Many theories assimilate the idioms of modality to those of quantification; they hold that so-and-so is possible iff there is a "world" at which it is true that so-and-so. "Modal realism" identifies worlds with certain concrete particulars, and truth at a world with what is true of it. Rival "ersatz" theories identify worlds with certain abstract entities and identify what is true at them with what they represent. ;David Lewis argues that pre-theoretic modal intuitions are best explained by modal realism. (...) I try to make a case for ersatzism. ;First, I argue that modal realism is flawed on the grounds that it entails the impossibility of certain intuitively possible spatiotemporal structures; it fails to explain fully even those intuitions with which it is compatible; and it renders the origin of modal knowledge mysterious. ;Next, I argue that objections to ersatzism are not conclusive. ;Lewis objects that even a generic version of ersatzism requires an unnameable and maybe unintelligible primitive relation. I suggest that the problems with naming are perfectly general; they have nothing to do with metaphysical theories of modality in particular. And I suggest a solution taken from Lewis himself. I also argue that any purported unintelligibility is due to illegitimately assimilating the relation to spatiotemporal relations. ;Finally, I consider some difficulties with a version of ersatzism that aims to reduce modality to impure set-theory. One concerns the accommodation of intuitions about properties that are not, but might have been, instantiated. Another concerns accommodation of intuitions about relations of exclusion and entailment among properties. I suggest that these difficulties are due to faulty assumptions about the nature of properties rather than any fundamental flaws in this ersatz approach. So I propose an account of properties that when incorporated into ersatzism circumvents these difficulties and allows it to claim the advantages of modal realism without its drawbacks. Unlike traditional accounts, this takes the essence of a property to consist in its role in imposing a certain classificational structure on the particulars that instantiate it, rather than in any unique and irreducible "quiddity". (shrink)

John Dewey’s Metaphysical Theory provides an overview and technical exposition of Dewey’s mature ontological theory. In particular, “nature,” “experience,” and their relationship, are given extended treatment through a close reading of primary texts. Following Dewey’s metaphysical postulates and conclusions, the book suggests how experience may reveal the fundamental traits of nature. In addition, the book reveals how Dewey understood the ways in which all phenomena may relate within an inclusive economy of existence, what it means to (...) have an “identity,” what constitutes “selfhood” or personality, and how metaphysics relates to the ideals of democracy and social ethics. (shrink)

In this article, we consider three metaphysical theories of personal identity: the soul theory, the body theory, and the psychological theory. Clinical cases are discussed as they present conceptual problems for each of these theories. For the soul theory, the case of Phineas Gage, and cases of pedophilic behavior due to a brain tumor are discussed. For the body theory, hypothetical cases of cephalosomatic anastomosis and actual cases of dicephalic parapagus and craniopagus parasiticus are (...) discussed. For the psychological theory, cases of delusions and memory impairments are discussed. After a discussion of all these cases, we conclude that it is very difficult to unequivocally favor one of these theories, yet we argue that this discussion must be based not on abstract armchair speculation, but rather, consideration of real clinical cases. (shrink)

