First published in 1973, Rules and Meanings is an anthology of works that form part of Mary Douglas' struggle to devise an anthropological modernism conducive to her opposition to reputedly modernizing trends in contemporary society. The collection contains works by Wittgenstein, Schutz, Husserl, Hertz and other continentals. The underlying themes of the anthology are the construction of meaning, the force of hidden background assumptions, tacit conventions and the power of spatial organization to reinforce words. The work serves to (...) complement the philosophers' work on everyday language with the anthropologists' theory of everyday knowledge. (shrink)

This book concerns the metasemantics of quantum mechanics (QM). Roughly, it pursues an investigation at an intersection of the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of language, and it offers a critical analysis of rival explanations of the semantic facts of standard QM. Two problems for such explanations are discussed: categoricity and permanence. New results include 1) a reconstruction of Einstein's incompleteness argument, which concludes that a local, separable, and categorical QM cannot exist, 2) a reinterpretation of Bohr's principle of (...) correspondence, grounded in the principle of permanence, 3) a meaning-variance argument for quantum logic, which follows a line of critical reflections initiated by Weyl, and 4) an argument for semantic indeterminacy leveled against inferentialism about QM, inspired by Carnap's work in the philosophy of classical logic. (shrink)

Semantic generalists and semantic particularists disagree over the role of rules or principles in linguistic competence and in the determination of linguistic meaning, and hence over the importance of the notions of a rule or of a principle in philosophical accounts of language. In this paper, I have argued that the particularist’s case against generalism is far from decisive and that by moderating the claims she makes on behalf of her thesis the generalist can accommodate many of the (...) considerations that the particularist cites in support of her position. (shrink)

This paper explores the prospects for using the notion of a primitive normative attitude in responding to the sceptical argument about meaning developed in chapter 2 of Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It takes as its stalking-horse the response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein developed in a recent series of important works by Hannah Ginsborg. The paper concludes that Ginsborg’s attempted solution fails for a number of reasons: it depends on an inadequate response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s ‘finitude’ (...) objection to reductive dispositionalism; it erroneously rejects the idea that a speaker’s understanding of an expression guides her use; it threatens to collapse into either full-blown non-reductionism or reductive dispositionalism; and there is no motive for accepting it over forms of non-reductionism such as those developed by Barry Stroud and John McDowell. (shrink)

The use of conventional logical connectives either in logic, in mathematics, or in both cannot determine the meanings of those connectives. This is because every model of full conventional set theory can be extended conservatively to a model of intuitionistic set plus class theory, a model in which the meanings of the connectives are decidedly intuitionistic and nonconventional. The reasoning for this conclusion is acceptable to both intuitionistic and classical mathematicians. En route, I take a detour to prove that, given (...) strictly intuitionistic principles, classical negation cannot exist. (shrink)

Can there be rules of language which serve both to determine meaning and to guide speakers in ordinary linguistic usage, i.e., in the production of speech acts? We argue that the answer is no. We take the guiding function of rules to be the function of serving as reasons for actions, and the question of guidance is then considered within the framework of practical reasoning. It turns out that those rules that can serve as reasons for (...) linguistic utterances cannot be considered as normative or meaning determining. Acceptance of such a rule is simply equivalent to a belief about meaning, and does not even presuppose that meaning is determined by rules. Rules that can determine meaning, on the other hand, i.e., rules that can be regarded as constitutive of meaning, are not capable of guiding speakers in the ordinary performance of speech acts. (shrink)

The dissertation provides an analysis and elaboration of Michael Dummett's proof-theoretic notions of validity. Dummett's notions of validity are contrasted with standard proof-theoretic notions and formally evaluated with respect to their adequacy to propositional intuitionistic logic.

The rule-following debate, in its concern with the metaphysics and epistemology of linguistic meaning and mental content, goes to the heart of the most fundamental questions of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. This volume gathers together the most important contributions to the topic, including papers by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Graeme Forbes, Warren Goldfarb, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Ruth Millikan, Philip Pettit, George Wilson, and José Zalabardo. This debate has centred on Saul Kripke's reading of the (...) rule-following sections in Wittgenstein and his consequent posing of a "sceptical paradox" that threatens our every day notions of linguistic meaning and mental content. These essays are attempts to respond to this challenge and represent some of the most important work in contemporary theory of meaning. They examine the notion of meaning; whether it is possible to find a suitable meaning-constituting fact from our previous behaviour or mental histories; objections to, and defenses of, dispositional accounts of meaning; the plausibility of non-factualism about meaning; our attempts to develop non-reductionist accounts of meaning; and the sources of the normativity which attaches to meaning, such as the linguistic practice of the community or the dispositions of the individual. With an introductory essay and a comprehensive guide to further reading the book is an excellent resource for courses in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, Wittgenstein, and metaphysics, as well as for all philosophers, linguists, and cognitive scientists with interests in these areas. Contributors include Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Graeme Forbes, Warren Goldfarb, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Alexander Miller, Ruth Garrett Millikan, Philip Pettit, George. M. Wilson, Crispin Wright, and José L. Zalabardo. (shrink)

