This highly original book argues for increased recognition of pregnancy, birthing and childrearing as social activities demanding simultaneously physical, intellectual, emotional and moral work from those who undertake them. Amy Mullin considers both parenting and paid childcare, and examines the impact of disability on this work. The first chapters contest misconceptions about pregnancy and birth such as the idea that pregnancy is only valued for its end result, and not also for the process. Following chapters focus on (...) childcare provided in different circumstances and on the needs of both providers and receivers of care. The book challenges the assumption that isolated self-sacrifice should be the norm in either pregnancy or childcare. Instead reproductive labor requires greater social support. Written from the perspective of a feminist philosopher, the book draws on the work of, and seeks to increase dialogue between, philosophers and childcare professionals, disability theorists, nurses and sociologists. (shrink)

In this paper, we identify some key features of what makes something a disease, and consider whether these apply to pregnancy. We argue that there are some compelling grounds for regarding pregnancy as a disease. Like a disease, pregnancy affects the health of the pregnant person, causing a range of symptoms from discomfort to death. Like a disease, pregnancy can be treated medically. Like a disease, pregnancy is caused by a pathogen, an external organism invading (...) the host’s body. Like a disease, the risk of getting pregnant can be reduced by using prophylactic measures. We address the question of whether the ‘normality’ of pregnancy, its current necessity for human survival, or the value often attached to it are reasons to reject the view that pregnancy is a disease. We point out that applying theories of disease to the case of pregnancy, can in many cases illuminate inconsistencies and problems within these theories. Finally, we show that it is difficult to find one theory of disease that captures all paradigm cases of diseases, while convincingly excluding pregnancy. We conclude that there are both normative and pragmatic reasons to consider pregnancy a disease. (shrink)

This paper aims to problematize pregnancy and support the development of a safe alternative method of gestation. Our arguments engage with the health risks of gestation and childbirth, the value assigned to pregnancy, as well as social and medical attitudes toward women’s pain, especially in labor. We claim that the harm caused by pregnancy and childbirth provides a prima facie case in favor of prioritizing research on a method of extra corporeal gestation.

In ‘The Pregnancy Rescue Case: why abortion is immoral’, Hendricks presents The Pregnancy Rescue Case. In this reply I argue that even if it would be better (i.e., less bad) for the abortion to be prevented in The Pregnancy Rescue Case, that does not mean that typical abortions are impermissible. I also argue that there is a possible explanation, consistent with the pro-choice view and empirically testable, as to why people would think it better for the abortion (...) to be prevented in The Pregnancy Rescue Case. (shrink)

McGovern, Kevin This article explores what may ethically be done to prevent pregnancy after rape. The issue of pregnancy approach is dealt with in this article.

Elselijn Kingma argues that, in cases of mammalian placental pregnancy, the foster (roughly, the post-implantation embryo/foetus) is part of the gravida (the pregnant organism). But she does not consider the possibility of proper overlap. I show that this generates a number of serious problems for her argument and trace the oversight to a quite general issue within the literature on biological individuality. Doing so provides an opportunity to pull apart and clarify the relations between some importantly distinct questions concerning (...) organismality and organismic parthood, and to identify the implications that this has for those who want to draw on this literature when making metaphysical or mereological arguments. (shrink)

Pregnancy is a one of the most complex phenomena of life and is essential to the life cycle of mammals. Pregnancy is also a crucial aspect of humans’ life and experience. But what is pregnancy? This question has received little attention in philosophy until recently, when it got picked up by metaphysicians and philosophers of science. However, the philosophical discussion is still in its infancy. This article provides a survey of the recent debate on the metaphysics of (...) pregnancy. It explores the relation between the pregnant organism and the gestated one, motivating the further study of pregnancy from a philosophical perspective (§1, §2). It summarises the three main models of pregnancy present in the literature, the containment view (§3), the parthood view (§4) and the splitting process view (§5) with their advantages and shortcomings. Then, it explores a recent debate on whether pregnancy is a disease (§6). Lastly, it considers how one can decide between these models, for instance by favouring a given view of biological individuality over another (§7). The article concludes that none of the views is fully satisfactory, and thus inviting to continue the research on pregnancy from a metaphysical and philosophical perspective. (shrink)