This paper intends to show that our reception of Plato’s criticism of Anaxagoras’ philosophy of mind is somehow mediated by Thomas Aquinas’ conception of freedom.The Socratic-Platonic Metaphysical theory of mind as something essentially connected to the best is transformed by Aristotle into a theory of the intelligence which, in its acting, necessarily records the possibility of performing the opposites or contraries. Therefore, ‘the (Platonic) best’ is now specifically understood as ‘the best possible’. Within this Metaphysical conception, (...) Aquinas distinguishes two levels (which are also to be found in ‘freedom’). In the first or more superficial one –here called ‘horizontal’–, the mind chooses to perform the best possible or not, that is, it can fulfill the science which is within the mind itself or not. In the second or more radical one –here called ‘vertical’–, the mind has to perform a reflexive act, by means of which it chooses willing or not its necessary possibility of performing the science that the mind possesses. Key words: Mind; Ancient and MedievalPhilosophy;Metaphysics; Aquinas. Superación de la concepción anaxagoriana del Noûs mediante una teoría metafísica de lo mejor posible: de Sócrates a Santo Tomás de Aquino Resumen Este artículo se propone mostrar que nuestra recepción de la crítica de Platón a la filosofía de Anaxágoras se encuentra mediada, de algún modo, por la concepción de la libertad de Tomás de Aquino. La teoría metafísica de la mente de Sócrates y Platón, como aquello conectado esencialmente con lo mejor, es transformada por Aristóteles en una teoría de la inteligencia que, en su desempeño, registra necesariamente la posibilidad de llevar a cabo los opuestos o contrarios. Por lo tanto, “lo mejor (platónico)” se entiende ahora específicamente como “lo mejor posible”. Dentro de esta concepción metafísica, Santo Tomás distingue dos niveles (que se van a encontrar también en la “libertad”). En el primero o más superficial –denominado aquí “horizontal”– la mente escoge hacer lo mejor posible o se abstiene de hacerlo, es decir, puede realizar o no la ciencia que está dentro de la misma mente. En el segundo o más radical –llamado aquí “vertical”- la mente tiene que realizar un acto reflexivo, por medio del cual escoge, voluntariamente o no, su posibilidad necesaria de actuar de acuerdo con la ciencia que posee ella misma. Palabras clave: mente; filosofía antigua y medieval; metafísica; Santo Tomás de Aquino. (shrink)

This paper intends to show that our reception of Plato’s criticism of Anaxagoras’ philosophy of mind (noûs) is mediated by Thomas Aquinas’ conception of freedom. The Socratic-Platonic Metaphysical theory of mind as essentially connected to the best is transformed by Aristotle into a theory of the intelligence which, in its acting, necessarily records the possibility of performing the opposites or contraries. Therefore, ‘the (Platonic) best’ is now specifically understood as ‘the best possible’. Within this Metaphysical conception, (...) Aquinas distinguishes two levels (which are also to be found in ‘freedom’). In the first or more superfical one–here called ‘horizontal’–, the mind chooses to perform the best possible or not, that is, it can fulfill the science which is within the mind itself or not. In the second or more radical one –here called ‘vertical’–, the mind has to perform a reflexive act, by means of which it chooses willing or not its necessary possibility of performing the science that the mind possesses. (shrink)

In order to establish his "school of principle" system of thought, which was founded on objective idealism, Zhu Xi proposed a theory of "investigating things and exhausting principles" [gewu qiongli]. This became the epistemological foundation for his system of thought. This epistemology formed an organic whole with his world view. On the one hand, his "theory-of-investigating-things" epistemology opened up pathways for his system of objective idealism; on the other hand, his "school-of-principle" system formed the theoretical foundation for his (...) epistemology of "investigating things" and gave this epistemology its obviously metaphysical characteristics. (shrink)

Ethics traditionally has always been derived from metaphysics, but these days metaphysics is considered to be "mere interpretation". In the face of all scepticism and relativism I contend that ethics is more certian than metaphysics. And so, ethics can ground metaphysics. And I go on, in later works to ground ethics on the Earth. Ethics has always had something to do with God. I redefine ethics, and open into God in a completely new way. That ethics brings us into relationship (...) with the living God and I have walked this path of relationship with Spirit for all of my life, and all of my works spring from it. (shrink)

Bio-ontologies are digital frameworks for handling biological and biomedical data. They consist of theoretical entities and relations with explicitly defined logical structures and precise definitions, whose purpose is to provide a shared language for representing information to be distributed and integrated across diverse scientific contexts. It is tempting to view bio-ontologies as clear and formal expressions of a scientific community’s ontological commitments about their domain of inquiry, and to view their integration as tantamount to the metaphysical unification of science (...) that some philosophers have envisaged. However, I argue that the local, practical, social and technological factors that influence their design prevent us from straightforwardly reading metaphysical conclusions from them. I discuss these complications and suggest how they can be overcome, revealing more general lessons for the development of a well-founded scientific metaphysics. (shrink)

