The current research investigates how prior preferences affect causal learning. Participants were tasked with repeatedly choosing policies (e.g., increase vs. decrease border security funding) in order to maximize the economic output of an imaginary country and inferred the influence of the policies on the economy. The task was challenging and ambiguous, allowing participants to interpret the relations between the policies and the economy in multiple ways. In three studies, we found evidence of motivated reasoning despite financial incentives for accuracy. For (...) example, participants who believed that border security funding should be increased were more likely to conclude that increasing border security funding actually caused a better economy in the task. In Study 2, we hypothesized that having neutral preferences (e.g., preferring neither increased nor decreased spending on border security) would lead to more accurate assessments overall, compared to having a strong initial preference; however, we did not find evidence for such an effect. In Study 3, we tested whether providing participants with possible functional forms of the policies (e.g., the policy takes some time to work or initially has a negative influence but eventually a positive influence) would lead to a smaller influence of motivated reasoning but found little evidence for this effect. This research advances the field of causal learning by studying the role of prior preferences, and in doing so, integrates the fields of causal learning and motivated reasoning using a novel explore‐exploit task. (shrink)

According to many criteria, agency, intentionality, responsibility and freedom of decision, require conscious decisions. Freud already assumed that many of our decisions are influenced by dynamically unconscious motives or that we even perform unconscious actions based on completely unconscious considerations. Such actions might not be intentional, and perhaps not even actions in the narrow sense, we would not be responsible for them and freedom of decision would be missing. Recent psychological and neurophysiological research has added to this a number of (...) phenomena (the "new unconscious") in which behavior is completely unconscious or in which the decision or its execution is influenced by unconscious factors: priming, automatic behavior, habitualized behavior, actions based on plain unconscious deliberations, intrusion of information from the dorsal pathway, etc. However, since this makes up the largest part of the behavior which is generally regarded as action, intentionality, yet agency, responsibility and even compatibilist freedom of decision for the largest part of our behavior may be threatened. Such considerations have led to a lively debate, which, however, suffers from generalizations that lump all these unconscious phenomena together. In contrast, the aim of this article is to discuss individual unconscious influences on our behavior separately with respect to what extent they require changes in traditional conceptualizations. The first part (2-4) of the article outlines the "traditions" and their elaborations: the intentional causalist concept of action, an associated empirical theory of action and standard concepts of responsibility and compatibilist freedom of decision, as well as the challenges for them. In the second part (5-9), the aforementioned unconscious influences on our actions (except for automated and habitualized actions, which I discuss elsewhere) are examined: 1. unconscious priming, 2. dynamically unconscious motives, 3. dorsal pathway information influencing conscious decisions, 4. unconsciously altered execution of conscious intentions, 5. unconscious deliberations and decisions. To what extent do these phenomena C1. require a change in the concept of action, C2. curtail intentionality or agency, C3. responsibility and C4. freedom? The result is: The curtailments prove to be far less dramatic than they initially appear; they require more watchfulness but no conceptual change. (shrink)

ABSTRACT BACKGROUND: The objective of this study was to identify factors motivating women to take part in endometriosis research and to determine if these factors differ for women participating in clinical versus basic science studies. METHODS: A consecutive series of 24 women volunteering for participation in endometriosis‐related research were asked to indicate, in their own words, why they chose to volunteer. In addition, the women were asked to rate, on a scale of 0 to 10, sixteen potentially motivating factors. The (...) information was gathered in the form of an anonymous self‐administered questionnaire. RESULTS: Strong motivating factors (mean score >8) included potential benefit to other women's health, improvement to one's own condition, and participation in scientific advancement. Weak motivating factors (mean score <3) included financial compensation, making one's doctor happy, and use of ‘natural’ products. No difference was detected between clinical and basic science study participants. CONCLUSION: This study is the first study to specifically investigate the factors that motivate women to take part in endometriosis research. Understanding why women choose to take part in such research is important to the integrity of the informed consent process. The factors most strongly motivating women to participate in endometriosis research related to improving personal or public health; the weakest, to financial compensation and pleasing the doctor. (shrink)

(1979). Motivation and Mode: an attempt to measure the attitudes of ‘O’ level GCE candidates to English language. Educational Studies: Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 231-239.

Socrates’ view about human motivation in Plato’s early dialogues has often been called ‘intellectualist’ because, in his account, the motivation for any given intentional action is tied to the intellect, specifically to beliefs. Socratic motivational intellectualism is the view that we always do what we believe is the best (most beneficial) thing we can do for ourselves, given all available options. Motivational intellectualism is often considered to be at the centre of Socrates’ intellectualist account of actions, according to (...) which: (1) we never act against our present judgment about what is best to do; (2) all wrongdoing is due to ignorance; (3) non-rational desires cannot motivate actions; (3) we all desire the good; and (5) no one does wrong willingly. Despite their centrality for Socratic philosophy, interpreters disagree on the exact interpretation of these five claims and of Socrates’ account of motivation. This chapter surveys the interpretative landscape so that the reader may more easily navigate the primary and secondary literature and decide for themselves whether Socrates is a motivational intellectualist and, if so, in what sense. (shrink)

The increasing presence of women, especially university women, in risky alcohol consumption such as Binge Drinking, which is associated with gender-specific biopsychosocial problems, makes it necessary to analyze the variables underlying BD in order to adjust possible interventions more in line with their reality. The motives and expectancies of this pattern of consumption, as well as the consequences derived from it, are some of the variables that are shown to have the greatest weight in the prediction of BD. In the (...) present study we analyze, on the one hand, the performance of these variables among college women with alcohol use, and on the other hand, which of these variables allow us to classify BD. A total of 501 female university consumers of alcohol were assessed. Specifically, they completed a self-report of alcohol consumption, the Expectancy Questionnaire, the Drinking Motives Questionnaire and the Alcohol Consumption Consequences Evaluation. BD female students scored significantly higher on these instruments, except for compliance motives. The logistic regression analysis carried out to estimate the probability of performing BD using the social and conformity motives, the ACCE and positive expectancies correctly estimated have a 3.55-fold increase in the probability of having BD, compared to women classified as low risk by the ACCE. On the other hand, women classified as moderate risk by the ACCE have a 4.77-fold increase in the probability of having BD. In the case of social motives and positive expectancies, their increase multiplies by 1.165 and 1.024, respectively, the probability of having BD. The results of this study highlight the importance of adapting preventive measures to the consequences experienced by BD university students, especially in relation to the social motives and positive expectancies that modulate decision-making when engaging in this pattern of consumption. (shrink)

In this paper, I comment on Waismann’s view of ‘motivational explanations’ as he develops it in his unfinished, posthumously published essay ‘Will and Motive’. According to a traditional view, when we act, the motive is an internal psychological state of which we can know through introspection, and it triggers or causes the action. Thus the motive causally explains an independent event which is the action. As Waismann sees it, everything here is false. The motive is (1) not an internal psychological (...) state. (2) We do not know it through introspection. (3) It does not trigger an action, and (4) there is no causal explanation in which the motive is the cause and the action the effect. I analyze Waismann’s arguments for these claims and work out his positive view. Waismann draws our attention to two features: the uncertainty and instability of motives, and the fact that they are often ascribed on the basis of the action even when the agent wasn’t aware of them prior to acting. Might this hold only for certain motives: viz. ‘Triebfedern’ (drives), in particular those that are unconscious, but not for motives in the sense of ‘Beweggrund’ (reason, purpose)? If action explanations in the light of an agent’s purposes or reasons are unaffected by Waismann’s arguments for the instability and uncertainty of motives, then perhaps the traditional view would not be false for this kind of explanation: it is not uncertain, or unstable. However, I understand Waismann as trying to show (in particular through his interpretation of Dostojevki’s Raskolnikov) that even if a reason for which a person acts or a purpose is something that the agent is aware of prior to action, we get the same kind of instability and uncertainty that occurs with unconscious motives. Here is why: agents are normally aware of quite a number of reasons for and against acting in a certain way. But for any one of those reasons, they may deny – as Raskolnikov does – that that is the reason for which they did it. It was a reason, all right, and even one that they considered, but not the one for which they acted. Thus the problems of instability and uncertainty that Waismann points out affects motives not only insofar as they are unconscious and mere drives. They affect motives in the sense of ‘Beweggrund’ as well. (shrink)

