In Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 Aristotle raises a puzzle about moral habituation. Scholars take the puzzle to concern how a learner could perform virtuous actions, given the assumption that virtue is prior to virtuous action. I argue, instead, that Aristotle is concerned to defend the necessity of practice, given the assumption that virtue is reducible to virtuous action.

This paper attempts to develop a projectivistic understanding of chance or objective probability or partial determination. It does so by critically examining David Lewis’ philosophy of probability and his defense of Humean Supervenience, building thereupon the constructive projectivistic alternative, which will basically be a suitable reinterpretation of de Finetti’s position. Any treatment of the topic must show how it extends to natural necessity or deterministic laws or full determination in perfect parallel. The paper indicates at the end how this (...) demand can be met. (shrink)

This article draws on insights of young people learning to make natural pigments and traditional paintings in acute climate vulnerable areas. Why do they paint during ongoing crises and how do they voice their future concerns? Critical realism is applied as a meta-theory in this field-based study in a slum area in Kolkata and the Sundarbans mangrove forest. Methods comprise focus groups, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation. Analysis was done in an abductive process, applying Roy Bhaskar’s model of ‘four-planar social (...) being’. The analysis demonstrates how painting with natural pigments leads the young ones towards: (a) discovering beauty in nature (b) transcendence of borders (c) transformation and responsible action (d) discovering one’s own dignity. Findings are discussed considering the key concepts co-presence and crisis system. I reflect upon how this local effort can inspire a new economy, with the signposts: becoming co-present with the natural world and the necessity of beauty. (shrink)

n Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke criticized descriptivist theories of proper names and suggested a ‘better picture’ as a replacement. But while the ‘better picture’ that Kripke provided was very interesting and stimulating, it was little more than a sketch of a theory that needed much work and refinement. While Kripke argued that proper names are not synonymous with definite descriptions or clusters of definite descriptions, he was silent on what the semantic contents of names might be. Further, he (...) even speculated in the introduction to his book that the apparatus of propositions might break down given his arguments, thus further adding to the need to develop the agenda that he got underfoot. Still further, in his third lecture Kripke extended his account of proper names as being rigid designators to natural kind terms without providing arguments for such an extension and without arguing specifically that natural kind names are rigid designators. Consequently, it is not clear what one should think about his well known arguments regarding the epistemic and modal status of identity statements, such as ‘water is H2O.’. (shrink)

The modern belief that mindless forces can be ultimate efficient causes of natural events is a conceptual impossibility. The logically ultimate cause of any change, the something that is ultimately making it occur in the present moment, is either a mind or not. More specifically, the cause either chooses to act or it does not. By choice here, I mean an act of free will in the libertarian sense. Where there is choosing in this sense there must be a mind. (...) And when we say that an agent acts thus freely, we mean that it acts without being causally determined to act by anything beyond itself. However, this is conceptually indistinguishable from the idea of an ultimate efficient cause. To say that an agent is the ultimate cause in a causal chain is, by definition, to say that it acts without being caused to act by anything beyond itself. It is the head of the causal chain. It is, therefore, a matter of conceptual necessity that ultimate causes be minds, a fact that we have been blind to since the Scientific Revolution on the bad analogy of machines. Thus, every force ultimately governing the universe must be a mind corresponding either to the polytheist’s or the monotheist’s generic definition of divinity, and monotheism’s eternal mind will always be the most complete and justifiable explanation for the existence of the universe as a whole, even for the existence of the gods themselves. (shrink)

