade humana, o meio ambiente e a divindade geradora de vida. Encontra-se uma viva consciência da imanência de Deus e da sacralidade da criação, da transparência de Deus e de sua diafania por toda parte. Essa espiritualidade recupera valores que são essenciais para o ser humano e que estão esquecidos e abafados em nossa sociedade marcada por uma lógica egocêntrica e pela racionalidade do mercado. Palavras-chave: Teologia índia; alteridade; espiritualidade terrenal; espiritualidade cosmoteândrica. ABSTRACT The present article aims to situate the discussion of the Indian theologies nowadays. It also seeks to situate the essential challenge of the recognition of native alterity as well as the rights that go with such peculiarity. This paper first begins by reflecting on controversies that cover the question of the Indian theologies in the current days.. After that, a detailed discussion on the difficulties of general apprenticeship involving consciousness of the native people as “a different people ” is made. Expressive difficulties on the part of the Catholic Church in dealing with diversity as well as its tendency to comprehend diversity as a conjunctural and not a structural subject are currently observed. The discussion on alterity has required full attention on the side of Christian theology, which has broadened understanding on such issue. Apprenticeship concerning the question of alterity involves expansion of vision and also the recovering of those values which have always been present on Christian repertoire. It is important to emphasize here that one of those basic Christian values to be considered are those related to the recovering of terrestrial spirituality of native people. The spiritual life expressed by the Indian theology appears to be "cosmoteandric". In the Andean rituals, celebration and integration of human community, environment and divinity, are always present. A lively consciousness of the immanence of God, as well as awareness of the sacrality of the creation and the transparency of God and of his manifestation in everywhere is often found among Indian people. Such spirituality recovers values considered of strong importance for human being but unfortunately put aside in our society which is undoubtedly marked by an egocentric logic and by the rationality of economy and market. Key words : Indian theology; alterity; terrestrial spirituality; cosmoteandric spirituality. (shrink)

Através de algumas considerações de caráter teológico, pretendemos mostrar que a festa da Virgem Maria de Guadalupe tem profundo enraizamento no coração do povo de Deus, por duas razões fundamentais: Primeiro: a devoção à "Guadalupana" nos remete à Palavra de Deus, que instrui nossa fé; e segundo, tal devoção se funda em uma verdadeira epifania profética. A reflexão teológica se sustenta em algumas idéias centrais: Guadalupe permite a reestruturação da consciência indígena. Analogicamente, Guadalupe permite nomear a Deus em três modos: (...) cristológico, trinitário e antropológico. Guadalupe, gravada na Tilma (manto) de Juan Diego, desvela um mundo como mundo de Maria que não é possível habitar. Na narrativa do Nican Mopohua discernimos uma Simbólica da Bondade originária , que manifesta o amor misericordioso do Pai no Filho, com a figura do Servo Sofredor como pano de fundo. Finalmente, Guadalupe remete ao texto bíblico, por ser interpretação do mesmo e sinal de sua recepção. A Virgem de Guadalupe assume dessa forma as características de um verdadeiro profeta. Palavras-chave: Festa; sagrado; sociedade; religião. Resumen Es nuestro propósito mostrar, a través de algunas consideraciones de caracter teológico, que la Fiesta en torno de la Virgen María de Guadalupe tiene un arraigo profundo en el corazón del pueblo de Dios por dos razones fundamentales: Primero, la devoción a la Guadalupana nos remite a la Palabra de Dios, que instruye nuestra Fe; y segundo, la devoción se funda en una verdadera epifanía profética. La reflexión teológica se basa en algunas ideas fuerza: Guadalupe permite la reestructuración de la conciencia indígena. Guadalupe analógicamente permite nombrar a Dios en tres modos, cristológico, trinitario y antropológico. Guadalupe, grabada en la Tilma de Juan Diego, despliega un mundo como mundo de María que nos es posible habitar. En la narrativa del Nican Mopohua discernimos una Simbólica de la Bondad originaria , que manifiesta el amor misericordioso del Padre en el Hijo, con la figura del Siervo Sufriente como telón de fondo. Guadalupe es, finalmente, referencia al texto bíblico, por ser interpretación del mismo y señal de su recepción. La Virgen de Guadalupe asume las características fundamentales de un verdadero profeta. Palabras clave: Fiesta; sagrado; sociedad; religión.Through some theological observations, we intend to show that the feast of the Virgin Mary of Guadalupe has deep rooting in the heart of the people of God, for two basic reasons: Firstly: the devotion to the "Guadalupana" sends us to the Word of God, that instructs our faith; secondly: such devotion is founded on an authentic prophetic Epiphany. The theological reflection is supported in some central ideas: Guadalupe allows the reorganization of the aboriginal conscience. Analogicalally, Guadalupe allows us to nominate God in three ways: christological, trinitarian and anthropological. Guadalupe, recorded in Juan Diego's Tilma (mantle), reveals a world as a world of Mary which is not possible to inhabit. In the narrative of Nican Mopohua we discern a Symbolic approach of the originary Goodness, that manifests the merciful love of the Father in the Son, with the figure of the Sufferer Servant as background.. Finally, Guadalupe sends us to the Biblical text, for being an interpretation of such text and a sign of its reception. The Virgin of Guadalupe finally assumes the characteristics of an authentic prophet. Keywords: feast; sacred; society; religion. (shrink)

Bafomé, a mais duradoura criação do escritor Éliphas Lévi, é um ícone do universo esotérico: é a imagem “satânica” mais conhecida da história. Na tentativa de desvendar a sua rica composição simbólica, uma exegese iconográfica será conduzida por intermédio da psicologia analítica, fundada pelo psiquiatra suíço Carl Gustav Jung. As origens de Bafomé na alquimia, na cabala e no gnosticismo serão perscrutadas e os conceitos Junguianos do inconsciente coletivo e dos arquétipos irão, em grande parte, balizar a interpretação proposta neste (...) trabalho. Tal análise será dividida em oito subáreas, entre elas: o significado do seu aspecto animalesco na escatologia cristã, o hermafroditismo na psicologia e nas ciências arcanas, as qualidades mágicas do pentagrama e a importância hermética do caduceu. Por fim, conclui-se que o Bafomé é um símbolo de self, o arquétipo da totalidade psíquica. Bafomé tem por finalidade ser uma alternativa à imagem primordial cristã de autorrealização, mais integradora e menos repressora que esta. Palavras-chave: Alquimia. Cristianismo. Magia. Psicologia junguiana. Religião e psicologia.Baphomet, the lasting creation of the French writer Éliphas Lévi, is an icon of the esoteric universe: it is the history’s best-known “satanic” image. In an attempt to unravel its rich symbolic composite, an iconographic exegesis will be conducted through the use of analytical psychology, founded by the Swiss psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung. The origins of Baphomet in alchemy, Kabbalah and Gnosticism will investigated mostly through the application of Jungian concepts such as the collective unconscious and the archetypes. Such analysis will be divided into eight sub-areas, including: the significance of his animal appearance in Christian eschatology, hermaphroditism in psychology and the arcane sciences, the magical qualities of the pentagram and the importance of the caduceus in hermetism. Finally, we conclude that Baphomet is a symbol of the self, the archetype of psychic wholeness. Baphomet aims to be an alternative to the Christian primordial image of self-realization, more inclusive and less repressive than the latter. Keywords: Alchemy. Christianity. Jungian psychology. Magic. Religion and psychology. (shrink)

Partimos dos eixos propostos por José Carlos Barcellos no artigo “Literatura e teologia” para enquadrar a fortuna crítica que se elevou em torno de Franz Kafka quanto à relação entre sua literatura e a temática religiosa. O primeiro eixo lida com a perspectiva de que a literatura se apresente como uma teologia não teórica, nele analisamos a configuração de Kafka como um cabalista de acordo com Scholem. No segundo, sob a ótica de que a teologia está presente na literatura, observamos (...) a crítica de Anders aos investimentos apologistas que diagnosticam em Kafka uma teologia positiva. O terceiro eixo enfoca a literatura como “lugar teológico” e por ele discutimos com Brod e Moller sobre a possibilidade de visualizar a literatura de Kafka como signatária da mesma esperança que se encontra nestes analistas. Já o quarto eixo trata de uma interpretação mais focada no aspecto humano, assim como a leitura interpretativa de Heller. Por último é apresentado o método da analogia estrutural de Kuschel como uma possibilidade de respeitar as peculiaridades de cada uma das áreas envolvidas. Por meio deste levantamento procuramos defender a manutenção da tensão entre literatura e religião como a melhor forma de respeitar tanto uma quanto a outra. Palavras-chave: Literatura. Religião. Teologia. Franz Kafka. José Carlos Barcellos.We assumed the positions proposed by José Carlos Barcellos in the article “Literature and theology” to frame the criticism which revolves Franz Kafka and the relation between his literature and religion. The first position deals with the perspective which considers literature as a non-theoretical theology. Based on that, we analyze the configuration of Kafka as a cabalist, according to Shcolem. In the second position, under the point of view that theology is present in literature, we observed Ander’s criticism of the apologist investments which diagnosed a positive theology in Kafka. The third aspect focuses on literature as a “theological place”, and based on it we discuss with Brod and Moller about the possibility of seeing Kafka’s literature as holder of the same hope found on those analysts. The fourth point approaches an interpretation focused on the human aspect, as Heller’s interpretative reading. Finally, it is presented Kuschel’s method of structural analogy as a possibility of respecting the peculiarities of each area involved. Through this survey we tried to defend the maintenance of the tension between literature and religion as the best way to respect both of them. Keywords : Literature. Religion. Theology. Franz Kafka. José Carlos Barcellos. - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2012v10n25p157. (shrink)

A pesquisa quantitativa tem sido predominante nos estudos sobre oração. A partir de uma abordagem qualitativa baseada na análise de conteúdo, este estudo examina as relações entre oração e saúde. Os dados são provenientes de 104 vídeos com entrevistas gravadas com participantes de igrejas Católicas, Protestantes e Pentecostais. A análise levantou quatro categorias descritivas do uso da oração: 1. Como estratégia de coping (enfrentamento) (62,5%); 2. Para manter viva a espiritualidade (15,3%); 3. Como técnica de empoderamento mútuo (8,6%); 4. Como (...) ponto de mudança no processo existencial (13,4%). Correspondem a estas categorias, respectivamente, os tipos de oração: 1. Petição, Lamentação; 2. Descanso, Sacramental, 3. Intercessão; 4. Conversão, Chamado; Movimento do Espírito. De acordo com a literatura corrente, a oração proporciona formas de conexão orientadas “para dentro/si mesmo” ; “para cima/divino” e “ para fora/outro” . Os resultados sugerem uma modalidade de conexão ainda não estudada: a conectividade epifânica – que se origina no sagrado, vem ao encontro do humano, e marca um ponto de mudança no processo existencial. Os achados indicam estreita relação entre oração e saúde mental e espiritual, como diminuição da ansiedade, direção e propósito na vida, e apontam a importância de maiores estudos na interface entre teologia e psicologia da religião. Palavras-chave: Oração. Coping religioso espiritual. Saúde mental e espiritual. Psicologia da religião. Subjetividade.Quantitative research has been prevalent in the studies on prayer. Using a qualitative approach based on content analysis, this study examines the relationship between prayer and health. Data come from 104 recorded interviews of participants from Catholic, Protestant and Pentecostal traditions. The analysis found four categories that describe the use of prayer: 1. Prayer as a religious coping strategy (62,5%); 2. Prayer as a discipline to keep spirituality alive (15,3%); 3. Prayer as a technique of mutual empowerment (8,6%); 4. Prayer as a turning point in the existential process (13,4%). The types of prayer corresponding to these categories are: 1. Petitionary and Lamentation; 2. Rest and Sacramental; 3. Intercessory prayer; 4. Conversion; Calling; Movement of the Spirit. According to the current literature, prayer provides inward, outward and upward connectivity. The results indicate an additional connectivity not yet studied: the Epiphanic connectivity, which comes from sacred to human and marks a turning point in the existential process. The outcomes suggest a close relationship between prayer and spiritual and mental health by decreasing anxiety, making meaning and purpose in life, and point out the relevance and need for further studies on the interface between theology and psychology of religion. Key words : Prayer. Spiritual religious coping. Mental and spiritual health. Psychology of religion. Subjectivity. (shrink)