The article considers conceptual ideas of color categorization as a cultural practice. Color categorization is the process of dividing the color continuum into discrete color groups (color categories) and fixing them in the human mind through the cutural sign system. In modern color studies, this process is viewed from the ecocentric perspective. According to ecocentrism, humans and other living being are equal parts of nature, and they should coexist in harmony and peace. In this regard, it becomes important to search (...) for ecological motivation not only in the human body, but also in human activity, especially in cultural practices. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to analyze conceptual ideas of color categorization from the ecocentric perspective. The systematization of the indicated conceptual ideas allowed us to identify three key directions based on ecological motivation: (1) nature-centered, (2) body-oriented and (3) socio-cultural. The mentioned directions are formed on the basis of such concepts as "environment", "corporeality" and "sociality", respectively. Acting as the main factors that determine the content and structure of color categories, environment, human body and culture form the main vector of color categorization. The environment comprises a set of objects with chromatic characteristics. They are the material for color categorization, and their configuration sets examples of color combinations. The physiological and biological features of the human body determine the process of color perception and its cognitive processing resulting into color categories. As the color categories become a part of human activity, their cultural semantics is created in the form of cultural meanings and connotations. (shrink)

If it is true that an agent who has a moral reason for acting has a reason for acting independently of whether or not she has a desire to so act , then it cannot also be true both that moral reasons are necessarily motivating and that an agent who is motivated to act is motivated in virtue of a desire to so act . This dissertation argues that the arguments given against Motivational Internalism about Moral Reasons are stronger than (...) the arguments given against either Moral Reasons Authoritativeness or Desire Motivationalism. ;Chapter 1 outlines two types of motivational internalism: Motivational Internalism about Moral Judgments , and Motivational Internalism about Moral Reasons . It also outlines six other sub-positions on the nature of moral reasons, moral judgments and moral obligations, and on the nature of the connection between desires and motivation. Two of these sub-positions are Moral Reasons Authoritativeness and Desire Motivationalism . ;Chapter 2 argues that deontological intuitionists, such as H. A. Prichard, rejected MIMR in order to defend both MRA and DM. Here I defend Prichard's motivational externalist account of moral motivation, in terms of a desire to do one's duty, from a selection of criticisms. ;Chapter 3 argues that W. D. Falk, who coined the terms "internalism" and "externalism", rejected DM in order to defend both MIMR and MRA. Here I argue that Falk's motivational internalist account of moral motivation, in terms of an impulse to act that is not a desire and that has a sui generis sense of necessity attached to it, fails. Since Falk has not refuted DM, he cannot successfully defend MRA. ;Chapter 4 argues that moral noncognitivists, such as A. J. Ayer, rejected MRA in order to defend both MIMR and DM. Here I argue that Ayer's account of moral reasons, according to which some fact about a situation is moral reason for acting if and only if awareness of this fact evokes a moral feeling in an agent, fails. Since Ayer has not refuted MRA, he cannot successfully defend MIMR. (shrink)

In a series of publications, Tamar Gendler has argued for a distinction between belief and what she calls ?alief?. Gendler's argument for the distinction is a serviceability argument: the distinction is indispensable for explaining a whole slew of phenomena, typically involving ?belief-behaviour mismatch?. After embedding Gendler's distinction in a dual-process model of moral cognition, I argue here that the distinction also suggests a possible (dis)solution of what is perhaps the organizing problem of contemporary moral psychology: the apparent tension between the (...) inherently motivational role of moral judgments and their manifestly objectivistic phenomenology. I argue that moral judgments come in two varieties, moral aliefs and moral beliefs, and it is only the former that are inherently motivating and only the latter that have an objectivistic phenomenology. This serves to both bolster the case for the alief/belief distinction and shed new light on otherwise well-trodden territory in metaethics. I start with an exposition of the moral-psychological problem (?1) and a discussion of Gendler's alief/belief distinction (?2). I then apply the latter to moral judgments in an attempt to dissolve the former (?3). I close with discussion of the upshot for our understanding of moral thought, moral motivation, and moral phenomenology (?4). (shrink)

Consider the following argument: (1) Whether, or the degree, persons are morally culpable ultimately depends on the (final) reasons that motivate their actions; (2) The degree to which persons are morally culpable should be a central concern of criminal law; (3) Criminal law in many countries focuses more on the beliefs and intentions of agents and less on their motivating reasons; therefore (4) Criminal law in many countries is unjust and should be revised. The premises of this argument are appealing (...) and widely accepted, yet its conclusion is radical. Therefore, the argument is interesting and important. However, the argument is not entirely clear in several respects, and the attempt to clarify it reveals several significant (although not necessarily decisive) doubts regarding its soundness. In this paper, I examine these doubts as well as a related, more general, lesson concerning normative arguments about the law. (shrink)

In football it was recently demonstrated, that patterns of motivational constructs in young talented football players are relatively stable in early adolescence, and are associated with specific performance related outcomes (Zuber, Zibung, & Conzelmann, 2015). The aim of the present study was to check whether the motivational patterns found in youth elite football also re-emerge in ice hockey, showing similar relations to performance. 135 young male ice hockey talents (MAge = 17.26, SD = 1.24) playing on the highest and second (...) highest level of their age group were questioned about five motivational constructs. Six months later, their coaches rated their players’ current game performance. The results demonstrated a very high similarity of the patterns in ice hockey with the ones earlier found in football. In terms of the transition to performance levels, the highly intrinsically achievement-oriented players were rated by their coaches as belonging to the top-level players significantly more often (OR = 2.6), whereas the non-achievement-oriented failure-fearing players show a higher chance to be rated as part of the lowest performance group (OR = 3.8). The results indicate the importance of achievement motivation for performance in ice hockey also, and this generalizability thus provides relevant clues which are important for consideration in national programs for talent identification across several sports. (shrink)

This paper tries to provide a complete list and classification of the motives for acting in accordance with morals, to explain the mechanisms underlying the less transparent among these motives, and to probe which of these motives are suited for justifying morals. (1) After giving reasons for the importance of an empirical theory of moral motives for ethics, and after specifying the exact question of the present study (2) a general model of moral action (3) and a main classification of (...) the motives for acting morally is presented. (4) Self-transcendent motives, (5) motives close to morals, like sympathy and respect, (6) and moral motives in the narrow sense, which proceed from moral judgements, are scrutinized in detail. Only the motives near to morals and interest in cooperation but not the moral motives in the narrow sense are suited for justifying morals. (7) A concluding sketch of the development of moral judgements shows that only motives near to morals and interest in cooperation (but not e.g. pure reason) are also the sources of autonomously developed moral criteria. (shrink)