According to the received view the later Wittgenstein subscribed to the thesis that speaking a language requires being guided by rules (thesis RG). In this paper we question the received view. On its most intuitive reading, we argue, (RG) is very much at odds with central tenets of the later Wittgenstein. Giving up on this reading, however, threatens to deprive the notion of rule-following of any real substance. Consequently, the rule-following considerations cannot charitably be read as a deep and (...) subtle defense of (RG) against the threat of paradox, as proponents of the received view are wont to do. Instead, we argue, the rule-following considerations provide Wittgenstein's deep and subtle reasons for rejecting the very idea that speaking a language involves rule-guidance. Although Wittgenstein subscribed to (RG) during his middle period writings, his later remarks on rules, far from being a clarification and elaboration of his earlier views, are directed against the claim of the middle period that speaking a language is an essentially rule-guided activity. (shrink)

Germany is an interesting case with respect to the governance of reprogenetics. It has a strong profile in the technosciences and high aims regarding the global bioeconomy, yet her regulation of human genetics, reproductive medicine and embryo research has for a long time been rather restrictive. German biopolitical exceptionalism has often been explained by reference to Catholicism and the legacy of the Nazi past. The Germans, so goes the common story, have learnt the lessons of history and translated them into (...) unconditional respect for human dignity, which in turn translates into unconditional protection of human life, including the human embryo, and the firm repudiation of any eugenic distinction between ‘life worth to live’ and ‘life not worth to live’. This, however, is not the whole story. Alongside deontological strictness we find another strand of governing body politics and reprogenetics in Germany, the rule-and-exception model, running from the mid-1970s abortion law via the 2002 Stem Cell Act to the 2011 regulation of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. In contrast to the former, that strongly draws on Kant and his concept of human dignity, the latter bears resemblances to Carl Schmitt's concept of state of exception. The article will show that the rule-and-exception model builds the exception into the rule and transforms the meaning and mandate of ethics, namely from safeguarding ethical standards to deciding about the exception. Given that the exception has now tended to become the rule, the question is whether the lessons of history will govern German reprogenetics for much longer. (shrink)

This chapter concentrates on two discussions, both of which enlist Wittgenstein's rule‐following considerations in support of radical and highly revisionary conclusions about the objectivity of meaning ‐ conclusions which may appear to entail, and have been taken to entail, consequences for the objectivity of truth and judgment which are no less radical and revisionary. There is widespread agreement that Wittgenstein advances, in the rule‐following sections of Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, considerations that are quite destructive (...) of certain conceptions of meaning, understanding, and rule‐following into which one may easily slide when attempts a general philosophical account of them. Saul Kripke interprets central sections of Philosophical Investigations as developing a 'skeptical paradox' about meaning. Kripke himself describes the skeptical conclusion as 'insane and intolerable'. (shrink)

This article starts out by delineating an interpretation of Kripke on Wittgenstein, an interpretation that seems to stand the best chance of fitting at least the basic concerns and insights expressed in the Investigations. In doing so, this article sketches a conception of meaning and truth conditions against which Wittgenstein's remarks are plausibly directed, and it explains how Kripke's reconstruction of Wittgenstein can be read as incorporating a broad attack on that conception. The interpretation with which the article opens (...) offers what the article calls ‘the dramatic reading of the Skeptical Argument.’. (shrink)

