Joas revisits certain moments in the reception of his work, specifies the overall project to which The Power of the Sacred belongs - conceived as the first part of a triptych - and regrets that the live discussion could not take place due to the pandemic. He agrees with the overall perspective and the content of what Tétaz puts forward in the introduction to the dossier. He expresses his interest in Gonzalez's text, while stressing that what Gonzalez points out is (...) not, for him, a central issue. At the same time, he specifies that his field of work is historical sociology - or a historiography of religions informed by sociology - which is also, as such, an empirical research, and returns to the Royce and Durkheim comparison to mark some inflections to what Gonzalez writes. Joas then turns to Gisel's contribution, underlining the part of misunderstandings, but also the part of real differences, while reaffirming his objective: to put forward a history of moral universalism. Joas goes on to comment on Scholl's text, regretting that the author treats “disenchantment” and “secularization” in the same way, which are, for him, two clearly distinct fields of phenomena. As for Scholl's thesis - that secularisation has also been implemented by religious actors - Joas approves of it, especially as he has defended it elsewhere. Finally, Joas addresses Ullern's text, while emphasizing what the author called "not reading", which, in turn, makes a confrontation on the substance fail. (shrink)

La critique de la philosophie de William James qu’Émile Durkheim développe dans Pragmatisme et sociologie est examinée selon deux aspects : 1) le désaccord entre James et Durkheim sur le problème des concepts et de la conceptualisation ; 2) l’échec presque total de Durkheim à considérer le thème le plus proprement sociologique du travail de James : sa théorie de l’ habit (ou habitude). Dans les deux cas, référence est faite au rôle joué (et parfois non joué) dans la critique (...) de Durkheim par les Principles of Psychology. Malgré l’influence du contexte historique et les malentendus qui en découlent, la réception du pragmatisme par Durkheim touche ainsi parfois des nerfs sensibles de la philosophie et de la psychologie de James. (shrink)

Portée par une histoire mouvementée, la notion d’historisme (historicisme) constitue une voie d’entrée privilégiée pour éclairer la réflexivité nouvelle qui affecte en profondeur la philosophie et, plus généralement, les sciences humaines au cours des deux derniers siècles. Au fil d’une histoire conceptuelle retraçant son émergence et ses différents transferts – en jurisprudence, histoire, théologie, économie, sociologie – cet ouvrage vise à éclairer la réception philosophique de l’historisme, de Nietzsche, Dilthey à Husserl, en passant par le néo-kantisme (Windelband, Simmel, Rickert, Weber, (...) Troeltsch). Cette relecture de l’histoire intellectuelle allemande offre non seulement une clarification indispensable du concept d’historisme, mais également une source incontournable pour aborder la question plus contemporaine du relativisme politique ou culturel. (shrink)

Stimulated by Hugh Upton's recent article in this journal, in which he argues that there can be a moral duty to cheat in games, I attempt to examine his claims. Much of what he writes revolves around examples from two sports, cricket and rugby, and with differing connections to those games' rules. While the example from cricket is said to involve a breach of the spirit of that game, it is contravention of the written rules of rugby on which (...) the latter part of Upton's case focuses. Given limited space I concentrate on the cricketing example, but several of the points I make about that apply also to when rule-breaking itself is involved. My conclusions express doubts about whether a case for a moral duty to cheat in games has been established. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:La Métaphysique de Royce, avec un appendice de texts, publiée et préfacée par Miklos VetöDwayne Alexander TunstallGabriel Marcel La Métaphysique de Royce, avec un appendice de texts, publiée et préfacée par Miklos Vetö Paris L'Hartmattan, 2005xix + 250 pp.Gabriel Marcel's La Métaphysique de Royce (MR) is the most influential Continental interpretation of Josiah Royce's philosophy. Moreover, Marcel's monograph-length study of Royce's metaphysics remains the only significant work on (...) Royce's philosophy written in French. MR was originally published as a series of four articles in La Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (May-June 1918 and January-April 1919) and published, in a slightly edited form, as a monograph by Aubier in 1945. The L'Hartmattan edition of Marcel's MR is, to my knowledge, the first edition of Marcel's MR to be published in any language since the publication of the English translation of MR in 1956 under the title, Royce's Metaphysics.1Because an English translation of MR is already available, this review will not examine Marcel's actual monograph in any significant detail. Rather, it will describe Vetö's preface and the texts comprising this book's appendices.Vetö's preface seeks to fulfill two aims: (1) to situate MR in its own historical context and (2) to convey its insights to a contemporary audience. Vetö fulfills the first aim by situating Royce's thought within the milieu of late nineteenth-century Anglo-American idealism and its reception of German idealism (pp. vii-viii). He also fulfills this aim by explaining how a young Marcel could have devoted an entire monograph to Royce's thought. As for fulfilling the second aim, Vetö admits that doing so will be difficult, since Royce's thought "attracts only very modest attention from philosophers and historians of philosophy outside of America" (p. vii). It seems that Vetö attempts to fulfill the second aim by concentrating on how Royce's thought influenced the development of Marcel's thought. Due to space constraints, I will describe only a few of the more insightful observations Vetö makes about Marcel's MR in his preface.One such insightful observation is Vetö's recognition that, unlike most formulations of the principle of individuation in the Western philosophic tradition, Royce's principle of individuation is essentially volitional. Following Marcel, Vetö explains how Royce does not think that an individual is definable, ontologically speaking, by its empirical qualities or by some logical designation of class membership. Royce thought that an individual cannot be defined apart from the communal and moral interests of the one who recognizes that individual (p. xi). In fact, the act of recognizing an individual is an act of love for Royce. What Royce regards as love is different than the common definitions of the term, however. Vetö reminds the reader that Roycean love involves the exclusive selection of an individual to be the object of one's attention. This means that whenever one exclusively attends to someone or something in the world, that someone or something becomes a genuine individual.2 [End Page 582]Another insightful observation is Vetö's recognition that Royce's conception of God as fellow-sufferer, indeed as the One who experiences our sufferings more intensely and meaningfully than we do, seems to anticipate Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy and, to a greater extent, Charles Hartshorne's process theology (p. xiv).A third insightful observation is Vetö's description of how Royce's thought influenced the development of Marcel's thought. While Marcel writes that Royce's thought had only a negligible influence on the formation of his mature position on intersubjectivity in his author's preface to the English translation of his monograph in 1956, Vetö contends that Royce obviously played an important role in Marcel's early insights into the nature of intersubjectivity. This is especially true of Marcel's insights into intersubjectivity as they are articulated in the second part of his Metaphysical Journal (1927).3 In that work, Marcel notes how his own nascent existentialism, e.g., his distinction between being and having... (shrink)

This article undertakes to examine the reception of Platonic theories of falsification in the contemporary philosophy of Leo Strauss and his adherents. The aim of the article is to consider the Straussian response to, and interaction with, Platonic ideas concerning deception and persuasion with an emphasis on the arguments found in the Laws. The theme of central interest in this analysis is Plato’s development of paramyth in the Laws. Paramyth entails the use of rhetorical language in order to persuade the (...) many that it is to their advantage to obey certain laws. It does so without explaining in detail why a given law is ethically correct and its use assumes that the audience, on the whole, is not capable of understanding the finer philosophical underpinnings of the law. The so-called ‘noble lie’ of the Republic is also considered in this context. The crucial issue, for Plato if not for Strauss, is whether or not an instance of falsification, however minor, for the purposes of persuasion contains ‘truth-value’, that is, whether it is morally justifiable in terms of ends and means. In terms of Strauss’s reception of Plato, such issues as ancient Hebrew mysticism, Medieval Jewish and Islamic scholarship and Heideggerian Phenomenology figure in the argument. Ultimately, the article finds that Strauss and his followers have constructed a particular view of Platonic ideas that, while unique, is not compatible with their original signification. (shrink)

