The hypothesis in the target paper is that the cognitive function of language lies in making possible the integration of different types of domain-specific information. The case for this hypothesis must consist, at least in part, of a constructive proposal as to what feature or features of natural language allows this integration to take place. This commentary suggests that the vital linguistic element is the relative pronoun and the possibility it affords of forming relative clauses.

It is occasionally tempting, after climbing a mountain, to use the elevation one has gained to dash up to the top of a connected peak which does not have sufficient interest to induce one to climb so high for its sake alone. It is in this spirit that I turn to Geach's Latin Prose theory of relative clauses. The matter itself is of no very great moment, and some new ground will have to be covered in dealing with Geach's (...) arguments. Nevertheless we shall primarily be applying the theory constructed in the body of the paper, and when one is in a position to expose bad arguments relatively rapidly, it is perhaps a good idea not to leave them unchallenged, especially when they appear to be gaining currency. (shrink)

The orthography of the relative pronoun and the near demonstrative pronoun in the Byblian dialect of Phoenician is exactly the same, meaning that the grapheme z in introductions to dedication inscriptions has been left to interpretation. The historically related nature of these pronouns and their linguistic development led to this situation, in which the written expression of both pronouns in Byblian is identical. In this article, I examine this situation from a variety of perspectives, using both inner-Phoenician (...) word order and comparative data from related languages, in order to show that two patterns underlie the pronoun z in the introduction to Byblian dedication inscriptions. First, I present the historical data regarding the development of the near demonstrative and relative pronouns in Phoenician. Next, I provide an analysis of the syntax of Phoenician dedication inscriptions and offer comparative material in mortuary inscriptions in Phoenician as well as evidence from Old Aramaic and Samʾalian. In doing so, I argue that, in light of comparative evidence, there is good reason to posit that two patterns exist underlying Byblian z, one in which the grapheme indicates the relative pronoun and another in which the grapheme indicates the near demonstrative. (shrink)

Pronouns often convey information about a person’s social identity (e.g., gender). Consequently, pronouns have become a focal point in academic and public debates about whether pronouns should be changed to be more inclusive, such as for people whose identities do not fit current pronoun conventions (e.g., gender non-binary individuals). Here, we make an empirical contribution to these debates by investigating which social identities lay speakers think that pronouns should encode and why. Across four studies, participants were (...) asked to evaluate different types of real and hypothetical pronouns, including binary gender pronouns, race pronouns, and identity-neutral pronouns. We sampled participants from two languages with different pronoun systems: English (N = 1,120) and Turkish (N = 260). English pronouns commonly denote binary gender (e.g., he for men), whereas Turkish pronouns are identity-neutral (e.g., o for anyone). Participants’ reasoning about pronouns reflected both a familiarity preference (i.e., participants preferred the pronoun type used in their language) and—critically—participants’ social ideologies. In both language contexts, participants’ ideological beliefs that social groups are inherently distinct (essentialism) and should be hierarchal (social dominance orientation) predicted relatively greater endorsement of binary gender pronouns and race pronouns. A preregistered experimental study with an English-speaking sample showed that the relationship between ideology and pronoun endorsement is causal: Ideologies shape attitudes toward pronouns. Together, the present research contributes to linguistic and psychological theories concerning how people reason about language and informs policy-relevant questions about whether and how to implement language changes for social purposes. (shrink)

This paper looks at an approach to Principle C in which the disjoint reference effect triggered by definite description arises because there is a preference for using bound pronouns in those cases. Philippe Schlenker has linked this approach to the idea that the NP part of a definite description should be the most minimal in content relative to a certain communicative goal. On a popular view about what the syntax and semantics of a personal pronoun is, that should (...) have the effect of favoring a pronoun over a definite description. This paper shows how that can be made the source of “Vehicle Change,” an effect in ellipsis contexts in which definite descriptions seem to behave like pronouns. It requires, however, a way of distinguishing bound pronouns from non-bound pronouns, and the paper makes a proposal about how these two kinds of pronouns can be distinguished in the way needed. (shrink)

Speaking of Professor Geach's belief that pronouns in natural language function like the bound variables in quantification theory, Gareth Evans, in ‘Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses - I’ says :I want to try to show that there are pronouns with quantifier antecedents that function in a quite different way. Such pronouns typically stand in a different grammatical relation to their antecedents, and; in contrast with bound pronouns, must be assigned a reference, so that their (...) most immediate sentential contexts can always be assigned a truth value. The relevant grammatical relation appears to be Klima's relation of ‘in construction with’. When the pronoun is in construction with its antecedent, as in [‘Some man loves his mother’] and [‘No man is happy when he is in love’] the result is a bound pronoun. (shrink)

Doubling unconditionals are exemplified by the Spanish example Venga quien venga, estaré contento ‘Whoever comes, I’ll be happy’. This curious and little studied construction is attested in various forms in a number of Romance and Slavic languages. In this paper, I provide a basic description of these constructions, focusing especially on Spanish, Czech, and Slovenian, and argue that they can be brought in line with analyses of run-of-the-mill unconditionals if one recognizes that the wh-structure within the unconditional antecedent is a (...) free relative and that the free relative is focused. The focused free relative introduces alternatives and thus gives rise to the denotation proposed by Rawlins :111–178, 2013) for English unconditionals. In the last part of the paper, I hypothesize that at least some non-doubling unconditionals could in fact have a doubling underlying structure, which is disguised by relative sluicing—clausal ellipsis with a relative pronoun remnant. (shrink)

Reconstruction effects in relative clauses are a class of phenomena where the external head of the relative clause seems to behave as if it occupied a position within the relative clause, as far as some commonly accepted principle of grammar is concerned. An often cited type of example is "The [relative of his] [which every man admires most] is his mother.", where the pronoun "his" in the relative head appears to be bound by the quantified (...) noun phrase "every man" in the relative clause - although the latter does not c-command the former, which is commonly required for binding. Several solutions have been developed in various theoretical frameworks. One interesting aspect about reconstruction effects in relative clauses is that they can be used as a benchmark for competing theories of grammar: Which architecture of the syntax-semantics interface can provide the most satisfying explanation for these phenomena? This volume brings together researchers working in different frameworks but looking at the same set of empirical facts, enabling the reader to develop their own perspective on the perfect tradeoff between syntax and semantics in a theory of grammar. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify and resolve issues surrounding the so-called formal linking problem in interpreting the Internally Headed Relative Clause construction in Korean and Japanese, a problem that has been identified in recent E-type pronominal treatments of the construction (e.g., Hoshi, K. (1995). Structural and interpretive aspects of head-internal and head-external relative clauses. PhD dissertation, University of Rochester; Shimoyama, J. (2001). Wh-constructions in Japanese. PhD dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst). In the literature, this problem refers to (...) the difficulty of capturing the delimited semantic variability of the E-type pronoun present in the embedding clause of the construction. I show that the E-type pronoun at issue is subject to a different licensing condition from a typical E-type pronoun and therefore presents a different linking problem. More specifically, it requires that the embedded clause describe a state of its antecedent and its descriptive content be supplied by a salient property represented in the logical form of the embedded clause. I propose an event-based semantic analysis that derives the effects of this novel generalization by establishing a binding relation between the event structure of the embedded clause and the denotation of the E-type pronoun. (shrink)