The relation of Pascal’s philosophy to language is well-known. Pascal’s rhetorical considerations, his reflections on the language of “honnêteté”, and the analysis of definition in De l’Esprit géométrique have been the focus of many commentaries. But the epistemological interest of these texts remains undetermined, in the context of a more general reflection on the nature of meaning, truth, and language. In this article, I show how Pascal’s reflection is confronted with a particular challenge regarding the meaning of words. (...) This problem can be restated with the help of the concept of rule and involves our ability to assess what it means to follow a rule. I trace Pascal’s evolution in the face of this problem, adopting successively a dogmatist position, a skeptical position and finally a position which I describe as both anthropological and pragmatist. This evolution demonstrates both the continuity and discursive progress of Pascal’s reflection on human knowledge from De l’Esprit géométrique to the Pensées. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rules and CommunityJeffrey Bedrick, MDThe paper, “The Dilemma of Compliance: Roles and Rules in Schizophrenia, Censorship, and Life,” by Riley Paterson raises a number of interesting issues. I am only able to address a few of these issues here, and I do so in the hope of broadening our consideration of some of the basic concerns.Paterson focuses his attention on the potentially repressive side of rules, (...) even while acknowledging the broader role of rules in human life. Thus, towards the end of his paper he writes “While I regard all experience as rule- and role-bound, the aforementioned groups”—those who “experience schizophrenia, persecution, or are otherwise marginalized and vulnerable”—“experience rules and roles with particular violence.” He admirably warns us to be sure that in our work with people we are not traumatizing or re-traumatizing them.But rules play a broader role in human life. Paterson discusses censorship and the role that rules can play in repressing the expression of ideas. But rules also allow the use of language and govern communication in general. Writers living under censorship resorted, Paterson notes, to a system of exoteric and esoteric writing and communication. But those esoteric texts, if they were not to remain purely private and unknowable to those who read the texts, had to follow certain rules and conventions to signal the reader that the exoteric text was not all there was, and that there was another, esoteric, meaning to be found within the text. Writing under conditions of censorship remained a communal, intersubjective, endeavor.With schizophrenia, the seeming central topic of the paper, the situation becomes even more complex. We shall see that Paterson’s analyses point us in two different directions.Paterson writes:In schizophrenia we see an exaggerated instance of the dilemma raised above: There is a gap that exists between the publicly available roles, and the person we feel ourselves to be. We are required to conform with the demands of these roles to preserve what we feel most natural in ourselves. People with schizophrenia often must conceal, at times, their experiences of hallucinations and delusions in order to preserve some ability for social interaction. In my clinical work, however, people with schizophrenia have often reported it has felt freeing to learn when and with whom they can share those thoughts and experiences. Freeing, not because they need to hide part of themselves but because doing so opens up possibilities of social interaction and community.Further, Paterson writes of the difficulties people with schizophrenia may have with ‘weintentionality.’ Referencing Salice and Henriksen (2021) [End Page 381] he concludes that “the self-disorders of schizophrenia preserve a capacity for joint intentionality (rule following) but severely inhibit an experience of group belonging and identity (weintentionality).” Indeed he notes, again following Salice and Henriksen (2021), “that some individuals experiencing more mild forms of schizophrenia spectrum disorders found great comfort and safety in rule following.” The problem for people with schizophrenia thus seems less with applying specific rules, which might in some cases be meant to regulate or repress behavior, than in establishing we-intentionality. Many phenomenologists have explored the concept of intersubjectivity and have noted, as have many psychoanalysts and therapists, that there is no pure, interior subject but that our very selfhood is formed in interaction and relation to others. (See, for one example, the work of Alfred Schutz (1967) for a phenomenological investigation of intersubjectivity and the social.) To borrow Paterson’s gardening metaphor, there are no sole, beautiful flowers. They must be cared for to grow, or be part of a natural ecosystem that allows them to flourish.Cognitive and negative symptoms are widely accepted as posing more of a burden to schizophrenia than the more flamboyant hallucinations and delusions. These seem to me to be due less to a difficulty conforming or complying to social rules that may be felt to be restrictive or repressive and more due to the difficulties with intersubjectivity and we-intentionality. The people I have worked with who were most limited by their schizophrenia in my judgment have been people with severe thought disorders who demonstrated severe loosening of associations and word salad. I say... (shrink)

This philosophical game changer looks critically at the Golden Rule in the context of game theory to see where it works and where it doesn’t, when it is applicable and when it isn’t. It shows you why knowing the difference can offer you a powerful way to transform your life from one driven by fear to one driven by love.

This paper provides a semantic analysis of admissible rules and associated completeness conditions for arbitrary deductive systems, using the framework of abstract algebraic logic. Algebraizability is not assumed, so the meaning and significance of the principal notions vary with the level of the Leibniz hierarchy at which they are presented. As a case study of the resulting theory, the nonalgebraizable fragments of relevance logic are considered.