Na esteira da conquista colonial de África, desencadeada na segunda metade do século XIX, alguns antropólogos e missionários europeus, que estabeleceram longa convivência com sociedades de diferentes regiões do continente africano, lograram realizar as primeiras recolhas e sistematizações acadêmicas do imaginário cultural de comunidades tradicionais. Tomando tal contexto como pano de fundo e contraponto, o artigo destaca algumas vozes de teóricos “nativos” (Ki-Zerbo, Hampaté Bâ, Honorat Aguessy), com vistas a explicitar e discutir alguns traços do proprium cultural africano. Na concepção (...) daquelas culturas tradicionais, a religião, assentada no mesmo arco da cultura oral, funda todos os demais componentes da vida social. Sobre tal pressuposto, o texto discute quatro aspectos principais: a concepção (ingênua) de uma unidade cultural africana; a importância da tradição oral para o conhecimento da história e do imaginário das sociedades daquele continente; as imbricações da ação política e das questões culturais; as polarizações (desnecessárias) de Europa versus África para fins de caracterizar adequadamente as culturas africanas. Palavras-chave: Culturas africanas. Religião tradicional africana. Oralidade.During the colonial conquest of Africa, which began in the second half of the nineteenth century, some European missionaries and anthropologists, who have established long acquaintance with some societies from different regions of Africa, managed to make the first academic collection and systematization of African traditional thought. Taking such a context as a backdrop and counterpoint, this article highlights some voices of African theorists (Ki-Zerbo, Hampaté Bâ, Honorat Aguessy), in order to explain and discuss some essential features of African culture. Within the traditional African conception, the religion, founded on the same pillars of oral culture, founds all other components of social life. On this assumption, the text discusses four main aspects: the naive conception of an African cultural unity; the importance of the oral tradition to the knowledge of history and of African imagery; imbrications of political action and cultural issues; unnecessary polarizations of the Europe versus Africa for purposes of adequately characterize African cultures. Keywords : African Cultures. African traditional religion. Orality. (shrink)

O artigo quer avaliar a presença das intuições religiosas de Dostoievski na escritura teológica do jovem Barth. Procuramos demonstrar os elementos fundamentais de sua trajetória teológica e, sobretudo, seu contato com Eduard Thurnysen, autor de uma obra sobre Dostoiévski, que exerceu uma influência determinante no horizonte hermenêutico que deu forma à postura teológica do Barth de Römerbrief, obra que instaurou uma negatividade desconstrutora de toda euforia religiosa do humanismo moderno. Partimos do pressuposto que Dostoievski determinou a intelligentsia religiosa do cristianismo (...) em proporções pouco explicitadas, e a obra do jovem Barth representou parte de uma reflexão teológica que encontrou no autor russo os fundamentos de um cristianismo trágico que emancipou-se das ilusões de uma auto-idolatria moderna e eclesiástica. Palavras-chave : Dostoiévski. Barth. Humanismo. Negatividade. Niilismo.This article aims to analizes the presence of Dostoievski's religious insights in the theological writing of the young Barth. We tried to demonstrate the key elements of his theological career and, especially, his contact with Eduardo Thurnysen, author of a book on Dostoievski, who exercised a decisive influence on the hermeneutical horizon that shaped the theological posture of Romerbrief' s Barth - a work that established a negativity that desconstructed all religious euphoria of modern humanism. We assumed that Dostoyevsky has determined a religious intelligenstsia of Christianity in proportions rarely made ​​explicit. The work of the young Barth represented part of a theological reflection which found in the Russian author the foundations of a tragic Christianity that has emancipated Barth from illusions of a modern and ecclesiastical self-idolatry Keywords : Dostoievsky. Barth. Humanism. Negativity. Nihilism. (shrink)

Entendemos que nenhuma sociedade constrói o presente e alicerça o futuro sem compreender sua cultura e sem conhecer o significado de sua história. O objetivo deste artigo consiste em apresentar uma metodologia aplicada na sala de aula das primeiras séries do ensino fundamental, cujo propósito foi despertar a imaginação simbólica dos alunos através do uso das lendas presentes nos livros didáticos do ensino religioso ministradas pelos docentes. Os temas estudados têm como base teórica a fenomenologia da religião, a antropologia e (...) a teoria geral do imaginário. Selecionamos para nosso estudo como fundamentação metodológica a pesquisa descritiva, de campo e a abordagem qualitativa para análise dos dados. Ponderamos que a pesquisa descritiva observa, registra, analisa e correlaciona fatos ou fenômenos sem manipulá-los, ela procura descobrir, com precisão possível, a frequência com que um fenômeno ocorre, sua relação e conexão com outros, sua natureza e característica. Nos primeiros resultados de nossa investigação cientifica foi identificado que as lendas trabalhadas na sala de aula potencializam o imaginário popular resguardando a identidade cultural de uma manifestação religiosa. Consideramos que esta metodologia de ensino proposta pode ser implantada pelos professores do ensino religioso no seu planejamento. Palavravas-chave : Lendas. Imaginação. Educação.No society is able to build the present and set the bases for the future without understanding its culture and without knowing the meaning of its history. The purpose of this article is to present the methodology put into practice in the classrooms of the first grades of the elementary school, which have the sole intention to wake up the symbolic imagination of the students through the use of the legends found in the didactic books of the religious teaching ministered by the faculty members. The topics studied are based upon the religious phenomenology, anthropology and the general theory of imaginary. For our study, we used the field research and the qualitative approach as a methodological foundation, to make the data analysis. We consider that the descriptive research observes, registers, analyses and co-relates facts or phenomena without manipulating them; such approach helps us to discover the frequency in which a phenomenon happens, the connection of the phenomenon with the others, and also its nature and characteristics. Since the first results of our scientific investigation we have identified that the legends seen by the students in their classroom have potentized the popular imaginary and have maintained the cultural identity of a religious manifestation. We consider that the teachers of religious teaching can introduce this teaching methodology proposed in their school plans. Keywords : Legends. Imagination. Education. (shrink)

As religiões de matriz africana no Brasil possuem um rico e complexo sistema de crenças, ritos e mitos que caracterizam a sua experiência religiosa. Este trabalho limita-se a estudar alguns temas religiosos do Candomblé de raiz nagô. A ideia de criação funda-se na concepção de um duplo cosmos, organizado em dois planos: o universo físico (aiyê) e o seu duplo espiritual (órum). Deus (Olorum), concebido como ser supremo e criador de todos os outros seres, estabelece relação com os seres humanos (...) pela mediação dos ancestrais coletivos (Orixás) e familiares (Egúns). Não há uma separação nítida entre os Orixás, enquanto divindades relacionadas às forças da natureza, e os ancestrais fundadores do povo. A partir dessas concepções, destaca-se o Axé como o elemento mais importante dessa tradição, perpassando todo o seu drama religioso na busca de uma experiência na participação na força vital (Deus), envolvendo a vida dos adeptos e as suas relações sociais na comunidade do terreiro de Candomblé. Palavras chave: Espiritualidade nagô. Religiosidade afro-brasileira. Axé.The religions of African origin in Brazil have a rich and complex system of beliefs, rites and myths, which characterizes their religious experience. This work aims to study some of the religious themes' Candomblé Nago. The idea of ​​creation is based on the design of a dual cosmos, organized in two levels: the physical universe (Aiye) and its spiritual double (Orum). God (Olorun), conceived as the supreme being and creator of all other beings, establishes relationship with humans through the mediation of collective ancestors (Orishas) and their families (EGUNS). There is no clear separation between the Orishas as deities related to the forces of nature, and the founding ancestors of the people. Based on these concepts, the Axe is highlighted as the most important element of this tradition, passing all his religious drama in search of an experience of participation in the life force (God), involving the lives of followers and their social relations within the community of Candomblé titled Terreiro. Key-words: Nago spirituality. Afro-Brazilian religiosity. Axé. (shrink)

A linguagem apofática é um gênero discursivo estreitamente relacionado à Teologia Negativa, cuja formulação mais acabada se encontra na obra do Pseudo-Dionísio (séc. V), místico que funda uma tradição negativa que se perpetuará durante toda a Idade Média e Moderna. Na contemporaneidade diversos autores (DERRIDA, 1995 e 1997; FRANKE, 2007; PONDÉ, 2003; VEGA, 2004 e 2009 e outros) têm destacado a retomada desse gênero discursivo nas artes, na literatura e nas ciências humanas de forma geral. A linguagem apofática é, portanto, (...) um discurso que visa à própria transcendência e se orienta para a denúncia de um vazio intrínseco à linguagem e ao mundo que dela se origina, de tal modo que o Deus que aí comparece desliza sob nossa linguagem sem se deixar prender em nossas teias discursivas. No presente texto a impossibilidade do nome de Deus torna-se metáfora para se refletir, a partir do exemplo da mística de Angelus Silesius, sobre as possibilidades de um pensamento negativo cujos fundamentos sejam o esvaziamento da linguagem, que se vê despojada de sua capacidade de dizer o mundo, e o aprendizado do não-saber. Palavras-chaves: Linguagem apofática; Linguagem; Angelus Silesius; não-saber.Apophatic language is a genre closely related to negative theology, whose the most accomplished formulation is found in the Pseudo-Dionysius work (fifth century), who founded a mystical tradition that perpetuated throughout the Middle and Modern Ages. Several authors in contemporary such as Derrida (1995 and 1997), (Franke, 2007), (Pounde, 2003), (Vega, 2004 and 2009), and others, have highlighted the resumption of that genre in the Arts, Literature and the Humanities in general. Apophatic is, thus, a discourse that seeks transcendence, and it orients itself to denounce the emptiness intrinsic to language as well as to world, so that the God that there appears slips under our language without being caught in our discursive webs. In this text the impossibility of God's name becomes a metaphor to reflect, from the example of the mystique of Silesius Angelus, on the possibility of a negative thought whose foundations are the emptiness of the language, which finds itself stripped of its ability to tell the world, and from the learning of the not-knowing. Keywords: Apophatic language; Failure of language; Angelus Silesius; not-to knowing. (shrink)

Resumo Neste estudo o autor procura analisar a compreensão da natureza humana que está subjacente às palavras de Aquiles, na Ilíada, IX,318-320 e na Odisseia, XI,489-491. Segundo o autor, Aquiles é portador de uma interpretação da condição humana que traduz uma determinada compreensão do que significa ser humano. De modo a deixar ver a compreensão da natureza humana presente nas palavras de Aquiles, o autor recorre a indícios encontrados noutros pontos das obras homéricas referidas, relacionando as concepções presentes nos dois (...) textos alvo. Identifica-se ainda a descrição da natureza humana que é possível fazer a partir das situações que envolvem os versos em análise. Assim, por um lado procura-se identificar que compreensão da natureza humana está presente no discurso de Aquiles e, por outro, que natureza humana emerge das alterações que o seu discurso sofre. Na Ilíada o autor encontra indícios de uma compreensão afetada pela ira, envolvendo o mundo humano numa aura de melancolia, na qual predomina o reconhecimento da injustiça por toda a parte. Da Odisseia obtém-se uma avaliação da vida que considera qualquer forma de existência humana preferível a qualquer forma de morte. Finalmente, o artigo explora o modo como a sua interpretação acerca da vida é modulada pelas mudanças que de cada vez se abatem sobre ele. Palavras-chave : Aquiles, compreensão, disposições afetivas, existência, natureza humana, vida e morteThe author analyses the understanding of human nature that underlies the words of Achilles in the Iliad, IX,318-320 and Odyssey, XI,489-491. According to the author, Achilles bears an interpretation of the human condition that reflects a certain understanding of what it means to be human. In order to bring to light the understanding of human nature present in the words of Achilles, the verses listed are analysed, using evidences found elsewhere in the Homeric works mentioned, and relating the concepts present in the two target texts. A diagnosis is made in order to identify the description of human nature that is presented by the situations involving the poetic subject. In short, the author seeks to identify which understanding of human nature is present in the speech of Achilles, and what is the concept of human nature that emerges from the changes happening through the verses. Thus, in the Iliad the author finds evidences of an understanding affected by anger, involving the human world in a wave of melancholy in which the recognition of injustice predominates. And in Odyssey the article finds an evaluation of life that sustains that any form of human existence is preferable when compared with death – compared with death, life is better. The article explores in particular the idea that Achilles’ interpretation of life is modulated by the changes he suffers in his life. Keywords: Achilles, existence, human nature, life and death, moods, understanding. (shrink)

O presente artigo apresenta uma reflexão sobre as interfaces entre teologia e espiritualidade. Sabe-se que a teologia escolástica se tornou muito especulativa e racional, relegando a espiritualidade à piedade popular e suas devoções. Teólogos modernos redescobrem a dimensão existencial da teologia, uma vez que, enquanto ciência da revelação, ela busca uma linguagem racional coerente para a experiência cristã de Deus. A teologia conjuga fé e razão; a experiência de fé, no entanto, é anterior à reflexão racional que, em última instância, (...) está a serviço da experiência, para iluminá-la e torná-la mais fiel à experiência fundamental da revelação de Jesus Cristo, que se encontra nas Escrituras. Nesse sentido, a espiritualidade emerge como aspecto intrínseco à teologia. A teologia, se permanecer fiel à sua missão, se expressará existencialmente como sapientia fidei. Este artigo trata, portanto, da relação evidente, mas muitas vezes esquecida, entre teologia (discurso racional) e espiritualidade (experiência cristã de Deus), mostrando que a teologia só cumpre o seu papel de serviço à Igreja se conduz o crente à experiência do mistério indizível de Deus que se aproximou de nós em Jesus Cristo. Palavras-chave: Teologia. Experiência de Deus. Espiritualidade. Trindade. Oração.The present article presents a reflection on the connection between theology and spirituality. It is known that scholastic theology became very speculative and rational reducing spirituality to popular piety and its devotions. Modern theologians have rediscovered the existential dimension of theology, once that, being the science of revelation, it seeks a rational language coherent with the Christian experience of God. Theology joins faith and reason – the experience of faith, nonetheless, comes before the rational reflection, which, in last instance, is in benefit of the experience in order to illuminate it and make it more faithful to the fundamental experience of revelation in Jesus Christ, found in the Scriptures. In this sense, spirituality emerges as an intrinsic aspect to theology. Theology, if it is to remain faithful to its mission, expresses itself existentially as sapientia fidei (the wisdom of faith). This article treats, therefore, of the evident relationship, many times forgotten, between theology (rational discourse) and spirituality (Christian experience of God) showing that theology only fulfills its role in service to the Church if it leads the believer to an experience of the undivided mystery of God in the person of Jesus Christ. Keywords: Theology. Experience of God. Spirituality. Trinity. Prayer. (shrink)