Nietzsche employs the concept of pregnancy metaphorically at various points in his writings; discussing the pregnancy of philosophers (GM III 8, BGE 292), spiritual pregnancy (EH, Clever 3; GS 72) and being pregnant with thoughts or deeds (D 552). I explore how Nietzsche uses the notion of pregnancy in Dawn, arguing that it connects to the theme of self-cultivation. I employ the various associations that Nietzsche makes with pregnancy, including the unknown, selfishness, strangeness, and solitude, (...) to elucidate Nietzsche’s understanding of self-cultivation. I show how the metaphor of pregnancy, in which we do not control what we give birth to, both expresses and helps us explore the problem of what, if the self is made up of and directed by many competing drives, shapes and directs self-cultivation. I argue that Nietzsche’s deliberate references to the context of Plato’s discussion of pregnancy involve a self-conscious challenge to Plato’s concept of the philosopher, and of philosophy, and a reimagining of what they will give birth to. The appropriation of Plato’s famous metaphor thus underscores how Nietzsche’s concept and method of self-cultivation contrasts to Plato’s care for the soul and is rooted in attentiveness to the body and its drives. (shrink)

Part graphic novel, part feminist and philosophical analysis, The Pregnancy ≠ Childbearing Project explores how pregnancy can be a meaningful and distinct phenomenon from childbirth and does not equate with childbearing or the production of children.

In cases in which we must choose between either (i) preventing a woman from remaining unwillingly pregnant or (ii) preventing a fetus from being killed, we should prevent the fetus from being killed. But this suggests that in typical cases abortion is wrong: typical abortions involve preventing a woman from remaining unwillingly pregnant over preventing a fetus from being killed. And so abortion is typically wrong—and this holds whether or not fetuses are persons.

Fetal reduction is the practice of reducing the number of fetuses in a multiple pregnancy, such as quadruplets, to a twin or singleton pregnancy. Use of assisted reproductive technologies increases the likelihood of multiple pregnancies, and many fetal reductions are done after in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer, either because of social or health-related reasons. In this paper, I apply Joe Horton’s all or nothing problem to the ethics of fetal reduction in the case of a twin (...) class='Hi'>pregnancy. I argue that in the case of a twin pregnancy, there are two intuitively plausible claims: abortion is morally permissible, and it is morally wrong to abort just one of the fetuses. But since we should choose morally permissible acts rather than impermissible ones, the two claims lead to another highly implausible claim: the woman ought to abort both fetuses rather than only one. Yet, this does not seem right. A plausible moral theory cannot advocate such a pro-death view. Or can it? I suggest ways to solve this problem and draw implications for each solution. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

This introductory article is structured around the following themes: it begins with a brief overview of some important works that have paved the way for the present discussion. This is followed by a critique of the concept of “experience” and the philosophies based on it, that was first presented by feminist thinkers Joan Scott and Judith Butler in the 1980’s. The question this debate poses to the discussions in this book is whether focusing on experience is still a philosophically viable (...) option. After that, the views of Edmund Husserl – often described as “the father of phenomenology” – are presented on the particular themes of motherhood and pregnancy, as it is often overlooked that he had anything to say on the topic. Then follows a short outline of the structure of the experience of pregnancy, and also the modest suggestion that pregnancy should be seen not only as “split subjectivity” but also as a specific mode of phenomenological “in-between.” Thereafter the question is taken up whether pregnancy as a philosophical topic might also affect the methodological core of phenomenology. The article ends with a speculative outlook towards certain themes that have developed as a consequence of thinking pregnancy philosophically. (shrink)

Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen argue that we have good reason to classify pregnancy as a disease. They discuss five accounts of disease and argue that each account either implies that pregnancy is a disease or, if it does not, it faces problems. This strategy allows Smajdor and Räsänen to avoid articulating their own account of disease. Consequently, they cannot establish that pregnancy is a disease, only that plausible accounts of disease suggest this. Some readers will dismiss (...) Smajdor and Räsänen’s claims as counterintuitive. By analogy, if a mathematical proof concludes ‘2+2=5’, readers will know—without investigation—that an error occurred. Rather than dismiss Smajdor and Räsänen’s work, however, the easiest way to undermine their argument is to describe at least one plausible account of disease that (i) excludes pregnancy and (ii) avoids the problems they raise for it. This is our strategy. We focus on dysfunction accounts of disease. After outlining Smajdor and Räsänen’s main arguments against dysfunction accounts, we explain why pregnancy is not a disease on these accounts. Next, we defend dysfunction accounts against the three problems that Smajdor and Räsänen raise. If successful, then contra Smajdor and Räsänen, at least one plausible account of disease does not imply that pregnancy is a disease. We suspect that defenders of other accounts can respond similarly. Yet, we note that insofar as dysfunction accounts align with the commonsense intuition that pregnancy is not a disease, this, all else being equal, seems like a point in their favour. (shrink)