Some philosophers, notably Professors Quine and Geach, have stressed the analogies they see between pronouns of the vernacular and the bound variables of quantification theory. Geach, indeed, once maintained that ‘for a philosophical theory of reference, then, it is all one whether we consider bound variables or pronouns of the vernacular'. This slightly overstates Geach's positition since he recognizes that some pronouns of ordinary language do function differently from bound variables; he calls such pronouns ‘pronouns (...) of laziness'. Geach's characterisation of pronouns of laziness has varied from time to time, but the general idea should be clear from a paradigm example: A man who sometimes beats his wife has more sense than one who always gives in to her.The pronouns ‘one’ and ‘her’ go proxy for a noun or a noun phrase in the sense that the pronoun is replaceable in paraphrase by simple repetition of its antecedent. (shrink)

This dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective’ evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (...) perspectival thought and talk is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group. In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective’ evaluative thought and talk whose truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form ’S knows that p.’ Following a brief introduction, chapter 2 presents a new, error-theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. The case for relativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers' use of the word "know" without recourse to an error theory. In chapter 2, I show that the relativist can only account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in 3 I show that all major competitor theories - forms of invariantism and contextualism - are subject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. This raises the following fundamental question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions: If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism's error attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors. In Part II, I develop a novel unified account of the content and communication of perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective’ thoughts and Lewisians about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter 4, I argue that the self-location view of belief is in conflict with the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. I argue that understanding mental content and speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views. On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds - possible worlds ‘centred’ on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuitively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter 5, I show that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters 5 and 6 that the empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relativist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena on the sequenced worlds view. (shrink)

This paper investigates relative constructions as in The gifted mathematician that you claim to be should be able to solve this equation, in which the head noun is semantically dependent on an intensional operator in the relative clause, even though it is not c-commanded by it. This is the kind of situation that has led, within models of linguistic description that assume a syntactic level of Logical Form, to analyses in which the head noun is interpreted within the (...) CP-internal gap by reconstruction or interpretation of a lower element of a chain. We offer a solution that views surface representation as the input to semantics. The apparent inverted scope effects are traced back to the interpretation of the head nominal gifted mathematician as applying to individual concepts, and of the relative clause that you claim to be as including an equational statement. According to this view, the complex DP in question refers to the individual concept that exists just in the worlds that are compatible with what is generally supposed to be the case, is a gifted mathematician in those worlds, and is identical to you in those worlds. Our solution is related to the non-reconstructionist analysis of binding of pronouns that do not stand in a c-command relationship to their binder, as in The woman that every man hugged was his mother in Jacobson Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory IV:161-178, 1994) and Sharvit Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory VI:227-244, 1996), and allows us to capture both similarities with and differences from the latter type of construction. We point out and offer explanations for a number of properties of such relative clauses—in particular their need for an internal intensional operator, their incompatibility with any determiner other than the definite article, and the fact that some of their properties are shared by demonstrably distinct kinds of relative clauses. (shrink)

We develop a vector space semantics for verb phrase ellipsis with anaphora using type-driven compositional distributional semantics based on the Lambek calculus with limited contraction of Jäger. Distributional semantics has a lot to say about the statistical collocation based meanings of content words, but provides little guidance on how to treat function words. Formal semantics on the other hand, has powerful mechanisms for dealing with relative pronouns, coordinators, and the like. Type-driven compositional distributional semantics brings these two models (...) together. We review previous compositional distributional models of relative pronouns, coordination and a restricted account of ellipsis in the DisCoCat framework of Coecke et al. :1079–1100, 2013). We show how DisCoCat cannot deal with general forms of ellipsis, which rely on copying of information, and develop a novel way of connecting typelogical grammar to distributional semantics by assigning vector interpretable lambda terms to derivations of LCC in the style of Muskens and Sadrzadeh Logical aspects of computational linguistics, Springer, Berlin, 2016). What follows is an account of ellipsis in which word meanings can be copied: the meaning of a sentence is now a program with non-linear access to individual word embeddings. We present the theoretical setting, work out examples, and demonstrate our results with a state of the art distributional model on an extended verb disambiguation dataset. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hippota NestorRichard P. MartinDouglas Frame. Hippota Nestor. Hellenic Studies 37. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2009. Dist. by Harvard University Press. x + 912 pp. 12 black-and-white plates, 6 maps. Paper, $34.95.This magisterial volume achieves a remarkable new synthesis of work on the deep roots of the Homeric poems in Indo-European antiquity with fine-grained historical analyses of the period when the text was crystallizing (eighth–fifth centuries b.c.e.). (...) Frame’s unmatched range of learning in specialized subjects from Vedic meter and Greek noun morphology to the tangled web of Ionian inter-state relations in the archaic era enables him to buttress a massive structure of argumentation arrayed with architectural artistry over five large parts (each the size of a small monograph and detailed with a mass of excellent notes). The result should change views not just of the underlying poetic structure of the Iliad and Odyssey but also of the place, date, and circumstances of their composition. Few Classics books containing 782 pages of text can be said to reward reading of every paragraph; this one does.The argument evolves in two extended narrative sequences: one about Nestor (parts 1 and 2, comprising chaps. 1–7), the other about the locales affecting the shape of Homeric poetry (parts 3–5, chaps. 8–14). It is the all-important figure of Nestor, along with the myth-historical evidence about his family the Neleids, that unites the two.The first sequence starts from the findings of Frame’s 1978 monograph The Myth of Return in Early Greek Epic (New Haven), which has remained essential for its careful exposition of the deep mythopoetic structure of the Odyssey. Tracing the implications of etymology—the verbal root shared between the name Nestor and nostos (“return”)—led Frame three decades ago to profound conclusions about narrative, culture and its heroes, the “return to light and life” as related to the notion of “consciousness” (noos), and the epic role played by the cunning intelligence of Odysseus and Nestor. Here he expands the earlier analysis to take full account of the connection between Nestor and the cognate Nāsatyā, twin Vedic gods better known as the Aśvinā, the Dioscuric horsemen of the Indic pantheon. That the horseman (hippota) Nestor can be related to an Indo-European “twin myth” is held to be the key to the Pylian hero’s function in Homeric poetry.After a precise account of the semantics of the root *nes- as developed in Greek with specific reference to “safe return,” Frame tackles the even more complex Sanskrit linguistic and poetic evidence. The Nāsatyā are known for saving and healing, returning others to light—or even, in a cosmic context, dispelling [End Page 687] darkness to retrieve light itself. Beneath the usual treatment of the pair as indissociable are slender signs of distinction; in their paternity, for instance (Rig Veda 1.181), and in hints that one is associated with cattle, the other with horses. Frame follows these traces through later epic stories about Nakula and Sahadeva, sons of the Vedic twin gods who express more openly the paternal variations. Juxtaposing the rich evidence concerning Castor and Pollux in Greek tradition, he finds that it preserves an archaic situation whereby one (immortal) twin rescues another (mortal) from death. A rigorous linguistic and metrical analysis, bringing in the evidence of Iranian for a singular noun, enables him to conclude that the twin-name Nāsatyā actually represents the nominalization of an old syntagma (third-person singular + relative pronoun) *nasati ya “he who brings back to life.”The meaningfulness of this carefully sketched Indo-European background for Nestor emerges chiefly in Iliad 11.670–761, his autobiographical tale of youthful raiding. His brother Periclymenos had been killed when Heracles sacked Pylos; some time later Nestor must take on the characteristics of his dead “twin,” seize cattle from the Epeians of Elis, and then become a horseman in the ensuing battle for his city. Although Periclymenos is not technically a twin brother (he is one of eleven sons of Neleus besides Nestor, or one of two others, according to the Odyssey), this shape... (shrink)