Previous studies have found that serum lipid levels independently associate with mental health problems in adulthood. However, little is known about the association between serum lipid levels and positive aspects of mental health such as resilience and self-esteem, which develop in adolescence. The aim of this study is to examine the association between serum lipid levels and resilience and self-esteem in Japanese adolescents. Data were pooled data from the Adachi Child Health Impact of Living Difficulty study in 2016 and (...) 2018, a school-based, cross-sectional study in Adachi City, Tokyo, Japan. Resilience of the child was assessed by caregivers, and self-esteem was self-identified via questionnaires. Serum lipid levels [total cholesterol, low-density lipoproteins, and high-density lipoproteins ] were assessed in school health checkup, in addition to height and weight measurements. Multiple linear regression was applied to investigate the association between standardized serum lipid levels and resilience and self-esteem. LDL showed inverse association with resilience [β = −1.26, 95% confidence interval = −2.39 to −0.14] after adjusting for child’s BMI, month of birth, sex, absence of parent, household income, caregiver’s mental health, and lifestyle. We also found an inverse association of total cholesterol and higher LDL cholesterol with self-esteem. HDL cholesterol was not associated with resilience and self-esteem. Among Japanese adolescent, total and LDL cholesterol may be biomarkers of resilience and self-esteem. (shrink)

In the first chapter of the Origin of species and in two chapters of the Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discusses the origin of domestic pigeons, claiming that all the known breeds were produced from a single species: Columba livia, the rock pigeon. The detailed defense of this point is of high relevance in Darwin’s argumentation strategy, since the differences between the several domestic breeds is so large that, if they were found in the wild, they (...) could be classified as different species or genera. If man was able to produce such large differences, it becomes plausible that nature can produce even larger differences, and therefore the process of natural selection becomes acceptable. Darwin emphasizes the enormous differences between the several domestic breeds (that may have dissimilar cranial structures and a varying number of vertebrae), and at the same time he attempts to show that there are connections and transitions between the extreme types, arguing for their common origin. One of the several interesting parts of his argument is an experiment of crossing between widely different breeds, which led him to obtain pigeons similar to the wild species. The detailed analysis of Darwin’s study of pigeons shows the extreme care he took in his attempt to provide strong arguments for his theory. RESUMO: No primeiro capítulo do Origin of species, e em dois capítulos do Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discute a origem dos pombos domésticos, defendendo que todas as raças conhecidas provêm de uma única espécie: Columba livia, o pombo de rocha. A defesa detalhada desse ponto é de grande importância na estratégia argumentativa de Darwin, pois as diferenças entre as várias raças de pombos são tão grandes que, se fossem encontradas em estado selvagem, poderiam ser classificadas como espécies ou gêneros diferentes. Se o homem foi capaz de produzir mudanças tão grandes como essas, torna-se plausível que a natureza possa produzir diferenças ainda maiores, e assim o processo de seleção natural se torna aceitável. Darwin enfatiza as grandes diferenças entre as raças de pombos (que chegam a possuir, por exemplo, diferentes estruturas cranianas e diferentes números de vértebras), e ao mesmo tempo procura mostrar a existência de nuances e transições entre os tipos extremos, para defender a origem comum. Um dos aspectos interessantes de sua argumentação é um experimento de cruzamento entre raças bem diferentes, através da qual obtém pombos semelhantes à espécie selvagem. A análise detalhada desse estudo de Darwin mostra o extremo cuidado que ele tomava para tentar proporcionar fortes argumentos a favor de sua teoria. (shrink)

A work of music is repeatable in the following sense: it can be multiply performed or played in different places at the same time, and each such datable, locatable performance or playing is an occurrence of it: an item in which the work itself is somehow present, and which thereby makes the work manifest to an audience. As I see it, the central challenge in the ontology of musical works is to come up with an ontological proposal (i.e. an account (...) of what sort of thing a work of music is) which enables us to explain what such repeatability consists in, whilst doing maximal justice to the way in which we conceive of musical works in our reflective critical and appreciative practice. To this end, many have found it tempting to defend some version or other of the type-token theory : the thesis that a work is a type and its occurrences are its tokens. Much of the early debate prompted by the publication of Jerrold Levinson's seminal 'What a Musical Work Is' in 1980 has taken the type-token theory for granted, choosing to focus on how musical works, qua types, are individuated. (A key question here has been whether we should hold, with the sonicist , that works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike; or whether we should agree with Levinson's contextualist thesis that exact sound-alikes are distinct, if composed in distinct musico-historical contexts.) More recently, however, the type-token theory itself has been put under pressure, and alternatives have been suggested. So, e.g. Gregory Currie and David Davies have held versions of the thesis that musical works (and artworks generally) are acts of composition, whilst Guy Rohrbaugh has recommended that we think more innovatively about our metaphysical categories, and treat musical works (along with all repeatable artworks) as historical individuals . Historical individuals, like particular substances, come into and go out of existence, could have been somewhat different than they are, and can change through time; but such items, unlike particular substances, are nonetheless capable of having occurrences. In the last few years, ontologists of music have also stepped back to consider the very nature of their enterprise. In particular, a debate has ensued concerning the cogency of ontological proposals (such as those of Nelson Goodman, Nicholas Wolterstorff and Julian Dodd) that are substantially revisionary of our folk concept of a work of music. Amie Thomasson, David Davies and Andrew Kania occupy, to a greater or lesser degree, the descriptivist standpoint, according to which such revisionary ontologies are misconceived. The debate between revisionists and descriptivists in the ontology of music – if prosecuted against the backdrop of an awareness of developments in meta-ontology more generally – is a particularly fertile area in the philosophy of music at present. Author Recommends Wollheim, Richard. Art and its Objects . 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. This seminal study nicely introduces and motivates the type-token theory, and in the course of doing so, helpfully, although perhaps contentiously, distinguishes types from both sets and properties. Wollheim's treatment was to a large part responsible for stimulating the subsequent debate as to the ontological nature of musical works. Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is.' Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980); reprinted in his Music, Art and Metaphysics , 63–88. This paper has, perhaps, been the most influential account of the nature of musical works, post-Wollheim. Presuming the type-token theory to be correct, Levinson elaborates it by claiming musical works to be, not sound structures (i.e. structured patterns of sound-types), but a species of types he calls indicated structures . According to Levinson, a work of music is not to be identified with its sound structure, S ; it is, in fact, a compound of S and a performance-means structure, PM , as indicated (typically, via a score) by its composer on a certain occasion : something that we can represent as S/PM -as-indicated-by- X -at- t . Such indicated structures, Levinson argues, fit the bill for being what works of music are, because they come into being with their indication (i.e. their composition), are individuated in terms of the musico-historical context in which they were composed, and have their specified performance-means (i.e. their instrumentation) essentially. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Works and Worlds of Art . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Part I of this book sees Wolterstorff defend a Platonistic version of the type-token theory (although Wolterstorff calls them 'kinds' rather than 'types'). According to Wolterstorff, considerations about the existence conditions of types commit us to the thesis that works of music, qua types, are entities that cannot come into or go out of existence. Kivy, Peter. 'Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defence.' Grazer Philosophische Studien 19 (1983): 109–29. In this article, Kivy ingeniously (and wittily) defends a variety of Platonism about works of music against the animadversions of Levinson. Currie, Gregory. An Ontology of Art . New York: St, Martin's Press, 1989. Here Currie introduces and defends the thesis that works of music (and, indeed, all artworks) are compositional action-types. The book also contains some well-aimed criticisms of Levinson's account. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. In this book, Dodd defends the type-token theory, but argues that no version of it can escape the Platonisic consequence that musical works exist at all times (and hence, are discovered, rather than created, by their composers). Dodd also defends another controversial thesis, this time concerning musical works' individuation. According to Dodd, and pace Levinson and others, sonicism is correct: works that sound exactly alike are identical. Rohrbaugh, Guy. 'Artworks as Historical Individuals.' European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 177–205. In this essay, Rohrbaugh makes some pointed criticisms of the type-token theory of repeatable artworks in the course of arguing that such works should be viewed, not as types, but as historical individuals (see above). Rohrbaugh suggests that treating musical works as historical individuals best captures our intuitions about such works' temporal and modal characteristics, and, in the course of elaborating his position, he makes some meta-ontological claims that see him endorsing a non-revisionary, descriptivist approach to the ontology of art. As Rohrbaugh sees it, ontologies of art are 'beholden to our artistic practices' (179), and 'aesthetics should not be beholden to the metaphysics on offer, but rather should drive new work in metaphysics' (197). Ridley, Aaron. 'Against Musical Ontology,' Journal of Philosophy 100 (2003): 203–220. This paper sees Ridley outlining a sceptical attitude towards the project of formulating ontological proposals. In his view, a 'serious philosophical engagement with music is orthogonal to, and may well in fact be impeded by, the pursuit of ontological issues' (203). Thomasson, Amie. 'The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics.' JAAC 63 (2005:221–9). Thomasson defends descriptivism in the ontology of art by arguing that such a position is a consequence of the only defensible solution to a problem in the theory of reference: the so-called 'qua' problem concerning how the reference of a term can be fixed. Davies, David. Art as Performance . Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. Davies' position is characterised by two theses: one methodological, the other ontological. The methodological claim is that the ontology of art faces a pragmatic constraint : roughly speaking, the ontology of art is answerable to the epistemology of art. The ontological claim is that the rigorous enforcement of the pragmatic constraint commits us to the thesis that all artworks are compositional action-tokens. Online Materials http://www.blackwell-compass.com/subject/philosophy/article_view?article_id=phco_articles_bpL173 Dodd, Julian. 'Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology.' Philosophy Compass 3/6 (2008): 1113–34. doi: [DOI link] http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118557784/abstract Thomasson, Amie. 'Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are We Doing Here?' Philosophy Compass 1/3 (2006): 245–55. doi: [DOI link] http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122517227/abstract Davies, David. 'Works and Performances in the Performing Arts.' forthcoming in Philosophy Compass . doi: [DOI link] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/music/ Kania, Andrew. 'The Philosophy of Music.' Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Sample Mini-Syllabus Week 1: The Type/Token Theory Introduced Wollheim, Richard. Art and its Objects , §§4–8, 21–3, 35–7. Kivy, Peter. Introduction to a Philosophy of Music , chapter 11. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapter 1. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Works and Worlds of Art , chapter 2. Week 2: The Type/Token Theory and Platonism in Music Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Works and Worlds of Art , chapter 2. Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is'. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapters 2–5. Kivy, Peter. 'Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defence.' Grazer Philosophische Studien 19 (1983): 109–29. Kivy, Peter. 'Platonism in Music: Another Kind of Defence.' American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 245–52. Predelli, Stefano. 'Against Musical Platonism.' British Journal of Aesthetics 35 (1995): 338–50. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Can a Musical Work be Created?' British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (2004): 113–34. Week 3: Musical Works as Indicated Structures Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is'. Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is, Again', in his Music, Art and Metaphysics . Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1990. 215–63. Dodd, Julian. 'Musical Works as Eternal Types.' British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (2000). Davies, Stephen. Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Account , chapter 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Howell, Robert. 'Types, Indicated and Initiated.' British Journal of Aesthetics 42 (2002): 105–27. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Fine Individuation.' British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2007): 113–37. Week 4: Musical Work as Historical Individuals Rohrbaugh, Guy. 'Artworks as Historical Individuals'. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapter 6. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Defending Musical Perdurantism.' British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2006): 59–69. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Defending "Defending Musical Perdurantism".' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 331–37. Week 5: Musical Works as Compositional Actions Currie, Gregory. An Ontology of Art . New York: St, Martin's Press, 1989. Davies, David. Art as Performance . Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapter 7. Week 6: Meta-ontology of Music: What are we Doing When we do the Ontology of Music? Ridley, Aaron. 'Against Musical Ontology'. Thomasson, Amie. 'The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics'. Thomasson, Amie. Ordinary Objects , chapter 11. OUP, 2007. Davies, David. 'The Primacy of Practice in the Ontology of Art.' Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (2009): 159–72. Kania, Andrew. 'Piece for the End of Time: In Defence of Musical Ontology,' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 65–79. Kania, Andrew. 'The Methodology of Musical Ontology: Descriptivism and its Implications.' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 426–44. Cameron, Ross. 'There are No Things That are Musical Works.' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 295–314. Dodd, Julian. 'Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology.' Philosophy Compass 3/6 (2008): 1113–1134. doi: [DOI link] Focus Questions 1. Are musical works literally created by their composers? 2. Critically examine Levinson's thesis that musical works are 'indicated structures'. 3. What, if anything, is wrong with the thesis that musical works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike? 4. Should we immediately be sceptical of ontological proposals for works of music that are substantially revisionary of the way in which we ordinarily think of them? (shrink)

