This paper addresses the question whether there is a rational connection between self-respect and the disrespect of others by engaging with the so-called Stoic View (SV) presented by Colin Bird. According to SV, there is no such connection because the disrespect other people show us can never provide us with a reason to lose our self-respect. This essay argues that SV is correct only from a third-personal perspective and false from a first-personal one. Since we are social cognizers, we use (...) how other people treat us as evidence, for instance, about our moral status, and we are justified in doing so if we have no reason to dismiss them as untrustworthy. Distinguishing between the first-and third-personal perspectives is important to avoid victim-blaming. I show this by discussing an example from literature in which the protagonist concludes that she does not have equal moral status and thus lacks in self-respect without any mistake in her reasoning simply because she has been given false information about her moral status. (shrink)

This article discusses the self-respect argument for basic liberties, which is that self-respect is an important good, best supported by basic liberties, and that this yields a reason for the traditional liberty principle. I concentrate on versions of it that contend that self-respect is best supported by basic liberties for reasons related to the recognition that such liberties convey. I first discuss the two standard approaches loosely associated with John Rawls and Axel Honneth. Here self-respect pertains to traits and conduct (...) (Rawls) or to one’s personhood (Honneth). It is argued that these approaches fail to show why self-respect is better supported by the liberty principle than certain alternatives worth taking seriously – unless (in the case of personhood self-respect) self-respect is construed in such a narrow way that it is not a condition for autonomy or welfare in any plausible sense. I then identify a self-attitude that I call “a sense of competence”, which at least shows that the liberty principle is more important to autonomy than what we might otherwise have reasons to believe. (shrink)

Patricia White; Self-respect, Self-esteem and the ‘Management’ of Schools and Colleges, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pag.

In this essay I develop W.E.B. Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness to demonstrate the limitations of Kant’s and Rawls’s models of self-respect. I argue that neither Kant nor Rawls can explain what self-respect and resistance to oppression warrants under the conditions of violent and systematic racial exclusion. I defend Du Bois’s proposal of voluntary black self-segregation during the Jim Crow era and explain why Du Bois believes that the black American community has a moral right to assert its self-respect (...) by mitigating exposure to racial violence and animus in a white-controlled polity. (shrink)

Rawls argues that ‘Parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect’. But what are these social conditions that we should so urgently avoid? One evident candidate might be conditions of material inequality. Yet Rawls seems confident that his account of justice can endorse such inequalities without jeopardising citizens’ self-respect. In this article I argue that this confidence is misplaced. Unequalising incentives, I claim, jeopardise the self-respect of those least advantaged—at (...) least under a Rawlsian schema—by undermining the very processes by which Rawls hopes to make distributional inequalities and self-respect compatible. I begin by setting out Rawls’s distinct account of self-respect before moving to describe how Rawls expects the difference principle to support citizens’ in this regard. I then draw upon GA Cohen’s distinction between ‘strict’ and ‘lax’ interpretations of the difference principle to argue that the presence of unequalising incentives undermines both the direct and indirect support that the difference principle can offer to citizens’ self-respect. As such, I claim that Rawls must either weaken his endorsement of unequalising incentives, or risk violating his ‘prior commitment’ to avoiding social conditions harmful to citizens’ self-respect. (shrink)

John Rawls says that one of the requirements for stability is “[s]ociety as an employer of last resort” (PLP, lix). He explains: “[t]he lack of . . . the opportunity for meaningful work and occupation is destructive . . . of citizens’ self-respect” (PLP, lix). Rawls implies in these claims that the opportunity for meaningful work is a social basis of self-respect. This constitutes a significant shift in his account of self-respect, one that has been overlooked. I begin by clarifying (...) Rawls’s account of self-respect in A Theory of Justice, then consider some post-Theory developments in it. After exploring the nature of Rawls’s commitment to the opportunity for meaningful work, I ask why he comes to think it is a social basis of self-respect. I extract a partial answer from his writings, then speculate about his full reasoning. Finally, I consider whether Rawls is right that the opportunity for meaningful work is a social basis of self-respect. I give some reason to believe that he is. (shrink)