Both Hegel and Marx appear committed to the idea that the Reign of Terror was in some sense necessary. I argue that Hegel explains this necessity in terms of the concept of ‘absolute freedom’, together with the associated self-conception and normative picture of the world. It will be argued that Marx also views the Reign of Terror as necessary because of an abstract conception of political freedom and the citizen which conflicts with a determinate individuality that is characterized by (...) particular interests and identities. In connection with Marx’s critique of Hegel’s theory of the modern state I draw attention to a puzzle, the discussion of which will lead to a brief account of how Marx’s attempt to overcome the opposition between the state and civil society differs from Hegel’s. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Existence and the Good: Metaphysical Necessity in Morals and Politics by Franklin I. GamwellWilliam MeyerExistence and the Good: Metaphysical Necessity in Morals and Politics FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011. 219 pp. $24.95In the current era, a few prominent philosophers have called into question the antiteleological tendencies of modern thought. For instance, Thomas Nagel argues that we should reject the antiteleology (...) of science and its “comprehensive, speculative world picture” of “reductive materialism” (Mind and Cosmos, Oxford 2012, 4). As a nontheist, Nagel proposes a “natural teleology” as a secular alternative to theism and to the nonteleology of science as a way to offer a more intelligible and holistic understanding of existence; yet he admits at one point: “Without God, it is unclear what we should aspire to harmony with” (Secular Philosophy & the Religious Temperament, Oxford 2010, 6). With less notoriety but with greater insight, Franklin Gamwell challenges not only modernity’s nonteleology but also its postmetaphysical outlook. By developing a neoclassical or process form of metaphysical theism informed by the works of Charles Hartshorne and Alfred North Whitehead, Gamwell spells out with thoughtful clarity what we should aspire to harmonize with in our individual and collective lives.Focusing on moral and political theory, Gamwell demonstrates that a coherent understanding of ethics (The Divine Good: Modern Moral Theory and the Necessity of God, HarperSanFrancisco, 1990) and politics (Democracy on Purpose: Justice and the Reality of God, Georgetown University Press, 2000) presupposes a neoclassical metaphysical teleology. Here, in Existence and the Good, he offers [End Page 228] a more concise, refined, and integrated formulation of these previous arguments as well as new engagements with important thinkers such as Martin Heidegger and Jeffrey Stout.Gamwell pursues metaphysics in both a “strict” and a “broad” sense: the former refers to critical reflection on the most general characteristics of existence as such, while the latter refers to reflection on the necessary conditions of existence with understanding (17–19). Beginning with the former, he argues that metaphysics properly conceived––in terms of becoming rather than being––is a valid and essential enterprise because “something exists” is necessarily true while “nothing exists” cannot possibly be true (25). He then seeks to show that metaphysics in a broad sense includes metaphysics in the strict sense because existence with understanding necessarily presupposes a metaphysical telos. Toward this end, he engages Heidegger on the metaphysics of subjectivity (chap. 2). Whereas the later Heidegger maintains that all understandings of totality are wholly dependent upon some lifeworld, Gamwell counters that “totality is prior to meaning” because “exemplifications of subjectivity are constituted by prior or nonconscious relations to an order of actualities and possibilities” (49).In chapter 3 Gamwell explicates his neoclassical theism by arguing that the metaphysical telos must be an all-inclusive divine individual. Distinct from Hartshorne, he posits that God does not relate to the world merely in terms of an integration of all past actualities but rather “cooccupies the locus of all contemporaries.” Thus, all “worldly enactment localizes the divine” (90). Gamwell offers here a metaphysical version of incarnation: “Localization of the divine means relation to a becoming that cooccupies one’s place in the world and, therefore, means a communion unlike any other, so that God, we may say, is ‘closer than hands or feet.’ As the metaphysical individual, God is literally the one ‘in whom we live and move and have our being’” (92).Gamwell concludes by engaging Stout on the underlying necessity of metaphysics for democracy. Whereas Stout offers an “ethics without metaphysics” in the form of a “specific pragmatism,” which holds that citizens can coordinate actions on the basis of “moral norms [that] are entirely creatures of historically located social practices” (134), Gamwell maintains that democracy requires “a metaphysical pragmatism,” because “the practice of democratic discourse itself, as all human practices, implies the necessary principle or principles of morality” (146). The key distinction here is between implicit and explicit: Gamwell submits that democracy implicitly presupposes the divine metaphysical telos because that telos is rooted in the very character of reality as such. However, this does not mean that citizens must explicitly recognize or hold... (shrink)