This 1994 book develops a way of representing the meanings of linguistic expressions which is independent of any particular language, allowing the expressions to be manipulated in accordance with rules related to their meanings which could be implemented on a computer. It begins with a survey of the contributions of linguistics, logic and computer science to the problem of representation, linking each with a particular type of formal grammar. A system of graphs is then presented, organized by scope relations in (...) which linguistic constituents are sub-graphs whose configuration is determined by their categories. In developing this system, the author extends the notion of scope and argues that anaphoric and relative pronouns are structural signs not linguistic constituents. Certain count nouns are made the basis of this system and an account of proper names relating the count nouns, is given. (shrink)

Proper names are generally taken to be count nouns. This paper argues that this is mistaken and that at least in some languages, for example German, names divide into mass and count. Making use of Kayne's (2005, 2010) theory of light nouns, this paper argues that light nouns are part of (simple) names and that a mass-count distinction among light nouns explains the behavior of certain types of names in German as mass rather than count. The paper elaborates the role (...) of light nouns with new generalizations regarding their linguistic behavior in quantificational and pronominal NPs, their selection of relative pronouns in German, and a general difference in the support of plural anaphora between English and German. (shrink)

We show that vector space semantics and functional semantics in two-sorted first order logic are equivalent for pregroup grammars. We present an algorithm that translates functional expressions to vector expressions and vice-versa. The semantics is compositional, variable free and invariant under change of order or multiplicity. It includes the semantic vector models of Information Retrieval Systems and has an interior logic admitting a comprehension schema. A sentence is true in the interior logic if and only if the ‘usual’ first order (...) formula translating the sentence holds. The examples include negation, universal quantifiers and relative pronouns. (shrink)

Every pregroup grammar is shown to be strongly equivalent to one which uses basic types and left and right adjoints of basic types only. Therefore, a semantical interpretation is independent of the order of the associated logic. Lexical entries are read as expressions in a two sorted predicate logic with ∈ and functional symbols. The parsing of a sentence defines a substitution that combines the expressions associated to the individual words. The resulting variable free formula is the translation of the (...) sentence. It can be computed in time proportional to the parsing structure. Non-logical axioms are associated to certain words (relative pronouns, indefinite article, comparative determiners). Sample sentences are used to derive the characterizing formula of the DRS corresponding to the translation. (shrink)

There is much to indicate that the German scholars began a real, global revolution. I have become convinced that, apart from a very few exceptions, everyone in the last century, including world-renowned academics, put their trust in them. How is this possible? I am far from repeating the words: credo, quia absurdum, but it turns out that, up to the present, Diels’ and Kranz’s proposal has never been verified by anyone. This is clearly reflected as well in LSJ. It seems, (...) then, that Zeller, Diels and Kranz aliique permulti bear full responsibility for – ut ita dicam – the “ambiguities” that have since accumulated and piled up, layer on layer, all around B67. -/- I cannot connect ὀνομάζεται with <πῦρ> because of three clamant facts: (1) the absence of the relative pronoun ὅ between <πῦρ> and ὁκόταν (ut supra, passim); (2) the audacious attempt to give the phrase καθ’ ἡδονήν a sense that it never possessed; (3) the context in which fragment B67 was quoted. These are, in my opinion, real impediments to the road chosen by Zeller, Diels, Kranz, Kirk, Marcovich, Conche and countless others. I cannot circumvent them or pass them by in silence. Why was this so difficult for me, while for others it was so easy…? -/- Yes, I understood that, in order to somehow justify associating ὀνομάζεται with <πῦρ>, one must: (1) insert <ὅ> between <πῦρ> and ὁκόταν, and then (2) fit the word ἡδονή to <πῦρ>. But at the same time I realised that, unfortunately, the matter is not so simple, especially when one seeks at all cost to give the rather uncertain, and not the only, conjecture <πῦρ> some kind of name – whatever name, in fact – not according to someone’s pleasure, but according to the scent of those roots with which πῦρ was supposed to be mixed during sacrificial offerings. The whole enterprise is really perilous when we consider that for fire mixed with roots we have no name whatsoever attested by tradition, and that the context in which Hippolytus quoted B67 in no way indicates either the making of sacrifices or the smells associated therewith. -/- Wojciech Wrotkowski: Pleasure. New Research on Fragment B67 of Heraclitus of Ephesus, pp. 143-145. (shrink)

One of the clearest phonological developments of the language of Attic inscriptions of the Hellenistic period down to the end of the second century B.C. is the change . I have studied this phenomenon with particular reference to the period 323–146 B.C., taking into account also the trends before 323 and after 146 B.C. down to the end of the pre- Christian era. The object of this article is to draw attention to the fact that in only one instance, the (...) relative pronoun, is there not a marked progressive increase in the frequency of at the expense of. (shrink)