A central feature of John Tomasi’s ‘Free Market Fairness’ is the emphasis it places upon the good of self-respect. Like Rawls, Tomasi believes that accounts of justice ought to offer support for the self-respect of citizens. Indeed, this is a key way in which Tomasi aspires to engage with the ‘high-liberal’ tradition. Unlike Rawls however, Tomasi argues that this support is best provided by our treating a broader set of economic liberties as basic liberties. In this paper I raise two (...) concerns about this latter claim. Firstly, I trace a number of significant ways in which Tomasi’s discussion of self-respect differs from that of Rawls. Whilst such divergences are not necessarily problematic, I argue that they serve to limit the purchase his account has on left-liberals. Further, I argue that the ideal of self-respect is more deeply ‘hard-wired’ into Rawls’s account of justice than Tomasi recognises. As such, Tomasi fails to address the full range of additional ways in which Rawls expects his principles of justice to support citizens’ self-respect. I argue that this also limits the force of Tomasi’s claims. Secondly, and more seriously, I argue that there are significant tensions between Tomasi’s discussion of self-respect and his most forceful argument in favour of the market democratic model he proposes. I argue firstly that Tomasi’s account of when citizens’ self-respect is jeopardised does not allow us to readily distinguish between economic security born of systems of welfare and redistribution, and economic security born of market forces and historical contingency. And more troubling still, is Tomasi’s belief that self-respecting citizens must view themselves as a ‘central cause’ of their situation. Such self-conceptions, I argue, can only coexist alongside the greater wealth thesis if citizens engage in quite naked self-delusions about their causal power. I argue that theorists of justice have good reason to be suspicious of promulgating such delusions and, as such, that this poses a serious problem for a justification of market democracy which aspires to rest upon an appeal to self-respect. (shrink)

Knowledge and respect exhibit a puzzling self-other asymmetry: Self-respect generates an imperative to know oneself, but as the objectionability of paternalism and privacy violations illustrate, respect for others can require that we avoid acquiring, or making use of, knowledge we have about them. This article elaborates this asymmetry and offers a solution to it, rooted in the distinctive importance that self-knowledge has for self-respecting rational agents: Self-respecting agents have reasons to have others defer to their ‘surfaces’ or self-presentations in order (...) to inhibit making themselves vulnerable to others in ways that undermine their self-respect by subordinating their wills to the wills of others, as well as to ensure that self-knowledge can play its desired role in the lives of self-respecting agents. (shrink)

This article adapts John Rawls’s writings, arguing that past injustice can change what we ought to publicly affirm as the standard of justice today. My approach differs from forward-looking approaches based on alleviating prospective disadvantage and backward-looking historical entitlement approaches. In different contexts, Rawls’s own concern for the ‘social bases of self-respect’ and equal citizenship may require public endorsement of different principles or specifications of the standard of justice. Rawls’s difference principle focuses on the least advantaged socioeconomic group. I argue (...) that a historicized difference principle considers the relative standing of racial, gender, and other historically stigmatized groups; provides their members assurance by weakening incentives to manipulate justice to another group’s advantage; and may result in policies resembling reparations, though justified by forward-looking considerations of self-respect and public assurance. I then examine how disrespectful justifications were historically used to forcibly include indigenous peoples as citizens. While Rawls thinks providing citizens one package of basic liberties signals respect, indigenous self-government could better support self-respect. I invoke Rawlsian international justice, which calls for mutual respect between peoples. Indigenous peoples’ status should reflect their past and persisting peoplehood, providing assurance by weakening incentives to unjustly transform international into domestic contexts. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that self-respect is ‘perhaps the most important’ primary good and that its status as such gives crucial support to controversial ideas like the lexical priority of liberty. Given the importance of these ideas for Rawls, it should be no surprise that they have attracted much critical attention. In response to these critics, I give a defense of self-respect that grounds its importance in Rawls’s moral conception of the person. I show that this (...) understanding of self-respect goes well beyond giving support to the lexical priority of liberty, also supporting Rawls’s still more controversial view of public reason. On my account, taking self-respect seriously requires the coercive enforcement of public reason. This is a novel argument for public reason, in that it grounds the idea in justice as fairness and mandates its coercive enforcement. (shrink)

