This chapter sets out the theorems, and presents some examples that show in a rough way how the theorems work. It explains separability precisely, and states the theorems. The chapter starts the work of interpreting the theorems, and also explains the significance of their conclusions from a formal, mathematical point of view. It then discusses a significant assumption that is used in the proofs of the theorems. The published proofs of both the separability (...) theorems depend on an assumption that may be objectionable in some contexts. These theorems are about an ordering defined on a field of alternatives. If an ordering can be represented by an additively separable utility function, the theorem shows it can be represented by a whole family of additively separable functions. Each member of the family is an increasing linear transform of the others, and the family includes every increasing linear transform of each of its members. (shrink)

Gabbay's separation theorem about linear temporal logic with past has proved to be one of the most useful theoretical results in temporal logic. In this paper, we establish an analogous statement a...

The Stone's Separation Theorem is equivalent to Weak König's Lemma.

Define a second order tree to be a map between trees. We show that many properties of ordinary trees have analogs for second order trees. In particular, we show that there is a notion of “definition by recursion on a well-founded second order tree” which generalizes “definition by transfinite recursion”. We then use this new notion of definition by recursion to prove an analog of Lusin’s Separation theorem for closure spaces of global sections of a second order tree.

A full separation theorem for the derivable rules of intuitionistic linear logic without bounds, 0 and exponentials is proved. Several structural consequences of this theorem for subreducts of (commutative) residuated lattices are obtained. The theorem is then extended to the logic LR+ and its proof is extended to obtain the finite embeddability property for the class of square increasing residuated lattices.

This paper addresses arguments that “separability” is an assumption of Bell’s theorem, and that abandoning this assumption in our interpretation of quantum mechanics (a position sometimes referred to as “holism”) will allow us to restore a satisfying locality principle. Separability here means that all events associated to the union of some set of disjoint regions are combinations of events associated to each region taken separately.In this article, it is shown that: (a) localised events can be consistently defined without (...) implying separability; (b) the definition of Bell’s locality condition does not rely on separability in any way; (c) the proof of Bell’s theorem does not use separability as an assumption. If, inspired by considerations of non-separability, the assumptions of Bell’s theorem are weakened, what remains no longer embodies the locality principle. Teller’s argument for “relational holism” and Howard’s arguments concerning separability are criticised in the light of these results. Howard’s claim that Einstein grounded his arguments on the incompleteness of QM with a separability assumption is also challenged. Instead, Einstein is better interpreted as referring merely to the existence of localised events. Finally, it is argued that Bell rejected the idea that separability is an assumption of his theorem. (shrink)

Varieties of the Fan Theorem have recently been developed in reverse constructive mathematics, corresponding to different continuity principles. They form a natural implicational hierarchy. Some of the implications have been shown to be strict, others strict in a weak context, and yet others not at all, using disparate techniques. Here we present a family of related Kripke models which separates all of the as yet identified fan theorems.

In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of work in reverse mathematics concerning natural mathematical principles that are provable from RT, Ramsey's Theorem for Pairs. These principles tend to fall outside of the "big five" systems of reverse mathematics and a complicated picture of subsystems below RT has emerged. In this paper, we answer two open questions concerning these subsystems, specifically that ADS is not equivalent to CAC and that EM is not equivalent to RT.

Varieties of the Fan Theorem have recently been developed in reverse constructive mathematics, corresponding to different continuity principles. They form a natural implicational hierarchy. Earlier work showed all of these implications to be strict. Here we reprove one of the strictness results, using very different arguments. The technique used is a mixture of realizability, forcing in the guise of Heyting-valued models, and Kripke models.

Separability is roughly the principle that, in comparing the value of two outcomes, one can ignore any people whose existence and welfare are unaffected. Separability is both antecedently plausible, at least as a principle of beneficence, and surprisingly powerful; it is the key to some of the best positive arguments in population ethics. This chapter surveys the motivations for and consequences of separability. In particular, it presents an ‘additivity theorem’ which explains how separability leads to total (...) utilitarianism and closely related axiological views. It then examines systematically how this family of views can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion by incorporating lexicality, a critical level, or a neutral range. (shrink)