This article examines the excitement that Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments generated in France during the French Revolution, focusing particularly on the writings of political theorists, participants and commentators such as the abbé Sieyès, Pierre-Louis Rœderer, the Marquis de Condorcet and Sophie de Grouchy Condorcet, who were dismayed at their political opponents’ use of Rousseau, and looked to Smith for an understanding of the passions that was compatible with democratic sovereignty and representative government. In the political context of (...) the early 1790s, clarifying the concept of natural sociability, which Rousseau had rejected, but Smith and Helvétius, in different ways, each regarded as indispensible to a society dependent on advanced division of labour, became a central concern in the public lectures delivered by Pierre-Louis Rœderer as the Terror took hold. ☆ My thanks to Emma Rothschild, Michael Sonenscher, Brian Young and other participants in the History of Political Thought Seminar, Oxford, and The Hexagonal Forum, Cambridge, where earlier versions of this paper were presented and helpfully discussed. I’m also grateful for comments on an earlier draft from Carolina Armenteros, Clare Jackson, Duncan Kelly, Michael Sonenscher and Richard Whatmore. (shrink)

In this article I analyse some moments of Nietzsche’s reception and influence between Europe and America (namely in Martin Heidegger, Giovanni Papini and Josiah Royce) from a pragmatist perspective, in order to show how a selective monism and a realist pluralism emerge from their interpretations of Nietzsche. On the basis of this historiographic and theoretical reconstruction, I emphasize that Nietzsche, through both his monism and his pluralism, can question any presumed irreversibility in the moral field. By recognising the subject’s (...) possibility of change, of reversing the only superficial irreversibility of its Da-sein, Nietzsche’s pragmatism in this sense represents a great theoretical achievement, indispensable for the definition of a new bio-anthropological paradigm, in which identity can effectively coexist with difference. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pragmatism's Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy by Trevor PearceAlexander KleinTrevor Pearce. Pragmatism's Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2020. Pp. 384. Paperback, $35.00.Pragmatist pioneers were young lions in the days of Darwin. Evolutionary-biological thinking infused this philosophical movement from the start. And yet the last time a major monograph appeared on classic pragmatism and evolutionary biology—Philip Wiener's Evolution and (...) the Founders of Pragmatism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1949)—the author could personally thank Ralph Barton Perry, William James's junior colleague and eventual biographer. John Dewey himself wrote the foreword.Almost seventy-five years later, we have Trevor Pearce's painstakingly researched Pragmatism's Evolution. The author has graduate training in both biology and philosophy and is a former student of William Wimsatt and Robert Richards's (343). The book offers an intricate portrait of how debates about evolutionary biology informed the thinking of a loose-knit group of pragmatists between the years 1860 and 1910. While a remarkable variety of figures are discussed, ten pragmatists command the most attention: Chauncey Wright, C. S. Peirce, Francis Ellingwood Abbot, John Fiske, William James, Josiah Royce, John Dewey, Jane Addams, G. H. Mead, and W. E. B. Du Bois (18). Call them "the American Ten."Without downplaying Darwin, an overarching theme is the special significance of Herbert Spencer. Despite many specific disagreements with him (see e.g. 74, 207–8, 253–54, 281), the American Ten all accepted something more fundamental from Spencer: an intellectual framework that explains mind and morality in terms of functional relationships between organism and environment.After an introduction outlining what Pearce identifies as four chronological "cohorts" of pragmatists (more on this concept below), he examines the 1860s and 1870s reception of Darwin (chapter 1) and Spencer (chapter 2), showing how senior pragmatists like Wright, Peirce, and James defended evolution during this period. In chapter 2, we meet the Metaphysical Club's arch Spencerian, John Fiske, and we get a reading of James's critique of Spencer's psychology and sociology. Chapter 3 gives a highly detailed, reference-work-like portrait of the second cohort's training in evolutionary biology during the 1880s—chiefly Royce, Dewey, Addams, Mead, and Du Bois. In chapter 4, we learn that in the 1880s and 1890s, idealists like Edward Caird, Samuel Alexander, David George Ritchie, and Josiah Royce all co-opted ideas from evolutionary biology, which they apparently thought compatible with Hegelian dialectics. Chapter 5 shows that central planks of Peirce's metaphysics and Dewey's ethics are responsive to an 1890s dispute over the causes of the biological variation upon which selection acts (the so-called "factors" debate). The final two chapters show how pragmatist ethics (chapter 6) and epistemology (chapter 7) were infused with substantive ideas about evolution and about scientific experiment more generally.The depth and use of historical scholarship on offer here are both remarkable. On depth, Pearce draws from nineteen special collections and archives housed at institutions from California to Manchester, UK. The reference list (published on Pearce's website) runs [End Page 160] to 118 pages and was apparently too long for inclusion in the book. Archival research and lengthy bibliographies are to be expected in today's history of philosophy. But the sheer range of sources Pearce draws from is, by any measure, impressive.The use to which he puts those sources is provocative. Close reading, and in particular argument reconstruction, is usually the stock in trade for historians of philosophy. Pearce takes a different approach (7), seeking interpretive insight through a kind of philosophical network analysis. The nodes are mainly philosophers, scientists, and social critics. Unlike digital network analyses, Pearce connects his nodes by hand, via a great multiplicity of social, educational, and intellectual relations. We learn who studied evolution where, with whom, and when; what specific texts were assigned in classes taken, in classes taught; who attacked whom, who sided with whom; and so on.The resulting networks are rich, though they can be difficult to track due to their complexity. At its best, the book uses networks to produce genuine insights that... (shrink)

Lawrence Kohlberg's writings on moral education remain the greatest influ-- ence on moral education today in the United States. His student, Carol Gilligan, is one of the most influential writers on feminist ethics and on the idea that there are gender differences in morals. In a remarkable passage, Kohlberg described Emile Durkheim's conception as 'the most philosophi-- cally and scientifically comprehensive, clear and workable approach to moral education extant'. He went on to say that the workability of (...) the system has been demonstrated in Soviet Russia, and describes what he calls the 'logical but to us rather horrifying innovations' suggested by Durkheim's ideas. (shrink)

The question of a pragmatist justification of religious beliefs appeared in James’s writing in 1898, as an alternative to Royce’s theory of the absolute. This pragmatist justification was repeated in The Varieties of Religious Experiences in 1902 but it failed to give a proper account of the truth of religious beliefs based on private religious experiences and ultimately failed to answer Royce’s arguments. James knows that any possible pragmatist justification of religious belief based on the practical consequences of religious belief (...) must be completed by a metaphysical theory of the non-natural causality of religious experiences. But that would require going beyond the dualistic and naturalistic account of the Varieties. Nevertheless, the difficulties of the monistic theories of the Essays in Radical Empiricism pushed James to defend, in A Pluralistic Universe, a pantheistic theory in which the Absolute is accepted as a logical possibility, which in turn supposes to accept the composition theory of consciousness that he had rejected in The Principle of Psychology. Therefore, James’s final theory isn’t very different to Royce’s theory, since Royce’s theory is not a theory of the necessity of the Absolute but rather a theory of its possibility. (shrink)

Josiah Royce was undoubtedly one of the most interesting thinkers of classical American philosophy in the transition from the 19th to the 20th century. His works cover a wide range of subjects from psychology and issues of social philosophy to metaphysics. Surrounded by philosophers such as William James or Charles Sanders Peirce, Royce developed a concept of pragmatism which he himself called "absolute pragmatism" and which was centred around a theory of community. The essays in this edited volume deal with (...) this pragmatistic approach in his work and discuss it from various points of view. Among other things, they explore Royce's relationship to German idealism, the foundation of his ethics as well as his philosophical doctrine of God and his philosophy of religion. This results in rather divergent assessments of his philosophy, each of which is evidence of the enduring relevance of his thinking for the world of today. (shrink)