The role of research ethics consultants in biomedical research has increased to the point that they have an advisory capacity at all research institutes. For such professionals, we have established an educational system, which includes teaching materials, training methods, and nationwide educational workshops. These workshops have served to examine the developed system’s usefulness and to provide realistic training for consultant candidates. In addition, we have used the current workshop to encourage clinical research investigators to participate. Subsequently, we examined its usefulness (...) as an opportunity to provide exposure to research ethics. In October 2019, we held a 1-day pilot workshop in Tokushima, Japan, which included a basic lecture in research ethics. During the lecture, two sets of materials were used for case discussion: case 1, covering issues related to a clinical trial, and case 2, covering issues related to human biological specimens. At the end of the workshop, a 30-item self-reporting anonymous questionnaire was provided. Of the 13 total participants, 9 were clinical research investigators and related personnel, while 6 had no direct intention to act as consultants. Respondents indicated that case 2 was more difficult than case 1. However, both cases were generally accepted as educational materials; thus, satisfaction was expressed in relation to both. As the evaluations of the cases were generally positive, we will further examine the usefulness of participation in the workshop in the cultivation of research ethics in the investigator community. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Among recent criticisms of impartial moral theories, especially in consequentialist and deontological forms, Bernard Williams’ integrity objection is perhaps the most tantalizing. This objection is a complaint—at once both general and deep—that impartial moral theories are systematically incapable of finding room for integrity in human life and character. Kantians have made forceful responses to this integrity objection and have moved on. Consequentialists have found the objection more trying. I offer reasons to think that consequentialists too can safely move (...) on. These reasons suggest the relationship between integrity and impartiality is less antagonistic than often supposed.RÉSUMÉ : Parmi les récentes critiques des théories morales impartiales, notamment les critiques conséquentialiste et déontologique, l’objection d’intégrité de Bernard Williams est possiblement la plus attrayante. Cette objection—à la fois générale et profonde—reproche aux théories morales impartiales d’être incapables de retrouver l’intégrité dans la vie et le caractère humains. Les kantiens ont répondu vigoureusement à cette objection, puis sont passés à autre chose. Les conséquentialistes ont trouvé l’objection plus éprouvante. Je soutiens que les conséquentialistes peuvent, eux aussi, passer à autre chose, en suggérant que le rapport entre l’intégrité et l’impartialité est moins antagonique que supposé. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Integrity and Impartial MoralityVolume 51, Issue 2Greg Scherkoske DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000455Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Integrity and Impartial MoralityVolume 51, Issue 2Greg Scherkoske DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000455Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Integrity and Impartial MoralityVolume 51, Issue 2Greg Scherkoske DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000455Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Esta reflexão pretende mostrar o discurso racional cartesiano na segunda prova da existência de Deus. Para tanto, Descartes se depara com uma pergunta central: qual a causa da existência da res cogitans que é finita e possui a ideia de infinito? A resposta é encontrada na desproporcionalidade ontológica entre o finito e o infinito. Essa desproporcionalidade é elucidada mediante dois conceitos: o princípio de causalidade que determina que a causa deve ser igual ou superior a coisa causada e o princípio (...) de criação contínua em que a causa que criou o ser não é menor do que aquela que o conserva em sua existência. As objeções destacadas no texto contra os argumentos cartesianos foram escolhas deliberadas que servem para elucidar a importância da racionalidade como fundamento para a prova da existência de Deus. A relação entre o entendimento e a liberdade, apresentada no texto sucintamente, justifica a impossibilidade da res cogitans ser causa de si mesma. Palavras-chave: Infinito; finito; causalidade; criação contínuaThis essay aims to show the rational Cartesian discourse on the second proof of God’s existence. In order to do so, Descartes faces a core question: which is the cause for the existence of the res cogitans that is finite in front of the idea of the infinite? The answer is found in the ontological disproportionality between the finite and the infinite. This disproportionality is elucidated through a couple crucial concepts: the principle of causality, which determines that the cause must be equal or superior to the caused thing and the principle of continuous creation, in which the cause that created the being is not inferior than the one that preserves its existence. The objections highlighted in the text against the Cartesian arguments were deliberated choices, to elucidate the relevance of rationality as the foundation for the proof of God’s existence. The relation between the understanding and the liberty, showed on the text even if succinctly, justifies the impossibility of the res cogitans to be the cause of itself. Key words: Infinite; finite; causality; creation continuous. (shrink)

Patrimônio de Fé e Religiosidade: os Bens Culturais inseridos na Festa do Senhor dos Passos em São Cristóvão, Sergipe, Brasil. (Heritage of Faith and Religiosity: Cultural Objects inserted on the Festival of Senhor dos Passos in São Cristóvão) - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2013v11n31p1018 O conceito de Bens Culturais de uma localidade vem passando por novos paradigmas quanto à abrangência e relevância. Nesse âmbito, além do Patrimônio Material de ruas, praças, igrejas, objetos artísticos e históricos, o discurso e ações dos órgãos oficiais e (...) da comunidade, devem também se pautar pela valorização das produções imateriais da cultura. Esses elementos envolvem os sujeitos e os sons produzidos por eles, seus ofícios, memórias, festas e religiosidade. Nesse sentido, o presente artigo visa analisar os Bens Culturais que compõem o cenário da celebração do Senhor dos Passos e descrever os seus valores histórico, religioso e artístico. A metodologia utilizada foi: pesquisa bibliográfica, documental e de campo. Após as três etapas da pesquisa e observação no local, constatado que a Festa do Senhor dos Passos em São Cristóvão possui elementos patrimoniais conectados que a transforma em um evento vinculado à identidade cultural-religiosa da região. Alguns desses elementos já são tombados nos níveis estadual, nacional e mundial, enquanto que outros, embora não reconhecidos pelos órgãos oficiais de salvaguarda do Patrimônio, são valorizados pela comunidade no que concerne a afetividade, memória, dádiva e pertencimento: Patrimônios de Fé, Religiosidade e Culto em Sergipe. Palavras-chave : Patrimônio Cultural. Festa. Religiosidade. Senhor dos Passos. São Cristóvão (Sergipe).The concept of cultural property that belongs to one locality has been going through new paradigms regarding the scope and relevance. In this context, in addition to material assets (streets, squares, churches and historical-artistic objects) the speech and actions of official bodies and the community, should also be guided by the appreciation of intangible productions. Such elements involve the subjects and the sounds produced by them, their crafts, memories, parties and religiosity. In this way, this article aims at analyzing the aspects that make up the scene of the festivities of Senhor dos Passos as a Cultural object and describes its historical, religious and artistic values. The methodology used was the bibliographic, documental and field research. After the three stages of research and on-site observation, it was found that the Festival of Senhor dos Passos in São Cristóvão owns connected heritage elements which turn it into an event linked to the religious-cultural identity of the region. Some of these elements are already safeguarded statewide and at national and global levels, while others, though not recognized by the official bodies of safeguarding of heritage are valued by the local community by affection, memory, donation and belongingness: Heritage of Faith, Religiosity and cult in Sergipe. Keywords : Cultural Heritage. Festivity. Religiosity. Senhor dos Passos. São Cristóvão (Sergipe). (shrink)