Plato's Timaeus contains a powerful and influential myth, of the construction of the universe by a divine craftsman. A god imposes reason on necessity, to bring order from a primeval 'receptacle' of disordered matter. There results the 'child' that is the cosmos - a copy of an eternally-existing perfect model. Here eight new essays from a distinguished international cast, explore aspects of this challenging work: the principles of the mythical narrative, how the world soul and human body are formed, (...) implications for illness - mental and physical, the importance of music and harmonious proportion. Later developments are also treated: Aristotle's theory of generation, the commentary of Proclus and elements of modern evolutionary theory. (shrink)

This chapter discusses how jus in bello necessity can and should be balanced against the principle of humanity. In many ways, the principle of humanity covers much of the same ground as human rights principles, except in this case the principle is already internal to jus in bello. So this chapter explains how some human rights principles—under the guise of the principle of humanity—have a proper role to play in checking the inherent permissiveness of jus in bello necessity. (...) To accomplish this task, the chapter examines how the principle of humanity and necessity work in both legal and philosophical arguments about just conduct during warfare. (shrink)

In an effort to account for our a priori knowledge of synthetic necessary truths, Kant proposes to extend the successful method used in mathematics and the natural sciences to metaphysics. In this paper, a uniform account of that method is proposed and the particular contribution of the ‘Copernican hypothesis’ to our knowledge of necessary truths is explained. It is argued that, though the necessity of the truths is in a way owing to the object's relation to our cognition, the (...) truths we come to know are fully objective, expressing necessary relations between properties. Kant's distinction between ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena’ is shown to serve to properly restrict the scope of the necessity claims so that they do express necessary connections between properties. (shrink)

In the Theodicy, Leibniz argues against two impious conceptions of God—a God who makes arbitrary choices and a God who doesn’t make choices at all. Many interpret Leibniz as navigating these dangers by positing a kind of non-Spinozistic necessitarianism. I examine passages from the Theodicy which reject not only blind necessitarianism but necessitarianism altogether. Leibniz thinks blind necessitarianism is dangerous due to the conception of God it entails and the implications for morality. Non-Spinozistic necessitarianism avoids many of these criticisms. Leibniz (...) finds that even necessary actions should receive certain rewards and punishments as long as they necessarily lead to a change in future behavior. But Leibniz rejects even non-Spinozistic necessitarianism on the grounds that it is inconsistent with punitive justice. Whether Leibniz successfully avoids necessitarianism, it ought to be clear that he sees his own position as significantly distinct from necessitarianism and not just Spinozism. (shrink)

The Philosophical Forum, Volume 52, Issue 3, Page 245-261, Fall 2021.

Plantation Logics, Citizenship Violence and the Necessity of Slowing Down Based on the work of anti-colonial thinker Anton de Kom, this article reveals the formative violence of modern citizenship in the Dutch colonial context of Suriname and its inheritances in Europe. The article firstly discusses how Anton de Kom’s work, based on the experiences of slavery and indenture, deconstructs universalist-inclusive narratives about the law and citizenship. From the lens of what I term Citizenship Violence, the racialised socio-legal binary embedded (...) in modernity that De Kom’s seminal work We Slaves of Suriname points to will be analysed. Secondly, the normalisation of capitalism in post-independent Suriname will be discussed. Thirdly, attention is drawn to how De Kom’s work can be made relevant for contesting the coloniality of Europe’s citizenship and migration regime. Lastly, a pressing contemporary afterlife of racial slavery and capitalism in terms of the omnipresent self-exhausting neo-liberal ethics will be discussed. Pleading for an ethics of ‘slowing down’, I ask how Anton de Kom’s anti-colonial and anti-capitalist critique can be translated into a decolonial critique of the neo-liberal subject and the logics of capitalist modernity in which it is embedded. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers are often said to be indifferent or even hostile to the history of philosophy – that is, not to the idea of history of philosophy as such, but regarded as a species of the genus philosophy rather than the genus history. Here it is argued that such an attitude is actually inconsistent with approaches within the philosophies of mind that are typical within analytic philosophy. It is suggested that the common “argument rather than pedigree” claim – that is, (...) that claim that philosophical ideas should be evaluated only in the context of the reasons for or against them, and not in terms of historical conditions that brought them about – presupposes an early modern “egological” conception of the mind as normatively autonomous, and that such a view is in contradiction with the deeply held naturalistic predispositions of most contemporary philosophers of mind. Using the example of Wilfrid Sellars, who attempted to combine “naturalist” and “normative” considerations in his philosophy of mind, it is argued that only by treating the mind as having an artifactual dimension can these opposing considerations be accommodated. And, if the mind is at least partly understood as artifactual, then, to that extent, like all artifacts, it is to be understood via a narrative about the particular human activities in which those artifacts are produced and in which they function. (shrink)