A l'epoque ou le pragmatisme se presente comme la seule theorie de la verite existante, Emile Durkheim propose, dans ce cours inedit prononce a la Sorbonne en 1913-1914, de s'interroger sur les rapports que cette pensee entretient avec la sociologie et la philosophie. Se demarquant d'emblee des theses majeures du pragmatisme, Durkheim n'en reconnait pas moins la puissance critique a l'egard du rationalisme, et insiste sur les enjeux qui naissent d'une telle confrontation. Si l'ensemble de la tradition philosophique et de (...) la culture francaise est rationaliste, alors l'etude detaillee du pragmatisme en tant que forme possible de l'irrationalisme (de ses origines comme de ses formes recentes, notamment dans la pensee de William James) se justifie aussi bien d'un point de vue national que d'un point de vue strictement philosophique. (shrink)

During the eighteenth century, German philosophers wrote on a broad range of topics in moral philosophy: from meta-ethical issues such as the nature of obligation, to elaborate systems of normative ethics (often in the form of a doctrine of duties to self, others, and God), to topics in applied ethics such as the permissibility of the death penalty and censorship. Moral philosophy was also intimately related to the modern natural law tradition at the time, as well as to (...) discussions taking place in theology and psychology, to name only a few other disciplines. As a result, it is often hard to isolate eighteenth-century German moral philosophy without addressing a whole host of other philosophical subjects. There are nonetheless certain central topics that were discussed by nearly every major figure of the period and which therefore serve as a window into how German philosophers approached moral philosophy during the eighteenth century. In this chapter I illustrate that one such topic is the principle of morality; namely what philosophers took to be the supreme norm at the foundation of judging actions to be morally good or evil. As we will see, although several figures approached this principle in a broadly similar way by identifying “perfection” as the central concept at work, they differ considerably with respect to important details. Furthermore, certain common threads reveal themselves: philosophers differ not only with respect to the content of the principle, but also with respect to the way in which it can be derived, how particular duties can in turn be derived from the supreme principle, and how the principle can be formulated. I begin by outlining Christian Wolff’s influential principle of perfection (Section 1), followed by a consideration of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s subtle revision of this principle (Section 2) and Christian August Crusius’s theological alternative (Section 3). I then briefly consider the impact that the reception of eighteenth-century British philosophy had on German moral philosophy during the second half of the eighteenth century (Section 4), before considering Moses Mendelssohn’s and Immanuel Kant’s answers to the 1763 Prize Essay Question (Section 5) and Johann August Eberhard’s unique mixture of rationalism and empiricism from the early 1780s (Section 6). I conclude (Section 7) with a brief discussion of Kant’s approach to the principle of morality and the principle of happiness proposed against it by his early empiricist critics. (shrink)

Historians are now generally agreed that the Darwinian recognition and institutionalization of the polygenist position was more than merely nominal.194 Wallace, Vogt, and Huxley had led the way, and we may add Galton (1869) to the list of those leading Darwinians who incorporated a good deal of polygenist thinking into their interpretions of human history and racial differences.195 Eventually “Mr. Darwin himself,” as Hunt had suggested he might, consolidated the Darwinian endorsement of many features of polygenism. Darwin's Descent of Man (...) was published in the same year that the Anthropological Institute was founded, and it was no coincidence that it was broadly congruent with Knoxian/ Anthropological race science. Recent scholarship has stressed the derivative character of the Descent, and Darwin's views on race were clearly influenced by the earlier interpretations of the abovecited Darwinians.196However, although the Descent was written in the light of the anthropological struggles of the 1860s, it is essential to acknowledge its origins in Darwin's notebooks of the late 1830s and early 1840s. A good deal of the congruence between Darwinian and Knoxian conceptions of race may be traced back to these early notebook constructions. As these document, Darwin, like Knox, brought to his very earliest conceptions of human evolution a “commitment to the idea of human races as discrete biological units with distinct moral and mental traits.”197 The young Darwin had been concerned with the same sorts of questions on racial biological and cultural differences that preoccupied Knox around the same time, and he was committed to as ruthless a naturalism. Apart from their individual and independent debts to Quetelet's “moral statistics,” both Darwin and Knox drew heavily on the general themes of struggle and adaptation in the contemporary “common context” of biological and social thought.198 Given their common context, the broad general similarities between the Knoxian laws of race antagonism and subordination and the Darwinian struggle for existence between races need occasion no strained historical explanation of direct influence.199Nevertheless, in more explicit ways, the Descent does show the conflation of Knoxian/Anthropological and Darwinian racial views, and Darwin located his discussion of these issues squarely within the dispute “of late years” between polygenists and monogenists.200 His mature views on race were shaped by the contemporaneous confrontations and negotiations between the Darwinians and the Anthropologicals. It is within this context that the minor historical puzzle of Darwin's failure to acknowledge Knox's “generic descent” may be explained. Apart from the difficulties of integration and interpretation of his scattered theoretical writings, Knox, through his adoption by Hunt and the Anthropologicals, became identified with anti-Darwinism and therefore with antievolutionism.201 Moreover, Knox, the disreputable and marginal “savage radical” and lately resurrected and equally unsavory “Anthropological,” was hardly an acceptable “precursor.” Yet, paradoxically, it was via the antithetical medium of the Anthropological platform that Knox's race science made an indirect and unacknowledged, but lasting, impact on the Darwinian anthropological model.In the Descent, Darwin argued that racial traits arose very early in the prehistory of man, were not biologically adaptive, and were therefore relatively fixed in character. By viewing race formation as a distant and closed episode of human history, Darwin endorsed the Knoxian categories of race as fixed and unalterable types. Although he thought it irrelevant whether human races were called species or subspecies, he conceded more to the Knoxian view than Huxley by granting that a naturalist confronted for the first time by specimens of Negro and European man “might feel himself fully justified in ranking the races of man as distinct species.”202 Consistent with the Knoxian interpretation, struggle, competition, and survival occurred between racial units rather than between individuals and, in Darwin's view, accounted for the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon and the inevitable triumph of the more intellectual and moral races over the lower and more degraded ones.Darwin was as insistent as Knox on the biological basis of intellectual and moral differences, and, through his tendency to reduce social and cultural differences to biology, he maintained the essential Knoxian/Anthropological link between race and culture.203 For above all, the Descent did much more than offer a naturalistic explanation of human evolution: it proffered social interpretation, justification, and prescription, and its timely appearance gave a powerful boost to the “moralizing naturalism” of Huxley and Galton, and to Spencer's “Social Darwinism.”204 We may draw a straight line from Knox's “moral anatomy,” through Hunt's “anthropology,” and on to “Social Darwinism” and the “social surgeons” of the eugenics movement.The Darwinians did not, of course, we their tendency to naturalize existing economic and social relations to Knox or Hunt and the Anthropologicals—they were simply reflecting the same general intellectual trend that had affected Knox and the Anthropologicals as well. And in the larger context, the forces that had created a climate receptive to Knox's racism had intensified: in the seventies, the need to justify white imperialism and class and racial inequalities was greater than ever. Scientific racism no longer appeared an aberration but the very essence of the scientific study of man, taking on a newfound respectability in the “new” evolutionary anthropology. But in more specific ways, through the struggle between the Darwinians and Anthropologicals for scientific and ideological hegemony, Knox's “moral anatomy” was institutionalized and perpetuated in late Victorian scientific racism. In the process, the delicate balance that Knox had maintained between his radicalism and his racism was outweighed by conservative institutional and social needs, and his “moral anatomy” was retooled — first by Hunt, and then by the Darwinians — to fit those needs. (shrink)