ABSTRACT I argue that this examination and appreciation for the shift to abductive reasoning should be extended to the intersection of neuroscience and novel brain-computer interfaces too. This paper highlights the implications of applying abductive reasoning to personalized implantable neurotechnologies. Then, it explores whether abductive reasoning is sufficient to justify insurance coverage for devices absent widespread clinical trials, which are better applied to one-size-fits-all treatments. INTRODUCTION In contrast to the classic model of randomized-control trials, often with a large number of (...) subjects enrolled, precision medicine attempts to optimize therapeutic outcomes by focusing on the individual.[i] A recent publication highlights the strengths and weakness of both traditional evidence-based medicine and precision medicine.[ii] Plus, it outlines a tension in the shift from evidence-based medicine’s inductive reasoning style (the collection of data to postulate general theories) to precision medicine’s abductive reasoning style (the generation of an idea from the limited data available).[iii] The paper’s main example is the application of precision medicine for the treatment of cancer.[iv] I argue that this examination and appreciation for the shift to abductive reasoning should be extended to the intersection of neuroscience and novel brain-computer interfaces too. As the name suggests, brain-computer interfaces are a significant advancement in neurotechnology that directly connects someone’s brain to external or implanted devices.[v] Among the various kinds of brain-computer interfaces, adaptive deep brain stimulation devices require numerous personalized adjustments to their settings during the implantation and computation stages in order to provide adequate relief to patients with treatment-resistant disorders. What makes these devices unique is how adaptive deep brain stimulation integrates a sensory component to initiate the stimulation. While not commonly at the level of sophistication as self-supervising or generative large language models,[vi] they currently allow for a semi-autonomous form of neuromodulation. This paper highlights the implications of applying abductive reasoning to personalized implantable neurotechnologies. Then, it explores whether abductive reasoning is sufficient to justify insurance coverage for devices absent widespread clinical trials, which are better applied to one-size-fits-all treatments.[vii] ANALYSIS I. The State of Precision Medicine in Oncology and the Epistemological Shift While a thorough overview of precision medicine for the treatment of cancer is beyond the scope of this article, its practice can be roughly summarized as identifying clinically significant characteristics a patient possesses (e.g., genetic traits) to land on a specialized treatment option that, theoretically, should benefit the patient the most.[viii] However, in such a practice of stratification patients fall into smaller and smaller populations and the quality of evidence that can be applied to anyone outside these decreases in turn.[ix] As inductive logic helps to articulate, the greater the number of patients that respond to a particular therapy the higher the probability of its efficacy. By straying from this logical framework, precision medicine opens the treatment of cancer to more uncertainty about the validity of these approaches to the resulting disease subcategories.[x] Thus, while contemporary medical practices explicitly describe some treatments as “personalized”, they ought not be viewed as inherently better founded than other therapies.[xi] A relevant contemporary case of precision medicine out of Norway focuses on the care of a patient with cancer between the ventricles of the heart and esophagus, which had failed to respond to the standard regimen of therapies over four years.[xii] In a last-ditch effort, the patient elected to pay out-of-pocket for an experimental immunotherapy (nivolumab) at a private hospital. He experienced marked improvements and a reduction in the size of the tumor. Understandably, the patient tried to pursue further rounds of nivolumab at a public hospital. However, the hospital initially declined to pay for it given the “lack of evidence from randomised clinical trials for this drug relating to this [patient’s] condition.”[xiii] In rebuttal to this claim, the patient countered that he was actually similar to a subpopulation of patients who responded in “open‐label, single arm, phase 2 studies on another immune therapy drug” (pembrolizumab).[xiv] Given this interpretation of the prior studies and the patient’s response, further rounds of nivolumab were approved. Had the patient not had improvements in the tumor’s size following a round of nivolumab, then pembrolizumab’s prior empirical evidence in isolation would have been insufficient, inductively speaking, to justify his continued use of nivolumab.[xv] The case demonstrates a shift in reasoning from the traditional induction to abduction. The phenomenon of ‘cancer improvement’ is considered causally linked to nivolumab and its underlying physiological mechanisms.[xvi] However, “the weakness of abductions is that there may always be some other better, unknown explanation for an effect. The patient may for example belong to a special subgroup that spontaneously improves, or the change may be a placebo effect. This does not mean, however, that abductive inferences cannot be strong or reasonable, in the sense that they can make a conclusion probable.”[xvii] To demonstrate the limitations of relying on the abductive standard in isolation, commentators have pointed out that side effects in precision medicine are hard to rule out as being related to the initial intervention itself unless trends from a group of patients are taken into consideration.[xviii] As artificial intelligence (AI) assists the development of precision medicine for oncology, this uncertainty ought to be taken into consideration. The implementation of AI has been crucial to the development of precision medicine by providing a way to combine large patient datasets or a single patient with a large number of unique variables with machine learning to recommend matches based on statistics and probability of success upon which practitioners can base medical recommendations.[xix] The AI is usually not establishing a causal relationship[xx] – it is predicting. So, as AI bleeds into medical devices, like brain-computer interfaces, the same cautions about using abductive reasoning alone should be carried over. II. Responsive Neurostimulation, AI, and Personalized Medicine Like precision medicine in cancer treatment, computer-brain interface technology similarly focuses on the individual patient through personalized settings. In order to properly expose the intersection of AI, precision medicine, abductive reasoning, and implantable neurotechnologies, the descriptions of adaptive deep brain stimulation systems need to deepen.[xxi] As a broad summary of adaptive deep brain stimulation, to provide a patient with the therapeutic stimulation, a neural signal, typically referred to as a local field potential,[xxii] must first be detected and then interpreted by the device. The main adaptive deep brain stimulation device with premarket approval, the NeuroPace Responsive Neurostimulation system, is used to treat epilepsy by detecting and storing “programmer-defined phenomena.”[xxiii] Providers can optimize the detection settings of the device to align with the patient’s unique electrographic seizures as well as personalize the reacting stimulation’s parameters.[xxiv] The provider adjusts the technology based on trial and error. One day machine learning algorithms will be able to regularly aid this process in myriad ways, such as by identifying the specific stimulation settings a patient may respond to ahead of time based on their electrophysiological signatures.[xxv] Either way, with AI or programmers, adaptive neurostimulation technologies are individualized and therefore operate in line with precision medicine rather than standard treatments based on large clinical trials. Contemporary neurostimulation devices are not usually sophisticated enough to be prominent in AI discussions where the topics of neural networks, deep learning, generative models, and self-attention dominate the conversation. However, implantable high-density electrocorticography arrays (a much more sensitive version than adaptive deep brain stimulation systems use) have been used in combination with neural networks to help patients with neurologic deficits from a prior stroke “speak” through a virtual avatar.[xxvi] In some experimental situations, algorithms are optimizing stimulation parameters with increasing levels of independence.[xxvii] An example of neurostimulation that is analogous to the use of nivolumab in Norway surrounds a patient in the United States who was experiencing both treatment-resistant OCD and temporal lobe epilepsy.[xxviii]Given the refractory nature of her epilepsy, implantation of an adaptive deep brain stimulation system was indicated. As a form of experimental therapy, her treatment-resistant OCD was also indicated for the off-label use of an adaptive deep brain stimulation set-up. Another deep brain stimulation lead, other than the one implanted for epilepsy, was placed in the patient’s right nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum region given the correlation these nuclei had with OCD symptoms in prior research. Following this, the patient underwent “1) ambulatory, patient-initiated magnet-swipe storage of data during moments of obsessive thoughts; (2) lab-based, naturalistic provocation of OCD-related distress (naturalistic provocation task); and (3) lab-based, VR [virtual reality] provocation of OCD-related distress (VR provocation task).”[xxix] Such signals were used to identify when to deliver the therapeutic stimulation in order to counter the OCD symptoms. Thankfully, following the procedure and calibration the patient exhibited marked improvements in their OCD symptoms and recently shared her results publicly.[xxx] In both cases, there is a similar level of abductive justification for the efficacy of the delivered therapy. In the case study in which the patient was treated with adaptive deep brain stimulation, they at least had their neural activity tested in various settings to determine the optimum parameters for treatment to avoid them being based on guesswork. Additionally, the adaptive deep brain stimulation lead was already placed before the calibration trials were conducted, meaning that the patient had already taken on the bulk of the procedural risk before the efficacy could be determined. Such an efficacy test could have been replicated in the first patient’s cancer treatment, had it been biopsied and tested against the remaining immunotherapies in vitro. Yet, in the case of cancer with few options, one previous dose of a drug that appeared to work on the patient may justify further doses. However, as the Norwegian case presents, corroboration with known responses to a similar drug (from a clinical trial) could be helpful to validate the treatment strategy. (It should be noted that both patients were resigned to these last resort options regardless of the efficacy of treatment.) There are some elements of inductive logic seen with adaptive deep brain stimulation research in general. For example, abductively the focus could be that patient X’s stimulation parameters are different from patient Y’s and patient Z’s. In contrast, when grouped as subjects who obtained personalized stimulation, patients X, Y, and Z demonstrate an inductive aspect to this approach’s safety and/or efficacy. The OCD case holds plenty of abductive characteristics in line with precision medicine’s approach to treating cancer and as more individuals try the method, there will be additional data. With the gradual integration of AI into brain-computer interfaces in the name of efficacy, this reliance on abduction will continue, if not grow, over time. Moving forward, if a responsive deep brain stimulation treatment is novel and individualized (like the dose of nivolumab) and there is some other suggestion of efficacy (like clinical similarities to other patients in the literature), then it may justify insurance coverage for the investigative intervention, absent other unrelated reasons to deny it. III. Ethical Implications and Next Steps While AI’s use in oncology and neurology is not yet as prominent as its use in other fields (e.g., radiology), it appears to be on the horizon for both.[xxxi] AI can be found in both the functioning of the neurotechnologies as well as the implementation of precision medicine. The increasing use of AI may serve to further individualize both oncologic and neurological therapies. Given these implications and the handful of publications cited in this article, it is important to have a nuanced evaluation of how these treatments, which heavily rely on abductive justification, ought to be managed. The just use an abductive approach may be difficult as AI infused precision medicine is further pursued. At baseline, such technology relies on a level of advanced technology literacy among the general public and could exclude populations who lack access to basic technological infrastructure or know-how from participation.[xxxii] Even among nations with adequate infrastructure, as more patients seek out implantable neurotechnologies, which require robust healthcare resources, the market will favor patient populations that can afford this complex care.[xxxiii] If patients already have the means to pay for an initial dose/use of a precision medicine product out of pocket, should insurance providers be required to cover subsequent treatments?[xxxiv] That is, if a first dose of a cancer drug or a deep brain stimulator over its initial battery life is successful, patients may feel justified in having the costs of further treatments covered. The Norwegian patient’s experience implies there is a precedent for the idea that some public insurance companies ought to cover successful cancer therapies, however, insurance companies may not all see themselves as obligated to cover neurotechnologies that rely on personalized settings or that are based on precision/abductive research more than on clinical trials. CONCLUSION The fact that the cases outlined above rely on abductive style of reasoning implies that there may not be as strong a justification for coverage by insurance, as they are both experimental and individualized, when compared to the more traditional large clinical trials in which groups have the same or a standardized protocol (settings/doses). If a study is examining the efficacy of a treatment with a large cohort of patients or with different experimental groups/phases, insurance companies may conclude that the resulting symptom improvements are more likely to be coming from the devices themselves. A preference for inductive justification may take priority when ruling in favor of funding someone’s continued use of an implantable neurostimulator. There are further nuances to this discussion surrounding the classifications of these interventions as research versus clinical care that warrant future exploration, since such a distinction is more of a scale[xxxv] than binary and could have significant impacts on the “right-to-try” approach to experimental therapies in the United States.[xxxvi] Namely, given the inherent limitations of conducting large cohort trials for deep brain stimulation interventions on patients with neuropsychiatric disorders, surgically innovative frameworks that blend abductive and inductive methodologies, like with sham stimulation phases, have traditionally been used.[xxxvii] Similarly, for adaptive brain-computer interface systems, if there are no large clinical trials and instead only publications that demonstrate that something similar worked for someone else, then, in addition to the evidence that the first treatment/dose worked for the patient in question, the balance of reasoning would be valid and arguably justify insurance coverage. As precision approaches to neurotechnology become more common, frameworks for evaluating efficacy will be crucial both for insurance coverage and for clinical decision making. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This article was originally written as an assignment for Dr. Francis Shen’s “Bioethics & AI” course at Harvard’s Center for Bioethics. I would like to thank Dr. Shen for his comments as well as my colleagues in the Lázaro-Muñoz Lab for their feedback. - [i] Jonathan Kimmelman and Ian Tannock, “The Paradox of Precision Medicine,” Nature Reviews. Clinical Oncology 15, no. 6 (June 2018): 341–42, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41571-018-0016-0. [ii] Henrik Vogt and Bjørn Hofmann, “How Precision Medicine Changes Medical Epistemology: A Formative Case from Norway,” Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 28, no. 6 (December 2022): 1205–12, https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.13649. [iii] David Barrett and Ahtisham Younas, “Induction, Deduction and Abduction,” Evidence-Based Nursing 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2024): 6–7, https://doi.org/10.1136/ebnurs-2023-103873. [iv] Vogt and Hofmann, “How Precision Medicine Changes Medical Epistemology,” 1208. [v] Wireko Andrew Awuah et al., “Bridging Minds and Machines: The Recent Advances of Brain-Computer Interfaces in Neurological and Neurosurgical Applications,” World Neurosurgery, May 22, 2024, S1878-8750(24)00867-2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wneu.2024.05.104. [vi] Mark Riedl, “A Very Gentle Introduction to Large Language Models without the Hype,” Medium (blog), May 25, 2023, https://mark-riedl.medium.com/a-very-gentle-introduction-to-large-language-models-without-the-hype-5 f67941fa59e. [vii] David E. Burdette and Barbara E. Swartz, “Chapter 4 - Responsive Neurostimulation,” in Neurostimulation for Epilepsy, ed. Vikram R. Rao (Academic Press, 2023), 97–132, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-91702-5.00002-5. [viii] Kimmelman and Tannock, 2018. [ix] Kimmelman and Tannock, 2018. [x] Simon Lohse, “Mapping Uncertainty in Precision Medicine: A Systematic Scoping Review,” Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 29, no. 3 (April 2023): 554–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.13789. [xi] Kimmelman and Tannock, “The Paradox of Precision Medicine.” [xii] Vogt and Hofmann, 1206. [xiii] Vogt and Hofmann, 1206. [xiv] Vogt and Hofmann, 1206. [xv] Vogt and Hofmann, 1207. [xvi] Vogt and Hofmann, 1207. [xvii] Vogt and Hofmann, 1207. [xviii] Vogt and Hofmann, 1210. [xix] Mehar Sahu et al., “Chapter Three - Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Precision Medicine: A Paradigm Shift in Big Data Analysis,” in Progress in Molecular Biology and Translational Science, ed. David B. Teplow, vol. 190, 1 vols., Precision Medicine (Academic Press, 2022), 57–100, https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.pmbts.2022.03.002. [xx] Stefan Feuerriegel et al., “Causal Machine Learning for Predicting Treatment Outcomes,” Nature Medicine 30, no. 4 (April 2024): 958–68, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-024-02902-1. [xxi] Sunderland Baker et al., “Ethical Considerations in Closed Loop Deep Brain Stimulation,” Deep Brain Stimulation 3 (October 1, 2023): 8–15, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdbs.2023.11.001. [xxii] David Haslacher et al., “AI for Brain-Computer Interfaces,” 2024, 7, https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.dnb.2024.02.003. [xxiii] Burdette and Swartz, “Chapter 4 - Responsive Neurostimulation,” 103–4; “Premarket Approval (PMA),” https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/pma.cfm?id=P100026. [xxiv] Burdette and Swartz, “Chapter 4 - Responsive Neurostimulation,” 104. [xxv] Burdette and Swartz, 126. [xxvi] Sean L. Metzger et al., “A High-Performance Neuroprosthesis for Speech Decoding and Avatar Control,” Nature 620, no. 7976 (August 2023): 1037–46, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06443-4. [xxvii] Hao Fang and Yuxiao Yang, “Predictive Neuromodulation of Cingulo-Frontal Neural Dynamics in Major Depressive Disorder Using a Brain-Computer Interface System: A Simulation Study,” Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience 17 (March 6, 2023), https://doi.org/10.3389/fncom.2023.1119685; Mahsa Malekmohammadi et al., “Kinematic Adaptive Deep Brain Stimulation for Resting Tremor in Parkinson’s Disease,” Movement Disorders 31, no. 3 (2016): 426–28, https://doi.org/10.1002/mds.26482. [xxviii] Young-Hoon Nho et al., “Responsive Deep Brain Stimulation Guided by Ventral Striatal Electrophysiology of Obsession Durably Ameliorates Compulsion,” Neuron 0, no. 0 (October 20, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2023.09.034. [xxix] Nho et al. [xxx] Nho et al.; Erik Robinson, “Brain Implant at OHSU Successfully Controls Both Seizures and OCD,” OHSU News, accessed March 3, 2024, https://news.ohsu.edu/2023/10/25/brain-implant-at-ohsu-successfully-controls-both-seizures-and-ocd. [xxxi] Awuah et al., “Bridging Minds and Machines”; Haslacher et al., “AI for Brain-Computer Interfaces.” [xxxii] Awuah et al., “Bridging Minds and Machines.” [xxxiii] Sara Green, Barbara Prainsack, and Maya Sabatello, “The Roots of (in)Equity in Precision Medicine: Gaps in the Discourse,” Personalized Medicine 21, no. 1 (January 2024): 5–9, https://doi.org/10.2217/pme-2023-0097. [xxxiv] Green, Prainsack, and Sabatello, 7. [xxxv] Robyn Bluhm and Kirstin Borgerson, “An Epistemic Argument for Research-Practice Integration in Medicine,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 43, no. 4 (July 9, 2018): 469–84, https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhy009. [xxxvi] Vijay Mahant, “‘Right-to-Try’ Experimental Drugs: An Overview,” Journal of Translational Medicine 18 (June 23, 2020): 253, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12967-020-02427-4. [xxxvii] Michael S. Okun et al., “Deep Brain Stimulation in the Internal Capsule and Nucleus Accumbens Region: Responses Observed during Active and Sham Programming,” Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry 78, no. 3 (March 1, 2007): 310–14, https://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.2006.095315. (shrink)