We determine the computational complexity of the Hahn-Banach Extension Theorem. To do so, we investigate some basic connections between reverse mathematics and computable analysis. In particular, we use Weak König's Lemma within the framework of computable analysis to classify incomputable functions of low complexity. By defining the multivalued function Sep and a natural notion of reducibility for multivalued functions, we obtain a computational counterpart of the subsystem of second-order arithmetic WKL0. We study analogies and differences between WKL0 and the class (...) of Sep-computable multivalued functions. Extending work of Brattka, we show that a natural multivalued function associated with the Hahn-Banach Extension Theorem is Sep-complete. (shrink)

We aim at developing a systematic method of separating omniscience principles by constructing Kripke models for intuitionistic predicate logic $\mathbf {IQC}$ and first-order arithmetic $\mathbf {HA}$ from a Kripke model for intuitionistic propositional logic $\mathbf {IPC}$. To this end, we introduce the notion of an extended frame, and show that each IPC-Kripke model generates an extended frame. By using the extended frame generated by an IPC-Kripke model, we give a separation theorem of a schema from a set of schemata in (...) $\mathbf {IQC}$ and a separation theorem of a sentence from a set of schemata in $\mathbf {HA}$. We see several examples which give us separations among omniscience principles. (shrink)

All separable states satisfy all Bell-type inequalities, which involve as their assumption only existence of local realistic (local hidden variable) models of the correlations of spatially separated systems, observed by two or more observers making independent decisions on what to measure (free will). The recent observation by Loubenets, that some separable states do not satisfy the original Bell inequality (1964) has no consequences whatsoever for the studies of the relation of separability with local realism. The original Bell inequality was (...) derived using an additional assumption that the local results for a certain pair of local settings reveal perfect Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) correlations. Therefore violation of this inequality by some quantum predictions implies that either (i) the predictions do not allow a local realistic model, or (ii) the predictions do not have the required EPR correlations, or finally both (i) and (ii). (shrink)

The apparent nonlocality of quantum theory has been a persistent concern. Einstein et al. and Bell emphasized the apparent nonlocality arising from entanglement correlations. While some interpretations embrace this nonlocality, modern variations of the Everett-inspired many worlds interpretation try to circumvent it. In this paper, we review Bell's "no-go" theorem and explain how it rests on three axioms, local causality, no superdeterminism, and one world. Although Bell is often taken to have shown that local causality is ruled out by the (...) experimentally confirmed entanglement correlations, we make clear that it is the conjunction of the three axioms that is ruled out by these correlations. We then show that by assuming local causality and no superdeterminism, we can give a direct proof of many worlds. The remainder of the paper searches for a consistent, local, formulation of many worlds. We show that prominent formulations whose ontology is given by the wave function violate local causality, and we critically evaluate claims in the literature to the contrary. We ultimately identify a local many worlds interpretation that replaces the wave function with a separable Lorentz-invariant wave-field. We conclude with discussions of the Born rule, and other interpretations of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Although logical empiricism is now mostly decried, their naturalist claim that the content of a theory can be read off from its structure, without any philosophical considerations needed, still supports traditional strategies to escape cases of underdetermination. The appeal to theoretical equivalence or to theoretical virtues, for instance, both assume that there is a neutral standpoint from which the structure of the theories can be analyzed, the physically relevant from the superfluous separated, and a comparison made between their theoretical content (...) and virtues. In my dissertation, I examine the presuppositions upon which such strategies depend. I argue that the methodological principle underlying them, according to which theories with no superfluous structure should be preferred, is unpractical, for what constitutes relevant structure is determined by epistemic considerations about the aim of scientific theories. In chapter 1, I analyze the claim that theories with ordinary bosons and fermions are theoretically equivalent to theories with exotic `paraparticles'. I argue that this claim does not do justice to the latter, as the proof is formulated in a vocabulary parochial to the former and thus favors one of the theory while giving an impoverished version of the second. In chapter 2, I examine recent arguments to the effects that any interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that can offer a no-go theorem against paraparticles possesses an explanatory advantage over other interpretations and should, as such, be favored over others. Given that most physicists consider paraparticles as surplus structure whose non-observation does not require an explanation, I evaluate arguments of both sides and suggest a third way to approach the question. Finally, in chapter 3, I turn my attention to methods for excluding another kind of unphysical structure, mathematical artifacts, from rival dark matter models. Simulations are our only window into what rival models predict about the universe’s structure. But for them to play a useful role in generating knowledge, we need to distinguish reliably between real predictions and artifacts. I argue that robustness analysis fails to fulfill this task. I propose in its place another methodology, that of crucial simulations. (shrink)