Truthmaker theorists typically claim not only that all truths have truthmakers (Truthmaker Maximalism), but also that there is some enlightening metaphysical theory to be given of the nature of those truthmakers (e.g. that they are Armstrongian states of affairs, or tropes, or concrete individuals). Call this latter thesis the "Material Theory Thesis" (it is the thesis that there is some true material theory of truthmakers). I argue that the Material Theory Thesis is inconsistent with Truthmaker (...) Maximalism. (shrink)

Jennifer Trusted's new book argues that metaphysical beliefs are essential for scientific inquiry. The theories, presuppositions and beliefs that neither science nor everyday experience can justify are the realm of metaphysics, literally `beyond physics'. These basic beliefs form a framework for our activities and can be discovered in science, common sense and religion. By examining the history of science from the eleventh century to the present, this book shows how religious and mystical beliefs, as well as philosophical speculation have (...) had a considerable role in motivating scientists and inspiring scientific inquiry. _Physics and Metaphysics_ presupposes no technical knowledge of either philosophy or science. It is an ideal introduction to science and the important forces that have shaped its history and ideas. (shrink)

There is a systematic and suggestive analogy between grounding and causation. In my view, this analogy is no coincidence. Grounding and causation are alike because grounding is a type of causation: metaphysical causation. In this paper I defend the identification of grounding with metaphysical causation, drawing on the causation literature to explore systematic connections between grounding and metaphysical dependence counterfactuals, and I outline a non-reductive counterfactual theory of grounding along interventionist lines.

Quantum field theory, one of the most rapidly developing areas of contemporary physics, is full of problems of great theoretical and philosophical interest. This collection of essays is the first systematic exploration of the nature and implications of quantum field theory. The contributors discuss quantum field theory from a wide variety of standpoints, exploring in detail its mathematical structure and metaphysical and methodological implications.

In this paper, I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfit’s theory, in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification. Then, I focus on two objections: C. Korsgaard’s claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, and M. Johnston’s contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independently of a metaphysical theory. I argue that even if these (...) theories have a point, they do not cover a range of situations in which justification may be sought. It is in these situations that a metaphysical theory may find its place. (shrink)

Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse is considered one of the founders of sociology as a discipline. His four books which form Principles of Sociology are published here together for the first time - representing a synthesis of the philosophical and scientific methods of social inquiry. Although very scarce, the study by Hobson and Ginsberg is still regarded as the most comprehensive account of Hobhouse's life and works. There is also a memoir by Hobson and a selection of Hobhouse's otherwise inaccessible writings.

Metaphysical theories are beautiful. At the end of this book, Jiri Benovsky defends the view that metaphysical theories possess aesthetic properties and that these play a crucial role when it comes to theory evaluation and theory choice.Before we get there, the philosophical path the author proposes to follow starts with three discussions of metaphysical equivalence. Benovsky argues that there are cases of metaphysical equivalence, cases of partial metaphysical equivalence, as well as interesting cases (...) of theories that are not equivalent. Thus, claims of metaphysical equivalence can only be raised locally. The slogan is: the best way to do meta-metaphysics is to do first-level metaphysics.To do this work, Benovsky focuses on the nature of primitives and on the role they play in each of the theories involved. He emphasizes the utmost importance of primitives in the construction of metaphysical theories and in the subsequent evaluation of them.He then raises the simple but complicated question: how to make a choice between competing metaphysical theories? If two theories are equivalent, then perhaps we do not need to make a choice. But what about all the other cases of non-equivalent "equally good" theories? Benovsky uses some of the theories discussed in the first part of the book as examples and examines some traditional meta-theoretical criteria for theory choice (various kinds of simplicity, compatibility with physics, compatibility with intuitions, explanatory power, internal consistency,...) only to show that they do not allow us to make a choice.But if the standard meta-theoretical criteria cannot help us in deciding between competing non-equivalent metaphysical theories, how then shall we make that choice? This is where Benovsky argues that metaphysical theories possess aesthetic properties – grounded in non-aesthetic properties – and that these play a crucial role in theory choice and evaluation. This view, as well as all the meta-metaphysical considerations discussed throughout the book, then naturally lead the author to a form of anti-realism, and at the end of the journey he offers reasons to think better of the kind of anti-realist view he proposes to embrace. www.jiribenovsky.org. (shrink)