This paper discusses Wittgenstein understood the language of the dimensions of the human form of life point of view, we oppose the idea and the text is the interpretation of the relationship between the nature of the argument. Move to reposition Wittgenstein language, means the direct meaning of the moment, rather than explain, and not because of our shortage of facts and work to a standstill. The main thrust of this significance and the fact that a direct interaction between (...) the current text of the practice of continuing involvement, the text was able to express the meaning of the moment between the facts and narrative unity. In other words, Wittgenstein on the rules, customs, or life in the form of reflection, allows us to claim the author intended meaning of the text depends on the point of view, and negative with the intention of the author of a variety of relativism between the interpretation of , the transfer can be prudent to try to speculate Huan room. For example, Stanley Xu fee claim, meaning diverse, according to the interests of our interests, goals and assumptions of the "default" of the "premise" and different. But Wittgenstein's writings, pointed out that the rules in order to grasp the meaning of such person does not involve the "premise" of the argument. Is a form of life on our training the next day, and thus to control of both the immediate and direct facts and meaning. This allows us to re-confirm, indeed, does not rely on the text to explain the fact that there is, in fact and thus understand the text for further explanation for the fact that between the true distinction. Meaning and truth of the "total structure" does not eliminate the practice of interpretation, but will be classified as appropriate Field, is the world we start to go beyond the immediate text directly taken to the open practice. • We will be reading Jane Austen's "Mansfield Park", for example, to influence our thinking about changing the form of text to read way to view this view. This paper argues that a Wittgensteinian understanding of language as an integral dimension of human forms of life speaks against the view that our relationship to texts is interpretive in nature. Wittgenstein's re-orientation to language entails that meaning is immediate rather than interpretive, and that our works don't stop short of the facts. The aim of this paper is to show that the immediate mutuality of meanings and facts carries over to our textual practices so that our texts make available immediate unities of meanings and narrative facts. That is, Wittgenstein's reflections on following rules, customs or forms of life allow us to steer a careful course between the view that a text is determined by the author's intentions and a relativism of variable interpretations that results from denying the relevance of authorial intentions. For example, Stanley Fish holds that meanings vary insofar as they are "predetermined 'by our" presuppositions "-our interests, goals and assumptions. But Wittgenstein's work suggests that following rules, and hence grasping meanings, does not involve something as variable as individual" presuppositions. "Rather , our training into forms of life opens up a second-nature where grasp of both facts and meanings is immediate. This allows us to re-affirm the view that there are textual facts that do not depend on interpretation; that there is a difference between apprehending the facts of a text and going on to provide further interpretations of those facts. The 'co-constitution' of meanings and facts does not foreclose interpretive practices but allocates them to their proper sphere-as practices that we may wish to undertake in order to go beyond the initial immediate openness of the world of a text. We can test this view by considering the way our changing forms of forms affect the way we read a text such as Jane Austen's Mansfied Park. (shrink)

In his book, The Logic of Democracy, T.L. Thor son has published a chapter entitled "Majority Rule and Minority Rights". In this paper he has pointed out a controversy which has arisen between "natural rights democrats" and "majority rule democrats." In this paper I argue that elected representatives represent the majority and their rule can be called the rule of the majority so long they can protect the rights of individuals. This is why the natural rights of man are more (...) fundamental and essential than majority rule. In conclusion, I insist that neither "natural rights" nor "majority rule" can be called the elements of democracy. If the former and the latter could have been understood as the end of democracy and the means to achieve the end, respectively, then the controversy would not have arisen. (shrink)