If sociology is about society must it not also be about morality? In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the identification between sociology and morality was clear cut; Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Spencer, and Veblen all dealt with moral issues and one might argue that they saw themselves as engaged in a moral vocation. Now, one might argue that the connections between sociology and moral currents have become more tenuous. Moral Culture examines what it means to be (...) moral in contemporary social and cultural life. Author Keith Tester takes the highly original and revealing step of exploring how violence today, and throughout history, affects the relatively safe and secure people who live in the west and who tend to know horror only through television and cinema screens. The book raises questions about the meaning and significance of massacres in the Balkans, Rwanda and, rather more historically, the Holocaust, and the slaughter of Vietnamese peasants by American soldiers in My Lai. It also discusses how Adolf Eichmann and the men of Charlie Company might be different from or similar to us. It answers questions about whether this is a time of moral decay or more seriously, the collapse of moral Civilization. Sociologists often claim that they make a virtue of being relevant and objective, but few have attacked these issues with the urgency and originality that Keith Tester displays in this work. Each chapter provides a historically aware account of a moral problem making it especially relevant reading for students of cultural studies, sociology, political science, and moral philosophy. (shrink)

I argue that psychopathy undermines three common assumptions typically invoked in favor of moderate reasons responsive theories of moral responsibility. First, I propose a theory of psychopathic agency and claim that psychopathic agency suggests that the systems underlying receptivity to reason bifurcate into at least two sub-systems of receptivity. Next, I claim that the bifurcation of systems for receptivity suggests that reactivity is not “all of a piece” but that it too decomposes into at least two subsystems. Lastly, I (...) argue that prior attempts by Fischer and Ravizza to address these concerns contain an appeal to internalism. Since Fischer and Ravizza want their theory to remain agnostic about the nature of reasons for action, this appeal to internalism is problematic for their view. I close by suggesting that if we are to make sense of when and why psychopaths are responsible then a mechanism-based theory of responsibility must be able to explain how different systems of receptivity and reactivity come together to constitute a single mechanism that grounds responsibility ascriptions for action and they must do so without tacitly appealing to implausible forms of internalism about reasons for action. (shrink)

The inclusion of more women’s works on introductory syllabi in philosophy has been suggested as one possible strategy to increase the proportion of philosophers that are female. Objections to this strategy often reflect the assumption that attention to the identity of authors is irrelevant to philosophy and detrimental to other pedagogical goals such as fairly and accurately representing the canon, and offering selections on the basis of their philosophical quality rather than the identities of their authors. I suggest the extent (...) to which one perceives it important to include women on introductory syllabi, one’s “gender perception,” may be affected by one’s largely unconscious, and unchosen, habits of moral perception; I appeal to Peggy DesAutel’s distinction between two types of moral perceiver to suggest that the differences between advocates and critics of more inclusive curriculum are not merely differences in values, but reflect fundamental and unchosen biases which result in receptivity to different considerations as to the reasons to change the way we introduce philosophy to newcomers. I provide evidence that inclusive curriculum may benefit all students, and suggest alternative approaches to representing the importance of those benefits to philosophers whose habits of moral perception may incline them to receptivity to principled rules and fairness rather than affective considerations. (shrink)

A natural way to think of epistemic virtue is by analogy with an archer. Just as a skilled archer is able to take aim and hit a target, a skilled epistemic agent will aim at truth and, if things go well, get things right. Here we highlight aspects of epistemic virtue that do not fit this model, particularly ways in which epistemic virtues can be non-voluntary and not goal-directed. In doing so, we draw on two important figures in the history (...) of philosophy: the 6th-century Indian Buddhist Buddhaghosa and the 20th-century French philosopher Simone Weil. Despite many differences, both thinkers emphasize the importance of attention in moral and epistemic virtue. Their work highlights ways in which attention that is neither voluntary nor goal-directed can nevertheless play an important role in moral and epistemic life. (shrink)

In Mengzi 6A4, Gaozi states that “yì 義 (propriety, rightness) is external, not internal.” In 6A5, Meng Jizi says of yì that “...it is on the external, not from the internal.” Their defenses are met with Mengzi’s resistance. What does he perceive and resist in these statements? Focusing on several key passages, I compare six promising interpretations. 6A4 and a relevant part of 2A2 can be rendered comparably sensible under each of the six. However, what Gaozi says in 6A1 clearly (...) is evidence to Mengzi that, of the six views, Gaozi holds three although he does not convey them in his statement. As for Meng Jiz’s defense of his statement, Meng Jizi cites a special occasion where one is required to act one way even though one would feel a different way. Mengzi’s response has been traditionally interpreted as boiling down to a dissenting opinion about empirical psychology, that the agent on that special occasion would in fact feel the same way as they ought to act. But on a more charitable reading, the point Mengzi makes is conceptual: Though the satisfaction of yì may not require that the feeling and the act align perfectly in this case, cases where the alignment obtains are conceptually prior. This not only refutes Meng Jizi’s statement but also enables a more elegant explanation of why the Mengzi rightly has no record of Mengzi affirming that yì is internal. I conclude that 6A5 itself uniquely favors one interpretation, as far as Meng Jizi’s position is concerned: How one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies yì. (shrink)

I argue that curiosity about the world deserves attention as a moral virtue, even apart from the role it may play in (the more generally praised) love of wisdom. First, close relationships and caring are reasonably considered part of a well-lived life, and curiosity is important for caring both about people and about things in the world. Second, curiosity helps us to define an appropriate way for persons to be affected by certain situations. Perhaps most important, curiosity can help (...) one to live well because it addresses the most fundamental existential task humans face, the need to see their lives as meaningful. I argue that curiosity is a distinctive virtue but suggest that related virtues (e.g., receptivity, reverence) may contribute to different kinds of worthy engagement with the world. (shrink)

In this chapter, I attempt to provide a richer account of reflective agency than standard theorists do, by focusing on the deep connection between the role of empathic receptivity and that of reflection. In From Enlightenment to Receptivity, Michael Slote innovatively introduces the idea of receptivity as a virtue into the domains of epistemology and ethics, and argues that the virtue of receptivity plays a crucial role in the realization of a good life (2013). In contrast, I incorporate receptivity as (...) a virtue into the domain of philosophy of action, particularly the philosophical analysis of reflective agency, an aspect on which Slote does not place much emphasis. To date, standard theories of reflective agency have concentrated on analyzing its self-governing aspect (e.g., Bratman 2007; Frankfurt 1999; Korsgaard 1996). Such an analysis is undoubtedly important because autonomous agency is a central value in the modern world. However, standard theorists’ strong commitment to individualistic, self-determining agency appears to have hindered them from appreciating the fundamental significance of empathic receptivity toward others’ perspectives in our rational, reflective lives. To remedy this tendency, I demonstrate how empathic receptivity significantly contributes to the development of our reflective activity. In our temporally extended lives, empathic receptivity is not only associated with an event at a single moment but also with a dynamic process unfolding over time. In my view, such diachronic receptivity helps us to deepen our understanding of others’ perspectives, and in so doing, to reflectively examine our own ways of thinking and acting from different angles that we have not previously recognized. Given that our agency unfolds temporally, practical rationality appears to be partly a matter of how we can develop our reflective capacity conducive to continuous learning from others. My receptivity-based account aims to capture such interpersonal and learning aspects of reflection and thus overcome the individualistic, introspective model of reflection that has long dominated the mainstream philosophy of action. The discussion proceeds as follows. In Section 1, I begin by arguing for receptivity’s centrality in empathy and then briefly sketch how the virtue of empathic receptivity functions in our temporally unfolding lives. In Section 2, I attempt to offer a realistic, dynamic account of the relationship between empathic receptivity and reflection. Particularly, I discuss how a receptively virtuous person can appropriately confront anxiety caused by encountering another’s serious challenge. In the last section, I clarify the strength of my receptivity-based model of reflection by comparing it with Michael Bratman’s policy-based model of reflection. (shrink)

Selections from Durkheim's writings focus on the nature of his conception of society and its moral context.