PREFACE. THE Author of this very practical treatise on Scotch Loch - Fishing desires clearly that it may be of use to all who had it. He does not pretend to have written anything new, but to have attempted to put what he has to say in as readable a form as possible. Everything in the way of the history and habits of fish has been studiously avoided, and technicalities have been used as sparingly as possible. The writing of this (...) book has afforded him pleasure in his leisure moments, and that pleasure would be much increased if he knew that the perusal of it would create any bond of sympathy between himself and the angling community in general. This section is interleaved with blank shects for the readers notes. The Author need hardly say that any suggestions addressed to the case of the publishers, will meet with consideration in a future edition. We do not pretend to write or enlarge upon a new subject. Much has been said and written-and well said and written too on the art of fishing but loch-fishing has been rather looked upon as a second-rate performance, and to dispel this idea is one of the objects for which this present treatise has been written. Far be it from us to say anything against fishing, lawfully practised in any form but many pent up in our large towns will bear us out when me say that, on the whole, a days loch-fishing is the most convenient. One great matter is, that the loch-fisher is depend- ent on nothing but enough wind to curl the water, -and on a large loch it is very seldom that a dead calm prevails all day, -and can make his arrangements for a day, weeks beforehand whereas the stream- fisher is dependent for a good take on the state of the water and however pleasant and easy it may be for one living near the banks of a good trout stream or river, it is quite another matter to arrange for a days river-fishing, if one is looking forward to a holiday at a date some weeks ahead. Providence may favour the expectant angler with a good day, and the water in order but experience has taught most of us that the good days are in the minority, and that, as is the case with our rapid running streams, -such as many of our northern streams are, -the water is either too large or too small, unless, as previously remarked, you live near at hand, and can catch it at its best. A common belief in regard to loch-fishing is, that the tyro and the experienced angler have nearly the same chance in fishing, -the one from the stern and the other from the bow of the same boat. Of all the absurd beliefs as to loch-fishing, this is one of the most absurd. Try it. Give the tyro either end of the boat he likes give him a cast of ally flies he may fancy, or even a cast similar to those which a crack may be using and if he catches one for every three the other has, he may consider himself very lucky. Of course there are lochs where the fish are not abundant, and a beginner may come across as many as an older fisher but we speak of lochs where there are fish to be caught, and where each has a fair chance. Again, it is said that the boatman has as much to do with catching trout in a loch as the angler. Well, we dont deny that. In an untried loch it is necessary to have the guidance of a good boatman but the same argument holds good as to stream-fishing... (shrink)

Abstract: This paper assesses the Everettian approach to the measurement problem, especially the version of that approach advocated by Simon Saunders and David Wallace. I emphasise conceptual, indeed metaphysical, aspects rather than technical ones; but I include an introductory exposition of decoherence. In particular, I discuss whether---as these authors maintain---it is acceptable to have no precise definition of 'branch' (in the Everettian kind of sense). (A version of this paper will appear in a CTNS/Vatican Observatory volume on Quantum (...) class='Hi'>Theory and Divine Action, ed. Robert Russell et al.). (shrink)