Motivation in schizophrenia has been a key research aim for several decades. Motivation is a very complex process underlying negative symptoms that has been assessed and identified using very different instruments and terminologies. This study provides a comprehensive overview of the growing literature production and highlights an extensive set of variables to better understand the study of motivation. Electronic databases were searched in order to compile relevant studies of motivation in individuals with schizophrenia. The initial search (...) identified 3,248 potentially interesting records, and of these, 161 articles published between 1956 and 2017 were finally included. Information such as year of publication, journal, country, and number of authors was codified. Variables related to sample characteristics, methodological aspects, and motivational terms were also extracted. The results revealed a significant growth trend in literature production, especially since the 2000s, with reward as the main term studied. In addition, questionnaires were identified as the preferred instrument to assess motivation in patients with schizophrenia. Other aspects such as country of publication, authors, journals of publication, and co-citation network analysis were also examined. The discussion offers recommendations for future research. (shrink)

Upholding cooperative norms via punishment is of central importance in organizations. But what effect does punishing have on the reputation of the punisher? Although previous research shows third parties can garner reputational benefits for punishing transgressors who violate social norms, we proposed that such reputational benefits can vary based on the perceived motive for the punishment. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that individuals who endorsed a consequentialist (versus deontological) motive for punishing were seen as more trustworthy. In Study (...) 3, the results showed that when pitted against one another, a person who endorsed a consequentialist (versus deontological) motive for punishing was chosen more often as a partner in a Trust Game. In Study 4, we found that a manager who expressed a consequentialist reason for punishing an employee was seen as having less psychopathic tendencies, and this related to the manager being perceived as more trustworthy and a superior cooperation partner. Using a recall methodology, Study 5 results showed that employees who perceived their managers as having more consequentialist (versus deontological) motives for punishing also perceived their managers as being less psychopathic and more trustworthy. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Based on the observation that ancient Chinese thinkers formulated their conception of logic and agency mainly around the concept of biàn 辯 (discrimination), Chris Fraser argues that (1) ancient Chinese thinkers had no concept of sentence or proposition, (2) they did not engage in logical argumentation in its proper sense, and (3) reason or rationality was not highly valued in ancient China for normative evaluation of actions. However, the text of the Mòzǐ 墨子 contains strong pieces of evidence against these (...) claims, and I argue that the opposite is clearly the case in Mòzǐ. Then, I move on to apply the metaethical idea of judgment internalism—the idea that there is an “internal” or conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation—to some passages from the Mòzǐ and argue that Mòzǐ is best interpreted as a flexible internalist who is willing to incorporate an externalist idea into his system of thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Moral Motivation and the Development of Francis Hutcheson’s PhilosophyJohn D. BishopHutcheson was an able philosopher, but philosophical analysis was not his only purpose in writing about morals. 1 Throughout his life his writings aimed at promoting virtue; his changing philosophical views often had to conform, if he could make them, to that rhetorical end. But a mind which understands philosophical argument cannot always control the conclusions at which (...) it arrives. The result for Hutcheson was often tension in his thought—which in the end produced a farrago when he tried to create a system of moral philosophy.Throughout his writing career, Hutcheson’s views on the problem of moral motivation were a combination of change and development against a background of certain constant views. A close examination of his views on moral motivation throws light on the development of his thought, including his growing Stoicism, and some of the changes he made to the moral sense theory.The phrase “moral motivation” can refer to either of two issues. On the one hand there is the question of what motivates virtuous actions, and the usual answer for Hutcheson is benevolence. Because they are approved by the moral sense, actions motivated by benevolence are morally good or virtuous (terms which I will use interchangeably). Hutcheson in his late writings calls such actions “formally good” to distinguish them from actions which do in fact promote the greatest happiness, or the natural good, of others; these latter actions are “materially good.” 2 On the other hand there is [End Page 277] the question of how our knowledge of the virtuousness of certain actions can motivate and how in particular such knowledge can motivate morally good actions. For Hutcheson we know which actions are morally good because we have a moral sense, but how this knowledge motivates morally good actions is a question Hutcheson made several attempts to answer. This second question, how the moral sense can motivate morally good actions, is the focus of this paper. The development of Hutcheson’s idea of benevolence will be commented on briefly, but first we need to look at some of the unchanging aspects of Hutcheson’s thought and purposes to provide background to the issue of motivation.Virtuous actions are the result of virtuous character. Hutcheson maintained this from his earliest publications (Reflections, par. 5) to his posthumous System. 3 A virtuous character cannot be directly chosen, even if we wanted to, because we cannot choose to have benevolent desires: “[N]either benevolence nor any other affection or desire can be directly raised by volition” (Inquiry, IV, 139; revised from first edition).But virtue can be cultivated:... virtue, itself, or good dispositions of mind, are not directly taught, or produced by instruction; they must be originally planted in our nature by its great Author, and afterwards strengthened and confirmed by our own cultivation.(Inquiry, IV, 271. Changed from I, 253, with reference to cultivation added; cf. also Introduction, 13, 25, 38, 39, 58–59, etc.)We can cultivate virtue in ourselves; and through writing, teaching, conversation, and social interaction, we can cultivate it in others. 4 At the start of his career, when announcing in Reflections the purpose of his writing on [End Page 278] moral theory, Hutcheson regrets that the moral systems common in his day are not conducive to promoting virtue: they are written, he says, by moralists who are “sour and morose in their deportment;... easily put out of humour...; dejected with common calamities, and insolent upon any prosperous change in fortune” (Reflections, par. 4). He promises that his forthcoming Inquiry will not have this fault. In the preface to the Essay he complains about the writings of the ethical egoists because “many [people] have been discouraged from all attempts of cultivating kind generous affections in themselves, by a previous notion that there are no such affections in nature...” (I, v; III, v). Throughout all the rest of his writings on morality Hutcheson advocates both the private and communal cultivation of virtue, and at the same time he contributes to that cultivation.The other constant which dominates the moral motivation issue is Hutcheson’s rejection of egoism. Benevolence is a... (shrink)

This paper provides evidence for the following novel insights: (1) People’s economic decisions depend on their psychological motives, which are shaped predictably by the social context. (2) In particular, the social context influences people’s other-regarding preferences, their beliefs and their perceptions. (3) The influence of the social context on psychological motives can be measured experimentally by priming two antagonistic motives—care and anger—in one player towards another by means of an observance or a violation of a fairness norm. Using a mediation (...) approach, we find that the care motive leads to higher levels of cooperation which are driven by more optimistic beliefs, a different perception of the game as well as by a shift towards more pro-social preferences. (shrink)

Many studies of bribery acknowledge the important role of bribe-givers, but their true motives remain unclear. We propose that the likelihood of bribery depends on the willingness of an organization to affiliate with local parties or to be successful in a host country, or to have power over local parties. We further argue that different opportunities, either pervasive or arbitrary, facilitate different types of motives that affect the likelihood of bribery. In addition, we investigate the effect of perceived fairness on (...) the likelihood of bribery. We employ a 3 (motives: affiliation vs. achievement vs. power) × 2 (opportunities: pervasiveness vs. arbitrariness) × 2 (perceived fairness: high vs. low) factorial design in experimental settings among Executive MBA students in southern Taiwan. Our findings indicate that, when companies perceive a higher level of distributive fairness, high-achieving organizations are more likely to offer a bribe when the condition is pervasive. When they have a powerful motive, arbitrariness engenders a higher likelihood of bribery. When they perceive less distributive fairness, there are no significant differences between motive and opportunity. (shrink)