L.A. Paul argues that interesting issues for rational choice theory are raised by epistemically transformative experiences: experiences which provide access to knowledge that could not be known without the experience. Consideration of the epistemic effects of pregnancy has important implications for our understanding of epistemically transformative experiences and for debate about the ethics of abortion and applied ethics more generally. Pregnancy is epistemically transformative both in Paul’s narrow sense and in a wider sense: those who have not been (...) pregnant face significant barriers to acquiring the knowledge made accessible through pregnancy. This knowledge is crucial for engaging with the ethics of abortion. The epistemically transformativeWIDE nature of pregnancy may require us to use new methods to try to partially grasp what pregnancy is like such as for example, significant engagement with narrative literature. Because pregnancy is also epistemically transformative in a narrow sense, we need to work out how to engage in ethical reasoning when relevant knowledge is not fully accessible to all. This argument has implications beyond the debate about abortion. Philosophers in many areas of applied ethics will need to work out how to respond appropriately to epistemically transformative experiences. (shrink)

In this paper, I suggest that, if we are committed to accepting a threshold approach to personhood, according to which all beings above the threshold are persons with equal moral status, there are strong reasons to also recognise a second threshold that would be reached through human pregnancy, and that would confer on pregnant women a temporary superior moral status. This proposal is not based on the moral status of the fetus, but on the moral status of the pregnant (...) woman. It is not only the fetus which is an organism sui generis: the pregnant woman, also, is a unique being. Following almost any view on the moral status of the fetus, the pregnant woman should be regarded, herself, as more than a singular individual. She is, herself, ‘more than one’. Pregnant women are also necessary for the continued survival of the human species, and there are important justice-based reasons to recognise the higher status. Furthermore, the recognition of a superior moral status for pregnant women does not imply that pregnancy should always be viewed as desirable, or imply any position on the permissibility of abortion. My proposal is not as radical as it might seem, as it does not require that pregnant women should always receive superior treatment, but only that they should to some extent. It could have a range of potential positive practical consequences. Finally, my approach does not threaten, but rather promotes, human equality. (shrink)

In his paper, ‘Twin pregnancy, fetal reduction and the ‘all or nothing problem’, Räsänen sets out to apply Horton’s ‘all or nothing’ problem to the ethics of multifetal pregnancy reduction from a twin to a singleton pregnancy. Horton’s problem involves the following scenario: imagine that two children are about to be crushed by a collapsing building. An observer would have three options: do nothing, save one child by allowing their arms to be crushed, or save both by (...) allowing their arms to be crushed. Horton offers two intuitively plausible claims: it is morally permissible not to save either child and it is morally impermissible to save only one of the children, which taken together lead to the problematic conclusion that if an observer does not save both children, then it is better to save neither than save only one. Räsänen applies this problem to the case of 2-to-1 MFPR, arguing ultimately that, in cases where there is no medical reason to reduce, the woman ought to bring both fetuses to term. We will argue that Räsänen does not provide adequate support for the claim, crucial to his argument, that aborting only one of the fetuses in a twin pregnancy is wrong, so the ‘all or nothing’ problem does not arise in this context. Furthermore, we argue that the scenario Räsänen presents is highly unrealistic because of the clinical realities of 2-to-1 MFPR, making his argument of limited use for real-life decision making in this area. (shrink)