The relationship between "causal" and "meaningful" (Jaspers) influences on behavior is explored. The nature of meaning essentially involves rules and the human practices in which they are imparted to a person and have a formative influence on that person's thinking. The meanings that come to be discerned in life experience are then important in influencing the shape of that person's conduct. The reasoning and motivational structures that develop on this basis are realized by the shape of the neural (...) processing networks that constitute the mature human brain. This implies that meaning is not only realized by brain micro-structure but, in part, explains its workings. This in turn entails that in psychiatry we must continue to avail ourselves both of neuropsychology/neurobiology and of dynamic/meaningful explanation. Keywords: brain and mind, causality and meaning, cognitive models, meaning, mind and brain, neuropsychology and meaning CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Mainstream historians in recent decades have often treated formal categories and rules as something to be 'used' by individuals, as one might use a stick or stone, and the gains of an earlier legal history are often needlessly set aside. Anthropologists, meanwhile, have treated rules as analytic errors and categories as an imposition by outside powers or by analysts, leaving a very thin notion of 'practice' as the stuff of social life. Philosophy of an older vintage, as well (...) as the work of scholars such as Charles Taylor, provides fresh approaches when applied imaginatively to cases beyond the traditional ground of modern Europe and North America. Not only are different kinds of rules and categories open to examination, but the very notion of a rule can be explored more deeply. This volume approaches rules and categories as constitutive of action and hence of social life, but also as providing means of criticism and imagination. A general theoretical framework is derived from analytical philosophy, from Wittgenstein to his critics and beyond, and from recent legal thinkers such as Schauer and Waldron. Case-studies are presented from a broad range of periods and regions, from Amazonia via northern Chad, Tibet, and medieval Russia to the scholarly worlds of Roman law, Islam, and Classical India. As the third volume in the Legalism series, this collection draws on common themes that run throughout the first two volumes: Legalism: Anthropology and History and Legalism: Community and Justice, consolidating them in a framework that suggests a new approach to rule-bound systems. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses Claudine Verheggen's account of what she takes to be Donald Davidson's response to the sceptical paradox about rule-following and meaning developed in Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's ‘rule-following considerations.’ It focusses on questions about the normativity of meaning, the social character of meaning, and the role of triangulation in Davidson's account of the determination of meaning, and invites Verheggen to compare the non-reductionism she finds in Davidson with that developed in Crispin Wright's judgement-dependent (...) account of meaning.RÉSUMÉCet article examine ce que Claudine Verheggen considère comme étant la réponse de Donald Davidson au paradoxe sceptique développé dans l'interprétation qu'offre Saul Kripke des remarques de Wittgenstein sur la possibilité de suivre une règle. Je me concentre en particulier sur des questions concernant la normativité de la signification, le caractère social de la signification et le rôle que la notion de triangulation joue dans la position de Davidson sur la détermination de la signification. J'invite aussi Verheggen à comparer le non-réductionnisme davidsonien avec celui défendu par Crispin Wright dans sa conception de la signification en tant que dépendante du jugement. (shrink)

MEANING POSTULATES REINSTATED If I am right in agreeing with Cresswell that the "logicarrlexicaT distinction is one of degree rather than one of kind, that in turn impugns the distinction between the official truth-rules that define logical ...

What is a rule, if it appears to become confused with life? And what is a human life, if, in every one of its gestures, of its words, and of its silences, it cannot be distinguished from the rule? It is to these questions that Agamben's new book turns by means of an impassioned reading of the fascinating and massive phenomenon of Western monasticism from Pachomius to St. Francis. The book reconstructs in detail the life of the monks with their (...) obsessive attention to temporal articulation and to the Rule, to ascetic techniques and to liturgy. But Agamben's thesis is that the true novelty of monasticism lies not in the confusion between life and norm, but in the discovery of a new dimension, in which "life" as such, perhaps for the first time, is affirmed in its autonomy, and in which the claim of the "highest poverty" and "use" challenges the law in ways that we must still grapple with today. How can we think a form-of-life, that is, a human life released from the grip of law, and a use of bodies and of the world that never becomes an appropriation? How can we think life as something not subject to ownership but only for common use? (shrink)

A critique of structural theories of semantics, Particularly of the system developed by fodor and katz. The paper shows that such theories rest on misconceptions of sentential meaning and meaningfulness, Which it is argued, Admits of degree and varies with context. Also, Metaphorical meaning is bound to remain outside the theoretical reach of such systems, Which conceive of the everyday use of language as a mechanical process and not partly a creative one. Finally, It is argued that analogies (...) rather than rules are used in the process of semantic interpretation. (shrink)