Three studies are presented to validate the Spanish version of Oliver and Raney’s eudaimonic and hedonic motivations scale. In Study 1, 132 university students watched a dramatic film, filling out the scales to evaluate motivations regarding cinema consumption and reception processes. Eudaimonic motivation was associated with deeper cognitive processes during the reception and stronger identification with the protagonist. Study 2 evaluated the test-retest reliability of the eudaimonic and hedonic motivations scale. In Study 3, statistically significant age differences were observed (...) in hedonic and eudaimonic motivations. Furthermore, convergent correlations were detected between hedonic and eudaimonic motivations and preferences of different film genres. These results allow us to conclude that the Spanish version of the hedonic and eudaimonic motivations scale presents adequate psychometric properties, thus being convergent with those obtained by Oliver and Raney. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that a corporate purpose aiming to benefit all stakeholders has a positive effect on employee motivation and engagement, but no empirical studies into these specific effects were found. To examine this assumption, a corporate mission and vision matching the definition of a higher purpose were tested in two subsequent studies. The first study (N = 270) was a cross-sectional self-report study. The second study included a longitudinal design (N = 56) modeling purpose, motivation, and (...) engagement in a cross-lagged panel design over three time-points. The results associated purpose with motivation and engagement. The subsequent longitudinal analysis confirmed the presumed directionality from purpose to engagement, but not to motivation. Hence, while a corporate purpose can be added to the list of antecedents to work engagement, the relationship with motivation, despite the significant association with purpose in the cross-sectional study, remains more complicated. The present study adds to the knowledge of the beneficial effects of a broader purpose and responds to the current surge of interest in purpose as an instrument for sustainable business. (shrink)

SUMMARYThis Study reviews the prevalent concepts of maturation and motivation, and develops the following points :1. Developmental and clinical child Psychology are held apart less because of à differing focus of interests than because of differing concepts of maturation and motivation.2. Maturation is à term applied in biology and Psychology to, the development of the individual by growth processes, as distinguished from development by exercise and learning. It is defined in terms of à sequence or order of phases.3. (...) Sequences can be affected by conditioning. It is suggested that only the groundplan of life, the order of phases from birth through maturity and reproduction to death, is unalterable. Maturation is but one contributing factor, or principle, which co‐determines the more complex process of development.4. The goal‐determining factor in the individuals striving is called motivation. There are two major categories of motivation changes : the basic tendency of life is to establish the individuals equilibrium. From this point of view, all changes of direction are due to environmental influences which call for adaptation to reestablish equilibrium . The second category, the thesis of this Study, is that life is expansion , à process involving the homeostatic mechanism. In the course of the expansive as well as of the adaptive process, the individual changes its direction. Direction changes may be experienced in the act of reproduction when the individual transmits energies to new life; again, in the act of self‐limitation when the productive energies have been exhausted; another change of direction is that from flight movements to experimentation with and mastery of stimuli.5. Three developmental theories have been forwarded. The first, based on the concept of evolution, is à structuralization theory of development. The second, à biogenic theory of development, is related to the growth process and hypothecates à parallel of physical and Psychological development. The third developmental theory describes development as à change of motivation– an adaptation process resulting from the individuals dynamic relationship to his environment.The three theories emphasize three indispensable aspects of the developmental process: organization, content and form, Dynamics and objectives.6. Only the last of these three theories explained the fact of personality immaturity in relationship to the physical maturation, since the adaptive and the physical growth process could be conceived of as relatively independent from each other.7. Objections are raised against this theory of adaptation, to the extent that it claims adaptation to be identical with development.8. Objections are raised against the definition of the discharge principle as the basic tendency of the organism and against the identification of the discharge with the homeostasis principle.9. Since homeostasis is defined as an optimal tension level, and not as its lowest possible level, there must be states of tension which are overly‐low as well as overly‐high. In states of too‐low tension, charging must be à basic tendency of the organism.10. The main properties of life are growth and reproduction– that is, expansion, in which the environment is being exploited, adapted to life, mastered by the living being. Adaptation to the environment is only à partial aspect of life, and may be used as à detour to the opposite goal.11. All living beings have à course of life during which they develop structures that anticipate future needs. Theľ work with reserves. Anľ given need of à living being must be considered as related to the present, past and future of its life. As à consequence, it is impossible to assume that à tendency related only to the moment plays à basic role in the life of the individual. The acute release tendency relates only to acute phases or features of the needs of the immediate present.12. Consequently, deferral occurs not onlt in the course of adaptation, and as an imposed phenomenon; deferral may also occur as unimposed, unlearned behavior whenever the individual is not quite prepared for à desired experience.13. Motivation during growth and during decline is described and analyzed.14. Creativity is defined as constructive activity, à process which has its biological substratum in growth and reproduction. It consists of forming new products which develop, first, from experimentation with materials, and second, from the masterful handling of those materials.15. The probability of the processes of unlearned cooperation is presented.16. Neurosis is found to originate in connection with feelings of guilt and remorse over failing oneself as well as over failing others.17. The aim of life is seen in the contribution of biologically and/or culturally constructive products which can be utilized in the building process of life and of culture. (shrink)

Based on Eisenberg et al.'s model of prosocial motivations, the present study examined what motivates preschoolers to display instrumental helping and how various motivations develop during the preschool years. The participants were 477 preschoolers aged 3–5 years assigned to one of five groups. In each experimental group, the experimenter emphasized an altruistic or egoistic helping motivation, namely, empathic concern, moral rules, praise or rewards. In the control group, no helping motivations were emphasized. Their instrumental helping was then measured by (...) sorting cards for a sick child to play a game. The results show that each helping motivation had a positive effect on instrumental helping. Most of the motivational effects were similar across age, but the motivational effect of empathic concern increased obviously at the age of 5 years. Therefore, the present study reveals that both altruistic and egoistic motivations motivate preschoolers to help others. Most of the motivations develop steadily during the preschool years, but empathic concern as an altruistic motivation increases greatly at the end of the preschool years. The present study thus confirms the diversity of preschoolers' helping motivations with Eisenberg et al.'s model of prosocial motivations. (shrink)

The present study examined the effect of distant temporal distance on creative thinking and the underlying motivation mechanism. We tested our hypotheses in four studies. In Studies 1-4, participants in the distant temporal distance opposed to the proximal temporal distance performed better on a series of creative thinking tasks: the Alternate Uses Task (Study 1), the Chinese Remote Associates Test (Study 2), the Toy Design Task (Study 3) and the Ad Evaluation Task (Study 4). Moreover, Studies 2 and 3 (...) found that promotion motivation mediated the beneficial effect of distant temporal distance on the performance of the two creative thinking tasks. In conclusion, distant temporal distance facilitated creative thinking, and promotion motivation mediated this beneficial effect. (shrink)

Conceptualized within the framework of self-determination theory, the aim of the current study was to investigate the relation between perfectionistic concerns and (a) controlled (non-self-determined) motivation and (b) performance anxiety through basic psychological need frustration (frustration of competence, autonomy, and realtedness), and if these relations would be moderated by controlling teaching/coaching conditions. We used a cross-sectional moderated mediation design and purposefully selected Norwegian elite junior performers (N = 171; Mage = 17.3; SDage= 0.94) from talent development schools, who completed (...) an online questionnaire to report their perceptions of the study variables. Associations were examined using structural equation modeling. The results showed that perfectionistic concerns were positively associated with controlling conditions, basic needs frustration, controlled motivation, and performance anxiety. Reported controlling teaching/coaching conditions moderated the positive indirect relationship between perfectionistic concerns and (a) controlled motivation and (b) performance anxiety through competence need frustration. Specifically, these indirect associations were evident for performers reporting moderate or high levels of controlling teaching/coaching conditions. In contrast, there were no indirect associations via competence need frustration for those performers who reported low levels of controlling conditions. In conclusion, the results indicate that perfectionistic concerns appear to be a vulnerability factor that exposes elite junior performers to higher risks of entering a debilitative motivational process. This seems especially likely when exposed to controlling teaching/coaching conditions. Coaches and teachers working with elite junior performers should avoid using controlling mechanisms and instead foster autonomous functioning. (shrink)