Emile Durkheim and Henri Bergson, two of the most important thinkers of early 20th-century France, give us different accounts of the relationship between habits, society and life. The article focuses on their use of embodied metaphors to illustrate how each thinker conceives of habit as a force of life. It argues that Durkheim uses the metaphor of ‘lifting’ to describe how social life creates habits capable of transcending bodily instinct. Bergson also recognizes the force of habits; he uses the language (...) of leaping to describe the kind of action required to transcend them. The article makes three claims. First, it argues that these metaphors are central to each thinker’s understanding of the means by which habits attach us to life. Second, they offer a means of revisiting, and explicating, Bergson’s tacit critique of Durkheim in his Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Third, they both symbolize processes of conversion that inform each thinker’s diagnosis of the moral challenges faced in modern social life. (shrink)

The aim of my contribution is to outline three points of overlap between Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Durkheim’s sociology of morality in their respective views on social ethics: I will start by characterizing their shared conviction that the foundation of any form of morality cannot be found in some abstract principles but in actually existing, institutionalized normative rules that inform us about our role-obligations. In the second step I will show that Hegel and Durkheim also share the social-theoretical conviction (...) that we should differentiate modern societies into three different spheres all entailing different sorts of role-obligations; a part of this step will also specifically deal with the question of how both thinkers conceive of the problems raised by the modern, capitalist market economy. In the third part of my contribution I will consider the question of whether we find in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right a placeholder for what Durkheim refers to as a kind of cosmopolitan ethics, a standpoint beyond the role-obligations connected to membership in individual states. In my conclusion I will raise the question of the relevance of Hegel’s and Durkheim’s shared views on the basis for social ethics for contemporary discussions in political and social philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Meaning of “Aristotelianism” in Medieval Moral and Political ThoughtCary J. NedermanI. “Aristotelian” and “Aristotelianism” are words that students of medieval ideas use constantly and almost inescapably. 1 The widespread usage of these terms by scholars in turn reflects the popularity of Aristotle’s thought itself during the Latin Middle Ages: Aristotle provided many of the raw materials with which educated Christians of the Middle Ages built up the (...) edifice of medieval thought. From 1100 it was difficult to receive a good education in Europe without reading at least some Aristotle, along with authors such as Boethius and Cicero who were heavily indebted to the Philosopher’s teachings. After 1200 no university-trained cleric was likely to be wholly unfamiliar with the essential characteristics of the Aristotelian world-view. 2 Thus, Aristotelianism constituted an indispensable common currency of intellectual intercourse during the Middle Ages.Yet at the same time medieval Aristotelianism could never be all-embracing or complete. Given the centrality of Christian religion to medieval Latin thought, it was effectively impossible for Western thinkers to accept basic tenets of Aristotle’s philosophy, such as the nature of the soul, the powers of God, and the source of ultimate human happiness. 3 In view of the [End Page 563] incompatibility of primary Aristotelian and Christian doctrines, no author in medieval Europe could faithfully or safely espouse an unalloyed Aristotelianism.The “Aristotelianism” of the Middle Ages thus possesses something of a paradoxical quality: it is everywhere and yet nowhere. Such uncertainty about the precise meaning and appropriate application of the ascriptions “Aristotelian” and “Aristotelianism” has led some intellectual historians to raise fundamental questions about the validity of these classifications. In a provocative article on the interpretation of “Aristotelianism” in medieval and Renaissance natural philosophy, Edward Grant poses this problem quite pointedly: “What criteria have to be met for one to be considered, say an Aristotelian...? Can such criteria even be formulated? Is there an essence of Aristotelianism... that might provide a means of determining who is, and who is not, a legitimate member of [this group?]” 4 Grant’s own attempts to solve this problem are geared to the particular circumstances of medieval cosmology and physics, fields in which the Aristotelian paradigm entered Latin thought rapidly and reigned unchallenged for three centuries. 5 Consequently, his solutions do not generalize well to other areas of philosophical discourse, such as moral and political philosophy, which experienced rather different processes of Aristotelian transmission and reception.It may therefore be fruitful to examine more carefully the meaning of Aristotelianism as applied specifically to the fields of ethics and politics, and indeed to question whether (or in what ways) the ascription of an Aristotelian outlook to medieval moral and political thought is warranted. In particular I propose to consider the two standard definitions of “Aristotelianism” that have emerged from the literature on the moral and political ideas of the Latin Middle Ages: a strict, essentialist account which holds that Aristotelianism requires endorsement of some salient core of Aristotelian writing or doctrine; and a looser approach which maintains that mere citation of Aristotle’s work or adoption of his language is sufficient to earn the label “Aristotelian” for a medieval text or thinker. While both of these conceptions of Aristotelianism enjoy certain distinct merits, each ultimately proves inadequate to cope with the complexities of the use of Aristotle’s moral and political ideas and texts during the Middle Ages.Does the failure of attempts to define “Aristotelianism” coherently mean that the term itself is a spurious or irrelevant category for the analysis of medieval ethics and political philosophy? I shall ultimately argue that it is possible to identify a coherent meaning of Aristotelianism in the political and moral realms that avoids the shortcomings associated with previous interpretations. Specifically, I claim that the medieval “Aristotelian” tradition is [End Page 564] held together by a particular organization of and orientation towards the kind of knowledge necessary for achieving human good in its moral and political dimensions. Stated succinctly, Aristotelianism posits the practical quality of the study of ethics and politics and hence the value of such knowledge insofar as it guides action. In my view the Aristotelianism... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Josiah Royce: Pragmatist, Ethicist, Philosopher of Religion ed. by Christoph Seibert and Christian PolkeRobin FriedmanJosiah Royce: Pragmatist, Ethicist, Philosopher of Religion Christoph Seibert and Christian Polke, editors. Mohr Siebeck, 2021.In October 2015, the Warburg Haus, Hamburg, held a conference on the American philosopher Josiah Royce that brought together German and American scholars. The papers given at the conference led to this new book, Josiah Royce: Pragmatist, Ethicist, Philosopher (...) of Religion. Edited by the German scholars Christoph Seibert and Christian Polke, the volume includes eleven essays, nine delivered at the 2015 conference, together with additional contributions by Seibert and Polke, the conference organizers.It is valuable to see contemporary German scholars engaging with Royce and to compare their approach with that of American scholars. Americans tend to approach Royce through the tradition of pragmatism in the company of William James, Charles Peirce, and John Dewey, and to minimize the metaphysics in Royce's thought and its idealistic influences. [End Page 116]The book has the goal of developing Royce's thought to show how its insights and concerns may be valuable for contemporary life, not only for scholars of differing philosophical traditions. In their Introduction, Seibert and Polke describe Royce as a "pragmatist of his own kind" (3) and identify three themes in his philosophy. The first is community, which was central to Royce from the beginning and, following his serious study of Peirce, "became the ultimate principle of both his metaphysics and his philosophy of life" (3). The second theme is religion, which, for Royce, involved the "search for the ultimate meaning of his own life, as well as that of his fellows' lives" (3). The third broad theme in Royce is ethics and a lifelong concern with the nature of the examined life. Royce developed his ethical philosophy from an original critique of moral skepticism to the "never-ending task of building communities within and through mankind by way of a critical spirit of true and mutual loyalty" (3). Among these three, the editors consider religion as the most important. They state: "[R]eligion is a very important theme of Royce's philosophy: one may even assume that it is the central subject, which implies that his philosophy may be properly understood only if it is regarded as a philosophy of religion" (8). The centrality of religion is apparent in the essays. Consideration here must be brief.The book's first section, "Bridging Two Continents: Royce between Pragmatism and Idealism," includes three broad-ranging essays that work toward a synthesis between pragmatism and idealism in the thought of Royce. Ludwig Nagl's contribution, "Toward a Global Philosophical Discourse on Religion," discusses Royce's posthumously published "Lectures on Modern Idealism." Nagl uses this work, together with Royce's adaption of Peirce, to help create a bridge between pragmatism and idealism. He further explores Royce's interest in Eastern religion to suggest how Royce's thought might support a broad philosophical study of religion, not restricted to Christianity. Co-editor Seibert's article, "The Ethical Nucleus of Reality," focuses on Royce's epistemology and his ethics, while touching briefly on religion. The essay shows how Royce combined pragmatic and idealistic threads from his earliest writings, with particular attention to his book The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (SM). Royce's SM is also central to the American philosopher Douglas Anderson's essay "What Philosophy Meant to Josiah Royce." In SM, Royce argues that philosophy constitutes a critical reflection on experience that may be practiced by every person, not only by professional philosophers. Anderson, however, also identifies and criticizes a more elitist, professional aspect in Royce's conception of philosophy. For Anderson, Royce's thought had a pragmatist dimension in that philosophy was a "voluntarily chosen attitude toward conducting our lives" (80). Royce's thought also was idealistic [End Page 117] in its recognition of the finite character of human life and in the search for the whole. Anderson writes that, for Royce, "to understand our experiences and to gain some control of our futures, we must see those experiences in their relations to all of what is—no easy task" (80).The book's second section includes... (shrink)