It is gratifying to read, in a recent issue of this periodical, Mr. A. A. Barrett's informed exposition of the syntax of this passage, even though he balks at the need to extract a grammatical subject for the verb deducit in 157 from the relative pronoun qua in the previous line. However his persuasive presentation of what he relies on as evidence in support of his suggested interpretation from the mosaics from Zliten in Tripolitania, which portray scenes in an (...) amphitheatre, may seduce the unwary into an over-ready acquiescence in his proposal to read raeda in 157 for taeda of the manuscript tradition. Juvenal's words were correctly understood by T. Maguire as long ago as 1881, and the solution was restated with clarity in a note by W. V. Clausen recently. (shrink)

There is much to indicate that the German scholars began a real, global revolution. I have become convinced that, apart from a very few exceptions, everyone in the last century, including world-renowned academics, put their trust in them. How is this possible? I am far from repeating the words: credo, quia absurdum, but it turns out that, up to the present, Diels’ and Kranz’s proposal has never been verified by anyone. This is clearly reflected as well in LSJ. It seems, (...) then, that Zeller, Diels and Kranz aliique permulti bear full responsibility for – ut ita dicam – the “ambiguities” that have since accumulated and piled up, layer on layer, all around B67. I cannot connect ὀνομάζεται with <πῦρ> because of three clamant facts: (1) the absence of the relative pronoun ὅ between <πῦρ> and ὁκόταν (ut supra, passim); (2) the audacious attempt to give the phrase καθ’ ἡδονήν a sense that it never possessed; (3) the context in which fragment B67 was quoted. These are, in my opinion, real impediments to the road chosen by Zeller, Diels, Kranz, Kirk, Marcovich, Conche and countless others. I cannot circumvent them or pass them by in silence. Why was this so difficult for me, while for others it was so easy…? Yes, I understood that, in order to somehow justify associating ὀνομάζεται with <πῦρ>, one must: (1) insert <ὅ> between <πῦρ> and ὁκόταν, and then (2) fit the word ἡδονή to <πῦρ>. But at the same time I realised that, unfortunately, the matter is not so simple, especially when one seeks at all cost to give the rather uncertain, and not the only, conjecture <πῦρ> some kind of name – whatever name, in fact – not according to someone’s pleasure, but according to the scent of those roots with which πῦρ was supposed to be mixed during sacrificial offerings. The whole enterprise is really perilous when we consider that for fire mixed with roots we have no name whatsoever attested by tradition, and that the context in which Hippolytus quoted B67 in no way indicates either the making of sacrifices or the smells associated therewith. -/- Wojciech Wrotkowski: Pleasure. New Research on Fragment B67 of Heraclitus of Ephesus, pp. 143-145. (shrink)

La thématique des questions d’un point de vue diachronique est l’objet de cet article. Dans un premier temps, est proposé un tour d’horizon des questions ouvertes et fermées depuis le vieil anglais avant de nous intéresser à l’apparition et à l’évolution des pronoms relatifs en wh-. L’auxiliaire do est brièvement discuté. Sont ensuite analysés les syntagmes nominaux thématisés et les prédications existentielles, puis les questions tags ainsi que la grammaticalisation des questions fermées.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:512 BOOK REVIEWS Pagels simply shifted the sense in which she is using the word "liberty " with reference to readings of Gen. 1-3-from the earlier discussion in which it had primarily a theological and moral sense, to the discussion in chapter five, where a decidedly political specification is introduced. The Augustine who in contrast to earlier theologians appears as little more than an ideologue for the Roman Catholic (...) Empire is one which is engineered largely by this shi£t in term usage, and not by evidence from the texts. With considerably less trouble, Pagels could have found in Eusebius of Caesarea, or some other court theologian, a willing ideologue much more pliable than Augustine was. Her point that theologians and historians of ideas need to take more seriously the political agendas against which ideas arise is well taken. But by insisting that it was the political expediency of Augustine's teaching on original sin that caused it to catch on (pp. 99-100, 105, 118), Pagels skates perilously close to a reductionist reading of this theology despite her stated intention (p. xxvii) to the contrary. Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania JOHN C. CAVADINI Whose Justice? Which Rationality? by ALASDAIR MAc!NTYRE. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. Pp. xi+ 410. $22.95 (hardbound). One part of the Enlightenment project, for the past 300 years or so, has been to reach assured foundations for both thought and action. Thus Descartes, near the beginning of this project, insisted on starting with propositions which are clearly and distinctly true and on suspending commitment to any received wisdom. From this untainted beginning, the,thinker could build the edifice of thought and culture securely. Ordinary people might not maintain such purity; but, so influential has this image been in Western history, that even today we take the scientist and the philosopher as critical inquirers unbound by ties of tradition. Alasdair Maclntyre's Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is a brilliant challenge to this common understanding. Maclntyre's title indicates the scope as well as the direction of his argument. When questions of justice arise, that is, questions about the relationships of people with each other, about the apportioning of the goods of society and so on, they cannot be answered without reversing the question, without asking about the society in which the question BOOK REVIEWS 518 arises. To a great extent, the deeper question can only he answered from within that society with all of its givens. Sorting out the claims and counter-claims requires us to put them in the context of tradition. The same must he said for the questions of truth and of inquiry which always flow though and around the arguments about right and wrong. There.too we must reverse the question. The standards of rationality, like those of justice, inhere in society, in an ongoing enterprise from which the thinker cannot separate himself if he is to proceed. Hence the question, "Whose rationality? " The rejection of Descartes's pure beginning is not original with MacIntyre. C. S. Peirce and Ludwig Wittgenstein, to name just two among many, made the argument too effectively for rebuttal. What is different about Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is that it focusses as much on the relative pronouns as on the substantives. It traces concern about justice and rationality through history. Macintyre takes it as "crucial that the concept of tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive rational enquiry cannot be elucidated apart from its exemplifications." However, rather than attempting a universal survey, he attends to four exemplifications capable of supporting and clarifying the central thesis: ancient Greece from Homer to Aristotle, patristic and medieval Christianity with Augustine and Aquinas as the center points, the Scottish enlightenment beginning in the kirk and ending with Hume and Reid, and finally the very liberalism stemming from the enlightenment and challenged by the book at hand. What unifies a tradition is not so much an idea as a problem and a preoccupation. The problem and its attendant preoccupation become the focus of struggle(s) within society in a way which forms its internal development, which establishes its intellectual and moral perimeter, and which sets it in relation to... (shrink)