In many cultures arrogance is regarded as a serious vice and a cause of numerous social ills. Although its badness is typically thought to lie in its harmful consequences for other persons and things, I draw on Kant to argue that what makes it a vice is first and foremost the failure to respect oneself. But arrogance is not only a problem inside individuals. Drawing on feminist insights I argue that it is a systemic problem constructed in and reinforcing unjust (...) distributions of social power. I identify ways in which arrogance is connected with social arrangements of domination and subordination, then discuss implications of a power-focused analysis Among the implications: (1) contrary to the widely-held view, humility is not the personal virtue opposing arrogance, self-respect is; (2) arrogance is not always a vice, for in circumstances of oppression a certain kind of arrogance is a virtue of self-respecting resistance to domination. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper examines the claim that agents' self-respect depends on receiving appropriate respect from others. It concentrates on a particular version of the claim defended by Avishai Margalit. The paper argues that Margalit's arguments fail to explain why the rival stoic view, that agents ultimately retain responsibility for their own self-respect, is incorrect.

When we raise children what we are typically aiming for is a kind of flourishing; we want childrento live well as children, and to grow to become adults who live well too. Undoubtedly, part of what we are aiming forwhen we aim for a child’s flourishing is that they meet their developmental milestones well, and that they succeedamong their peers. We are also generally interested in how a child regards themselves; we want children tobelieve that they have value, and that (...) what they care about has value too. We also typically want children to havean appreciation for their relative value among others; that they are important among many other important beings,and we want them to act well in that knowledge. Of course, not all persons who raise children aim for those ends.Some do not care for how a child conceives of themselves, or whether the child flourishes at all. Others care fortheir children, and how they conceive of themselves, but aim poorly. As result, some children come to believe thatthey only deserve love and kindness when they succeed at meeting a caregiver’s ends. Some children come tobelieve that they have no worth at all. And yet other children, rather than believing they are unworthy, come toregard themselves as of superior worth; as children, for example, who bully and sneer at other children for being adifferent race, a different class, gender, ability, etc. may. When a child comes to understand themselves in theseterms, we typically see it at best as morally problematic, and at worst as a tragedy. Despite our interest inchildren’s self-conceptions, and the vast literature on how to conceive of and regard children, there is relatively littleregarding how children should conceive of and regard themselves. In order to explain how children shouldconceive of themselves it is my contention that a new account of self-respect is needed for the context of childhood;one that is responsive to the moral value of children, as well as their developmental capacities to recognize thatvalue. Given that developmental psychology is complex and subject to significant variation as children develop, myaim in this paper is to offer a snapshot of what I take self-respect to amount to in early childhood. In particular, Ifocus on an account fitting for children between three to six years of age. (shrink)

Unemployment in Europe is currently a major challenge. Two models for solving the problem are frequently proposed: a work model, which in its radical version institutes a legally binding right to employment, and a basic income model, which in its radical form establishes a universal, unconditional right to income security. In practice, western democracies have experimented with mixed forms of both models, with a greater emphasis on guaranteeing work. This article examines the justifications of these two models in their radical (...) versions, with a special focus on the experience of self-respect. The conclusion is that the benefits that traditionally are associated with paid work function better in justifying a right to basic income than a right to work. (shrink)

In Chapter 7, “Dignity, Self-Respect, and Bloodless Invasions”, Saba Bazargan-Forward asks How much violence can we impose on those attempting to politically subjugate us? According to Bazargan-Forward, “reductive individualism” answers this question by determining how much violence one can impose on an individual wrongly attempting to prevent one from political participation. Some have argued that the amount of violence one can permissibly impose in such situations is decidedly sub-lethal. Accordingly, this counterintuitive response has cast doubt on the reductive individualist project. (...) Bazargan-Forward argues, however, that political subjugation involves an institutionally embodied form of disrespect that has been altogether missed. A proper appreciation of this sort of disrespect, he contends, morally permits much greater defensive violence against those attempting to politically subjugate us or others. (shrink)