The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by (...) the no-supervenience theorem, except for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally. (shrink)

Yu, X., Riesz representation theorem, Borel measures and subsystems of second-order arithmetic, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 59 65-78. Formalized concept of finite Borel measures is developed in the language of second-order arithmetic. Formalization of the Riesz representation theorem is proved to be equivalent to arithmetical comprehension. Codes of Borel sets of complete separable metric spaces are defined and proved to be meaningful in the subsystem ATR0. Arithmetical transfinite recursion is enough to prove the measurability of Borel sets for (...) any finite Borel measure on a compact complete separable metric space. (shrink)

Berto’s highly readable and lucid guide introduces students and the interested reader to Gödel’s celebrated _Incompleteness Theorem_, and discusses some of the most famous - and infamous - claims arising from Gödel's arguments. Offers a clear understanding of this difficult subject by presenting each of the key steps of the _Theorem_ in separate chapters Discusses interpretations of the _Theorem_ made by celebrated contemporary thinkers Sheds light on the wider extra-mathematical and philosophical implications of Gödel’s theories Written in an accessible, non-technical (...) style. (shrink)

We show in ZFC that the existence of completely separable maximal almost disjoint families of subsets of $\omega $ implies that the modal logic $\mathbf {S4.1.2}$ is complete with respect to the Čech–Stone compactification of the natural numbers, the space $\beta \omega $. In the same fashion we prove that the modal logic $\mathbf {S4}$ is complete with respect to the space $\omega ^*=\beta \omega \setminus \omega $. This improves the results of G. Bezhanishvili and J. Harding in [4], where (...) the authors prove these theorems under stronger assumptions. Our proof is also somewhat simpler. (shrink)

We continue the work of [14, 3, 1, 19, 16, 4, 12, 11, 20] investigating the strength of set existence axioms needed for separable Banach space theory. We show that the separation theorem for open convex sets is equivalent to WKL 0 over RCA 0 . We show that the separation theorem for separably closed convex sets is equivalent to ACA 0 over RCA 0 . Our strategy for proving these geometrical Hahn-Banach theorems is to reduce to the finite-dimensional (...) case by means of a compactness argument. (shrink)

We show in ZFC that the existence of completely separable maximal almost disjoint families of subsets of $\omega $ implies that the modal logic $\mathbf {S4.1.2}$ is complete with respect to the Čech–Stone compactification of the natural numbers, the space $\beta \omega $. In the same fashion we prove that the modal logic $\mathbf {S4}$ is complete with respect to the space $\omega ^*=\beta \omega \setminus \omega $. This improves the results of G. Bezhanishvili and J. Harding in [4], where (...) the authors prove these theorems under stronger assumptions. Our proof is also somewhat simpler. (shrink)

The paper is a contribution to intuitionistic reverse mathematics. We introduce a formal system called Basic Intuitionistic Mathematics BIM, and then search for statements that are, over BIM, equivalent to Brouwer’s Fan Theorem or to its positive denial, Kleene’s Alternative to the Fan Theorem. The Fan Theorem is true under the intended intuitionistic interpretation and Kleene’s Alternative is true in the model of BIM consisting of the Turing-computable functions. The task of finding equivalents of Kleene’s Alternative is, intuitionistically, a nontrivial (...) extension of the task of finding equivalents of the Fan Theorem, although there is a certain symmetry in the arguments that we shall try to make transparent. We introduce closed-and-separable subsets of Baire space $${\mathcal{N}}$$ and of the set $${\mathcal{R}}$$ of the real numbers. Such sets may be compact and also positively noncompact. The Fan Theorem is the statement that Cantor space $${\mathcal{C}}$$, or, equivalently, the unit interval [0, 1], is compact and Kleene’s Alternative is the statement that $${\mathcal{C}}$$, or, equivalently, [0, 1], is positively noncompact. The class of the compact closed-and-separable sets and also the class of the closed-and-separable sets that are positively noncompact are characterized in many different ways and a host of equivalents of both the Fan Theorem and Kleene’s Alternative is found. (shrink)