This book provides extensive and critical engagement with some of the most recent and compelling arguments favoring abortion choice. It features original essays from leading and emerging philosophers, bioethicists and medical professionals that present philosophically sophisticated and novel arguments against abortion choice. The chapters in this book are divided into three thematic sections. The first set of essays focuses primarily on unborn human individuals--zygotes, embryos and fetuses. In these chapters it is argued, for example, that human organisms begin to exist (...) at conception and that zygotes, embryos and fetuses are persons. These chapters also explore questions about whether or not zygotes, embryos and fetuses are part of their mothers' bodies. The second set of essays focuses primarily on elective abortion and the debates surrounding it. These chapters consider whether or not opponents of abortion are commonly hypocritical, how opponents of abortion should think about adoption, how emerging technologies may affect the current debate and whether or not those participating in the debate should rely on analogies to support their case. Finally, the third set of essays shifts focus from the legal and moral status of elective abortion to its place in medical practice. In these chapters it is argued that elective abortion embodies a kind of ableism, and that elective abortion is medically unnecessary, harmful to women's mental health and that telemedicine abortion poses significant risks to women's health. Agency, Pregnancy and Persons offers an up-to-date examination of unborn human beings, the debates surrounding elective abortion and the place of elective abortion within medical practice. It will be of interest to medical professionals and those who work in philosophy, bioethics and medical ethics alike. (shrink)

Individuals with disabilities face significant challenges, both physically and socially. To claim a disability, therefore, is not something one ought to do lightly. Pregnancy, however, presents a very difficult and interesting case. Pain, discomfort, and inconvenience are often daily aspects of pregnancy, and pregnancy itself can cause physical, as well as social, impediments that can substantially interfere with one's day-to-day work and life. In practice, based on our current laws concerning family leave, ailments brought on by (...) class='Hi'>pregnancy can be cited as a temporary disability in certain circumstances. However, the kind of "pregnancyrelated disability" that is built into such leave policies and laws falls short of... (shrink)

Inside and outside of a Christian worldview, bioethicists have discussed ectopic pregnancy at some length as a maternal-fetal vital conflict. Most bioethicists agree that methotrexate and salpingostomy are low-risk, successful interventions for this life-threatening pathology, and are thus beneficent, just, and wholly acceptable. A small cohort of Christian, largely Catholic, bioethicists have reservations about methotrexate and salpingostomy, but cannot resolve their internal disputes about these because of flawed casuistry. This paper aims to settle the issue about whether methotrexate and (...) salpingostomy are acceptable within a Catholic worldview: despite the best arguments in favor of methotrexate as a moral option, it is morally unacceptable, and despite hesitation about salpingostomy related to analogies with previable delivery, it is the optimal procedure for ectopic pregnancy. (shrink)

Hendricks' pregnancy rescue case (PRC) tries to show that abortion is typically morally wrong. I argue here that there are at least two morally relevant differences between the abortion in PRC and the typical abortion so that the latter isn't morally wrong even if the former is morally wrong. I develop five modifications to PRC to show that these two differences are morally important. First, in PRC we don't know whether the person gives informed consent to the abortion, nor (...) does the medical professional who will perform the abortion, and so the abortion can't be performed because the patient gives informed consent to it. Second, not preventing the death of the fetus in PRC brings about the death of an additional fetus gestating in a separate pregnant person, whereas most abortions don't entail the termination of another's pregnancy. (shrink)

Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen argue that we have good reason to classify pregnancy as a disease. They discuss five accounts of disease and argue that each account either implies that pregnancy is a disease or if it does not, it faces problems. This strategy allows Smajdor and Räsänen to avoid articulating their own account of disease. Consequently, they cannot establish that pregnancyisa disease, only that plausible accounts of disease suggest this. Some readers will dismiss Smajdor and Räsänen’s (...) claims as counterintuitive. By analogy, if a mathematical proof concludes ‘2+2=5’, readers will know—without investigation—that an error occurred. Rather than dismiss Smajdor and Räsänen’s work, however, the easiest way to undermine their argument is to describe at least one plausible account of disease that (1) excludes pregnancy and (2) avoids the problems they raise for it. This is our strategy. We focus on dysfunction accounts of disease. After outlining Smajdor and Räsänen’s main arguments against dysfunction accounts, we explain why pregnancy is not a disease on these accounts. Next, we defend dysfunction accounts against the three problems that Smajdor and Räsänen raise. If successful, then contra Smajdor and Räsänen, at least one plausible account of disease does not imply that pregnancy is a disease. We suspect that defenders of other accounts can respond similarly. Yet, we note that insofar as dysfunction accounts align with the commonsense intuition that pregnancy is not a disease, this, all else being equal, seems like a point in their favour. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relations among critique, destruction and negation, on the one hand, and creation, affirmation, love, and care on the other, in Nietzsche’s writings from Daybreak to Zarathustra. In doing this, it traces a movement in Nietzsche's thought that can be understood as an integration of critique in the process of affirmation, which consolidates in Nietzsche’s project of self-overcoming. In contrast to readings that use the metaphor of art and the creativity of the artist, this paper presents (...) pregnancy as a cipher to understand Nietzsche’s project as well as the dynamics that are involved. A key issue addressed throughout the entire paper concerns the way in which Zarathustra says that he loves those who want their own downfall (Untergang) and go “zu Grunde” (or perish). To fully grasp the meaning of these rather puzzling utterances, the paper analyzes Nietzsche's engagement with Pascal (as a very particular case of “going under”). (shrink)