This paper engages with the recent dignity-based argument against hate speech proposed by Jeremy Waldron. It’s claimed that while Waldron makes progress by conceptualising dignity less as an inherent property and more as a civic status which hate speech undermines, his argument is nonetheless subject to the problem that there are many sources of citizens’ dignitary status besides speech. Moreover, insofar as dignity informs the grounds of individuals’ right to free speech, Waldron’s argument leaves us balancing hate speakers’ dignity against (...) the dignity of those whom they attack. I suggest instead that a central part of the harm of hate speech is that it assaults our self-respect. The reasons to respect oneself are moral reasons which can be shared with others, and individuals have moral reasons to respect themselves for their agency, and their entitlements. Free speech is interpreted not as an individual liberty, but as a collective enterprise which serves the interests of speakers and the receivers of speech. I argue that hate speech undermines the self-respect of its targets in both the agency and entitlement dimensions, and claim, moreover, that this is a direct harm which cannot be compensated for by other sources of self-respect. I further argue that hate speakers have no basis to respect themselves qua their hate speech, as self-respect is based on moral reasons. I conclude that self-respect, unlike dignity, is sufficient to explain the harm of hate speech, even though it may not be necessary to explain its wrongness. (shrink)

Philosophical work on self-respect has distinguished between various kinds of self-respect. In this paper, Shiying Li begins by introducing important kinds of self-respect and exploring the conceptual and empirical relations among them. She then discusses the value and political significance of social bases of self-respect for both individuals and society. While political theory on this topic, especially from the Rawlsian tradition, has focused on the social bases of self-respect in a well-ordered society, Li takes on the task of uncovering the (...) social bases of self-respect in an unjust society marked by structural injustices such as racism, sexism, social stigmas, and economic and other social inequalities. She provides arguments, including public reason arguments, for the political priority and urgency of securing robust self-respect for all in an unjust society, and thus paves the way for a discussion of the role that education, especially schooling, can and should play in securing robust self-respect. Li concludes by offering reasons to direct special attention to specific aspects of schooling and by making suggestions regarding a curriculum and pedagogy aimed at securing robust self-respect for all. (shrink)

This dissertation takes the form of three papers. Each one can be read on its own, and I present them here in a format that lends itself to such reading. However, they also center around a common topic: how Immanuel Kant conceives of immorality and how this theory informs his understanding of morality. In the first paper, I argue that Kant does not think immorality in human beings is always interpersonally arrogant, focusing in particular on what Kant means by “self-conceit.” (...) I argue that self-conceit is a happiness-emphasizing conception of self, in which one overvalues the inclinations. When life goes well, this self-conception and the standard of assessment it implies do lead to the opinion that one is worth more than others. When life goes badly, however, they lead to the opposite misunderstanding. In the second paper, I address another motivation for the claim that Kant thought interpersonal arrogance was the central moral problem for human beings: Kant’s theory of happiness. Kant held that human beings are competitive, as can be seen in several of his doctrines about how human beings conceive of and pursue happiness. I show how Kant explains this competitive bent in human nature while maintaining the thesis that human beings are interested in happiness only because it promises to be satisfying. I argue that Kant’s understanding of human rationality and of human interdependence result in competitiveness without the assumption that human beings are arrogant. In the third paper, I turn to Kant’s theory of self-respect, using my understanding of Kant on immorality and arrogance to explain the importance of self-respect in his moral theory. I argue that self-respect is significant specifically because it is a way of valuing oneself that acknowledges the disharmony between one’s desire for happiness and one’s commitment to morality. (shrink)