This paper attempts to explore the philosophical argument regarding an account of the development of management orientations and attributes a historical succession of these orientations to a human hereditary. It is hard to find such a consolidate and plausible theory which may provide deep insight into the history and theory of management. This paper is theoretical, based on literature and philosophical analysis. It argues that human behaviours become a force and its treatment cause the variance in human management. (...) The management with respect to human has periodically recognised these forces and acquired the tools for treatment of such forces. In this paper, theoretically through deductive-partial inductive approach, human forces are classified into six dimensions (gender, attain, social, relational, metaphysical and heredity force) and subsequently in four orientations of management (demo, socio, psycho-socio and meta-oriented management). Demo and socio-oriented management are explored with historical context, while the psycho-socio oriented management is argued with theoretical considerations, i.e., theories related to human work behaviour, performance, need and satisfaction. In last, a plausible argument is presented for meta-oriented management by considering its application in existing corporate structure management. (shrink)

Basic justice is needed everywhere, but the traditional criteria of substantive justice, such as liberty, equality, efficiency, or‘justice as fairness’etc., is challenged in contemporary society because of the ruin of the traditional metaphysics and religions. Habermas’s theory of discourse perhaps provides us a way to set a criterion for the post-metaphysical time. Justice is the union of the content and form. However, what his viewpoint on justice emphasizes is only the form of justice; he fails to consider the (...) substance of justice, even for the criterion of substantive justice. In the post-metaphysical society of pluralized values, we can obtain the criterion of substantive justice from his theory of justice. This criterion is the discursive consensus. (shrink)

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to (...) which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness. (shrink)

Any plausible ethics of belief must respect that normal agents are doxastically blameworthy for their beliefs in a range of non-exotic cases. In this paper, we argue, first, that together with independently motivated principles this constraint leads us to reject occurrentism as a general theory of belief. Second, we must acknowledge not only dormant beliefs, but tacit beliefs as well. Third, a plausible ethics of belief leads us to acknowledge that a difference in propositional content cannot in all contexts (...) count as a criterion for belief individuation. In some contexts, we need to individuate beliefs in a different manner, namely in such a way that they have at least part of their causal history essentially. (shrink)

Isaiah Berlin's (1909-97) standing in twentieth-century intellectual history rests primarily upon his post-Second World War writings in political theory and the history of ideas. Berlin's investigations into the antagonistic traditions of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment thought, and his advocacy of liberal responses to the conflicts between values, which, he believed, were an unavoidable feature of the human condition, have been the subject of extensive discussion. Less has been written, however, about Berlin's formative experiences of analytic philosophy during the 1930s and (...) late 1940s. It is often assumed that Berlin 'abandoned' philosophy after the war in favour of the history of ideas. As such, there is a tendency in much of the existing literature to underestimate the influence of Berlin's early analytical work on his later historical and political writings. Indeed, Berlin's work is regularly thought to be marked by a fracture at which point the study of philosophy is relinquished for that of history and political theory. The present article will aim to challenge this reading of Berlin's work. The article will advance two main claims. Firstly, it will be argued that not only is Berlin's early work in analytic philosophy of interest to those concerned with the development of his thought as a whole but also that it is highly edifying for any understanding of the nature of the outlook contained in his later writings. Secondly, the article will maintain that there exists a degree of continuity in Berlin's thought that connects his earlier and later work in a manner reflecting a greater level of coherence than is generally assumed. The main theme of continuity emphasized in the article is represented by Berlin's critique of what he terms the 'fallacy of reduction'. (shrink)