Although Plato's notion of spiritual pregnancy has received a great deal of critical attention in recent years, the development of the metaphor in the Symposium has not been fully analysed. Close attention to the details of the image reveals two important points which have so far been overlooked: There are two quite different types of spiritual pregnancy in the Symposium: a ‘male’ type, which is analogous to the build-up to physical ejaculation, and a ‘female’ type, which is analogous (...) to the physical experience of pregnancy as normally understood. (shrink)

To what extent are women obliged to be child-bearers? If reproductive technology could offer some form of ectogenesis, would feminists regard it as a liberating reproductive option? Three lines of reproductive rights arguments currently used by feminists are applied to ectogenesis. Each fails to provide strong grounds for prohibiting it. Yet, there are several ways in which ectogenesis could contribute to women's oppression, in particular, if it were used to undermine abortion rights, reinforce traditional views of fertility, increase fetal rights (...) in pregnancy, and perpetuate the unequal distribution of scarce medical resources. A re-thinking of women's relationship to pregnancy is needed in order to challenge ectogenetic research. (shrink)

IntroductionGlobally, 15% of adolescents give birth before turning 18, leading to considerable personal, social, and medical impacts on adolescents and to the general society.ObjectiveThis study aimed at exploring and comparing three psychological attributes between parents and teachers for the phenomena.Method672 teachers and 690 parents participated in the study.ResultsThe results indicated a significant mean difference between parents and teachers on empathy, attribution of blame, and feelings of responsibility. Except for attribution of blame, parents’ mean scores of other variables were higher than (...) that of teachers.DiscussionTeachers’ higher attribution of blame to pregnant adolescents and lower empathetic concern raises a prominent concern over students’ healthy environment at school.ConclusionUnderstanding social feelings about responsibilities over adolescents’ general health is very essential, especially for fighting against the problem of early pregnancy. (shrink)

Ethical and legal traditions recognize prenatal duties to avoid harm to offspring. However, applying the harm principle to pregnancy requires a careful balancing of a baby's welfare with a pregnant woman's interest in liberty and bodily integrity. In the case of maternal PKU the mother can prevent harm to her baby by returning to the admittedly unpleasant diet that prevented her from being retarded. Informing, counseling, and access to medical care should be the primary policy. Seizures and forced treatment (...) cannot be justified in this case, and only rarely in other situations. (shrink)

In this paper, I reflect on an important article by Bob Veatch in the inaugural issue of the Hastings Center Report, entitled “Experimental Pregnancy.” It is a report and elegant analysis of the Goldzieher Study, in which nearly 400 women were randomized to receive hormonal contraception or placebo absent consent or disclosure about placebo use, resulting in several pregnancies. Noting the study’s limited notoriety, I first consider the narratives that have instead dominated bioethics’ approach to pregnancy and research: (...) thalidomide and diethylstibesterol. These narratives have facilitated a narrow focus on avoiding fetal risk, to the exclusion of other ethically relevant considerations. I then revisit “Experimental Pregnancy” and offer two ways in which Bob’s analysis serves as an important corrective, first, by foregrounding research subjects, and second, by normalizing pregnancy and thus foregrounding foundational ethical considerations that are sometimes lost amidst pregnancy’s presumed exceptionalism. (shrink)