Education is among the forces with which oppressed people can become empowered. Nevertheless, the public policy nonprofit organization Demos has found that the median wealth of white high school dropouts in 2013 was higher than for black college graduates in the United States.1 The harsh realities of prejudice and limits on opportunity for historically disadvantaged communities motivate debates about how best to prepare, educate, and protect young people. The philosophical literature in the liberal political tradition has paid considerable attention to (...) the concept of self-respect, as it is important for deliberative democracy. If a person lacks self-respect, he might feel unworthy to speak up for himself. Or she.. (shrink)

The leading accounts of respect for others usually assume that persons have a rational nature, which is a marvelous thing, so they should be respected like other objects of ‘awesome’ value. Kant's views about the ‘value’ of humanity, which have inspired contemporary discussions of respect, have been interpreted in this way. I propose an alternative interpretation in which Kant proceeds from our own rational self‐regard, through our willingness to reciprocate with others, to duties of respect for others. This strategy, which (...) shares some similarities with moral contractualism, offers a way to justify other‐regarding moral requirements from self‐regarding rational dispositions. (shrink)

According to John Rawls, self-respect is the most important of the primary goods and is essential for the construction of the just society. Self-respect, however, remains a concept which is inadequately theorised, being closely linked to other concepts such as dignity, shame, pride, autonomy and security. Most usually self-respect is considered to be just the self-reflection of the respect we receive from others. In this paper I argue that self-respect consists of both a self-evaluative and a social reflexive element. Using (...) Darwall’s distinction between two types of respect as a building block, I argue that it is worth considering self-respect as having three dimensions. Broadly these are human recognition, status recognition and appraisal. (shrink)

Self-esteem and self-respect refer to a way through which one relates to oneself, although they can be used as a synonymous expressions. On the basis of long tradition, since Kant ties self-respect to morality, all reference to self-respect has to be based on morality. Self-respect has a deeper root than self-esteem which is used to indicate a simple feeling of satisfaction with oneself without any value meaning. Self-respect is not a duty in itself but rather an acknowledgment of moral law (...) which means the recognition of all moral duties. In Kantian ethics self-esteem comes from duty to treat oneself considering mankind in his person. From self-respect derive duties to oneself which are the foundation of duties to other people. Honesty has been understood as a commitment to find the truth and to live according to it. Honesty as a virtue means refusing any falsification of facts. Honesty is the most remarkable expression of self-respect and other-respect, without any concessions to self-deception or other-deception. The aim of the paper is to establish the differences between self-respect and self-esteem and to relate the two with the virtue of honesty. (shrink)

Although the thesis that equal basic liberties take priority over increases in wealth is one of the two most important theses in the rawlsian theory of justice, The argumentation for it is obscure. This article emphasizes the centrality of self-Respect in rawls' treatment of liberty, Specifies five particular assumptions he makes, And constructs a deductive argument from the rawlsian assumptions to the rawlsian conclusion about liberty. Of special interest are the premises of economic adequacy for the worst-Off man and the (...) incentive value of economic inequality, Which reveal the relation between the difference principle and the priority of liberty. (shrink)

I begin the chapter with research, reported recently in The Atlantic, on the surprising phenomenon that many successful women, all accomplished and highly competent, exhibit high degrees of self-doubt. Unlike the original research, the chapter aims to bring into view the role self-respect plays in higher education as another crucial explanatory factor. First, I clarify the main concepts that are relevant for getting a clear view of the notion of self-respect: different kinds of self-respect and the connection to the notion (...) of self-esteem are discussed. After this, in section III, I move on to the main theoretical positions that historically have put self-respect in the centre of their theorizing. The story starts with Immanuel Kant, continues with John Rawls, and ends with the influential accounts of Axel Honneth, Avishai Margalit and several feminist thinkers. Having covered the theoretical and conceptual landscape, I finally connect self-respect to higher education both on the systematic as well as on the more applied level of thinking. I then wrap up the chapter by connecting back to The Atlantic story we have started out with as well as make suggestions of further reading for those with deeper interest in the topic. I also provide a a brief list of the main takeaways as well propose some questions for discussion. (shrink)