After the demise of Christianity, Western society did not become secular, according to Emile Durkheim, but located foundations in a new religion he calls the “cult of the individual.” This religion holds the rational individual person as sacred, and corresponds to a multi-faceted, complex, and diverse society united around individual democratic rights and modern science. Different traditional religions can co-exist in the cult of the individual, but only if they accept a subordinate status in relation to it. Durkheim maintains, however, (...) that all religions construct authoritative regimes of truth and moral obligations, setting the stage for conflict. How then should modern democracies respond to challenges to their authority from traditional religions? This article argues that a Durkheimian response would be to assert the values of the cult of the individual, as this is the only way to maintain the integrity and viability of Western democratic society. (shrink)

In this paper the author states that education could be better defined as reception and responsibility and that this ethical relationship between educator and pupil is the root or essential element of education. The author proposes a new paradigm, the pedagogy of alterity, inspired by Le´vinas, as a different model for educational praxis and research. Education as reception and responsibility facilitates the learning of values and a moral environment in the classroom and it is a fundamental support for the (...) pupils in the current crisis of education. In this model, education is also political complaint and commitment. Being responsible for the other, taking responsibility for the other, means accepting the socio‐historical conditions of the pupil. Otherwise, we would not be referring to human beings of flesh and blood, but to spiritual entities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Josiah Royce in FocusDwayne A. TunstallJosiah Royce in Focus Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008.Josiah Royce in Focus reads like a sequel to Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley’s earlier book on Royce’s public philosophy, Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities. As she did in Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities, Kegley does a remarkable job of interpreting Royce’s philosophy such that it has [End Page 127] contemporary (...) relevance for academic philosophy, conflict resolution, psychology, and the religion-science dialogue. Yet, unlike with her earlier book, Kegley devotes over two-thirds of this book to the task of weaving together Royce’s life and educational experiences with his thought. This integration of Royce’s life with his thought allows the reader to glimpse just how Royce is “a model philosopher: a scholar and a committed teacher, as well as a philosopher much concerned about public issues and basic human concerns” (xiv). Kegley does this while introducing the reader to many dimensions of Royce, including Royce the son, Royce the father, Royce the first-generation Californian, Royce the first-rate historian of California, Royce the amateur novelist, and Royce the world traveler. Amazingly, she uses Royce’s life to illuminate his philosophical thought without psychologizing Royce and hence avoids the all-too-common urge to reduce people’s philosophical ideas to mere rationalizations of their own preferences and desires. This is to be applauded in the age of Oprah, the proliferation of memoirs, and the apparent glut of self-help books.The first five chapters constitute Kegley’s portrait of Royce the person and Royce the thinker. In chapter 1, “Royce as a Frontier Californian and Intellectual Pioneer: Forging Self and Thought in a New and Developing Land,” she introduces the reader to Royce the first-generation Californian and intellectual pioneer. Here she persuasively links his California frontier upbringing; his early educational experiences in California at the Lincoln School (San Francisco) and the University of California, Berkeley; his studies in Germany; and his graduate studies at Johns Hopkins to his concerns about social conflicts and his lifelong attempt to resolve those conflicts to better the communities in which they occur (7–12).Indeed, she persuasively argues that Royce had already formulated the central insights of his philosophy by the time of his arrival at Harvard University in 1882. Kegley’s interpretation of Royce’s intellectual development owes much to Randall Auxier’s recent work on Royce’s thought. In Auxier’s interpretation of Royce’s thought, Royce had formulated the central intellectual insights of his philosophy—especially his ethics, philosophy or religion, and public philosophy—years before The Religious Aspect of Philosophy was published in 1885. This account of Royce’s intellectual development differs somewhat from Frank M. Oppenheim’s account. Oppenheim’s account depicts Royce’s intellectual development as a series of interrelated yet momentous “maximal intellectual insights.” Each of these insights marks a noticeable shift in his intellectual development. Oppenheim thinks that, of all the maximal intellectual insights Royce had throughout his career, the [End Page 128] most momentous one is the 1912 Peircean insight. This insight leads Royce to convert to Peircean semiotics and clarify his moral philosophy and philosophy of religion with Peirce’s theory of interpretation. In Oppenheim’s account, The Sources of Religious Insight (1912) and The Problem of Christianity (1913) are the glorious fruits of his Peircean insight. What Kegley has done in chapter 1 is to provide an account of Royce’s intellectual development that supersedes Oppenheim’s account. Indeed, her account of Royce’s intellectual development could possibly change how scholars study Royce’s thought, much in the same way that John E. Smith’s Royce’s Social Infinite did from the early 1950s until recently.In chapter 2, “The Self,” Kegley depicts Royce as a late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century psychologist whose ideas are still relevant today. She reminds the reader throughout this chapter that Royce is a pioneer in psychology, given that his book Outlines of Psychology (1903) advances an approach to psychology that sidesteps faculty psychology and that he is one of the first psychologists, along with William James... (shrink)

Anyone who has taught an introductory ethics course has found themselves having to explain that some important words can be used in different ways. There is the way social scientists talk when they refer to the norms of a Balinese cockfight, the values of early modern scientific culture, and the morality of Bolsheviks. This chapter examines the possibility that the social aspects of morality might tell us something important about what morality must be, and thus inform our metaethics. It reviews (...) a case for a profitable engagement between metaethics and foundational questions about the social world. The chapter summarizes how extant metaethical views might accommodate, and indeed gain support from, the social features of morality. Naturalists are interested in whether moral facts can earn their keep in our scientific worldview by explaining empirical phenomena. More recent work premised on the idea that moral judgment is based on sentiment sees a more limited role for social induction. -/- . (shrink)

The reception of the heliocentric theory of Nicolaus Copernicus in Jewish thought of the 17th-century period is a good exemplification of the issue concerning the formation of the relationship between natural science and theology, or more broadly: between science and religion. The fundamental question concerning this relationship, which we can ask from today’s perspective of this problem, is: How does it happen that claims of a scientific nature, which are initially considered from a religious point of view to be incompatible (...) with the religious view of the world, are later accepted as possible to agree with this image of reality and are assimilated by a given religion? Based on the reception of the Copernican image of the universe by two representatives of Jewish philosophy in the 17th century—David Gans and Joseph Solomon Delmedigo—it is possible to trace this process and pose the thesis that it takes place according to two strategies. Within the framework of the first one, represented by Gans, in a situation of incompatibility between the scientific and religious images of nature, a scientific theory is sought that explains the observed phenomena and, on the other hand, satisfies the religious claims. Finding such a theory solves the problem of the incompatibility mentioned above of images of the world, gives the theory credibility from the religious point of view and constitutes an argument for its correctness. The second strategy, represented by Delmedigo, consists in refraining from pursuing a direct, immediate, and unequivocal reconciliation of the two images of the world while at the same time recognizing a properly justified scientific theory as correctly describing and explaining the phenomena occurring in nature. Consequently, the apparent incompatibility between the scientific and the religious worldview demands either a reformulation of religious statements in such a way as to remove this incompatibility or the restriction of the meaning of religious statements to the strictly religious and moral sphere, without the ambition to speak about nature. In either case, however, it is already a task for the representatives of the religion concerned who, when confronted with adequately justified scientific claims, to avoid exposing their religion to the accusation that its claims are unreasonable and anachronistic, undertake the task mentioned above of modifying or limiting the scope of their statements. It seems that in the representatives of Jewish thought and Judaism, who are the successors of Gans and Delmedigo, generally speaking, the second strategy has prevailed in this version, in which one abandons the claim of religion to statements about the material world at the price of a significant divergence of the paths of science and religion. Consequently, it treats them as different narratives, describing and explaining two separate spheres of reality. (shrink)