It can be stated that self-regulated learning (SRL) brings broad benefits to the process of students' learning and studying. However, research has yet to be undertaken in relation to one of its components, namely self-regulation of motivation and affectivity. The main objectives of this study are to examine the use of self-motivation strategies that involve classmates and to obtain models on the influence of academic goals and self-efficacy on such self-motivation strategies. To this end, was conducted a (...) study using two different samples of students in the compulsory secondary education or baccalaureate stages in Spain (N = 613 and N = 910). The results obtained indicate that, with regard to gender, differences only exist in the use of the strategy of deception (t = 5.450, p <.001, d =.364). That the two pairs of strategies positively and significantly correlated with one another (r =.239, p <.01 and r =.355, p <.01). That only the strategy of annulation of others correlates with a more adaptive type of motivation. Thus, the group of students that reported the greatest level in its use also did so in relation to task and ego self-enhancing goals, to self-efficacy, and being negatively associated with the goal of work avoidance. Finally, were offered models on relationships between academic goals, self-efficacy and enhancement and annulation strategies (χ² (8) = 5.204, p =.736) and deception and annulation strategies (χ² (4) = 3.228, p =.520). (shrink)

The efficacy of traditional training programs (e.g., neurodevelopmental therapy) in promoting independent mobility and early child development across all three International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health levels lacks rigorous research support. Therefore, early power mobility training needs to be considered as a feasible intervention for very young children who are unlikely to achieve independent mobility. This perspective article has three aims: (1) to provide empirical evidence of differences in early independent mobility, motivation, daily life activities, and social participation (...) between young children with typical development and motor disabilities; (2) to discuss the contemporary concepts of and approaches to early power mobility training for young children with motor disabilities and the current need for changes to such training; and (3) to provide recommendations for early power mobility training in pediatric rehabilitation. Independent mobility is critical for social participation; therefore, power mobility can be accessible and implemented as early as possible, specifically for infants who are at risk for mobility or developmental delay. To maximize the positive effects of independent mobility on children’s social participation, early power mobility training must consider their levels of functioning, the amount of exploration and contextual factors, including individual and environmental factors. (shrink)

People seem more divided than ever before over social and political issues, entrenched in their existing beliefs and unwilling to change them. Empirical research on mechanisms driving this resistance to belief change has focused on a limited set of well-known, charged, contentious issues and has not accounted for deliberation over reasons and arguments in belief formation prior to experimental sessions. With a large, heterogeneous sample (N = 3,001), we attempt to overcome these existing problems, and we investigate the causes and (...) consequences of resistance to belief change for five diverse and less contentious socio-political issues. After participants chose initially to support or oppose a given socio-political position, they were provided with reasons favoring their chosen position (affirming reasons), reasons favoring the other, unchosen position (conflicting reasons), or all reasons for both positions (reasons for both sides). Our results indicate that participants are more likely to stick with their initial decisions than to change them no matter which reasons are considered, and that this resistance to belief change is likely due to a motivated, biased evaluation of the reasons to support their initial beliefs (prior-belief bias). More specifically, they rated affirming reasons more favorably than conflicting reasons—even after accounting for reported prior knowledge about the issue, the novelty of the reasons presented, and the reported strategy used to make the initial decision. In many cases, participants who did not change their positions tended to become more confident in the superiority of their positions after considering many reasons for both sides. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME, MOTIVATION AND MORALITY Hume remarks, in the Abstract, that his account of the passions in Book II of the Treatise has 'laid the foundation' (A 7 Ì1 for his theory of morals. Pall Ardal has shown how Hume's theory of certain indirect passions (pride, humility, love, hatred) underpins his theory of the evaluation of character. I propose to explore the links between Hume's account of motivation (...) and his treatment of an agent 'ß moral assessment of prospective action. Where Ardal stresses the moral spectator, my focus is on the agent. Hume himself attends primarily to the moral spectator, but the agent's perspective is central in two of his chief arguments concerning morals, that for the thesis that moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense, and that for the artificiality of justice. I shall take it that the argument of Treatise II, iii, 3 ("Of the influencing motives of the will") provides the framework for analysis: acting for moral reasons is like acting for any other reason; citing his moral principles to explain a man's actions is like citing his desire to preserve his health as an explanation of his taking exercise; deliberating about moral matters is like pondering the purchase of a pair of shoes. Of course there are differences; I shall look to them shortly. It is essential, however, to begin with the similarities. To a first approximation, the central doctrine is that the reasons that explain actions are rational causes of those actions. Reasons for actions are constituted by suitably related desires and beliefs; volitions are somehow implicated in intentional actions. Reasons are causes: the desires and beliefs that constitute reasons cause volitions, and thus actions. They are rational causes: there are links of special kinds between the contents of the desires and beliefs that constitute an agent's reasons for what he does, and the content of the volitions implicated in the actions done. Hume is at pains to deny that "reason [here: belief] alone can... be a motive to any action of the will" (T 413). But he insists there are "two principal parts [of human nature], which are requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding' (T 493). I suggest that by "affections" he here means specifically (if broadly) desires, and so both the "direct passions" of desire and aversion and such "indirect passions" as benevolence, anger, pity, compassion and malice. Hume's official doctrines both of desires and of volitions are unsatisfactory as they stand; he treats each as simple impressions. To be sure, these simple impressions are said always to be accompanied by thoughts of (in Hume's phrase) their objects. Even such complex states, however, can play no satisfactory role in psychological theory. The insights that Hume's official doctrines mishandle can, I suggest, be incorporated into more defensible, and more-or-less Humean, analyses of the internal structure of desire and volition. Having made efforts along these lines elsewhere, however, I shall here concentrate on other features of desire and volition that are germane to Hume's moral psychology. Desires and volitions are alike in two linked respects, among others: neither takes a truth value (and so each differs from belief); each is a conative, not a cognitive, psychological state (and so, again, each differs from belief). Because desires and volitions are not capable of "an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact" it is "impossible... they can be pronounced either true or false" (T 458). Their general functional role is that of "propense and averse motions of the mind" (T 574). To be sure, there are differences. The principal difference is that of specific functional location: desires are constituents in reasons for acting: volitions are constituents of (or otherwise implicated in) actions done for such reasons. This functional difference is tied to differences of content. To grasp the many relations among belief, desire and volition, when the first two serve as 4 reason for (and so cause of) the third, it is useful to plot their causal relations onto the elements in an Aristotelian practical syllogism. Desires function as causally salient major premises... (shrink)

The current study aimed to investigate the level of proactive motivation among kindergarten teachers. The researcher used the descriptive approach is appropriate for the current study., and the current study community is kindergarten teachers in Iraq, Wasit Governorate, Al-Aziziyah City/ for the academic year (2023-2024). Accordingly, the study relied on the stratified random method in selecting its research sample, as the sample size amounted to (60) teachers from government kindergarten teachers in Al-Aziziyah City, affiliated to Wasit Governorate in Iraq. (...) The researcher constructed a proactive motivation scale consisting of (30) paragraphs distributed over (3) axes, and each axis has (10) paragraphs. The study concluded that there is a statistically significant effect of proactive behavior and perception on proactive planning at a significance level of 0.05 in the study sample, and there is a statistically significant effect of proactive behavior on proactive planning at a significance level of 0.05 in the study sample, and there is a statistically significant effect of proactive perception on proactive planning at a significance level of 0.05 in the study sample. (shrink)