Why should I let the toad work Squat on my life? Can’t I use my wit as a pitchfork And drive the brute off? Six days of the week it soils With its sickening poison — Just for paying a few bills! That's out of proportion. From Philip Larkin, ‘Toads’. ABSTRACT This paper mounts a Rawlsian argument for unconditional basic income on the grounds that it maximins the distribution of income and wealth understood as a social basis of self‐respect. (...) The most important objection to this argument available to Rawlsians is that basic income violates the demands of reciprocity, where reciprocity in any scheme of distribution is a requirement of justice. The second half of the paper addresses this objection. It is argued there that even if the objection can be made successfully by Rawlsians (and this is not clear), it is not sufficient to divest them of a commitment to basic income, given some practical considerations about the implementation of alternatives to basic income. (shrink)

We suggest a fuller understanding of the obligation to respect patient autonomy can be gained by recognizing patients as historically and socially situated agents, whose values are developed, challenged, and changed, rather than merely applied, in their decision-making about their use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis or preimplantation genetic screening (PGD/PGS). We ground this discussion in empirical research on the patients experiences with PGD/PGS, and conclude by suggesting that promoting patients’ self-respect is a useful ethical standard for providers and practices to (...) recognize. (shrink)

Many theories of social justice maintain that concern for the social bases of self-respect grounds demanding requirements of political and economic equality, as self-respect is supposed to be dependent on continuous just recognition by others. This paper argues that such views miss an important feature of self-respect, which accounts for much of its value: self-respect is a capacity for self-orientation that is robust under adversity. This does not mean that there are no social bases of self-respect that such theories ought (...) to incorporate. It means that they are different: they consist of the motivational and epistemic resources needed to develop and maintain such robustness. (shrink)

Can “self-respect” supplant the now much-maligned “global self-esteem” in psychological research and therapy? The aim of the present paper is to examine this suggestion and develop it further. It is argued that there are two distinct philosophical concepts of self-respect abroad in the literature, Kantian and Aristotelian, between which psychologists need to choose. The main components of Aristotelian self-respect are then worked out. The paper concludes by exploring how, in order to make those components objectively measurable, certain methodological pitfalls must (...) be avoided. (shrink)

Religiously offensive speech, i.e. speech that offends members of religious groups, especially religious minorities, is on the rise in western liberal democracies, particularly following the recent wave of right-wing populism in the UK, the US and beyond. But when is such speech wrongful? This paper argues that the wrongfulness of some religiously offensive speech does not depend on some intrinsic feature of it, or on the subjective reaction of its targets. Instead, such wrongfulness depends on the fact that religiously offensive (...) speech normally takes place against the background of enduring social injustices suffered by certain minorities, for example religious discrimination. In that context, we argue, religiously offensive speech is wrongful when it disables its victims from maintaining an adequately respectful relationship to themselves, and sets back their freedom through domination. Recognizing the wrongfulness of some religiously offensive speech, however, need not entail endorsing its legal regulation all things considered. The paper therefore illustrates different available forms of intervention, ranging from civil law action to state support for the victims of such speech and long-term programmes of citizenship education. (shrink)

This is the first anthology to bring together a selection of the most important contemporary philosophical essays on the nature and moral significance of self-respect. Representing a diversity of views, the essays illustrate the complexity of self-respect and explore its connections to such topics as personhood, dignity, rights, character, autonomy, integrity, identity, shame, justice, oppression and empowerment. The book demonstrates that self-respect is a formidable concern which goes to the very heart of both moral theory and moral life. Contributors: Bernard (...) Boxill, Stephen L. Darwall, John Deigh, Robin S. Dillon, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Aurel Kolnai, Stephen J. Massey, Diana T. Meyers, Michelle M. Moody-Adams, John Rawls, Gabriele Taylor, Elizabeth Telfer, Laurence L. Thomas. (shrink)