This article analyses strategies of perception of Europe that fit into a triple structure. The traditional division into philosophical, cultural, and political Europe is intersected with more fundamental European perceptions determined by different ways of thinking. In this article, these ways are referred to as the closed, the open and the hollow ones. Thus, three different conceptions of Europe arise: the closed Europe characterized by essentialism, ethnocentrism, and monologic consciousness; the open Europe based on the standpoint that protection of one’s (...) own identity and maturity depend on a dialogic relationship with representatives of other identities; and the hollow Europe that makes absolute the imperative of moral self-criticism, as well as identity’s deconstruction and its relativism. The discussion of all three strategies of perception of Europe is followed by the analysis of how they were received in Lithuania. The conclusion highlights the necessity to further research the relationship between all three conceptions of European identity. (shrink)

La thèse défendue dans cet article est que le gouvernement chinois, chapeauté par un Parti qui se revendique encore du communisme, se sert du capitalisme, en le contrôlant strictement, afin d’accélérer le développement, mais sans dévier d’un objectif prioritaire : la construction d’une société socialiste ; et il s’appuie sur le Marx qui pensait que le communisme supposait un haut développement des forces productives. En France, cette thèse est minoritaire, et combattue ; peut-être, paradoxalement, parce que des similitudes existent entre (...) les deux pays. Cependant, les malentendus entre eux sont aussi nombreux (1 re partie). Cela pourrait tenir notamment aux différences de modes de pensée de ces deux peuples, en particulier vis-à-vis des contradictions et des mouvements de la dialectique (2 e partie), comme aussi en matière de mobilisation de la morale par le discours politique (3 e partie). Pour finir, les auteurs analysent les effets de cette comparaison sur l’interprétation du « socialisme aux couleurs chinoises » (4 e partie). Classification JEL : B24, H59, N45, O53, O57, P20, P52. (shrink)

In the 1860s and 1870s the logic of Boole and the calculating machines of Babbage were key resources in W. S. Jevons’s attempt to construct a mechanical model of the mind, and both therefore played an important role in Jevons’s attempted revolution in economic theory. In this same period both Boole and Babbage were studied within the Cambridge Moral Sciences Tripos, but the Cambridge reading of Boole and Babbage was much more circumspect. Implicitly following the division of the (...) class='Hi'>moral sciences into material and ‘real’ as established by the Rev. Grote, John Venn treated Boole’s logic as a purely formal science, while Alfred Marshall based his psychological model of the mechanical part of the human mind upon Babbage’s two-level machine. From the different perspectives of logic and psychology, Venn and Marshall did not simply incorporate their readings of Boole and Babbage, but also attempted to establish the limits to any mechanical explanation of the mind. This comparison of the attitudes to mental science of Jevons and Marshall provides a foundation from which the differing conceptions of economic theory of the two men can be established.Keywords: Alfred Marshall; Charles Babbage; George Boole; John Venn; Logic; Psychology. (shrink)

L’œuvre de Cabanis a eu énormément de mal à sortir d’une place qui lui était prescrite au moment même de son inscription dans le champ philosophique et scientifique allemand. Cette place, c’est celle de continuateur audacieux, informé, d’un projet lui-même daté : le projet d’une anthropologie physiologique, dont on estimait que les limites en avaient d’emblée été fixées par Kant et qu’en conséquence il n’était pas voué à un grand avenir. Pendant un demi-siècle environ, l’œuvre philosophique de Cabanis, limitée ici (...) aux fameux mémoires sur les Rapports du physique et du moral chez l’homme, a trouvé dans l’anthropologie physiologique, critiquée par Kant, son pré carré et les conditions de sa relative extinction. C’est une seconde réception, sans doute plus souterraine, plus muette aussi sur l’influence réelle que Cabanis a pu exercer, qui lui a permis de ressurgir au début des années 1860, sous une autre forme ou en une autre place : celle de père de la psychophysiologie, une place en apparence identifiable ou superposable à la précédente mais bien distincte. C’est sur cette seconde position, plus favorable à Cabanis, qu’on conclut ces analyses. (shrink)

In The Problem of Christianity, Josiah Royce describes the case of the traitor as embodying "the exemplary type of moral tragedy" which he will use toward the adumbration of a theory of atonement. Royce describes the redemptive process of the traitor as a "tragic reconciliation, " for his sinful deed can never be undone. Still, the traitor can, with regard to his treason, "bring out of the realm of death a new life that only this very death rendered possible." (...) In this article, it is argued that Royce's use of "death" here is no mere metaphorical flourish. Drawing from The World and the Individual and The Problem of Christianity, it is proposed that for Royce, sin and death are different instances of the same evil. Moreover, it is suggested that Royce's novel and perceptive understanding of the limits of human nature leads him to valuable ways of coping with our finitude, both as individuals and communities. (shrink)

This essay examines the concept of the wandering heart-mind in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi 莊子. This essay examines the problems caused by a collection of behaviors in the heart-mind: the ability to make distinctions, the tendency to fix distinctions and language, and the need to act for the sake of fixed ends. Zhuangzi treats these problems with emptying, wandering, and mirroring. These techniques release the heart-mind from fixation and conflict, enabling the heart-mind to respond to conditions without acting (...) for fixed ends. Letting the heart-mind wander provides the receptivity and creativity necessary for responding to a complex world of constant change. Letting the heart-mind wander also opens the possibility of an intrinsically beneficial moral psychology, one where the heart-mind not only adapts to but enjoys a world of transformation and uncertainty. This interpretation of the heart-mind has important consequences for psychology, language, and ethics. In terms of psychology this interpretation diagnoses the limitations of knowledge and proposes therapeutic techniques to treat uncertainty and fixation. In terms of language this interpretation reveals different linguistic attitudes in the text, such as usefulness and play. In terms of ethics this interpretation provides a basis for Zhuangzi’s ethical vision of nourishing living and free-and-easy wandering. (shrink)

This edited collection sets forth a new understanding of aesthetic-moral judgment organised around three key concepts: pleasure, reflection, and accountability. The overarching theme is that art is not merely a representation or expression like any other, but that it promotes shared moral understanding and helps us engage in meaning-making. This volume offers an alternative to brain-centric and realist approaches to aesthetics. It features original essays from a number of leading philosophers of art, aesthetics, ethics, and perception, including Elizabeth (...) Burns Coleman, Garrett Cullity, Cynthia A. Freeland, Ivan Gaskell, Paul Guyer, Jane Kneller, Keith Lehrer, Mohan Matthen, Jennifer A. McMahon, Bence Nanay, Nancy Sherman, and Robert Sinnerbrink. Part I of the book analyses the elements of aesthetic experience— pleasure, preference, and imagination—with the individual conceived as part of a particular cultural context and network of other minds. The chapters in Part II explain how it is possible for cultural learning to impact these elements through consensus building, an impulse to objectivity, emotional expression, and reflection. Finally, the chapters in Part III converge on the role of dissonance, difference, and diversity in promoting cultural understanding and advancement. Social Aesthetics and Moral Judgment will appeal to philosophers of art and aesthetics, as well as to scholars in other disciplines interested in issues related to art and cultural exchange. (shrink)