Psycholinguistic experiments show that pronouns tend to be resolved differently depending on whether they occur in main or subordinate clauses. If a pronoun in a subordinate clause has more than one potential antecedent in the main clause, then the pronoun tends to refer to the antecedent which has a certain thematic role (depending on the verb and on the subordinating conjunction). In contrast, pronouns in main clauses tend to refer back to the subject of the previous main clause, (...) and this tendency is not affected by any verbs or conjunctions. In natural language processing, these findings have recently led to a proposal that pronoun resolution systems should have a split architecture, i.e. that they should use different mechanisms for pronoun resolution in the two cases. With the help of two parsed and coreference-annotated corpora, this paper estimates the impact of the split-architecture proposal. The findings of this work are as follows: (1) Subject pronouns in authentic texts behave the same way in main and subordinate clauses. (2) The number of sentences in which a split architecture would behave differently than a system that treats both cases the same way is close to zero. Therefore, a separate treatment of resolution within and across units is unlikely to improve the performance of any system. This result casts a doubt on the split-architecture proposal, and more generally on approaches that directly incorporate psycholinguistic results into performance-oriented algorithms for anaphora resolution without assessing the relative importance of the phenomena that underlie them. (shrink)

Expletive pronouns have posed significant challenges to both linguistic studies and natural language processing in Chinese. Based on the data from the Chinese corpus at the Center for Chinese Linguistics of Peking University, this paper investigates the automatic dependency parsing errors of expletive ta and relative constructions and provides a detailed quantitative analysis of the characteristics of the constructions in question. The findings not only provide evidence to show that even in radical pro-drop languages such as Mandarin, pleonastics (...) can occur in both object and subject positions but also offer important insights for Chinese natural language processing. (shrink)

It is widely held that introspection-based self-ascriptions of mental states are immune to error through misidentification , relative to the first person pronoun. Many have taken such errors to be logically impossible, arguing that the immunity holds as an “absolute” necessity. Here I discuss an actual case of craniopagus twins—twins conjoined at the head and brain—as a means to arguing that such errors are logically possible and, for all we know, nomologically possible. An important feature of the example is (...) that it is one where a person may be said to be introspectively aware of a mental state that occurs outside of her own mind. Implications are discussed for views of the relation between introspection and mental state ownership, and between introspection and epistemic criteria for the “mark of the mental.”. (shrink)

Most of the research done with spatial demonstratives have focused on the production, not the interpretation, of these words. In addition, emphasis has been largely on demonstrative pronouns, leaving demonstrative adverbs with relatively little research attention. The present study explores the interpretation of both demonstrative pronouns and demonstrative adverbs in Estonian—a Finno-Ugric language with two dialectal-specific demonstrative pronoun systems. In the South-Estonian dialectal region, two demonstrative pronouns, see—“this” and too—“that”, are used. In the North-Estonian region, only one, (...) see—“this/that”, is used. The aim of this study is twofold. First, we test if the distance and the visual salience of a referent have an effect on the interpretation of demonstratives. Second, we explore if there is a difference in the interpretation of demonstratives between native speakers from SE and NE. We used an interpretation experiment with 30 participants per group and compared the SE and NE group responses. The results clearly show that the distance of the referent has an effect on how demonstratives are interpreted across the two groups, while the effect of visual salience is inconclusive. There is also a difference in the interpretation of demonstratives between the two dialectal groups. When using the Estonian with an influence of the SE dialect, the NE speakers rely on demonstrative adverbs in interpreting the referential utterance that includes demonstrative pronoun and adverb combinations, whereas the SE speakers also take into account the semantics of demonstrative pronouns. We show that, in addition to an already known difference in the production, there is also a difference in the interpretation of demonstratives between the two groups. In addition, our findings support the recognition that languages that have distance neutral demonstrative pronouns enforce the spatial meaning of a referring utterance by adding demonstrative adverbs. Not only is the interpretation of demonstrative pronouns affected, but the interpretation of demonstrative adverbs as well. The latter shows the importance of studying adverbs also, not just pronouns, and contributes to further knowledge of how demonstratives function. (shrink)

This paper argues that truth values of sentences containing predicates of “personal taste” such as fun or tasty must be relativized to individuals. This relativization is of truth value only, and does not involve a relativization of semantic content: If you say roller coasters are fun, and I say they are not, I am negating the same content which you assert, and directly contradicting you. Nonetheless, both our utterances can be true (relative to their separate contexts). A formal semantic (...) theory is presented which gives this result by introducing an individual index, analogous to the world and time indices commonly used, and by treating the pragmatic context as supplying a particular value for this index. The context supplies this value in the derivation of truth values from content, not in the derivation of content from character. Predicates of personal taste therefore display a kind of contextual variation in interpretation which is unlike the familiar variation exhibited by pronouns and other indexicals. (shrink)

How much context-sensitivity is there in English? Cappelen and Lepore’s answer: Not very much. On their view, context-sensitivity is confined to a ‘Basic List’, ‘plus or minus a bit’, that includes pronouns, demonstratives, temporal and spatial adverbs like ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘yesterday’, and a short list of context dependent nouns and adjectives. Shockingly, the authors claim that ‘Lepore is ready’, ‘Cappelen has had enough’, and ‘Cappelen is quite tall,’ have a context-invariant meaning. Nor is that meaning incomplete, in the (...) sense of being something that can only be given a truth value relative to an enrichment. No, simultaneous utterances of ‘Lepore is ready’ always express the same proposition—that Lepore is ready—one that is true or false. When is it true? Cagily, the authors inform us that it is true if and only if Lepore is ready. One might wish to inquire further as to when Lepore is ready. For example: ‘If Lepore is ready for breakfast but not ready to learn to play golf, is Lepore ready?’ and ‘Given that I am always ready for a fulfilling relationship, am I ever not ready?’ Whenever they are faced with questions such as these, the authors defer to the arena of metaphysics, where they admit to being ‘rank amateurs’. (shrink)

An introductory text in linguistic semantics, uniquely balancing empirical coverage and formalism with development of intuition and methodology. -/- This introductory textbook in linguistic semantics for undergraduates features a unique balance between empirical coverage and formalism on the one hand and development of intuition and methodology on the other. It will equip students to form intuitions about a set of data, explain how well an analysis of the data accords with their intuitions, and extend the analysis or seek an alternative. (...) No prior knowledge of linguistics is required. After mastering the material, students will be able to tackle some of the most difficult questions in the field even if they have never taken a linguistics course before. -/- After introducing such concepts as truth conditions and compositionality, the book presents a basic symbolic logic with negation, conjunction, and generalized quantifiers, to serve as the basis for translation throughout the book. It then develops a detailed compositional semantics, covering quantification (scope and binding), adverbial modification, relative clauses, event semantics, tense and aspect, as well as pragmatic phenomena, notably deictic pronouns and narrative progression. -/- A Course in Semantics offers a large and diverse set of exercises, interspersed throughout the text; those labeled “Important practice and looking ahead” prepare students for material to come; those labeled “Thinking about ” invite students to think beyond the content of the book. (shrink)