Three studies examined the motivational implications of thinking about how things could have been worse. It was hypothesized that when these downward counterfactuals yield negative affect, through consideration of the possibility of a negative outcome, motivation to change and improve would be increased (the wake-up call). When downward counterfactuals yield positive affect, through diminishing the impact of a potentially negative outcome, motivation to change and improve should be reduced (the Pangloss effect). Results from three studies supported these hypotheses. (...) Studies 1 and 2 showed that a manipulation of the counterfactual made about an investment influenced decisions toward that investment. Study 3 showed that students’ academic motivation was influenced by a manipulation of the type of downward counterfactual they made after an exam and that affect mediated the relationship between the counterfactual and motivation. (shrink)

Contents Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Internalism and externalism: some terminology 1.1 Introduction 5 1.2 Falk and Frankena 5 1.3 The internalist position modified 9 1.4 The externalist position elaborated 12 1.5 Judgment internalism/externalism versus existence internalism/externalism 15 1.6 Other kinds of internalism and externalism 17 1.7 Varieties of existence internalism and externalism 19 1.8 Conclusion 26 Chapter 2 Bernard Williams on practical reasons 2.1 Introduction 27 2.2 The internal reason theory 27 2.3 Refining the sub-Humean model 29 2.4 Objections against (...) external reasons 40 2.4.1 The no-explanatory-force objection 41 2.4.2 The no-motivational-fuel objection 44 2.4.3 The obscurity objection 55 2.5 Conclusion 59 Chapter 3 Michael Smith on practical reasons 3.1 Introduction 60 3.2 The moral problem 60 3.3 Cognitivism, internalism, and Humean motivation 65 3.3.1 The objectivity of moral obligations 65 3.3.2 The practicality of moral judgments 67 3.3.3 The Humean theory of motivation 70 3.4 The conceptual analysis of normative reasons 73 3.4.1 Platitudes about normative reasons 73 3.4.2 The advice model 76 3.4.3 ‘If fully rational’-condition: Smith versus Williams 79 3.4.4 The analysis captures the platitudes 84 3.5 Moral rationalism: the solution to the moral problem 88 3.6 Smith’s analysis of normative reasons evaluated 91 3.6.1 The analysis trivializes convergence 92 3.6.2 Why do reasons have to be objective? 94 3.6.3 The analysis does not guarantee practicality 96 3.6.4 The analysis rests on a false platitude 98 3.6.5 Normative reasons and what I would desire if I were fully rational 100 3.6.6 The advice model is inconsistent with the convergence thesis 102 3.7 Conclusion 106 Appendix 1: Michael Smith between moral realism and moral nihilism 107 Appendix 2: Michael Smith’s fetishism objection against judgment externalism 111 Chapter 4 Derek Parfit on practical reasons 4.1 Introduction 132 4.2 Parfit’s externalism 132 4.2.1 The obscurity objection rejected 133 4.2.2 The no-explanatory-force objection rejected 135 4.2.3 The no-motivation-fuel objection rejected 136 4.3 Parfit’s value-based reason theory 139 4.3.1 Internalism and the desire-based reason theory 139 4.3.2 Parfit’s argument against reductive desire-based reason views 143 4.3.3 Parfit’s argument against non-reductive desire-based reason views 148 4.3.4 Arguments in favour of the value-based reason theory 154 4.4 Parfit’s normative non-naturalism 161 4.4.1 Korsgaard’s criticism of realism 163 4.4.2 Korsgaard’s constructivism 166 4.4.3 Parfit’s criticism of constructivism 168 4.4.4 The non-naturalist account of normativity evaluated 174 4.5 Conclusion 179 Appendix: Varieties of moral realism 180 Chapter 5 Harry Frankfurt on practical reasons 5.1 Introduction 194 5.2 Frankfurt’s theory of care and love 194 5.2.1 The hierarchical model 195 5.2.2 Care 200 5.2.3 Love 211 5.3 The love-based reason theory 215 5.4 The love-based reason theory evaluated 225 5.4.1 Love and desire: both motivating, both natural 225 5.4.2 The groundlessness objection 227 5.4.3 The authority of love 239 5.4.4 The objection of normative triviality 244 5.4.5 The love-based reason theory and morality 248 5.5. Conclusion 254 Bibliography 256. (shrink)

(1981). Opinions of School, Academic Motivation and School Adjustment in the First Year of Secondary Education: a pilot study in West Yorkshire. Educational Studies: Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 177-183.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.3 (2003) 104-107 [Access article in PDF] Motivating Aesthetics Cynthia C. Rostankowski Humanities Department San Jose State University The territory of philosophical aesthetics remains a conceptual hinterland in the world of academic disciplines. It is not the only hinterland, but in comparison to other disciplines in arts and letters, few scholars engage in the subject professionally, and many people avoid the territory it occupies (...) as a place to visit, let alone to tarry or reside. Why is this? Usually people do not wish to visit places that are uncomfortable in some way. Frozen wastelands, blazing deserts, war zones, and places with nothing to do or see are usually avoided because they are perceived as unpleasant, dangerous, or boring,and the same is very likely true of their conceptual analogs. In what senses might some people perceive aesthetics as analogous to Siberia, Sudan, or central Kansas? I would like to investigate what it is about aesthetics that causes people to shy away from it more often than to flock to it. I have long been fascinated by the responses of students who express amazement or confusion when exposed to the field of aesthetics as a part of an introductory philosophy class, or of arts educators who do not know what to do with aesthetics since it does not seem quite to fit with the rest of what they do, or the responses of some artists or other arts practitioners who are occasionally disdainful of aesthetics. It would be easy to say that aesthetics has merely had bad press or inadequate exposure in the classroom, but I suspect there is more to it than that. I have experienced many of the situations I have just mentioned, and they have usually surprised and sometimes demoralized [End Page 104] me. They have always motivated me to think harder about my beloved field of interest, to try to reveal its attractions to those who do not find it as appealing and engaging as I do, or as you, my reader does. (I am presuming that one who is reading an essay in a journal about aesthetic education has already found his or her comfort zone in the field.) I will also presume to offer some thoughts about motivating an interest in aesthetics among the aesthetically uninterested — why one might want to do it, and what one might do. Please note, I am not speaking of the aesthetically disinterested 1 ; they too have already found their place in the discipline!It is likely that the problem of aesthetics has to do in part with misunderstandings, and those misunderstandings are multi-layered. If one looks up the word "aesthetic" in the Oxford English Dictionary, one finds the following: (F)rom the Greek for perception...and, being pre-occupied;...pertaining to things perceptible by the senses, things material;..."criticism of taste"...the science which treats of the conditions of sensuous perception...of or pertaining to the appreciation or criticism of the beautiful...Recent extravagances in the adoption of a sentimental archaism as the ideal of beauty have still further removed aesthetic and its derivatives from their etymological and purely philosophical meaning. There are varied suggestions about the use of the term, including the mention of its removal in contemporary parlance from its original meanings. If one looks up the keyword "aesthetic" on the Internet, one may find the following sites: skin care, plastic surgery, dentistry, exterior and interior design, tattoos, and some art, art theory, and philosophy among other things. An exemplification in practice of what is suggested in the OED. It is clear that the meaning of the word "aesthetic" has become at best imprecise, at worst confusing in common parlance.So, the first misunderstanding regarding aesthetics is the meaning of the term. What is philosophical aesthetics? It is not what some misconstrue as the imposition of value judgments on society. Unfortunately, some presume that because matters of taste or definitions of beauty are considered in the field, someone must be telling someone what they ought to think is pleasing or beautiful. This is not the focus... (shrink)