The notion of “attitude” is central to the reception of Wittgenstein in moral philosophy, in at least two different contexts: firstly, in connection with early Wittgenstein it has become standard to speak of ethics as an “attitude towards the world as a whole”; and secondly, and in connection with the later Wittgenstein, the notion of the “attitude towards a soul” - in contrast with the alleged opinion that someone has a soul - has been used to elucidate a sense (...) of the moral significance of others, particularly in the writings of Peter Winch and Cora Diamond. Interestingly, within contemporary metaethics, the position that our moral judgments are expressions of attitude is labelled “moral expressivism”. In this paper I focus on Simon Blackburn’s version of moral expressivism. I argue that Blackburn’s position is motivated by the same concerns Wittgenstein expressed in his Lecture on Ethics. However, while Blackburn’s notion of “attitude” is ultimately an emotivist notion, denoting a binary affective response to the facts, the notion of “attitude” used in Wittgensteinian contexts is much subtler; while it often involves an emotional response, an attitude is primarily a way of conceiving the facts and in the context of his later work it is more firmly grounded in practices. I suggest finally that if we modify moral expressivism by adopting the Wittgensteinian notion of attitude, we are able to more capably answer some of the objections to standard moral expressivism and generate a more sophisticated and plausible view. (shrink)

Abstrak: Dalam artikel ini pandangan John Dewey tentang tolok ukur penilaian moral, sebagaimana ia jelaskan dalam teori etika pragmatiknya, akan disajikan dan dievaluasi. Artikel dibagi dalam tiga bagian. Pertama, berbeda dengan teori-teori etika teleologis, di mana moralitas tindakan dinilai dari menunjang tidaknya tindakan tersebut dalam upaya mencapai tujuan akhir hidup manusia, dalam pandangan Dewey, suatu tindakan dinilai secara moral baik kalau tindakan tersebut mencapai tujuan yang dimaksudkan untuknya. Tujuan tersebut bersifat kontekstual dan plural serta selalu terkait dengan sarana (...) yang tersedia untuk mencapainya. Kedua, bagi Dewey suatu tindakan dinilai baik atau benar secara moral kalau menunjang proses perwujudan diri si pelaku tindakan. Apa yang menunjang proses perwujudan diri si pelaku tindakan tak pernah dapat ditentukan secara a priori berdasarkan konsep kodrat manusia. Dalam memahami manusia, Dewey menolak paham esensialisme kondrat manusia. Ia memahami pengertian perwujudan diri manusia dalam konteks proses ‘transaksi’ manusia sebagai organisme dengan lingkungan hidup sekitarnya. Ketiga, sebuah evaluasi terhadap pandangan Dewey mengenai tolok ukur penilaian moral dalam teori etika pragmatiknya akan disajikan. Katakunci: etika, penilaian moral, organisme, lingkungan, ends-in-view, pengembangan diri, tradisi moral, pragmatisme, naturalisme, transaksi. Abstract: In this article John Dewey’s criteria for moral judgment, as he expounds in his pragmatic ethics, will be presented and evaluated. The article will be divided into three parts. First, different from traditional teleological ethics, in which the morality of an act is judged from the point of view of certain human final end, an act, in Dewey’s view, should be judged as morally good if it achieves its specific and contextual end-in-view. There are many ends-in-view as there are many moral acts, and an end-in-view can never be determined apart from its actually available means to achieve it. Second, for Dewey, an act is considered good or morally right if it does in practice lead to the human self-realization of the agent. What constitutes an agent’s human self-realization can never be determined in a priori way. Dewey rejects essentialism of human nature in understanding human being. He understands human self-realization within the context human dynamic process of “transactions” with his or her concrete environment. Third, an evaluation of Dewey’s view will be provided. Keywords: ethics, moral judgment, organism, environment, ends-in-view, self-realization, moral tradition, pragmatism, naturalism, transaction. (shrink)

If reason and emotion are taken as inseparable founda–tional components of human nature, then all knowledge must be characterized by both objective description and subjective, felt experience. If that is the case, then it is impossible for autonomy to be described in terms of rational knowledge, independent of affective response. Accordingly, autonomy and interdependence are mutually inclusive terms. Following the assumption that reason and emotion are integrally related in human understanding, morality can be explained by reference to both rational principles (...) and emotive, unreflected experience. Spinoza, Hume, and Vasu–bandhu provide three different but compatible views of moral development based on their views of the mutually informing effect of reason and emotion on motivation for action. In contrast to Kant, they describe the morally autonomous person as one who is directed by personal interests shaped by a consciousness of the context of emerging interrelated conditions. It is a context in which individual self–expression is a function of receptivity and responsiveness to the expression of others. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. German idealism, and especially transcendentalism, was a unique phenomenon in the history of philosophy of the 19th century, especially its views on nature, man and spirit. It influenced various idealistic teachings both in Europe and in America (transcendentalism). This paper explores the reception of Hegelian philosophy of history and right in the works of Julian Vassyian, a Ukrainian philosopher and nationalist. Both thinkers emphasize the importance of historical necessity, war, and (...) the role of individuals in shaping national identity. Hegel's concept of the "spirit of the world" and the unfolding of history through the dialectical process provides a foundational framework for understanding the evolution of nations. Vassyian, while influenced by Hegel, adapts his ideas to the unique historical and cultural context of Ukraine, a nation that has struggled with its identity and sovereignty due to external invasions and internal divisions. The study seeks to compare and contrast the way in which these two thinkers conceptualize history, the role of war, and the formation of national consciousness. M e t h o d s. Research methods used in this paper are the following: literature review, textual analysis, and contextual analysis that made possible to select the proper text fragments and identify the set of philosophical problems for the analysis and research. Comparative analysis allowed to reveal similarities and differences in the researched doctrines by Hegel and Vassyian and draw the conclusions R e s u l t s. The analysis reveals several key areas of alignment and divergence between Hegel and Vassyian. Both thinkers view history as the unfolding of an idea that manifests in the actions of peoples and nations. The "spirit of the world" in Hegel's philosophy and the "unwritten order of being" in Vassyian's thought share similar functions in terms of guiding historical processes and embodying the spirit of a nation. Both thinkers agree that war plays a crucial role in revealing the health or decline of a nation. For Hegel, war is a moment that exposes the vitality of a nation and serves as a necessary force in history. Vassyian shares this view, seeing war not just as a destructive force but as a defining moment for the Ukrainian nation, a means of preserving or renewing national identity in the face of adversity. Both thinkers outline the role of the individual in history, but while Hegel views the individual as a mere instrument of the "spirit of the world", Vassyian requires active, willful participation from the individual to bring about historical change. Vassyian stresses the concept of moral sacrifice and the individual's duty to the nation, suggesting that only through personal commitment to a higher cause can a nation evolve and fulfill its historical destiny. C o n c l u s i o n s. This study demonstrates that while Julian Vassyian was influenced by Hegelian philosophy of history, he adapted it to the Ukrainian context, highlighting the unique historical struggles faced by the Ukrainian people. The core concepts of historical necessity, war, and national identity in both philosophers' works converge around the idea that history is shaped by active, willful participation and sacrifice. However, Vassyian goes beyond Hegel's passive acceptance of historical determinism by emphasizing the importance of individual agency and moral commitment in shaping the fate of a nation. The paper concludes that Vassyian's philosophy offers a compelling interpretation of Ukrainian history and identity, suggesting that the Ukrainian nation's emergence is tied to the active will of individuals who align themselves with a higher moral purpose, particularly through the ongoing struggle and "war" for national survival and sovereignty. (shrink)

There are many moral qualities which are valued in men. But the question of virtue, of the moral worth of the person as an agent, is quite a different question from that of whether or not he possesses these moral qualities. The problem with which Kant wrestled for many years was that of the nature of the relation between the ‘feeling’ and the ground or motivation of moral action. His Critical doctrine was that the moral (...) feelings lie at the basis of morality, as subjective conditions of our receptiveness to the concept of duty. The Critical doctrine was to allocate the moral feeling to the causality of reason in its practical use, and in that way deliver it from the subjectivism which Kant attributes to all feelings. In the Prize Essay Kant explicitly limits the task of philosophy, however provisionally, to the analytic one of exhibiting, in Newtonian fashion, the basic elements of experience. (shrink)