'Practices without foundations' is, in genesis and in effect, a discussion of the following quotation , which serves therefore as an epigraph to it: ;Nelson Goodman's discussion of the 'new riddle of induction' ... deserves comparison with Wittgenstein's work. Indeed ... the basic strategy of Goodman's treatment of the 'new riddle' is strikingly close to Wittgenstein's sceptical arguments .... Although our paradigm of Wittgenstein's problem was formulated for a mathematical problem it ... is completely general and can be applied to (...) any rule or word. In particular, if it were formulated for the language of color impressions, as Wittgenstein himself suggests, Goodman's 'grue', or something similar, would play the role of 'quus'. But the problem would not be Goodman's about induction--"Why not predict that grass, which has been grue in the past will be grue in the future?"--but Wittgenstein's about meaning: "Who is to say that in the past I didn't mean grue by 'green', so that now I should call the sky, not the grass, 'green'?" vskip9pt ;This fascinating remark of Kripke's suggests a project, that of charting out both the interpretive and philosophic points of connection and disconnection between Wittgenstein, Goodman and Kripke. That project is this dissertation. ;My work severely tests Kripke's remark. For I argue that Kripke not only misreads Wittgenstein, but also mistakes the extremity of the 'scepticism' of his version of Wittgenstein for the priority of the philosophical puzzle that Goodman has bequeathed to us. ;To reach this conclusion, I show that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'meaning-scepticism' is unanswerable if statable, but actually unstatable; and that, under certain interpretations, the same is true of putative scepticisms derivable from Goodman's text. The upshot is that the sceptical reading of most twentieth century philosophy must be displaced in favour of 'post-scepticism' and 'philosophical ethnography'. The latter concepts, sketched toward the end of the dissertation, are perhaps its telos. (shrink)

An oft-defended claim of a close relationship between Gentzen inference rules and the meaning of the connectives they introduce and eliminate has given rise to a whole domain called proof-theoretic semantics, see Schroeder- Heister (1991); Prawitz (2006). A branch of proof-theoretic semantics, mainly developed by Dosen (2019); Dosen and Petric (2011), isolates in a precise mathematical manner formulas (of a logic L) that have the same meaning. These isomorphic formulas are defined to be those that behave identically (...) in inferences. The aim of this paper is to investigate another type of recently discussed rules in the literature, namely grounding rules, and their link to the meaning of the connectives they provide the grounds for. In particular, by using grounding rules, we will refine the notion of isomorphic formulas through the notion of hyper-isomorphic formulas. We will argue that it is actually the notion of hyper-isomorphic formulas that identify those formulas that have the same meaning. (shrink)

Several recent studies and initiatives have emphasized the importance of a strong ethical organizational DNA (ODNA) to create and promote an effective corporate governance culture of trust, integrity and intellectual honesty. This paper highlights the drawbacks of an excessively heavy reliance on rules-based approaches that increase the cost of doing business, overshadow essential elements of good corporate governance, create a culture of dependency, and can result in legal absolutism. The paper makes the case that the way forward for effective (...) corporate governance is to strike an optimal balance between rules-based and principles-based approaches. The recent corporate scandals have demonstrated that the ethical ODNA is critical to the driving force and basis of legal and regulatory requirements. Effective governance means adhering to ethical principles, not merely complying with rules, and is a crucial guardian of a firm’s reputation and integrity. It is through an effective corporate governance program (that is, one that optimally captures and integrates the appropriate aspects of rules-based and principles-based approaches, and identifies and assesses the related risks) that an organization can reconfigure its ODNA for improved performance. Focusing on the ethical ODNA as the basis of new governance measures provides an opportunity to develop a competitive advantage as it represents a potential source of differentiation, strengthens the relationship with all stakeholders of the organization by building a culture of trust and integrity, and re-instills investor confidence. This paper employs dialectical reasoning that links the ODNA through principles-driven rules in developing a risks-based approach. A comparison from a risk assessment perspective between rules-based and principles-based approaches is presented. Although there have been few applications employing dialectical reasoning in business research, this methodology can be extremely useful in isolating ethical issues and integrating them into the business process. The risks-based approach captures the benefits of both rules-based and principles-based approaches, and incorporates trust-based principles such␣as solidarity, subsidiarity and covenantal relationships. (shrink)