The CPT theorem states that any causal, Lorentz-invariant, thermodynamically well-behaved quantum field theory must also be invariant under a reflection symmetry that reverses the direction of time, flips spatial parity, and conjugates charge. Although its physical basis remains obscure, CPT symmetry appears to be necessary in order to unify quantum mechanics with relativity. This paper attempts to decipher the physical reasoning behind proofs of the CPT theorem in algebraic quantum field theory. Ultimately, CPT symmetry is linked to a systematic reversal (...) of the C*-algebraic Lie product that encodes the generating relationship between observables and symmetries. In any physically reasonable relativistic quantum field theory it is always possible to systematically reverse this generating relationship while preserving the dynamics, spectra, and localization properties of physical systems. Rather than the product of three separate reflections, CPT symmetry is revealed to be a single global reflection of the theory’s state space. (shrink)

A model of reality is called separable if the state of a composite system is equal to the union of the states of its parts, located in different regions of space. Spekkens has argued that it is trivial to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics using a separable ontological model, provided one allows for arbitrary violations of ‘dynamical locality’. However, since dynamical locality is strictly weaker than local causality, this leaves open the question of whether an ontological model for quantum (...) mechanics can be both separable and dynamically local. We answer this question in the affirmative, using an ontological model based on previous work by Deutsch and Hayden. Although the original formulation of the model avoids Bell’s theorem by denying that measurements result in single, definite outcomes, we show that the model can alternatively be cast in the framework of ontological models, where Bell’s theorem does apply. We find that the resulting model violates local causality, but satisfies both separability and dynamical locality, making it a candidate for the ‘most local’ ontological model of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

One diagnosis of Bell's theorem is that its premise of Outcome Independence is unreasonably strong, as it postulates one common screener system that purports to explain all the correlations involved. This poses a challenge of constructing a model for quantum correlations that is local, non-conspiratorial, and has many separate screener systems rather than one common screener system. In particular, the assumptions of such models should not entail Bell's inequalities. We prove that the models described do not exist, and hence, the (...) diagnosis above is incorrect. (shrink)

In the Böhm theorem workshop on Crete, Zoran Petric called Statman’s “Typical Ambiguity theorem” the typed Böhm theorem. Moreover, he gave a new proof of the theorem based on set-theoretical models of the simply typed lambda calculus. In this paper, we study the linear version of the typed Böhm theorem on a fragment of Intuitionistic Linear Logic. We show that in the multiplicative fragment of intuitionistic linear logic without the multiplicative unit the weak typed Böhm theorem holds. The system IMLL (...) exactly corresponds to the linear lambda calculus with multiplicative pairing. The system IMLL also exactly corresponds to the free symmetric monoidal closed category without the unit object. As far as we know, our separation result is the first one with regard to these systems in a purely syntactical manner. (shrink)

The two theories that revolutionized physics in the twentieth century, relativity and quantum mechanics, are full of predictions that defy common sense. Recently, we used three such paradoxical ideas to prove “The Free Will Theorem” (strengthened here), which is the culmination of a series of theorems about quantum mechanics that began in the 1960s. It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, (...) if the experimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particle’s response (to be pedantic—the universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous history of the universe. Our argument combines the well-known consequence of relativity theory, that the time order of space-like separated events is not absolute, with the EPR paradox discovered by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in 1935, and the Kochen-Specker Paradox of 1967 (See [2].) We follow Bohm in using a spin version of EPR and Peres in using his set of 33 directions, rather than the original configuration used by Kochen and Specker. More contentiously, the argument also involves the notion of free will, but we postpone further discussion of this to the last section of the article. Note that our proof does not mention “probabilities” or the “states” that determine them, which is.. (shrink)

Let A be a standard transitive admissible set. Σ 1 -separation is the principle that whenever X and Y are disjoint Σ A 1 subsets of A then there is a Δ A 1 subset S of A such that $X \subseteq S$ and $Y \cap S = \varnothing$ . Theorem. If A satisfies Σ 1 -separation, then (1) If $\langle T_n\mid n is a sequence of trees on ω each of which has at most finitely many infinite paths in (...) A then the function $n\mapsto$ (set of infinite paths in A through T n ) is in A. (2) If A is not closed under hyperjump and α = On A then A has in it a nonstandard model of V = L whose ordinal standard part is α. Theorem. Let α be any countable admissible ordinal greater than ω. Then there is a model of Σ 1 -separation whose height is α. (shrink)