Resumo: Pretendemos pensar as relações entre arte e sociedade, tendo sempre em mente a tensão irredutível entre a autonomia e a heteronomia de uma em relação a outra. Para tanto, traçaremos uma análise dos argumentos principais a respeito dessa relação dialética, em dois momentos distintos da reflexão filosófica sobre o tema. Em um primeiro momento, traremos a defesa de uma certa autonomia da arte com referência não apenas à sociedade que a produz, como também aos valores morais que são ensinados (...) através dela, com as reflexões e, sobretudo, com as críticas de Nietzsche sobre suas interpretações da tragédia clássica, a partir principalmente de O Nascimento da Tragédia, para, em um segundo momento, poder traçar um paralelo dessa argumentação com a constatação de Adorno a respeito da instrumentalização e da comercialização da arte, no contexto contemporâneo, expondo algumas das críticas de Nietzsche realizadas no séc. XIX sobre as produções culturais gregas do séc. IV a. C. e contextualizando-as em relação aos fenômenos estéticos contemporâneos.: We examine the relationship of art to society, bearing in mind the irreducible tension between the autonomy and heteronomy of the one in relation to the other. To do so, we analyze the main arguments about this dialectical relationship in two distinct moments of philosophical reflection on the subject. First, we argue for a degree of autonomy of art in relation not only to the social context that produces it but also with respect to the moral values that are taught through it, as found in the critique of Nietzsche in his interpretation of classical tragedy, principally in his The Birth of Tragedy. We then draw a parallel between this argumentation and that of Adorno on the exploitation and marketing of contemporary art. In this context, we also discuss Nietzsche's critique of the cultural productions of Greece in the fourth century BC, and contextualize them in relation to contemporary aesthetic phenomena. (shrink)

This article revisits Oman's idea that an intuitive felt knowledge of the divine underlies the articulate knowledge found in faith and theology. Such feeling, Oman claims, is analogous to ordinary perception and gives rise to the attempt to evaluate, understand, and respond to the divine. Theology is the formalized attempt to respond to the intuition of the divine. The article argues that Oman's emphasis on the experiential and experimental character of theology is helpful, but that his analysis of the (...) logic of faith requires reformulation.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.John Oman on feeling and theologyVolume 49, Issue 1ADAM HOOD DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000108Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. John Oman on feeling and theologyVolume 49, Issue 1ADAM HOOD DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000108Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. John Oman on feeling and theologyVolume 49, Issue 1ADAM HOOD DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000108Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Liberdade e eticidade: o diagnóstico crítico da modernidade política em Hegel Resumo: Após uma sucinta caracterização do processo de diferenciação e separação histórico-conceitual entre sociedade civil e Estado, respectivamente, entre o indivíduo burguês e o cidadão como traço principal da modernidade política, empreende-se uma análise concisa dos três registros da “apresentação” do conceito de liberdade, que, no âmbito do espírito objetivo, culmina no desenvolvimento do conceito de eticidade. Em seguida, explicita-se os três momentos lógicos, isto é, os três elementos constitutivos (...) e processuais do conceito de liberdade, que, em sua efetivação no âmbito do espírito subjetivo, assume três figuras, a da vontade natural, a da vontade do arbítrio e a da vontade livre que quer a efetivação universal da liberdade como seu “conteúdo, objeto e fim”. Hegel é por excelência o filósofo da modernidade política e, ao mesmo tempo, o seu crítico, na medida em que aprofunda a ruptura com a fundamentação teológica e jusnaturalista que o contratualismo moderno introduz no pensamento ético-político ao fundar a família, a sociedade e o poder político na vontade livre autônoma, ao mesmo tempo em que critica o caráter atomista e negativo da liberdade individual que o paradigma contratualista põe como sua base. Por fim, examina-se mais detidamente os dois pilares fundamentais que fundam a estrutura normativa de uma eticidade moderna e reflexiva : a pessoa como sujeito de direitos e a liberdade subjetiva da consciência moral moderna. Palavras-chave: Liberdade. Modernidade política. Diferença entre sociedade e Estado. Eticidade. Pessoa. Consciência moral. Freiheit und Sittlichkeit: die kritische Diagnose der politischen Modernität bei Hegel Zusammenfassung: Nach einer kurzen Darlegung des historisch-begrifflichen Differenzierungs- und Trennungsprozesses von burgerlicher Gesellschaft und Staat, beziehunsweise, zwischen dem „bourgeois“ und dem staatlichen Bürger, als den auszeichnenden Hauptzug der politischen Modernität, wird eine gedrängte Analyse der drei Ebenen der Darstellung des Freiheitsbegriffs, dessen Verwirklichung im Bereich des objektiven Geistes in der Entwicklung des Sittlichkeitbegriffs seinen Höhepunkt hat. Danach werden die drei logischen Momente, das heisst, die drei prozessualen Bestantandsteile des abstrakten Freiheitsbegriffs ausgelegt, die in ihrer Verwirklichung im subjektiven Geist die entresprechenden drei Gestalten des natürlichen Willens, des Willens als Willkür und desjenigen freien Willens, der die allgemeine Verwirklichung der Freiheit als „Inhalt, Gegenstand und Zweck“ hat. Hegel erweist sich als der profilierte und zugleich kritische Philosoph der politischen Modernität, insofern er den vom Kontraktualismus eingeführten Bruch mit der theologischen und naturrechtlichen Fundierung der Familie, der Gesellschat und der politischen Macht weiter vertieft und zugleich die negative und atomistische Dimension der individuellen Freiheit kritisiert, die der Kontraktualismus zu seiner Voraussetzung hat. Endlich, werden die zwei Grundpfeiler auseinandergelegt, welche die normative Struktur einer reflexiven und modernen Sittlichkeit begründen : die Person als Rechtssubjekt und die subjektive Freiheit als moralisches Gewissen. Schlüsselbegriffe: Freiheit. Politische Modernität. Differenz zwischen bürgerlicher Gesellschat und Staat. Sittlichkeit. Person. Gewissen. Freedom and ethical life: Hegel’s critical diagnosis of political modernity: Departing from a brief characterization of the historical-conceptual process by which civil society and the state, respectively, the bourgeois and the citizen, differed and separated from one another – a fundamental trait of political modernity –, I have undertaken a concise analysis of the three moments of the exposition of freedom’s concept, which, within the scope of objective spirit, culminates in the development of the concept of ethical life. Thereupon, I have elucidated the three logical moments, that is, the three constitutive and procedural elements of freedom’s concept, namely, universality, particularity and singularity, which, in their effectivation within the scope of subjective spirit, assume three figures: that of natural will, arbitrary will and the free will which wants the universal effectivation of freedom as its “content, object and aim”. Hegel is thus the philosopher of political modernity par excellence and, simultaneously, its severe critic, inasmuch as he, on the one hand, deepens the rift which modern contractualism introduced in ethical-political thought when it founded family, society and political power upon autonomous free will, and on the other, inasmuch as he, at the same time, tears down the atomist and negative character of individual freedom set forth by the contractualist paradigm as its basis. Finally, I examined in detail the two fundamental columns upon which a normative structure of a modern and reflexive ethical life are based: the person as subject of rights and the modern moral consciousness’ as subjective freedom. Keywords: Freedom. Political modernity. Difference between society and state. Ethical life. Person. Moral consciousness. Data de registro: 30/07/2020 Data de aceite: 21/10/2020. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar a hipótese de que a teoria kantiana do direito público seja estruturalmente antinômica, a despeito de que Kant só lhe tenha admitido o aspecto paradoxal. Com efeito, a teoria kantiana do direito público simultaneamente sustenta: (i) que o ingresso dos homens em um estado juridicamente organizado depende da obediência ao comando da razão que nos ordena celebrar o pactum unionis civilis e aceitar a submissão a uma ordem constitucional civil; (ii) que devemos aceitar como (...) nosso legítimo soberano a quem quer que tenha condições de efetivamente impor seu poder sobre nós. Bons intérpretes como Bouterwek e Hermann Cohen pensaram, contudo, que a verdadeira dificuldade dessa análise é uma desconcertante confusão dos conceitos de soberano e de soberania. A hipótese que procuramos explorar neste artigo é a de que se obterá um melhor entendimento da posição de Kant se admitirmos que os dois planos de análise e as teses conflitantes a que se acaba de aludir estão em uma posição reciprocamente equivalente à que se encontram tese e antítese nas antinomias dinâmicas analisadas na "Crítica da razão pura". The aim of this paper is to examine the hypothesis that Kantian theory of public rights is founded on an antinomic conceptual structure, even though Kant only admitted the paradoxical character of his doctrine. Kant's theory on public right states, at the same time, that: (i) the access to a rightful condition is dependent on our compliance to the command of reason to celebrate the pactum unionis civilis and the corresponding submission of the citizens under a civil constitution; (ii) we shall accept as our legitimate sovereign whoever is able to impose his power over us. Good interpreters, as Bouterwek and Hermann Cohen thought, however, that the true difficulty with his analysis is that it contains an astonishing confusion of the concepts of sovereign and sovereignty. The hypothesis I would like to explore in this paper is that perhaps a better understanding of Kant's position on this theme can be obtained by admitting that the two levels of analysis and the conflicting thesis we found in his doctrine of public rights are in a position reciprocally analogous to that occupied by thesis and antithesis in the dynamical antinomies assessed in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

John Harsanyi and John Rawls both used the veil of ignorance thought experiment to study the problem of choosing between alternative social arrangements. With his ‘impartial observer theorem’, Harsanyi tried to show that the veil of ignorance argument leads inevitably to utilitarianism, an argument criticized by Sen, Weymark and others. A quite different use of the veil-of-ignorance concept is found in evolutionary biology. In the cell-division process called meiosis, in which sexually reproducing organisms produce gametes, the chromosome number is (...) halved; when meiosis is fair, each gene has only a fifty percent chance of making it into any gamete. This creates a Mendelian veil of ignorance, which has the effect of aligning the interests of all the genes in an organism. This paper shows how Harsanyi's version of the veil-of-ignorance argument can shed light on Mendelian genetics. There turns out to be an intriguing biological analogue of the impartial observer theorem that is immune from the Sen/Weymark objections to Harsanyi's original. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.SOCIAL JUSTICE, GENOMIC JUSTICE AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE: HARSANYI MEETS MENDELVolume 28, Issue 1Samir Okasha DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267112000119Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. SOCIAL JUSTICE, GENOMIC JUSTICE AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE: HARSANYI MEETS MENDELVolume 28, Issue 1Samir Okasha DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267112000119Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. SOCIAL JUSTICE, GENOMIC JUSTICE AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE: HARSANYI MEETS MENDELVolume 28, Issue 1Samir Okasha DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267112000119Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Resumo: Neste artigo, propõe-se uma confrontação entre a teoria dos signos de Gotthold E. Lessing, tal como exposta em Laocoonte ou sobre as fronteiras da pintura e da poesia, e os dois ensaios de Theodor W. Adorno sobre as relações entre música e pintura. Pretende-se, com isso, demonstrar a presença decisiva de elementos da estética clássica alemã no pensamento adorniano do pós-guerra; em particular, observa-se o modo pelo qual a teoria racionalista de Lessing atua na abordagem dialética adorniana a respeito (...) da irredutibilidade formal dos meios artísticos e das possibilidades de sua convergência. À luz de tal confrontação, discutem-se, em um segundo momento do artigo, os temas da conferência de Adorno de 1966, A arte e as artes, que, em certa medida, consubstancia a discussão dos ensaios anteriores sobre música e pintura. Assinala-se, nesse contexto, a continuidade da posição teórica de Adorno e se apresentam as diferenças entre o processo de pseudomorfose e o de imbricação dos meios artísticos, segundo o filósofo.s: This article presents a comparison of Gotthold E. Lessing’s theory of signs, as found in his Laocoön: an essay on the limits of painting and poetry, and Theodore W. Adorno’s two essays on the relationship between music and painting. Our aim is to point out the decisive influence of German classical aesthetics on Adorno’s post-war aesthetics. Specifically, we discuss how Lessing’s theory functions as a framework for Adorno’s dialectical assessment of the formal specificity of artistic media and their possibilities of convergence in the context of the 1960’s avant-garde. In this context, we discuss the main implications of Adorno’s famous lecture of 1966, Art and the arts, which concerned the process of media convergence that intensified during the 1960’s, as well as the concepts of “overlapping” between artistic media and of “pseudomorphosis”. (shrink)