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that metaphysics is a necessary discipline -- necessary in the sense that all areas of philosophy, all areas of science, and in fact any type of rational activity at all would be impossible without a metaphysical background or metaphysical presuppositions. Because of the extremely strong nature of this claim, it is not possible to put forward a very simple argument, although I will attempt to construct one. A crucial issue here is what (...) metaphysics in fact is -- the nature of metaphysics. The conception of metaphysics which I support could be called Aristotelian, as opposed to Kantian: metaphysics is the first philosophy and the basis of all other philosophical and scientific inquiry. I will argue that this is indeed the most plausible conception of metaphysics. (shrink)

Many logicians have tried to formalize a modal logic from the Prior Analytics, but the general view is that Aristotle has failed to offer a consistent modal logic there. This paper explains that Aristotle is not interested in modal logic as such. Modalities for him pertain to the relations of predication, without challenging the assertoric system of deductions simpliciter. Thus, demonstrations or dialectical deductions have modal predicates and yet are still deductions simpliciter. It is a matter of distinguishing inferential (...) class='Hi'>necessity that applies to every deduction from the modal predicates in the two premises and conclusion. The modality of demonstrations can be either necessary or possible. The necessity is predicative, i.e., independent of inferential necessity. While the possible demonstration challenges the predicative necessity of the necessary demonstration, it preserves the inferential necessity of the deduction simpliciter. (shrink)

The relation between free will and necessity is one of the most important issues regarding the problem of “free will”. This is because of the rule which indicates that “being not necessary, an event would not be came off”. There has been an ongoing debate among theologians, philosophers and Jurists on whether this rule includes free actions. Sadrain Philosophers believe that this rule is inclusive of human free actions, while followers of the Na’eeni school endorse the opposite. In this (...) article, after reviewing the views of philosophers and jurists on the stages of a free action, I shall explore the question whether human actions, stages of which are understood deterministic, could be regarded as free, and so, whether Na’eenian criticisms against philosophers are justified. Besides, I shall put forth some innovative ideas of Allameh Ja’fari concerning the issue, whose view, while revises some philosophers’, is not compatible with that of Na’eeni. (shrink)

Many have argued that if God exists then he must necessarily create the best possible world , which entails that the bpw necessarily exists, and is therefore the only possible world. But without any scope for comparison, the superlative term ‘best’ is clearly inappropriate and so the bpw cannot be the bpw at all! As such, it must be impossible for God to create it. Hence if God exists then he must of necessity make something that is impossible to (...) create! Because of its conclusion, I call this the repugnant argument. I consider a number of possible responses to this argument. (shrink)

In The Corporeal Turn, political theorist John Tambornino offers a thorough rethinking of ethical and political theory by emphasizing human embodiment, and the primacy of passion and need, in response to the neglect of these matters in much of contemporary thought. Tambornino calls for a 'corporeal turn' or, as he explains, sustained attention to human embodiment—something that is often occluded when priority is given to reason or language. Working through a diverse set of thinkers, exploring such themes as necessity (...) and freedom, need and desire, nature and convention, and public and private, and noting vivid instances of politicized embodiment, Tambornino takes seriously Nietzsche's claim that philosophy has largely been an interpretation and misunderstanding of the body. The result is nothing less than a new orientation to ethical and political theory—one that appreciates the complex relations of language, politics, culture and corporeality-and a powerful intervention into those domains. (shrink)

What is this discipline called history of philosophy? What standards are relevant to its assessment? There aren’t single, straightforward answers to these quest.