Between 1964 and 1990, the notion of nonlocality in Bell's papers underwent a profound change as his nonlocality theorem gradually became detached from quantum mechanics, and referred to wider probabilistic theories involving correlations between separated beables. The proposition that standard quantum mechanics is itself nonlocal became divorced from the Bell theorem per se from 1976 on, although this important point is widely overlooked in the literature. In 1990, the year of his death, Bell would express serious misgivings about the mathematical (...) form of the local causality condition, and leave ill-defined the issue of the consistency between special relativity and violation of the Bell-type inequality. In our view, the significance of the Bell theorem, both in its deterministic and stochastic forms, can only be fully understood by taking into account the fact that a fully Lorentz-covariant version of quantum theory, free of action-at-a-distance, can be articulated in the Everett interpretation. (shrink)

We prove that if the physical entity S consisting of two separated physical entities S1 and S2 satisfies the axioms of orthodox quantum mechanics, then at least one of the two subentities is a classical physical entity. This theorem implies that separated quantum entities cannot be described by quantum mechanics. We formulate this theorem in an approach where physical entities are described by the set of their states, and the set of their relevant experiments. We also show that the collection (...) of eigenstate sets forms a closure structure on the set of states, which we call the eigen-closure structure. We derive another closure structure on the set of states by means of the orthogonality relation, and call it the ortho-closure structure, and show that the main axioms of quantum mechanics can be introduced in a very general way by means of these two closure structures. We prove that for a general physical entity, and hence also for a quantum entity, the probabilities can always be explained as being due to a lack of knowledge about the interaction between the experimental apparatus and the entity. (shrink)

We define and study a new restricted consistency notion RCon ∗ for bounded arithmetic theories T 2 j . It is the strongest ∀ Π 1 b -statement over S 2 1 provable in T 2 j , similar to Con in Krajíček and Pudlák, 29) or RCon in Krajı́ček and Takeuti 107). The advantage of our notion over the others is that RCon ∗ can directly be used to construct models of T 2 j . We apply this by (...) proving preservation theorems for theories of bounded arithmetic of the following well-known kind: The ∀ Π 1 b -separation of bounded arithmetic theories S 2 i from T 2 j is equivalent to the existence of a model of S 2 i which does not have a Δ 0 b -elementary extension to a model of T 2 j . More specific, let M ⊨ Ω 1 nst denote that there is a nonstandard element c in M such that the function n ↦ 2 log c is total in M . Let BLΣ 1 b be the bounded collection schema for Σ 1 b -formulas. We obtain the following preservation results: the ∀ Π 1 b -separation of S 2 i from T 2 j is equivalent to the existence of 1. a model of S 2 i +Ω 1 nst which is 1 b -closed w.r.t. T 2 j , 2. a countable model of S 2 i + BLΣ 1 b without weak end extensions to models of T 2 j. (shrink)

The class forcing theorem, which asserts that every class forcing notion ${\mathbb {P}}$ admits a forcing relation $\Vdash _{\mathbb {P}}$, that is, a relation satisfying the forcing relation recursion—it follows that statements true in the corresponding forcing extensions are forced and forced statements are true—is equivalent over Gödel–Bernays set theory $\text {GBC}$ to the principle of elementary transfinite recursion $\text {ETR}_{\text {Ord}}$ for class recursions of length $\text {Ord}$. It is also equivalent to the existence of truth predicates for the (...) infinitary languages $\mathcal {L}_{\text {Ord},\omega }$, allowing any class parameter A; to the existence of truth predicates for the language $\mathcal {L}_{\text {Ord},\text {Ord}}$ ; to the existence of $\text {Ord}$ -iterated truth predicates for first-order set theory $\mathcal {L}_{\omega,\omega }$ ; to the assertion that every separative class partial order ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a set-complete class Boolean completion; to a class-join separation principle; and to the principle of determinacy for clopen class games of rank at most $\text {Ord}+1$. Unlike set forcing, if every class forcing notion ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a forcing relation merely for atomic formulas, then every such ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a uniform forcing relation applicable simultaneously to all formulas. Our results situate the class forcing theorem in the rich hierarchy of theories between $\text {GBC}$ and Kelley–Morse set theory $\text {KM}$. (shrink)

This paper provides a finer analysis of the well-known form of the Local Deduction Theorem in contraction-free logics . An infinite hierarchy of its natural strengthenings is introduced and studied. The main results are the separation of its initial four members and the subsequent collapse of the hierarchy.