Objective: Theory and research suggest that the pursuit of personal goals that do not fit a person's affect-based implicit motives results in impaired emotional well-being, including increased symptoms of depression. The aim of this study was to evaluate an intervention designed to enhance motive-goal congruence and study its impact on well-being. Method: Seventy-four German students (mean age = 22.91, SD = 3.68; 64.9% female) without current psychopathology, randomly allocated to 3 groups: motivational feedback (FB; n = 25; participants learned about (...) the fit between their implicit motives and explicit goals), FB + congruence-enhancement training (CET; n = 22; participants also engaged in exercises to increase the fit between their implicit motives and goals), and a no-intervention control group (n = 27), were administered measures of implicit motives, personal goal commitments, happiness, depressive symptoms, and life satisfaction 3 weeks before (T1) and 6 weeks after (T2) treatment. Results: On two types of congruence measures derived from motive and goal assessments, treated participants showed increases in agentic (power and achievement) congruence, with improvements being most consistent in the FB+CET group. Treated participants also showed a trend-level depressive symptom reduction, but no changes on other well-being measures. Although increases in overall and agentic motivational congruence were associated with increases in affective well-being, treatment-based reduction of depressive symptoms was not mediated by treatment-based agentic congruence changes. Conclusion: These findings document that motivational congruence can be effectively enhanced, that changes in motivational congruence are associated with changes in affective well-being, and they suggest that individuals’ implicit motives should be considered when personal goals are discussed in the therapeutic process. (shrink)

Academic motivation and school climate perception are two factors affecting the learning process and outcomes of individuals. Although the factors affecting the motivation of individuals are different from each other, it is already known that the motivation realized by internal or external factors increases the quality of learning. Similarly, although the school climate, which includes the values, norms, and communication of individuals in the institution, varies for each institution, the positive or negative effects of the perceived school (...) climate on learners do not change. Academic motivation and perceived school climate are issues affecting all individuals at every stage of education. Although there are various studies conducted on the academic motivation and school climate of undergraduate students in the literature, there is no study on the sampling of higher religious education students. In the present study, the academic motivation and perceived school climate levels of the students who were studying in higher religious education institutions and the relationship between them were tested. It was also aimed to determine the reasons for choosing the faculty, the profession they wanted to pursue after graduation, their belief that they could get a job after graduation, and whether there was a significant difference between academic motivations and school climate perceptions. The correlational survey model, which is one of the quantitative research methods, was preferred for this purpose. The sampling of the study consisted of 425 students who were studying at the Faculty of Islamic Sciences at Selcuk University in the 2021-2022 academic year. The “Academic Motivation Scale” and “School Climate Scale for University Students” were used as the data collection tools.. According to the findings, the academic motivation levels of the students in the sampling group (x̅= 4.42) were found to be above the average. The average scores received by the students in the School Climate Scale for University Students (x̅=3.67) also indicated the existence of an open-positive setting in the learning environment. A positive and moderately significant relationship was detected between the academic motivations and school climate perceptions of the students in the sampling group (r=.340 p=.000. (shrink)

Physical activity, and likely the motivation for it, varies throughout the day. The aim of this investigation was to create a short assessment (CRAVE: Cravings for Rest and Volitional Energy Expenditure) to measure motivation states (wants, desires, urges) for physical activity and sedentary behaviors. Five studies were conducted to develop and evaluate the construct validity and reliability of the scale, with 1,035 participants completing the scale a total of 1,697 times. In Study 1, 402 university students completed a (...) questionnaire inquiring about the want or desire to perform behaviors “at the present moment (right now).” Items related to physical activity (e.g., “move my body”) and sedentary behaviors (e.g., “do nothing active”). An exploratory structural equation model (ESEM) revealed that 10 items should be retained, loading onto two factors (5 each for Move and Rest). In Study 2, an independent sample (n= 444) confirmed these results and found that Move and Rest desires were associated with stage-of-change for exercise behavior. In Study 3, 127 community-residing participants completed the CRAVE at 6-month intervals over two years- two times each session. Across-session interclass correlations (ICC) for Move (ICC = 0.72–0.95) and Rest (ICC = 0.69–0.88) were higher than when they were measured across 24-months (Move: ICC = 0.53; Rest: ICC = 0.49), indicating wants/desires have state-like qualities. In Study 4, a maximal treadmill test was completed by 21 university students. The CRAVE was completed immediately pre and post. Move desires decreased 26% and Rest increased 74%. Changes in Move and Rest desires were moderately associated with changes in perceived physical fatigue and energy. In Study 5, 41 university students sat quietly during a 50-min lecture. They completed the CRAVE at 3 time points. Move increased 19.6% and Rest decreased 16.7%. Small correlations were detected between move and both perceived energy and tiredness, but not calmness or tension. In conclusion, the CRAVE scale has good psychometric properties. These data also support tenets of the WANT model of motivation states for movement and rest (Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2020a). Future studies need to explore how desires to move/rest relate to dynamic changes in physical activity and sedentarism. (shrink)

Many philosophers today approach important psychological phenomena, such as weakness of the will and moral motivation, using a broadly Humean distinction between beliefs, which aim to represent the world, and desires, which aim to change the world. On this picture, desires provide the ends or goals of action, while beliefs simply tell us how to achieve those ends. In the Republic, Socrates attempts to explain the phenomena using a different distinction: he argues that the human soul or psyche consists (...) in reason, spirit, and appetite. It is initially tempting to assimilate Socrates’ picture to the standard belief ⁄ desire model, and to think that reason’s role in motivating action is restricted to calculating the best means for satisfying spirited and appetitive desires. But this would be a mistake, since Socrates thinks that each element in the soul is capable of setting the ends of action. But then how exactly should we understand these elements? My aim in this essay is to introduce the reader to Plato’s theory of the tripartite psychology. In part 2, I present Socrates’ argument for the claim that the soul has three elements. In part 3, I provide a general characterization of reason, spirit, and appetite, respectively. I then turn to discuss two central interpretive issues. In part 4, I discuss the sense in which Socrates considers the appetitive and spirited elements to be non-rational. And in the final part of the essay, I discuss the issue of how we ought to conceive of the parts of the soul, and more specifically, whether we should think of them as agent-like parts, or in some other way. (shrink)

The task that Hume explicitly sets himself in 3.2 of the Treatise is to identify the motive that renders just actions virtuous and constitutes justice as a virtue. But surprisingly, he never provides a clear account of what this motive is. This is the problem of the missing motive. The goal of this paper is to explain this problem and offer a novel solution. To set up my solution, I analyze a recent proposal from Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and illustrate what it (...) gets right and what it gets wrong. I develop a solution that retains the benefits of his proposal while addressing its defects. The result is a significant advancement in our understanding of Hume’s theory of justice. (shrink)