For Kant and Hill, self-respect is a morally central and morally powerful concern. Both have also had some things to say in moral praise of humility and in condemnation of arrogance, a trait widely regarded as the vice to which the virtue of humility is the prevention and cure. Arrogance can easily be seen as a failure to respect both other people and oneself. It might be thought, however, that humility and self-respect are in tension, if not at odds with (...) one another, for the one is widely thought to involve a low opinion of one’s worth and the other a high regard for it. My essay focuses on understanding, with the help of Kant and Hill, relations among various kinds of humility, arrogance, and self-respect. I argue that humility is not the virtue opposing arrogance, but rather, self-respect is, and that humility is at best an ancillary, instrumental, contextual virtue and the servant of self-respect; but at worst, it is as serious a vice as arrogance, indeed, an aspect of it. (shrink)

Certain situations seem to call for acknowledging the possibility that one’s own beliefs are biased or distorted. On the other hand, certain sorts of epistemic self-doubts (such as ‘I believe it’s raining, but it’s not’) seem paradoxical. And some have put forth epistemic principles requiring rational agents to regard their own credences as so-called ‘expert functions’. This paper examines the question of whether rationality requires agents to respect their own credences in a way in which they need not respect the (...) credences of others. (shrink)

Critics have argued that Rawls's account of self-respect is equivocal. I show, first, that Rawls in fact relies upon an unambiguous notion of self-respect, though he sometimes is unclear as to whether this notion has merely instrumental or also intrinsic value. I show second that Rawls’s main objective in arguing that justice as fairness supports citizens’ self-respect is not, as many have thought, to show that his principles support citizens’ self-respect generally, but to show that his principles counter the effects (...) of the market on lower class citizens’ sense of worth. This discussion establishes that Rawls, in the end, sees self-respect primarily as an intrinsic good. (shrink)

In this article I examine the importance of self-respect in the justification of Rawls’s theory of justice. First, I present two elements that are part of the contemporary debate on self-respect as a form of self-worth—namely, moral status and merit. Second, I specify the bases that support self-respect within A Theory of Justice. Finally, I discuss at length the function of self-respect in justifying the principles of justice. This inquiry implies an analysis of the relationship between self-respect and the component (...) parts of the two principles of justice: basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle. I also explore the connection between self-respect and the sense of justice in light of the stability argument, and how the relationship between the two is important for achieving social stability. (shrink)

This essay aims to show that arrogance corrupts the very qualities that make persons persons. The corruption is subtle but profound, and the key to understanding it lies in understanding the connections between different kinds of arrogance, self-respect, respect for others and personhood. Making these connections clear is the second aim of this essay. It will build on Kant's claim that self-respect is central to living our human lives as persons and that arrogance is, at its core, the failure to (...) respect oneself as a person. (shrink)

According to the influential disrespect account of what paternalism is, and why it is wrong, paternalism involves an anti-egalitarian, disrespectful attitude on the part of the paternalist: X (the paternalist) assumes an attitude of superiority when interfering in Y's matters for Y's good. Pace this account, the article argues that an important, although somewhat overlooked, form of paternalism is not, all things considered, insulting. This form of paternalism focusses on people's occasional lack of appropriate self-respect or their failure to see (...) themselves as equals or to stand vis-à-vis others as such. (shrink)

Arrogance is traditionally regarded as among the worst of human vices. Kant’s discussion of one kind of arrogance as a violation of the categorical moral duty to respect other persons gives familiar support for this view. However, I argue that what Kant says about the ways in which another kind of arrogance is opposed to different kinds of self-respect reveals how profoundly vicious arrogance can be. As a failure of self-respect, arrogance is the Ur-Vice that corrupts moral agency and rational (...) judgment. As its contrary, self-respect is thus morally vital: it is the first condition of the possibility of genuine moral agency and judgment. There are also important gender dimensions to arrogance: although women are called haughty, supercilious, disdainful, even imperious or presumptuous, they are rarely called arrogant, perhaps because arrogance is an exercise of power. I consider, then, whether despite the Kantian condemnation of it, something that is properly called "arrogance" might be, in contexts of oppression, a liberatory virtue of self-respect that oppressed peoples ought to cultivate. (shrink)