Photo by Hannah Busing on Unsplash INTRODUCTION Religion has long provided guidance that has led to standards reflected in some aspects of medical practices and traditions. The recent bioethical literature addresses numerous new problems posed by advancing medical technology and demonstrates an erosion of standards rooted in religion and long widely accepted as almost axiomatic. In the deep soul-searching that pervades the publications on bioethics, several disturbing and dangerous trends neglect some basic lessons of philosophy, logic, and history. The bioethics (...) discourse on medical aid in dying emphasizes similarity over previously recognized important distinguishing features. For example, it overplays a likeness between assistance in dying and the withdrawal of life-saving technology. In many bioethics’ topics, arguments based on a logical continuum are used to question the lines demarcating important moral differences. l. The Line Between Ethical and Not: Logic Based on Continuum Careful case selection, often either end of a continuum, allows the tearing down or ridiculing of many rules and codes across most professions and fields of interest. This situation holds true for traffic laws as well as medical ethics guidelines. It is relatively simple for those who desire to attack a particular viewpoint by selecting a case that makes that position seem untenable. In the ethics realm, good and bad medicine exist at opposite ends of an ethical continuum, with many practices lying in between. For example, much of medical ethics exists between the Nazi criminal physicians and the most sainted nurse or physician. A gradual progression occurred over less than two decades from a utilitarian position that supported limited euthanasia for those with certain mental illnesses to genocide. German society embraced a utilitarian ethic in which the value of human life no longer was intrinsic but instrumental.[1] Many morally significant points on a continuum were then ignored as the misguided utilitarian policy rampantly continued. A point in the continuum to distinguish between ethically justifiable and that which is not can be difficult to identify compared to the two extremes. This continuum is not unique to ethics but can be applied to almost any other aspect of human life and endeavor. Between a severely ill schizophrenic person and a superbly well-adjusted individual, there is a continuum of mental and psychological function. The existence of a continuum should not paralyze thinking and prevent us from drawing lines and identifying moral differences based on objective criteria as well as moral philosophy. Yet, by focusing on a continuum, many bioethicists use logic to disregard dividing lines between an "ethical" and an "unethical" act. Unfortunately, sometimes bioethicists draw revolutionary conclusions that would change the scope of medical practices which is accepted as ethical. There are many examples of similar shifts on the continuum. Many authors argue for the ethical permissibility of abortion by pointing out that the human fetus is no different in various characteristics, one arguing it is as like an ape or chick as it is like a person,[2] and does not achieve unique human and individual characteristics until well into the first year of life.[3] While human fetuses arguably do not have certain distinctive qualities of personhood, most people shy away from the logical next conclusion: permitting infanticide. For example, Joshua Lederberg condemns infanticide, in the face of biological illogic, because of our emotional commitment to infants, to me, a relatively weak explanation. Sir Francis Crick suggests we might consider birth at two days of life in order to decide whether an infant is a "suitable" member of society.[4] Giublini and Minerva suggest that infanticide should be permissible since late pregnancy abortions are permissible, arguing there is no significant difference between a fetus just before birth and an infant just after birth.[5] Clearly the continuum approach would allow for subjective arguments in favor of later infanticide at other points many days post-birth. Years ago, with a cynical tone, I mentioned infanticide as a further step on the continuum beyond abortion, and I was rightly shouted down as being deliberately provocative to assert the logic would ever stretch so far. While it is not an accepted mainstream position, the movement in academic settings from widespread condemnation to limited possible acceptance of infanticide has taken place in an incredibly short time. Public opinion and medical opinion in these areas have shifted dramatically in a short time. In another area, from a biological and chemical point of view, there is a continuum from man down to a single carbon atom. Yet, it would not seem logical to ignore the emotional differences, the meaning of personhood, or the moral distinction between killing an insect and killing a person. ll. A False Continuum: Medical Aid in Dying I assert that there has been an erosion of ethical guidelines in recent years attributable to using continuums to camouflage important distinctions. James Rachels’ work on active and passive euthanasia, which contends that the two are ethically identical, exemplifies that logic.[6] He illustrates this thesis, using a continuum to compare different scenarios with like consequences as morally equivalent, by comparing the deliberate drowning of a child with a deliberate failure to rescue a drowning child when easily able to do so. The author's comparison proposes that since much of the medical profession has already made peace with withholding treatment in order to hasten death, consistency inexorably demands that we permit active euthanasia as well.[7] When permission for active euthanasia was first introduced, it was limited exclusively to patients suffering severely from an intractable, incurable, and irreversible disease. These guidelines have been continuously eroded. There is now a substantial serious consideration for permitting active euthanasia of healthy elderly individuals who feel that they have completed their lives and are "tired of living."[8] There are many moral and factual differences along the ethical continuum. In human life, there is a difference between a live baby and a fetus, between a viable fetus and one that is not, between a fetus and a zygote, and between a zygote and a sperm cell. Similarly, there is a difference between pulling a trigger to kill someone and not interfering in preventing his death, which is reprehensible though both may be. There is a difference between not resuscitating an 80-year-old man with cancer when his heart stops and injecting him with a fatal dose of potassium chloride. I argue that an overt act of taking life repels civilized human beings is to be commended and encouraged as the reverence for human life or even for just a moment of human life is one of the great contributions of our civilization. CONCLUSION As an orthodox Jew, I feel that divinely inspired guidelines that have stood the test of centuries shape my beliefs, and such guidelines contradict medical aid in dying. I cannot speak to the viewpoint of those who do not access religion in defining their moral stance, nor do I implicate them in the current bioethics' trends, as I am not aware of the personal role of religion in the lives of most such authors. While many nonreligious people have a firm philosophical grounding and oppose medical aid in dying, I suggest that in the absence of any religious or other absolute standards, developing logically defensible ethical guidelines may be challenging. At the least, religion may play a role in defining the points on the continuums that are ethically meaningful and refuting the trending beliefs that if the endpoint is the same, allowing different methods of arriving at that end are somehow ethically equal. The continuum of ways death may result does not negate analysis of whether death is brought about in ways that recognize the importance of life. The German philosopher Hans Jonas said, "It is a question whether without restoring the category of the sacred, the category most thoroughly destroyed by the scientific enlightenment, we can have an ethics able to cope with the extreme powers that we possess today and constantly increase and are compelled to use."[9] While countries vary on the role of religion in policy, with many emphasizing freedoms of religion, a recent position paper released by a group of Jewish, Christian, and Moslem leaders suggested the need for agreement on the unique sanctity of human life.[10] I would recommend that such a document serve as an example of consensus on critical foundational bioethical guidelines for democratic secular societies. - [1] Alexander L Medical science under dictatorship. New England Journal of Medicine, 241, p39-47 DOI10.1056/NEJM194907142410201 [2] Lederberg J. A geneticist looks at contraception and abortion, Annals of Internal Medicine 67, sup 2, 25-27. https:/doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-67-3-25 [3] Ibid. [4] Editorial, Sociology: Logic of biology. Nature 220, 429 https://www.nature.com/articles/220429b0 [5] Giublini A Minerva F After-birth abortion: why should the baby live. J Med Ethics 39, 261- [6] Rachels J Active and passive euthanasia. New England Journal of Medicine 292, 78-80 [7] Ibid. [8] Cohen-Almagor R Euthanizing people who are "tired of life". in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide-Lessons from Belgium. Ch 11 of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, Cambridge University Press pp173-187. 2017 and DOI; https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108182799.012 [9] Hans Jonas, Technology and Responsibility: Reflections on the New Tasks of Ethics, 1972, found as Chapter IX, Philosophical Essays, 1980. https://inters.org/jonas-technology-responsability [10] A position paper of the Abrahamic Monotheistic religions on matters concerning the end-of-life. Vatican Press 28 October 2019 https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2019/10/28/191028f.html. (shrink)

As estéticas de Heidegger e Ortega representam dois modos de compreender a arte radicalmente distintos, o que é lógico se tivermos em conta que ambas respondem, por sua vez, a pontos de partida filosóficos absolutamente distintos: o ontológico e o humanista. Em oposição directa à estética ontológica heideggeriana, elaborada sobre a base da principalidade do ser, no segundo momento da sua filosofia pessoal e depois do seu contacto com o pensamento de Heidegger, Ortega, partindo da radicalidade metafísica do conceito de (...) vida humana e do seu carácter hermenêutico, elabora uma hermenêutica raciobiográfica da arte como método adequado de aproximação ao fenómeno artístico bem como toda uma estética humanista que não faz senão desenvolver a tendência humanista que caracteriza essencialmente a filosofia orteguiana desde a sua origem. /// Heidegger and Ortega's aesthetics represent two radically opposed views of Art, coming from two different philosophical starting points: ontological and humanist, respectively. In direct opposition to the Heideggerean ontological aesthetic, founded on the primacy of being, Ortega elaborates in the second period of his philosophy, after his contact with Heidegger's ideas, a ratio-biographical hermeneutic of Art. Starting from the metaphysical radicalism of the concept of human life and its hermeneutical character, Ortega uses this hermeneutic to approach the artistic phenomenon. This humanistic aesthetic naturally develops from the humanistic tendency that characterizes the essence ofOrteguean philosophy from its origin. (shrink)

Reviews the book, The mismeasure of desire: The science, theory, and ethics of sexual orientation by Edward Stein . It would hardly be overstating the matter to say that perhaps the single most hotly debated issue in both psychology and contemporary American culture is the nature and origins of human sexual desires. In opposition to the currently more widely accepted thesis that sexual orientation is determined at birth, philosopher and educator Edward Stein argues in this new book that much of (...) what we think we know about the origins of sexual desire is probably misguided and incomplete. Carefully examining a broad range of research on sexual orientation, Stein suggests that many of the most frequently cited findings are deeply flawed—not only methodologically but also in light of certain unquestioned philosophical assumptions and cultural stereotypes. Although the arguments in Stein’s book are more than a little likely to create controversy, and, indeed, some may well be found to be specious, his book is nonetheless a very welcome infusion of thoughtful philosophical and psychological thinking into the all-too-often muddled arena of contemporary academic and political debate. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, virtual and augmented reality, (semi-)autonomous ve- hicles, autoregulatory weapon systems, enhancement, reproductive technologies and human- oid robotics – these technologies (and many others) are no longer speculative visions of the future; they have already found their way into our lives or are on the verge of a breakthrough. These rapid technological developments awaken a need for orientation: what distinguishes hu- man from machine and human intelligence from artificial intelligence, how far should the body be allowed (...) to be changed and what are the dangers and opportunities presented by these technologies? Many of these questions are also addressed to theology. For example, questions about the image of humanity, the understanding of creation, the ethics of technological body interventions or the moral status of robots. What does theology have to say about these technological developments? It is the right time for theology to scientifically explore tech- nologization and AI and to formulate answers. As technology changes the various areas of human life, society and the world around us, the places and topics of theology are also undergoing transformation. Puzio, Anna: Theology Meets AI: Examining Perspectives, Tasks, and Theses on the Intersection of Technology and Religion. In: Puzio, Anna/Kunkel, Nicole/Klinge, Hendrik (Hg.): Alexa, How Do You Feel About Religion? Theological Approaches to Technology and Artificial Intelligence (Theology and AI 1). Darmstadt: wbg 2023, S. 29–41. DOI: 10.53186/1030373. (shrink)

The Review was founded in 1961 to bring an existential and phenomenological approach to the understanding of human experience. With a primary focus on the psychotherapeutic endeavor, the Review publishes original essays and first translations from the fields of literature and philosophy, as well as from psychology and psychiatry proper. The Review has published essays by nearly every major figure in the world, including Viktor Frankl, Eugene Gendlin, Jacques Lacan, R.D. Laing, RolloMay, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacob Needleman, Carl Rogers, and Jean-Paul (...) Sartre. In addition to continuing to publish original essays on a wide variety of general topics, in recent years the Review has published a series of special issues devoted to major figures in the field of existential psychology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

No presente trabalho procurarei expor dois desafios antirrealistas ancorados na história da ciência, que Stanford apelidou respectivamente de ‘antiga’ e ‘nova indução pessimista’. Argumentarei que existe uma solução realista já disponível a ambos os desafios pessimistas: o realismo experimental, inicialmente proposto por Hacking e Cartwritght, segundo o qual é possível comprometer-se com entidades teóricas com as quais desenvolvemos interações causais e com as quais produzimos fenômenos controlados, sem que tal compromisso se estenda às teorias mesmas. Tomarei como parâmetro não propriamente (...) os argumentos de Hacking e Cartwright que sofrem inúmeras críticas, mas uma formulação sofisticada do realismo experimental proposta por Egg. (shrink)

Resumo Neste artigo, o autor apresenta uma ideia original de “subjectividade”, na medida em que esta se desenvolve, no contexto da recém-fundada fenomenologia transcendental, designada por “fenomenologia generativa”. Esta figura da subjectividade é caracterizada por dois aspectos fundamentais : por um lado a “vibração” ou “oscilação” entre o “eu” e o “exterior” ; uma dimensão quadrupla de “transcendência”. Palavras-chave : alteridade, imaginação, mundo, self, subjectividade, transcendênciaIn this article I would like to put forward an original figure of “subjectivity” in so (...) far as it is developed in the context of a newly founded transcendental phenomenology called “generative phenomenology”. This figure of subjectivity is characterized by two fundamental aspects : the “vibration” or “oscillation” between the “self” and the “exterior” on the one hand and the quadruple dimension of “transcendence” on the other. Keywords : alterity, imagination, self, subjectivity, transcendence, world. (shrink)

ExtractIn a democracy people are free to express their opinions and question those of others. This is an important personal freedom, and also essential to the very idea of government by discussion. But it has also been held to be instrumentally important because in open public debate true ideas will conquer false ones by their merit, and the people will see the truth for themselves. In other words, democracy has an epistemic function as a kind of truth machine. From this (...) it follows that in a democracy there should be no dogma: no knowledge protected from public challenge and debate. Yet this whole argument is founded on embarrassing misconceptions of the nature of truth and of the working of democracy.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.DEMOCRACY IS NOT A TRUTH MACHINEVolume 12, Issue 33Thomas WellsDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175612000309Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. DEMOCRACY IS NOT A TRUTH MACHINEVolume 12, Issue 33Thomas WellsDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175612000309Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. DEMOCRACY IS NOT A TRUTH MACHINEVolume 12, Issue 33Thomas WellsDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175612000309Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation. (shrink)