Throughout his philosophical career, Hilary Putnam was preoccupied with the question of what survives of the traditional notion of a priori truth in light of the recurring historical phenomenon, made prominent by the scientific revolutions of the early decades of the twentieth century, through which “something that was literally inconceivable has turned out to be true”. Impugning the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, Putnam’s redefinition of “conceptual truth” in terms of “quasi-necessity relative to a conceptual scheme” is meant to accommodate the possibility (...) of transitions of just this sort. In this essay, I trace the origins and development of Putnam’s account of “quasi-necessity.” I try to defend it against some objections naturally arising in connection with the interplay of modality and negation. My main contention is that the main tenets of Putnam’s semantic externalism inform his reconception of conceptual truth, and that they must be recognized to hold of such basic logical notions as those of judgment and negation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pragmatism, Democracy, and the Necessity of RhetoricScott R. StroudPragmatism, Democracy, and the Necessity of Rhetoric by Robert Danisch Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007. Pp. xii + 190. $39.95, cloth.The classical pragmatists are an infuriating bunch for those in rhetorical studies. For instance, the commitment of William James and John Dewey to uncertainty and change in politics and epistemology stands to position them with those (...) studying rhetoric as a necessary tool in the uncertain situation that humans find themselves in—be it in nature or in society. But the pragmatists steadfastly avoid engaging (or even using) the concepts of rhetorical theory or practice. Even the commentary of James and Dewey on "communication" is vague and often perfunctory. Thus, contemporary rhetorical scholars find themselves at an impasse—Do they talk about the pragmatists, even though the pragmatists do not engage the rhetorical tradition in a sustained fashion, or do they simply ignore this important and fairly original strain of American thought (perhaps in favor of European lines of philosophical thought)? I believe that the more interesting choice is to pursue the former option and to engage the pragmatists in terms of what they have to offer communication studies and the study of rhetoric. This, of course, will necessitate acknowledging their compatibility and relative lack of engagement with the rhetorical tradition. The rewards of such a constructive engagement, however, could be great for the study of communication and rhetoric.This is the path that Robert Danisch's recent book, Pragmatism, Democracy, and the Necessity of Rhetoric, sets out to traverse. The stated project [End Page 96] of this work is to show the compatibility of the classical rhetorical tradition and the pragmatist tradition. Beyond this, Danisch attempts to show that rhetoric is essential to the pragmatist project and that a variety of rhetorics can be identified in the actual work or practices of important American pragmatists. As he clearly puts it in his concluding chapter, "This is precisely the purpose of pragmatism—it was designed as a philosophy that would ultimately extend beyond itself to invent tools, techniques, ideas, and instruments of change that it alone could not imagine. It is my contention that rhetorics and rhetorical theories are just those tools, techniques, ideas, and instruments" (144). I believe that Danisch goes an admirable distance in making this case and in furthering the still-nascent work that strives to connect rhetoric and pragmatism.Danisch begins his case for connecting rhetoric and pragmatism by addressing the two traditions in general terms. First, he limits his inquiry to classical rhetoric, although his concluding chapter features issues and figures within more recent rhetorical scholarship. This is a defensible strategy, as "rhetoric" is almost as ambiguous and inexact as "pragmatism." What connects both classical rhetoric and pragmatism, according to Danisch's way of setting up the analysis, is that both traditions represent approaches or orientations toward the world and society. Both see the world as fundamentally uncertain, and both see human action as playing a vital role in creating what actually "is" the case, whether it is in terms of scientific knowledge or political institutions. He clarifies this in terms of how rhetoric and pragmatism focus on action—"The question for both pragmatism and rhetoric concerns method. Active human agents employ tools and techniques designed to order and influence human affairs; pragmatism and rhetoric share this concern" (39). Thus, both focus on methods of guiding and directing human action such that it results in the sort of world that we want to instantiate or create. Danisch attempts to explore the connection of these two traditions, and he promises that beyond being possible, it will be rewarding in three ways. First, pragmatism seems to offer the resources and opportunities to develop "rhetorics based on its principles and fit to the problems of contemporary democracy" (15). Second, such an engagement of pragmatism with the concepts of classical rhetoric will reaffirm the importance of these classical concepts in today's circumstances. Third, both pragmatism and rhetoric will be improved, since "philosophies are improved by exploring their relationships to rhetoric, and rhetorics are improved by exploring their intellectual justifications" (15). Some may be uneasy... (shrink)