In modal subordination, a modal sentence is interpreted relative to a hypothetical scenario introduced in an earlier sentence. In this paper, I argue that this phenomenon reflects the fact that the interpretation of modals is an ANAPHORIC process. Modal morphemes introduce sets of possible worlds, representing alternative hypothetical scenarios, as entities into the discourse model. Their interpretation depends on evoking sets of worlds recording described and reference scenarios, and relating such sets to one another using familiar notions of restricted, (...) preferential quantification. This proposal relies on an extended model of environments in dynamic semantics to keep track of associations between possible worlds and ordinary individuals; it assumes that modal meanings and other lexical meanings encapsulate quantification over possible worlds. These two innovations are required in order for modals to refer to sets of possible worlds directly as static objects in place of the inherently dynamic objects—quite different from the referents of pronouns and tenses—used in previous accounts. The simpler proposal that results offers better empirical coverage and suggests a new parallel between modal and temporal interpretation. (shrink)

My thesis tests a novel definition of consciousness by applying it to theories of self-consciousness. This definition attempts to distinguish the phenomenon of consciousness from those of knowledge, belief, awareness, and perception by describing it as the noticing of objects and the registering of facts in thought. My investigation of self-consciousness is phenomenological in that it leaves aside questions as to whether selves exist or what their nature is and just examines what the contents of self-consciousness are. The main question, (...) throughout the thesis, is whether there are any contents that necessarily enter self-consciousness understood as consciousness associated with meaningful use of the first personal pronoun. My answer to this question is that there are not. This answer is reached after the discussion of a range of prominent theories that have emanated from Kant. All these theories have in common that they can be phenomenologically clarified with the help of my description of consciousness. Kant’s own views of “empirical self-consciousness” are phenomenologically relatively modest; but what he says about “transcendental self-consciousness”, incorporating a priori consciousness of one’s identity, cannot be phenomenologically supported. Similar restrictions apply to Fichte’s theory, which develops the notion of transcendental self-consciousness, explicating it as consciousness of “this very consciousness”. Strawsonian theories of self-consciousness (P.F. Strawson, G. Evans, Q. Cassam) claim that self-consciousness requires some awareness of oneself as a spatiotemporally located physical object. I argue that such a claim cannot be phenomenologically substantiated. The Strawsonian theories rely on a questionable “discrimination requirement”; but even if it is assumed that they are justified in claiming that, as self-conscious beings, we have to know, believe, perceive or be aware that we are physical objects, it still does not follow that we have to be conscious, in my sense, of ourselves as such objects. There is no particular type of object that is necessarily noticed and no particular type of fact that is necessarily registered in thought by a person who can meaningfully use the first personal pronoun. In the last part of the thesis, some of the results of the earlier chapters are applied to the problem of how to explain first person authority and an explanation which is compatible with those results is suggested. (shrink)

There has been a long debate on whether demonstratives are directly referential as Kaplan originally argued, or indirectly referential like a definite description. I propose a new analysis of demonstratives that combines intuitions from both direct and indirect approaches. The demonstrative is analyzed as an indirectly referential expression with a binary maximality operator that takes two arguments, where the second argument can be a deictic pointing, an anaphoric index, or a relative clause. Direct reference is encoded not in the (...) meaning of the demonstrative but in the meaning contributed by the pointing gesture, thus capturing both direct and indirect uses. I further propose that some pronouns in English function as demonstratives, realizing the binary structure and competing with the demonstrative. The main advantages of this proposal include (a) deriving the distribution of pronominal and adnominal demonstratives systematically; (b) capturing the unique interaction that demonstratives have with a pointing gesture; and (c) locating English demonstratives against a larger, cross-linguistic picture. (shrink)

Suppose that the following describes an intelligible scenario. A subject is wired up to another's body in such a way that she has bodily experiences ‘as from the inside’ caused by states and events in the other body, that are subjectively indistinguishable from ordinary somatosensory perception of her own body. The supposed intelligibility of such so-called crossed wire cases constitutes a significant challenge to the claim that our somatosensory judgements are immune to error through misidentification relative to uses of (...) the first person pronoun. After all, the subject in this case is liable to commit precisely the sort of error ruled out by such a claim. In this paper I argue that the proponent of this challenge must establish at least two things: that the subject is committing an error of misidentification, and that her judgement shares its epistemic grounds with our ordinary somatosensory judgements. Neither condition, I argue, can be reached from the stipulations permitted into the starting descriptions of the cases. (shrink)

Situation semantics was developed as an alternative to possible worlds semantics. In situation semantics, linguistic expressions are evaluated with respect to partial, rather than complete, worlds. There is no consensus about what situations are, just as there is no consensus about what possible worlds or events are. According to some, situations are structured entities consisting of relations and individuals standing in those relations. According to others, situations are particulars. In spite of unresolved foundational issues, the partiality provided by situation semantics (...) has led to some genuinely new approaches to a variety of phenomena in natural language semantics. In the way of illustration, this article includes relatively detailed overviews of a few selected areas where situation semantics has been successful: implicit quantifier domain restrictions, donkey pronouns, and exhaustive interpretations. It moreover addresses the question of how Davidsonian event semantics can be embedded in a semantics based on situations. Other areas where a situation semantics perspective has led to progress include attitude ascriptions, questions, tense, aspect, nominalizations, implicit arguments, point of view, counterfactual conditionals, and discourse relations. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, (...) we judge that “I feel pain,” we are tautologically aware that feels pain is instantiated and that it is instantiated in oneself. Moreover, he contends that this relationship holds not just for bodily sensations, but also for the sense of agency and for visual perception. But we deny that this relationship is tautological; instead, we treat Shoemaker’s principle (IEM) as a hypothesis. We then proceed to show that certain pathological states and experimentally-induced illusions can be adduced to show that IEM describes not a necessary relationship but a contingent relationship, one that sometimes fails to obtain. That we are not immune to error in the way Shoemaker describes has grave consequences for many aspects of his ideas concerning the first-person perspective. In the course of arguing that these empirical phenomena count against IEM, we also show that not only can the content of conscious experience be misrepresented, so too can the subject: that is, not only can the what of conscious experience be misrepresented, so too can the who. (shrink)