Recent liberal moral and political philosophy has placed great emphasis on the good of self-respect. But it is not always evident what is involved in self-respect, nor is it evident how societies can promote it. Assuming that self-respect is highly desirable, I begin by considering how people can live in a self-respecting fashion, and I argue that autonomous envisaging and fulfillment of one's own life plans is necessary for self-respect. I next turn to the question of how societal implementation of (...) rights may affect self-respect, and I urge that discretionary rights, which allow people to decline the benefits they confer, support self-respect more effectively than mandatory rights, which forbid people to refuse the benefits they confer. I conclude by examining the import of these contentions for feminist theory. I believe that my arguments are of particular concern to women because women have traditionally been victimized by a mandatory right to play a distinctively "feminine" role which has undermined their self-respect. (shrink)

Although neglected by psychology, self-respect has been an integral part of philosophical discussion since Aristotle and continues to be a central issue in contemporary moral philosophy. Within this tradition, self-respect is considered to be based on one's capacity for rationality and leads to behaviors that promote autonomy, such as independence, self-control and tenacity. Self-respect elicits behaviors that one should be treated with respect and requires the development and pursuit of personal standards and life plans that are guided by respect for (...) self and others. In contrast, the psychological concept of self-esteem is grounded in the theories of self-concept. As such, self-esteem is a self-evaluation of competency ratios and opinions of significant others that results in either a positive or negative evaluation of one's worthiness and inclusionary status. The major distinction between the two is that while competency ratios and others' opinions are central to self-esteem, autonomy is central to self-respect. We submit that not only is self-respect important in understanding self-esteem, but that it also uniquely contributes to individual functioning. Research is needed to establish the central properties of self-respect and their effects on individual functioning, developmental factors, and therapeutic approaches. (shrink)

For Kant and for feminists, self-respect is a morally central and morally powerful concern. In this paper I focus on some questions about the relation of self-respect to two other stances toward the self, humility and arrogance. Just as arrogance is usually treated as a serious vice, so humility is widely regarded as an important virtue. Indeed, it is supposed to be the virtue that opposes arrogance, keeping it in check or preventing it from developing in the first place. I’ve (...) argued elsewhere that, on Kant’s account, arrogance is a vice of disrespect for other people and for oneself. Humility is not, however, unproblematic from a Kantian perspective, and he is more concerned to identify bad forms of it than to praise it as a virtue or recommend it as a cure for arrogance. Feminist ethics draws our attention to the ways in which character traits, attitudes, beliefs, and stances take on differential moral valences in contexts of oppression, and what might be a virtue for members of dominant groups can be vices for members of subordinate groups. How, then, are we to understand and assess humility? The upshot of Kantian and feminist analyses is two-fold: First, humility is not the virtue opposing arrogance; rather, self-respect is. Second, humility is at best an ancillary, instrumental, contextual virtue and the servant of self-respect; but at worst, it is as serious a vice as arrogance, indeed, an aspect of it. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that self-respect constitutes an important value, and further, serves as an important basis for equality. I also argue that under conditions of inequality-producing segregation, voluntary separation in schooling may be more likely to provide the resources necessary for self respect. Accordingly, I defend a prima facie case of voluntary separation for stigmatized minorities when equality – as equal status and treatment – is not an option under either the terms of integration or involuntary segregation.

The article begins by reconstructing the just distribution of the social bases of self-respect, a principle of justice that is covert in Rawls’s writing. I argue that, for Rawls, justice mandates that each social basis for self-respect be equalized. Curiously, for Rawls, that principle ranks higher than Rawls’s two more famous principles of justice - equal liberty and the difference principle. I then recall Rawls’s well-known confusion between self-respect and another form of self-appraisal, namely, confidence in one’s determinate plans and (...) capacities. Correcting that confusion forces Rawls to accept objectionable and illiberal politics. Surprisingly, a consistent Rawls must endorse absolute economic equality, deny liberty any priority whatsoever, or sponsor still other illiberal political views - evidence of a flaw in the ethical basis of Rawls’s politics. (shrink)