Saul Kripke recently has published an interpretation of the later Wittgenstein's rule-following problem as a "sceptical paradox," the conclusion of which is that language is impossible. In this dissertation, I document the history of the rule-following problem in Wittgenstein's writings, thereby providing a historical perspective not provided by Kripke. In chapters I and II, I develop a broadly Kantian interpretation of the epistemology of the Tractatus. My interpretation conflicts both with interpretations according to which the Tractatus implicitly embodies an empiricist (...) epistemology or no epistemology at all and with idealist readings. In chapter III, I extend the comparison between Wittgenstein and Kant, arguing that there is an important sense in which the notion of thought is fundamental in the Tractatus. My interpretation conflicts with interpretations according to which the Tractarian theory of meaning requires a mental act of "dubbing" which correlates signs and objects as well as with interpretations according to which nothing mental is presupposed. On one hand, chapters I-III can be read independently of chapters IV and V as an interpretation of some aspects of the Tractatus. On the other hand, these chapters lay the groundwork for my argument in chapter IV that the rule-following problem in the Philosophical Investigations is a general and forceful restatement of the problem of an infinite regress of interpretations to which the Tractarian theory of meaning was supposed to provide a solution. For various reasons, which I recount, Wittgenstein became dissatisfied with his early answer, and the problem reappears in his later work. Finally, in chapter V, I present and evaluate Kripke's interpretation of the rule-following problem from the historical perspective developed in the preceding chapters. I suggest that Kripke fails to see that it is a carry-over of a problem with which Wittgenstein wrestled in the Tractatus. In addition, although he recognizes that the later Wittgenstein believes that no fact or process could account for our ability to represent the world, he does not show clearly why Wittgenstein believes that this is so. (shrink)

Wittgenstein famously remarks that ‘the meaning of a word is its use’ (PI §43). Whether or not one views this as gesturing at a ‘theory’ of meaning, or instead as aiming primarily at dissuading us from certain misconceptions of language that are a source of puzzlement, it is clear that Wittgenstein held that for certain purposes the meaning of an expression could profitably be characterised as its use. Throughout his later writings, however, Wittgenstein’s appeal to the notion (...) of use pulls in two directions. In several places, Wittgenstein seems to connect the notion of an expression’s meaning with that of use in the sense of usage or practice. More specifically, he suggests that for an expression to possess meaning is for there to be a practice of employing it according to certain rules. ‘That’, he tells us, ‘is why there exists a correspondence between the concepts “rule” and “meaning”’ (OC §62; cf. PG 68; PO 51; RFM VI §28; VW 103). Indeed, Wittgenstein goes so far as to say, ‘The rule-governed nature of our languages permeates our life’ (RC §303). Call the view that the meaning of an expression is determined by a general principle governing its use, rulism. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction The Structure of an Argument The Bipartite Account of Meaning Practice What You See/Hear is not Normless Seeing the Similarity in Particular Cases Notes.

For some, Peterson represents all that is wrong with patriarchal culture; for others, he is the Canadian academic prophet who has come to save civilization from dizzying confusion. Regardless of how one feels about him, his influence in North America-and beyond-is difficult to deny. While the "Peterson phenomenon" has motivated numerous articles and responses, much of what has been written is either excessively fawning or overly critical. Little has been produced that explores Peterson's thought-especially his immensely popular 12 Rules (...) for LIfe-within the context of his overall context and scholarly output. How is one to understand the ascendancy of Jordan Peterson and why he's become so popular? Does his earlier Maps of Meaning shed light on how one might understand his 12 Rules for Life? In Myth and Meaning in Jordan Peterson, scholars across various disciplines explore Jordan Peterson's though from a Christian perspective. Critical and charitable, sober-minded and generous, this collection of ten essays is a key resource for those looking to faithfully engage with Jordan Peterson's thought. --Dust Jacket Front Inside Flap. (shrink)

In this paper I clarify the distinction between actions performed under a social rule and a mere pattern of behavior through an examination of two distinctive features of actions performed under a social rule. Developing an argument proposed by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law, I first argue that, where a social rule exists, there nonconformity/conformity to the pattern of behavior set down in the rule count as good reasons for criticism/commendation of actions covered by the rule. Secondly I (...) argue that, where a social rule exists, nonconformity/conformity to the pattern set down in the rule must be taken account of (at the risk of self-contradiction) in judging actions covered by the rule commendable or subject to criticism. This in turn means that, where a social rule exists, there can be no genuine exceptions to the rule because the notion of a genuine exception to a social rule makes no sense. (shrink)

This article sets out to investigate aspects of the uptake of Renaissance law and medicine from some of the logical and natural-philosophical components of the university arts course. Medicine is shown to have a much laxer operative logic than law, reflecting its commitment to the theory of idiosyncrasy as opposed to the demands made upon the law by the need for a uniform application of justice. Symptomatic of the different uptake arc the contrasting meanings of "regulariter" and "generaliter" in the (...) two disciplines. Whereas the law treats the rule as inviolable and the exception as only valid if made explicit in due legal form, medicine is able to conceive of a nature as a field of knowledge broader than that encompassed by its rules of art. Both law and medicine approach evidence. (shrink)