In their recent paper ‘Is pregnancy a disease?’, Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen argue in the affirmative, highlighting features shared by both pregnancy and paradigmatic diseases. In particular, they point to the harmful symptoms and side effects of pregnancy, and the provision of medical treatment to both pregnant patients and those aiming to avoid pregnancy. They consider both subjectivist and objectivist approaches taken by philosophers of health in defining disease, and point out that neither approach convincingly (...) excludes pregnancy. Finally, they present a normative case for treating pregnancy as a disease, suggesting that this attitude could promote preventive provision of contraception and abortion, and encourage respect for (and better treatment of) patients’ suffering during pregnancy. In this response, I challenge various parts of Smajdor and Räsänen’s argument, and cast doubt on the normative benefits of their approach. (shrink)

Respected Catholic ethicists have recently defended the use of salpingostomy and methotrexate in the management of ectopic pregnancies.This article examines the arguments for the revised assessments to determine whether there are sound reasons to believe that these two methods do not constitute the direct and immediate killing of innocent human beings. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.1 (Spring 2011): 65–82.

In their paper, Romanis and Adkins delve into the potential impact of artificial amnion and placenta technology (AAPT) on cases of pregnancy loss1 that do not involve procreative loss. First, they call for more recognition of the negative feelings a person might have due to the premature end of their pregnant state. They claim that, should AAPT minimise concerns about prematurity as anticipated, individuals might feel pressured to opt for partial ectogestation to preserve their or their fetus’ well-being; moreover, (...) they point out that the feelings of loss in the context of AAPT are likely to be worse than the ones reported in neonatal intensive care units cases. Finally, they advocate for care pathways focusing on how the transfer of a fetus to the AAPT could affect the pregnant person, with particular attention to managing the grief potentially caused by the pregnancy loss. I praise the authors for such a call to action—especially since partial ectogestation is expected to become a reality in the short-term future—and I share their demands for additional and more attentive care of (formerly) pregnant patients. However, I am concerned that their approach is so focused on negative feelings towards pregnancy loss that it risks becoming …. (shrink)

This paper looks at the Catholic justification of medical interventions in ectopic pregnancies. The paper first shows that the way how Double Effect Reasoning is often applied to ectopic pregnancies is not consistent with the way Aquinas introduces this mode of reasoning. The paper then shows certain problems in common defences of the use of salpingectomies. The paper then re-evaluates the medical interventions used in the management of ectopic pregnancies, with both a focus on the aim of the treatment and (...) the timing of the treatment. (shrink)

Romanis and Adkins explore the near-term prospect of artificial amnion and placenta technology (AAPT) which is being developed to supplement the gestational process following the premature ending of a pregnancy.1 While fetal-centric narratives prevail in discussions surrounding AAPT, the authors subvert this trend by centering the experience of pregnant persons with respect to pregnancy loss. The overarching aim of their paper is to move beyond a ‘philosophical understanding of pregnancy towards practical-orientated conclusions regarding the care pathways surrounding (...) [AAPT]’ (Romanis and Adkins,1 p1). This commentary will critically examine the viability of this aim. Romanis and Adkins use the term ‘pregnancy loss’ to refer to the phenomenon where individuals experience a complex set of emotions following the premature ending of pregnancy, despite the survival of the gestated entity. Following Golish and Powell, the authors note how parents may experience contradictory emotions, such as joy mixed with grief, as well as a range of negative feelings including shame, disappointment and a sense of failure.2 At present, this phenomenon has been recognised among parents, particularly the (formerly) pregnant person, in the context of neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) when the infant survives preterm delivery and …. (shrink)

I ask what is required for pregnant trans and gender diverse (TGD) people to receive trustworthy reproductive healthcare which supports their autonomy. My focus is on wanted pregnancies. I understand interpersonal trust as a positive attitude towards the competence and motivation or commitment of a person trusted in a particular role, such as a healthcare professional, and autonomy as self-governance shaped by what one cares about. I conceive of autonomy as relational and potentially enhanced or damaged by social interactions. I (...) argue that mainstream bioethical conceptions of autonomy can accommodate my claims about how the autonomy of pregnant TGD persons can be diminished or supported, especially in relation to trust. I argue that support for the autonomy of pregnant TGD persons requires acknowledgement and understanding of their gender identity and when it is not relevant to their healthcare. My discussion has implications for whether morality requires us to affirm trans identities and what this means in healthcare. I conclude with remarks about what else we can learn by centering the experiences of pregnant TGD persons. (shrink)