ObjectiveFew research efforts have substantially introduced relevant studies on Chinese students’ adaptability in relation to the ineffectiveness of blended learning mode in College English. This study is guided by social cognitive theory, and related literature has been reviewed concerning adaptability. In this study, we aim to examine the involved relationships among contextual factors, self-efficacy, motivation, and adaptability to blended learning mode among non-English majored Chinese learners in the College English course.MethodsThe quantitative research method was employed in this study, and (...) 595 respondents were eventually collected to enable the data analysis. The structural equation modeling (SEM) approach was used to analyze the data.Results(1) The non-English majored learners’ adaptability to blended learning mode in College English was at a low level with a mean value of 2.26, indicating that students still suffer difficulties from class conducted in blended learning; (2) the fit indices were at the level of good fit, and it suggested the structural model had an overall good fit to the data as shown:x2/df = 2.496, RMESA = 0.050, GFI = 0.956, AGFI = 0.936, NFI = 0.968, RFI = 0.959, IFI = 0.980, TLI = 0.975, CFI = 0.980; (3) adaptability was positively related to contextual factors, self-efficacy, and motivation (p< 0.001); (4) contextual factors exerted an indirect effect on the adaptability not only through the separate mediating role of self-efficacy and motivation, but through the chain mediating role of self-efficacy and motivation (p< 0.01).ImplicationsThis study theoretically extends previous studies on adaptability by investigating the affecting factors in the framework of social cognitive theory. More practically important is that this study sheds light on the impact mechanism of positive and enjoyable environment, self-efficacy and motivation on non-English majored learners’ adaptability to blended learning mode in English course, which would provide a vital insight for administrators and College English instructors to reconsider the role of learners’ responses in the mixed mode to improve their English achievement more effectively, as well as to enhance and promote their user experience of the offered blended learning service. (shrink)

Science motivational beliefs are crucial for STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) performance and persistence, but these beliefs typically decline during high school. We expanded the literature on adolescents’ science motivational beliefs by examining: 1) changes in motivational beliefs in three specific science subjects, 2) how gender, immigrant generation status, and perceived support from key social agents predicted differences in adolescents’ science motivational beliefs, and 3) these processes among Latino/as in the United States, whose underrepresentation in STEM is understudied. We (...) used hierarchical linear modeling to estimate the changes in 104 (40% female) Latino/a high school students’ physics, chemistry, and biology motivational beliefs from 9th to 11th grade. Subject-specific ability self-concept, interest, and utility were regressed on gender, immigrant generation status, and perceived science support while controlling for family income, parent education, and adolescents’ school. Adolescents’ utility declined from 9th to 11th grade whereas their interest remained stable for all three science subjects. Adolescents’ ability self-concept increased for biology, decreased for physics, but remained stable for chemistry. Gender differences in adolescents’ motivational beliefs at 9th grade only emerged for physics utility as well as physics and chemistry interest; yet, there were no gender differences in how adolescents’ science motivational beliefs changed over time. Contrary to expectations, immigrant generation status was not significantly associated with adolescents’ science motivational beliefs at 9th grade or in terms of how they changed over time. Adolescents who perceived higher science support generally had higher motivational beliefs in 9th grade, but did not differ on their rate of change. Our findings highlight the need to examine specific science subjects, and that typical gender differences in adolescents’ motivational beliefs discussed in the literature may not generalize to all racial and ethnic groups. (shrink)

In the September 2020 edition of Perception, Alan Gilchrist published an editorial entitled “The Integrity of Vision” (Gilchrist, 2020). In it, Gilchrist critiques motivated perception research. His main points are as follows: (1) Motivated perception is compromised by experimental demand: Results do not actually show motivated perception but instead reflect subjects’ desires to comply with inferred predictions. (2) Motivated perception studies use designs that make predictions obvious to subjects. These transparent designs conspire with experimental demand to yield confirmatory but compromised (...) results. (3) Motivated perception research lacks guiding theory and cannot explain what appear to be contradictory results. (4) Motivated perception presents an unsupportable assault upon the impermeability of perception. The present commentary responds to these four assertions. (shrink)

Much of the plausibility of non-cognitivism in meta-ethics rests on the following argument derived from hume: 1) cognitive judgments alone can never have any motivational influence on our actions, 2) moral judgments have a motivational influence on our actions, and 3) therefore, no moral judgment is simply a cognitive judgment. this paper subjects various forms of this argument to criticism.

Philosophers have long analyzed the truth-condition of counterfactual conditionals in terms of the possible-worlds semantics advanced by Lewis [13] and Stalnaker [23]. In this paper, I argue that, from the perspective of philosophical semantics, the causal modeling semantics proposed by Pearl [17] and others (e.g., Briggs [3]) is more plausible than the Lewis-Stalnaker possible-worlds semantics. I offer two reasons. First, the possible-worlds semantics has suffered from a specific type of counterexamples. While the causal modeling semantics can handle such examples with (...) ease, the only way for the possible-worlds semantics to do so seems to cost it its distinctive status as a philosophical semantics. Second, the causal modeling semantics, but not the possible-worlds semantics, has the resources enough for accounting for both forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactual conditionals. (shrink)

It is sometimes suggested that if, whenever we act intentionally, we do, or try to do, what we are most strongly motivated to do at the time, then we are at the mercy of whatever desire happens to be strongest at the time. I have argued elsewhere that this is false (Mele 1987, ch. 5; 1992, ch. 4; 1995, ch. 3; 1996). This essay provides another route to that conclusion, but that is not my primary aim. The goal of this (...) paper is to display the bearing of some well-known experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet on this issue. Philosophical discussion of these experiments has focused on Libet's claims about consciousness. The significance of these experiments for the topics of motivation and agential control also merits serious attention. (shrink)

Teachers of science-based education in Malaysian secondary schools, especially those in the field of physics, often find their students facing huge difficulties in dealing with conceptual ideas in physics, resulting thus in a lack of interest towards the subject. The aim of this study was to assess the effectiveness of the Brain-Based Teaching Approach (henceforth BBTA) in dealing with the issues of the conceptual understanding of Newtonian physics of Form Four students in secondary science schools in the state of Kedah, (...) situated in the northern region of Peninsular Malaysia, and also their learning motivation towards the subject of physics. The BBTA is based on the Brain-Based Learning Principles, where detailed attention is given to seven main steps: (1) activation; (2) clarify the outcome and paint big picture of the lesson; (3) making connection; (4) doing the learning activity; (5) demonstrate student understanding; (6) review for student recall and retention/closure; and (7) preview the new topic. The effectiveness of the BBTA within the targeted context was then assessed in a quasi-experimental research approach involving 100 Form Four students from two secondary science schools. Data collected using the Test of Conceptual Understanding of Newtonian Physics and the Questionnaire of Physics Learning Motivation were then analysed descriptively and inferentially. The results obtained revealed that the BBTA was in fact exceedingly effective in dealing with the problems aforementioned. It was found that students who received physics education taught using the BBTA possessed a better conceptual understanding of Newtonian physics and also a higher learning motivation in the subject of physics, compared to students who received physics education taught using conventional teaching methods. (shrink)

Psychometrically sound short scales are required to comprehensively and yet economically assess fundamental motives in research settings such as large-scale assessments. In order to provide such a time- and cost-efficient instrument, we conducted three studies to develop further and validate 16 German scales with three items each assessing fundamental motives [16 motives research scales ]. In Study 1, we applied a top–down construction process to develop a preliminary item pool on the basis of a thorough revision of existing construct definitions. (...) In Study 2, we chose an approach that allowed us to balance the optimization of psychometric properties with content coverage to select three-item scales for each of the 16 motives. For the item selection process, we combined exploratory factor analyses, confirmatory factor analyses, ant colony optimization algorithm, and Mokken scale analyses. In Study 3, we cross-validated the results obtained in Study 2 and placed the 16mrs in a nomological network consisting of Big Five traits and Power, Achievement, Affiliation, Intimacy, and Fear motives. The results of these studies indicate that the 16mrs can be used to reliably and validly assess fundamental motives that represent a level of personality that differs from the Big Five and covers motivational aspects beyond the well-established Power, Achievement, Affiliation, Intimacy, and Fear motives. Limitations concerning the reliability of the Autonomy scale and the empirical discrimination of the Dominance and Status scales are discussed. In addition to the validated German version, we also provide the English translation of the items, which, however, need to be validated before use. (shrink)