Controlled languages are regimented fragments of natural languagedesigned to make the processing of natural language more efficient andreliable. This paper defines a controlled language, E2V, whose principalgrammatical resources include determiners, relative clauses, reflexivesand pronouns. We provide a formal syntax and semantics for E2V, in whichanaphoric ambiguities are resolved in a linguistically natural way. Weshow that the expressive power of E2V is equal to that of thetwo-variable fragment of first-order logic. It follows that the problemof determining the satisfiability of (...) a set of E2V sentences is NEXPTIMEcomplete. We show that E2V can be extended in various ways withoutcompromising these complexity results; however, relaxing our policy onanaphora resolution renders the satisfiability problem for E2Vundecidable. Finally, we argue that our results have a bearing on thebroader philosophical issue of the relationship between natural andformal languages. (shrink)

We found a direct relationship between variation in informants' grammaticality intuitions about pronoun coreference and variation in the same informants' use of a clause segmentation strategy during sentence perception. It has been proproposed that ‘c‐command’, a structural principle defined in terms of constituent dominance relations, constrains within‐sentence coreference between pronouns and noun antecedents. The relative height of the pronoun and the noun in the phrase structure hierarchy determines whether the c‐command constraint blocks coreference: Coreference is allowed only when (...) the complement structure containing the noun is attached higher than the pronoun. We collected informants' judgments on pronoun‐noun coreference in which the noun antecedent was contained in a complement structure dominated by either the Sentence‐node (S‐node) (higher than the pronoun) or the Verb‐phrase‐node (VP‐node) (not higher than the pronoun). We also assessed each informant's perceptual clause‐closure tendency using an auditory word‐monitor paradigm. Informants who strongly segmented clauses in the perceptual task did not differentiate between an S‐ and VP‐attachment of sentence complements, as revealed in their coreference judgments, but rather appeared to attach all sentence complements to the S‐node. Informants with relatively weak perceptual segmentation differentiated their coreference judgments according to the node attachment of the complement structure. These results indicate that the linguistic universal controlling within‐sentence coreference applies to the perceptually available structure for a sequence, not to its pure linguistic structure. Hence, linguistic intuitions result from the interaction of three independent faculties: language‐specific knowledge, perceptual processes, and linguistic universals. (shrink)

Specificational sentences show Connectivity Effects (Akmajian 1970, Higgins 1979, Halvorsen 1978, Jacobson 1994, among others). For example, an NP like no man embedded in a relative clause in general cannot bind a pronoun outside the relative clause, as illustrated in (3a); but in specificational copular sentences this binding is possible, as in (3b). This effect is called Variable Binding Connectivity. Similarly, the NP a unicorn cannot be interpreted de dicto with respect to the embedded verb look for in (...) (4a); but a de dicto reading is possible in the specificational sentence (4b) (Opacity Connectivity). Connectivity will be used in this paper as a diagnosis for specificational sentences. (shrink)

What does an understanding of the first person pronoun “I” contribute to the understanding of a sentence involving “I”? This paper emphasizes that the first person pronoun is typically used as a tool of communication. We need to think not just about what it is to use the first person pronoun with understanding, but also what it is to understand someone else’s use of the first person pronoun. A plausible principle governing linguistic understanding via the conditions of adequacy upon reporting (...) speech entails what I call the symmetry constraint, which is that an account of the sense of “I” must leave open the possibility of sentences involving “I” saying the same thing as sentences involving “you”. One immediate consequence of the symmetry constraint is that we need to make a distinction between token-sense and type-sense, discussed in sections 1 and 2. A number of authors, most prominently Gareth Evans in his influential book The Varieties of Reference, have proposed that the sense of “I” needs to be elucidated, at least in part, in terms of the speaker’s sensitivity to forms of self-specifying information that have the property of being immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun. As emerges in section 3, however, this way of thinking about the sense of “I” is not compatible with the symmetry constraint, since it makes the sense of “I” private and unshareable. This leads in section 4 to an alternative proposal for doing justice to the insight that the sense of “I” reflects a distinctive way of being presented to oneself. On this proposal, the distinctive way in which I am presented to myself can be systematically related to the distinctive way in which I am presented to you. What matters is not that I am in receipt of distinctive types of information about myself, but rather that I have a distinctive ability to locate myself in objective space. On a plausible way of thinking about the individuation of cognitive abilities, this is an ability that you also can have and that underwrites both your understanding of “you” when you address me, and your understanding of “I” as uttered by me. (shrink)