I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity . The general problem of my study may be expressed as follows: What is the metaphysical justification of the validity and existence of the pertinent classes of truths, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori, according to the Kripke Paradigm? My approach is meant to disclose the logical and ontological principles underlying Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori respectively. (...) The results of my study are to a certain extent negative: They attempt to show that the classes of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori statements cannot possibly be valid. If the general argument of this thesis is sound, then, on this ground, the realist conception of metaphysical essentialism is rejected. The positive thesis of this study is the articulation of certain ways to frame the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori which avoid the problems of realistic essentialism and which suggest a certain transcendental reading of modality. According to the Kripke Paradigm, any de dicto modal status derives ultimately from the de re modality inherent in the object designated, as the object is characterised by contingent and necessary properties on the ontological level. Thus, the Kripke Paradigm is primarily a thesis in de re realist essentialism. The final verdict in this study is that the Kripke Paradigm cannot sustain the realistic conception of de re metaphysical essentialism. If we should adopt a transcendental reading of modality, then certain portions of the Kripke Paradigm are valid. I do not delineate or possess the details of a comprehensive doctrine of transcendental metaphysic. Nevertheless, the observations I make should suffice to bring about the rough orientation of how I conceive the notion of transcendental modality. (shrink)

Drawing on Kant's published and unpublished texts and a wide range of texts from the history of logic and philosophical inquiries into language, Mosser provides an interpretation of some of Kant's most complex arguments.

This is a very informative and lucid account of the career of a central philosophical topic in eighteenth‐century Britain, the debate between libertarians and necessitarians, from Locke to Dugald Stewart. The work has many strengths, and I learnt much from it. It will be of great interest to historians of the period, but the readership should be wider than that. Those working on the debate today should also read this book. Harris (quite legitimately) does not see his task as that (...) of a historian of philosophy, mining old texts in pursuit of contemporary discussion. Instead he seeks to understand the philosophers and their problems on their own terms. In doing so, however, he offers an alternative perspective that may be enlightening to those in the thick of present‐day trench warfare. He not only discusses some neglected figures but also changes our understanding of those with whom we are familiar, especially Hume. I begin by laying out the main themes of the book and its contents. I then discuss Harris' treatment of Hume in more detail. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that taking basic human rights seriously—and the basic right to subsistence in particular—requires acknowledging that, given certain conditions, people in need have a right of necessity to take, use and/or occupy the property of others in order to get out of their plight. I explore the implications of this for the phenomenon of illegalized migration for subsistence reasons, and suggest that receiving countries ought not to deny entry to these migrants. On the contrary, those (...) seeking to enter should be morally permitted to do it. The reason is that, just as basic rights should serve as internal limits to any minimally reasonable system of property rights, so should they serve as limits to any minimally reasonable system of territorial rights. After developing this idea, I address some objections to the principle and its application, and conclude by pointing to the immediate, mediate and final duties that this principle gives rise to. (shrink)