Photo by Karl Raymund Catabas on Unsplash “After Buddha was dead, they still showed his shadow in a cave for centuries – a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way people are, there may still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow. – And we – we must still defeat his shadow as well!” – Friedrich Nietzsche[1] INTRODUCTION Friedrich Nietzsche famously declared that “God is dead!”[2] but lamented that his contemporaries remained living in the (...) shadow of God. For Nietzsche, the morality of his time was still based in the Christian tradition, even though faith in God was waning. Bioethics lives under a similar shadow: the shadow of Enlightenment Era-rationalism. Bioethics curricula focus on principles derived from Kantian deontology and utilitarianism. The allure of maintaining a moral framework that provides a rational method that can be handily applied to any situation remains strong. The principlist approach advanced by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress is taught to nearly all medical students in the United States,[3] and is essentially the canonical ethical framework of bioethics. In this model, the principle of autonomy is Kantian in nature, and the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are utilitarian in nature.[4] Moreover, the presented framework is an approach that, when applied rationally to any healthcare scenario, will yield an outcome “considered moral.”[5] This reflects a faulty conception of philosophy that plagues much of bioethics, wherein the only contribution of philosophy pertinent to bioethics is moral philosophy elucidated by European thinkers in the Enlightenment Era. The landscape of moral philosophy has evolved significantly from the 18th century. However, the bioethical world has not kept up with the philosophical world, remaining instead in the shadow of antiquated moral thinking. Also lacking in bioethics are other disciplines of philosophy, such as philosophy of language, existentialism, and aesthetics, which are often given no consideration at all. The inclusion of both modern moral philosophy and other philosophical fields is necessary if bioethics is to survive its transition into modernity. l. The Shadow of Enlightenment Enlightenment Era philosophers such as Immanuel Kant argued that one need only employ reason to obtain knowledge; emotion bore no relevance when determining ethical behavior. Kant’s moral theories thus privileged a duty to act according to moral imperatives over feelings. Other Enlightenment Era philosophers such as John Locke developed systems that attempted to quantify human goods and human ills. This quantification potentially reduces human welfare and suffering to utility. Today, in the world of philosophy, such a “neutral analysis,” as Cora Diamond noted, is “dead or moribund.”[6] Bernard Williams remarked that such moral philosophy is “empty and boring,”[7] and G. E. M. Anscombe stated that it “no longer generally survives.”[8] And yet, just as the atheists in Nietzsche’s world dwelt in the moral code of a dead God, bioethicists still pursue a unified moral system that takes an input, applies some moral rules, and generates a moral outcome, like the four principles approach that Beauchamp and Childress laid out.[9] Some detractors of principlism take issue with their approach for not being unified enough and want to replace it with a procedural framework that is even more systematic and complicated. They argue that the resulting moral framework would be a “comprehensive decision procedure for arriving at answers”[10] that retains the “impartiality that is an essential part of morality.”[11] The shadow of rationalist morality has caused bioethical decision making to become detached and rigid when bioethics should concern itself with the humans whose lives it affects. A rational, divorced-from-emotion way of thinking ultimately fails to yield satisfactory results when decisions are made by and for emotional beings. Dr. Paul Farmer, among others, championed the idea that bioethics should be de-philosophized, as philosophy, cold and calculated, fails to adequately respond to the realities of those worst off.[12] Instead, Dr. Farmer emphasized the inclusion of the social sciences, like sociology and anthropology, in bioethics. Undoubtedly, Dr. Farmer was on the right track; bioethics should certainly engage directly with the people whom its decisions involve. If the narrow band of moral philosophy currently found in bioethics – that of stringent rationalism – were all that philosophy had to offer, I, too, would advocate for a de-philosophization. Ludwig Wittgenstein notes that to attempt to capture the complexity of moral thinking in a manner that employs reason alone and casts aside emotion is a “hopeless task,” like reconstructing a sharp image “from a blurred one.”[13] Unfortunately, bioethics is mired in the remnants of this hopeless task. To Dr. Farmer, the dominant moral framework was too restrictive and was unresponsive to the social and humanitarian needs of those whom bioethics is meant to help. As such, he wished to free bioethics from the shadow of a morality derived from rationalist thinkers. ll. Beyond Rationalism Like Nietzsche, who tried to resolve Europe’s post-religion vacuum by providing his society with a new way to live, Dr. Farmer wanted to replace the rationalist philosophy upon which bioethics was built with a “resocialization” of the field.[14] I agree with Dr. Farmer’s call for resocialization, as well as his denouncement of philosophy as it exists in bioethics. Evaluating risks and benefits along a predetermined array of moral principles is far too rigid and impersonal to guide what are often the most important decisions one will make. For Dr. Farmer, the most needed change was restoring the social element of bioethics. However, in advocating for this resocialization, Dr. Farmer casts philosophy as the antithesis of social science, noting that “few would regard philosophy … as a socializing discipline.”[15] I disagree. Rationalist moral philosophy may be lacking in socializing force, but there are other fields of philosophy that are responsive to our social reality. Rather than de-philosophizing bioethics, it makes more sense to replace the antisocial philosophies predominant in bioethics with prosocial philosophies better suited to it. Of course, the contribution of philosophy to bioethics is more than moral theories from the Enlightenment Era. There are more recent philosophical contributions from outside the field of moral philosophy that have roused bioethical interest. Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby, et al., argue for philosophy’s continued place in bioethics, citing Derek Parfit’s “non-identity problem,” which altered the landscape of reproductive ethics, and David Chalmers’ contributions to philosophy of consciousness, which have implications for the moral status of brain organoids.[16] Still, these are narrow applications of philosophy to highly specialized areas of bioethics, which not all bioethicists are inclined to delve into. Philosophy in bioethics should not be confined to niche applications in specialist fields but should influence all bioethical thought. Fortunately, there remains untapped a wealth of philosophical disciplines that pertains to exactly this. Philosophy of language investigates the nature of meaning and understanding in communication, which is a necessary social action. Successfully deciphering and conveying moral values in discourse is a bioethicist’s bread and butter, as is resolving disagreements and reaching agreements. Indeed, it is often the case that miscommunication lies at the root of an impasse between a doctor and a patient. An understanding of the nature of the disagreement would help resolve the conflict, as different types of disagreements require different interventions for resolution. For instance, a “substantive disagreement,”[17] in which two parties use the same terms in the same ways and have a fundamental disagreement on which outcome is more desirable, can be resolved only if one party yields to the other. On the other hand, a “merely verbal dispute,”[18] in which two parties use the same terms to represent entirely different concepts and values, requires standardization of terminological usage for its resolution. As such, no one can overstate the moral importance of successful communication in bioethics, and an exploration of language itself would prove invaluable to a bioethicist’s training. Existentialism is another subset of philosophy that acknowledges the social nature of human existence, noting that one’s being in the universe is concomitant with the existence of others sharing the same universe.[19] Thus, there is the recognition that whatever existence is, it is not complete without the existence of others. With this as a starting point, existentialists examined how to live meaningfully with others in this world. Since ethics crucially involves others, it is no surprise that existentialists pondered how to live moral lives. Existentialist conceptions of morality did not revolve around acting in accordance with a set of rules, but rather, recognized individual freedom in choosing how to act and emphasized acting authentically. In this vein, bioethicists should commit to doing what is right rather than committing to applying a set of principles. Existentialism, while part of the broader bioethics literature, is less common throughout bioethics curricula and deserves more prominence. Martin Heidegger, for instance, emphasized the difference between two types of thinking: “calculative thinking” and “meditative thinking.” Heidegger characterizes calculative thinking as a computation, wherein from some given starting conditions “definite results”[20] are determined, and contrasts this with meditative thinking, which he describes as “thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is.”[21] Heidegger was critical of the pervasiveness of calculative thinking, seeing it as the “ground of thoughtlessness,”[22] in which we only relate to the world in a meaningless, mechanical way. This is the emphasized type of thinking in rationalist conceptions of morality popular in bioethics; from a set of starting conditions, a series of rules are applied, and a moral outcome is calculated. Such a technique, however, discounts the personal meaning individuals place on the aspects of their lives relevant to their decision making, as well as the meaning in committing to doing what is right. Under calculative thinking, such a commitment is reduced to rote rule-following. A turn to meditative thinking would ensure that bioethical decisions comport with living meaningful lives. Even aesthetics, a discipline devoted to examining beauty and taste,[23] has a place in bioethics. Just as the viewing of a painting, the listening of a song, or the reading of a book elicits an effective response, hearing a patient’s story leaves an emotional imprint. The recounting of a traumatic moment imparts sadness, and a joyous occasion begets joy in the listener as well. As acknowledged in the field of everyday aesthetics, these aesthetic experiences often spur us to act:[24] The unsightly appearance of a polluted riverbank drives us to remove the trash; the presence of sorrow in one’s life drives us to ameliorate it. To be mindful of aesthetic experiences and allow them to affect us emotionally is paramount to the motivation of a bioethicist to serve the patient, not out of an obligation to a job description, but out of a desire to truly avail the patient of their anguish. For example, the new field of narrative medicine utilizes critical reading and literary techniques to train clinicians and bioethicists in emotional understanding and listening skills that stress the social aspects of medicine beyond rational analysis and decision making. CONCLUSION Dr. Farmer is absolutely correct; bioethics is in dire need of resocialization. It should not be the case that the justification for a moral action is essentially that “the rules say so,” or that simply by teaching such rules to medical students, the very act of making bioethical decisions that diverge from those determined by principles can be seen as an act of “bad faith … hubris or, worse, malpractice.”[25] As bioethicists are coming to realize, the rationalist philosophical traditions that bioethics was founded upon are past their expiry, and the time for change is now. Indeed, as Dr. Farmer urges, “socializing disciplines” like anthropology, history, political economy, and sociology are necessary to humanize the field of bioethics.[26] So too, however, can philosophy be a socializing discipline, if we know where to look. Bioethics should evolve. Its new goal should be to focus on meaningful human relationships, and to phase out rigid, impersonal modes of moral thinking. The limited sampling of unsatisfying moral theories from hundreds of years ago leaves many bioethics students cold, and it is easy to see why bioethicists are ready to part ways with philosophy. I believe this is a move in the wrong direction; there is a place for philosophy in the future of bioethics. Just as bioethics needs a resocialization, it is also needs of a re-philosophization. These enrichments complement one another. There is more to bioethics than mechanically determining the right course of action in a healthcare setting. Bioethics engages with the most ancient of philosophical questions: questions of what makes human existence meaningful, what makes us who we are, how we want to relate to others, how and why we feel, what our place in the world is, how we can communicate what we think, and why our moral intuitions are so compelling. We would be remiss if we did not begin to investigate additional contributions to morality from a wider range of philosophies that try to provide answers to such questions, as they offer a richness to moral thinking that cannot be gleaned from traditional bioethical approaches alone. - [1] Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, ed. Bernard Williams, Josefine Nauckhoff, and Adrian Del Caro, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, 109. [2] Nietzsche, 120. [3] Daniel C O’Brien, “Medical Ethics as Taught and as Practiced: Principlism, Narrative Ethics, and the Case of Living Donor Liver Transplantation,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 47, no. 1 : 97, https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhab039. [4] K. D. Clouser and B. Gert, “A Critique of Principlism,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15, no. 2 : 219–36, https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/15.2.219. [5] O’Brien, “Medical Ethics as Taught and as Practiced,” 97. [6] Cora Diamond, “Having a Rough Story about What Moral Philosophy Is,” New Literary History 15, no. 1 : 168, https://doi.org/10.2307/468998. [7] Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, Canto ed, xvii. [8] G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33, no. 124 : 1, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100037943. [9] Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th ed, 13. [10] Clouser and Gert, 233. [11] Clouser and Gert, “A Critique of Principlism,” 235. [12] Paul Farmer and Nicole Gastineau Campos, “Rethinking Medical Ethics: A View from Below,” Developing World Bioethics 4, no. 1 : 17–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-8731.2004.00065.x. [13] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. Joachim Schulte, trans. P. M. S. Hacker, 4th edition, 40. [14] Farmer and Campos, “Rethinking Medical Ethics,” 20. [15] Farmer and Campos, 20. [16] Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby et al., “The Place of Philosophy in Bioethics Today,” The American Journal of Bioethics: AJOB, June 30, 2021, 3–5, https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2021.1940355. [17] Brendan Balcerak Jackson, “Verbal Disputes and Substantiveness,” Erkenntnis 79, no. S1 : 31–54, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9444-5. [18] C. S. I. Jenkins, “Merely Verbal Disputes,” Erkenntnis 79, no. 1 : 11–30, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9443-6. [19] Steven Crowell, “Existentialism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/existentialism/; Anita Avramides, “Other Minds,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/other-minds/. [20] Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, Harper Torchbooks, 46. [21] Heidegger, 46. [22] Heidegger, 45. [23] Nick Zangwill, “Aesthetic Judgment,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/aesthetic-judgment/. [24] Yuriko Saito, “Aesthetics of the Everyday,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/aesthetics-of-everyday/. [25] O’Brien, “Medical Ethics as Taught and as Practiced,” 112. [26] Farmer and Campos, “Rethinking Medical Ethics,” 20. (shrink)