This paper develops a phenomenological defense of Ian Hacking's experimental realism about unobservable entities in physical science, employing historically undervalued resources from the phenomenological tradition in order to clarify the warrant for our ontological commitments in science. Building upon the work of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heelan, the paper provides a phenomenological correction of the positivistic conception of perceptual evidence maintained by antirealists such as van Fraassen, the experimental relevance of which is illustrated through a phenomenological interpretation of the 1974 discovery (...) of the J/ ψ particle generally regarded as evidence for the charmed quark. The argument then turns to address known problems in Hacking's account, demonstrating that his own instrumentalist criterion of the real is inadequately rooted in the phenomenology of perception, and as a result, passes over the true ontological significance of experimental phenomena. The paper maintains that the proper criterion, only indirectly related to instrumentality, is the distinctive style of the real encountered in perception: empirical pregnancy. With this notion and Merleau-Ponty's associated reversibility thesis, I show that the phenomenological tradition provides insights into the warrant for our realist commitments that have yet to be adequately acknowledged by philosophers of science. (shrink)

Are pregnant women entitled to the same rights of self-determination and bodily integrity as other adults? This is the fundamental question underlying recent highprofile legal interventions in situations when pregnant women and healthcare staff do not agree on management options or appropriate behaviour. Courts on both sides of the Atlantic have sometimes answered that they are not, and the law has at times been manipulated to enforce compliance with medical recommendations. This book offers a comprehensive assessment of healthcare law as (...) applied to the unique situation of pregnancy. (shrink)

Pregnancy has been traditionally defined as the period during which developing embryos are incubated in the body after egg–sperm union. Despite strong similarities between viviparity in mammals and other vertebrate groups, researchers have historically been reluctant to use the term pregnancy for non‐mammals in recognition of the highly developed form of viviparity in eutherians. Syngnathid fishes (seahorses and pipefishes) have a unique reproductive system, where the male incubates developing embryos in a specialized brooding structure in which they are (...) aerated, osmoregulated, protected and likely provisioned during their development. Recent insights into physiological, morphological and genetic changes associated with syngnathid reproduction provide compelling evidence that male incubation in these species is a highly specialized form of reproduction akin to other forms of viviparity. Here, we review these recent advances, highlighting similarities and differences between seahorse and mammalian pregnancy. Understanding the changes associated with the parallel evolution of male pregnancy in the two major syngnathid lineages will help to identify key innovations that facilitated the development of this unique form of reproduction and, through comparison with other forms of live bearing, may allow the identification of a common set of characteristics shared by all viviparous organisms. BioEssays 29:884–896, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In this paper I take up (what I call) the pregnancy loss objection to defenses of abortion that deny fetal moral status. Though versions of this objection have been put forth by others—particularly Lindsey Porter’s in a 2015 paper—I argue that the existing versions of the objection are unsuccessful in various ways: failing to explain the ground of moral considerability that would apply to embryos/fetuses in very early pregnancy, lack of clarity about what it means to take grief (...) after miscarriage seriously, and implausible implications regarding pre-embryo and infertility cases. I go on to offer a more plausible version of the objection, which I apply only to mid-pregnancy and fetuses, by drawing on personal narratives of later pregnancy loss and abortion and emphasizing practices that indicate the relevant kind of mourning. I then take up the question of how experience of the sort I have in mind can function as evidence, by situating my version of the objection in a pragmatist ethical view. Finally I consider and respond to some worries about the very idea of taking experience of pregnancy loss to be evidence regarding fetal moral status. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, I argue that the positions set out in traditional debates about abortion are focused on the status of the fetus to the extent that they ignore the value and meaning of pregnancy as something involving persons other than the fetus. -/- In the second part of the paper, I build on Hilde Lindemann’s ideas by arguing that recognition of the related activities of calling a fetus into personhood and creating an identity as (...) a parent allow us to make sense of a variety of reactions to pregnancy and pregnancy loss while recognizing that pregnancy can and does have meaning for many people in many cases. (shrink)