A self-ascription is a thought or sentence in which a predicate is self-consciously ascribed to oneself. Self-ascriptions are best expressed using the first-person pronoun. Mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of mental predicates (predicates that designate mental properties), non-mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of non-mental predicates (predicates that designate non-mental properties). It is often claimed that there is a range of self-ascriptions that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM for short). What this (...) means, and exactly which self-ascriptions are properly classed as IEM, is a topic hotly disputed. Some claim that only mental self-ascriptions are IEM, others claim that some non-mental self-ascriptions are IEM. Before this question can be decided, it needs to be judged exactly what it means to say that a self-ascription is IEM. And here we stumble across the fact that there are, at least, two non-equivalent ways of defining the phenomenon1. I will be claiming that one of these definitions should be rejected. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a paradigm of experiment which, we believe, is of interest both in psychology and philosophy. There the subject wears an HMD (head-mount display), and a camera is set up at the upper corner of the room, in which the subject is. As a result, the subject observes his own body through the HMD. We will mainly focus on the philosophical relevance of this experiment, especially to the thesis of so-called 'immunity to error through misidentification (...) class='Hi'>relative to the first-person pronoun'. We will argue that one experiment conducted in this setting, which we call the bodily illusion experiment, provides a counterexample to that thesis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:From the Perspective of the Self: Montaigne’s Self-PortraitPatrick HenryFrom the Perspective of the Self: Montaigne’s Self-Portrait, by Craig B. Brush; 321 pp. New York: Fordham University Press, 1994, $32.50.In a note to Chapter One, the author explains that his is the third book to center on the self-portrait of Montaigne but, unlike one—Miroirs d’encre by Michel Beaujour—his deals only with Montaigne and, unlike both—the other is Montaigne’s Essays (...) as the Book of the Self by Richard Regosin—his is not geared toward literary theory and offers no theoretical approach to self-portraiture or autobiography. What we have, then, is a close textual analysis of the essayist’s self-portrait which is shown to coexist with the ubiquitous voice of the moraliste, whose subject is mankind in general, and a third voice, particularly pronounced in the 1588 and 1595 editions of the Essays, that of the “essayer,” “whose topic is his own book, its aim, its method of inquiry, and its production” (p. 120). Throughout his study, even as he scrutinizes the self-portrait, Brush demonstrates that these three voices are interrelated, interdependent, and virtually inseparable. [End Page 173]Brush’s exhaustive enterprise: to depict “how Montaigne came to the project [of self-portraiture], how he conceived it, how he practiced it, what he had to say about it, what he learned from the strange practice, how it became a way of life for him” (p. 8) takes him into areas that have been well-debated by Montaigne scholars. Thus we find lengthy discussions of the sense of the word “essay,” authorial modesty, the role of the reader, titles, beginnings, digressions, additions, endings, skepticism, nominalism, Catholicism, dialogue, ethics, evolution, the use of personal pronouns, the structure of individual chapters and of the book as a whole, the link between La Boétie’s death and the self-portraiture project, and the interplay between self and other.On each topic, however, Brush inevitably offers a fresh insight, a quirky intuition, or a new departure that makes the discussion worthwhile. He paints the history of both domestic and official portraiture at the moment when Montaigne began writing; he explains why a self-portrait is not an autobiography; he opposes the treatise and the essay; he differentiates clearly between self-study, self-knowledge, and self-portraiture; he depicts what is missing from the portrait that the essayist deemed relatively complete, and he weighs carefully the opposed proclivities of the essayist toward self-improvement and self-acceptance. In addition, he points out how the impossibility of finding a “pure self” forced Montaigne “to paint himself in context” (p. 107) and argues forcefully that the essayist’s “love of life was a profoundly religious experience” (p. 210). In a particularly rich commentary on “Of practice” (pp. 82–83), Brush stresses the importance of writing for the author of the Essays. In this case, the writing of the essay may in fact have been more significant for him than the event that the writing narrates, thus underscoring the essayist’s claim that this book has made him as much as he has made it. Finally, Brush’s tenth chapter, “Study Without a Book,” eloquently elucidates the originality that Montaigne brought to his reading of the ancient adage “Know Thyself.”It was inevitable that Brush would cover much familiar material but by keeping his encyclopedic knowledge of the history of Montaigne criticism in the end notes and by rigorously analyzing the Essays, he has written an eminently readable, jargon-free study that will serve both the beginning student and the seasoned Montaigne scholar. Having no theory to impose, he is free to chart the amazingly rich variety and diversity of the Essays, aspects of the human condition that the essayist always underscored. His book, clearly the product of years of ruminating on the Essays, contains hundreds of quotations from Montaigne’s Travel Journal and from seventy-seven of the one-hundred-seven chapters penned by the essayist. By giving us, in the main, nothing but his own personal reflections on the Essays, he has also curiously and interestingly provided us with his... (shrink)

I argue for the view that some we-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification (IEM) relative to the first-person plural pronoun. To prepare the ground for this argument I defend an account of the semantics of ‘we’ and note the variety of different uses of that term. I go on to defend the IEM of a certain range of we-thoughts against a number of objections.

In chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans claimed to have an argument that would present "an antidote" to the Cartesian conception of the self as a purely mental entity. On the basis of considerations drawn from philosophy of language and thought, Evans claimed to be able to show that bodily awareness is a form of self-awareness. The apparent basis for this claim is the datum that sometimes judgements about one’s position based on body sense are immune to (...) errors of misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun 'I'. However, Evans’s argument suffers from a crucial ambiguity. 'I' sometimes refers to the subject's mind, sometimes to the person, and sometimes to the subject's body. Once disambiguated, it turns out that Evans’s argument either begs the question against the Cartesian or fails to be plausible at all. Nonetheless, the argument is important for drawing our attention to the idea that bodily modes of awareness should be taken seriously as possible forms of self-awareness. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker argues that a certain class of self-ascriptions is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. In their “Self-Consciousness and Immunity,” Timothy Lane and Caleb Liang question Shoemaker’s view. Lang and Liang present a clinical case and an experiment and argue that they are counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. This paper is a response to Lane and Liang’s challenge. I identify the desiderata that a counterexample to Shoemaker’s view must meet and show that somatoparaphrenia and (...) the Body Swap Illusion fail to meet those desiderata. Thus, despite being puzzling phenomena, somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illusion are not counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. (shrink)

“Huo” 或 in “Heng Xian” 恆先 of the Chu bamboo slips in the Shanghai Museum is a significant concept in cosmology and cosmogony. “Huo,” as a cosmogonic period, is after “heng” 恆, but prior to qi 氣, hence it is relatively important. This term in the manuscript is used as an indefinite pronoun, meaning “something”, rather than “exist”, “indefinitely/ maybe” or “a state between being and nothingness”. However, in the cosmogonic sequence, it is indeed intermediate between nothingness and being. That (...) “huo,” as an indefinite pronoun, can be used as a philosophical concept is testified by “Bai Xin” 白心 in the Book of Guanzi 管子 and “Ze yang” 則陽 in the Book of Zhuangzi, in which the term “huo” also means “something.” “Heng Xian” uses an indefinite pronoun “huo” to refer to a stage in the genesis of the cosmos. This shows, on the one hand, that its author has contemplated cosmology more profoundly; on the other hand, it shows that the author’s knowledge about the structure of cosmogony has not yet been fully developed. Moreover, the concepts “huo” and “heng xian” both develop the notion implicit in the concept of “heng.”. (shrink)

When faced with an ambiguous pronoun, comprehenders use both multimodal cues and linguistic cues to identify the antecedent. While research has shown that gestures facilitate language comprehension, improve reference tracking, and influence the interpretation of ambiguous pronouns, literature on reference resolution suggests that a wide set of linguistic constraints influences the successful resolution of ambiguous pronouns and that linguistic cues are more powerful than some multimodal cues. To address the outstanding question of the importance of gesture as a (...) cue in reference resolution relative to cues in the speech signal, we have previously investigated the comprehension of contrastive gestures that indexed abstract referents – in this case expressions of personal preference – and found that such gestures did facilitate the resolution of ambiguous statements of preference. In this study, we extend this work to investigate whether the effect of gesture on resolution is diminished when the gesture indexes a statement that is less likely to be interpreted as the correct referent. Participants watched videos in which a speaker contrasted two ideas that were either neutral or moral acceptable). A gesture to the left or right side co-occurred with speech expressing each position. In gesture-disambiguating trials, an ambiguous phrase was accompanied by a gesture to one side or the other. In gesture non-disambiguating trials, no third gesture occurred with the ambiguous phrase. Participants were more likely to choose the idea accompanied by gesture as the stimulus speaker’s preference. We found no effect of scenario type. Regardless of whether the linguistic cue expressed a view that was morally charged or neutral, observers used gesture to understand the speaker’s opinion. This finding contributes to our understanding of the strength and range of cues, both linguistic and multimodal, that listeners use to resolve ambiguous references. (shrink)