Various natural deduction formulations of classical, minimal, intuitionist, and intermediate propositional and first-order logics are presented and investigated with respect to satisfaction of the separation and subformula properties. The technique employed is, for the most part, semantic, based on general versions of the Lindenbaum and Lindenbaum–Henkin constructions. Careful attention is paid to which properties of theories result in the presence of which rules of inference, and to restrictions on the sets of formulas to which the rules may be employed, restrictions (...) determined by the formulas occurring as premises and conclusion of the invalid inference for which a counterexample is to be constructed. We obtain an elegant formulation of classical propositional logic with the subformula property and a singularly inelegant formulation of classical first-order logic with the subformula property, the latter, unfortunately, not a product of the strategy otherwise used throughout the article. Along the way, we arrive at an optimal strengthening of the subformula results for classical first-order logic obtained as consequences of normalization theorems by Dag Prawitz and Gunnar Stålmarck. (shrink)

We prove in recursive analysis an existence theorem for computable minimizers of convex computable continuous real-valued functions, and a computable separation theorem for convex sets in ℝm.

Non-commuting quantities and hidden parameters – Wave-corpuscular dualism and hidden parameters – Local or nonlocal hidden parameters – Phase space in quantum mechanics – Weyl, Wigner, and Moyal – Von Neumann’s theorem about the absence of hidden parameters in quantum mechanics and Hermann – Bell’s objection – Quantum-mechanical and mathematical incommeasurability – Kochen – Specker’s idea about their equivalence – The notion of partial algebra – Embeddability of a qubit into a bit – Quantum computer is not Turing machine – (...) Is continuality universal? – Diffeomorphism and velocity – Einstein’s general principle of relativity – „Mach’s principle“ – The Skolemian relativity of the discrete and the continuous – The counterexample in § 6 of their paper – About the classical tautology which is untrue being replaced by the statements about commeasurable quantum-mechanical quantities – Logical hidden parameters – The undecidability of the hypothesis about hidden parameters – Wigner’s work and и Weyl’s previous one – Lie groups, representations, and psi-function – From a qualitative to a quantitative expression of relativity − psi-function, or the discrete by the random – Bartlett’s approach − psi-function as the characteristic function of random quantity – Discrete and/ or continual description – Quantity and its “digitalized projection“ – The idea of „velocity−probability“ – The notion of probability and the light speed postulate – Generalized probability and its physical interpretation – A quantum description of macro-world – The period of the as-sociated de Broglie wave and the length of now – Causality equivalently replaced by chance – The philosophy of quantum information and religion – Einstein’s thesis about “the consubstantiality of inertia ant weight“ – Again about the interpretation of complex velocity – The speed of time – Newton’s law of inertia and Lagrange’s formulation of mechanics – Force and effect – The theory of tachyons and general relativity – Riesz’s representation theorem – The notion of covariant world line – Encoding a world line by psi-function – Spacetime and qubit − psi-function by qubits – About the physical interpretation of both the complex axes of a qubit – The interpretation of the self-adjoint operators components – The world line of an arbitrary quantity – The invariance of the physical laws towards quantum object and apparatus – Hilbert space and that of Minkowski – The relationship between the coefficients of -function and the qubits – World line = psi-function + self-adjoint operator – Reality and description – Does a „curved“ Hilbert space exist? – The axiom of choice, or when is possible a flattening of Hilbert space? – But why not to flatten also pseudo-Riemannian space? – The commutator of conjugate quantities – Relative mass – The strokes of self-movement and its philosophical interpretation – The self-perfection of the universe – The generalization of quantity in quantum physics – An analogy of the Feynman formalism – Feynman and many-world interpretation – The psi-function of various objects – Countable and uncountable basis – Generalized continuum and arithmetization – Field and entanglement – Function as coding – The idea of „curved“ Descartes product – The environment of a function – Another view to the notion of velocity-probability – Reality and description – Hilbert space as a model both of object and description – The notion of holistic logic – Physical quantity as the information about it – Cross-temporal correlations – The forecasting of future – Description in separable and inseparable Hilbert space – „Forces“ or „miracles“ – Velocity or time – The notion of non-finite set – Dasein or Dazeit – The trajectory of the whole – Ontological and onto-theological difference – An analogy of the Feynman and many-world interpretation − psi-function as physical quantity – Things in the world and instances in time – The generation of the physi-cal by mathematical – The generalized notion of observer – Subjective or objective probability – Energy as the change of probability per the unite of time – The generalized principle of least action from a new view-point – The exception of two dimensions and Fermat’s last theorem. (shrink)