This pioneering book presents a reconstitution of Charles Sanders Peirce philosophical system as a coherent architecture of concepts that form a unified theory of reality. Historically, the majority of Peircean scholars adopted a thematic approach to study isolated topics such as semiotics and pragmatism without taking into account the author’s broader philosophical framework, which led to a poor and fragmented understanding of Peirce’s work. In this volume, professor Ivo Assad Ibri, past president of The Charles Sanders Peirce Society and (...) a leading figure in the Brazilian community of Peircean scholars, adopts a systemic approach to Peirce’s thought and presents Peirce’s scientific metaphysics as a deep ontological architecture based on a semiotic logic and on pragmatism as criteria of meaning. Originally published in Portuguese, this book became a classic among Brazilian Peircean scholars by presenting a conceptual matrix capable of providing a clear reference system to ground the thematic studies into the broader Peircean system. Now translated to English, this reviewed, amplified and updated edition aims to make this contributions available to the international community of Peircean scholars and to serve as a tool to understand Peirce’s work in a more systemic way by integrating concepts such as experience, phenomenon, existence and reality, as well as theories such as Chance, Continuity, Objective Idealism, Cosmology and Pragmatism, in a coherent system that reveals Peirce’s complex metaphysical architecture. "As the philosophical reputation of Charles S. Peirce continues to rise to first-tier prominence in the history of American philosophy, Ivo Ibri’s Kósmos Noetós assumes a unique status in both a pioneering and a magisterial work of transcontinental Peirce scholarship. This original work of this internationally renowned scholar and editor, and Professor of Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of San Paulo, penetrates to the heart of Peirce’s architectonic system of phenomenological, metaphysical, and semiotic categories which heuristically characterize our world as “a universe perfused with signs.” Ibri’s own synergistic commentary on the radiating registers of Peirce’s cosmogonically and pragmatistically conceived “one intelligible theory of the universe” also instructively contributes to the illumination of significant nodes of interface with a range of relevant theoretical trends in the contemporary academy; as well, it places Peirce in the company of such thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant, and Schelling who preceded Peirce in providing a legacy of first-tier reasoning on our intelligibly developing world. Kosmos Noetos impresses as Ibri’s pure, lucid, passionately thought-loving, philosophical articulation of his own and as the indispensable prolegomena to all future Peirce studies." David Dilworth, State University of New York at Stone Brook – USA "Ivo Ibri has offered us in this exquisite work a framing of the inner logic of Charles S. Peirce's core metaphysical vision and its existential implications. It is a deep and nuanced exploration of the internal dynamics of Peirce’s central metaphysical categories, developed through rigorous and detailed attention to the evolution of Peirce’s thought on the ‘vitally important topics’ of the appearing, the reality, and the intelligibility of the world. The two-leveled format of the book, an intricate weaving of Peirce’s texts and discursive elaboration and linkage by Ibri, gives it a distinctive feel and is the bedrock of its value. The book is a remarkable combination of presentation and analysis. It is informed by Ibri’s deep philosophical culture and is a gentle and convincing argument for the centrality of metaphysics in understanding Peirce’s thought. It offers in a new way indispensable suggestions for our own attempts to think about our places in an evolving universe with the aid of Peirce and offers threads of thought to be followed up by others." Robert E. Innis, University of Massachusetts Lowell – USA. (shrink)

In this article I press four different objections on Forst’s theory of the ‘Right to Justification’. These are (i) that the principle of justification is not well-formulated; (ii) that ‘reasonableness and reciprocity’, as these notions are used by Rawls, are not apt to support a Kantian conception of morality; (iii) that the principle of justification, as Forst understands it, gives an inadequate account of what makes actions wrong; and (iv) that, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, Forst’s (...) account veers towards a version of moral realism that isprima facieincompatible with Kantian constructivism. I then evaluate Forst’s theory in the light of a distinction made by Sharon Street between restricted and unrestricted constructivism. I show that Forst has reason to deny that it is either the one or the other, but he is not able to show that it is both or neither. I conclude that the arguments Forst advances in support of his constructivist theory of the right to justification entail that it is a metaphysical and comprehensive conception in the relevant, Rawlsian sense. Forst’s theory of the right to justification therefore fails to fulfil one of the main stated aims. (shrink)

Attempting to deflate ontological debates, the proponent of Quantifier Variance (QV) claims that there are multiple quantifier meanings of equal metaphysical merit. According to Hirsch—the main proponent of QV—metaphysical merit should be understood intensionally: two languages have equal merit if they allow us to express the same possibilities. I examine the notion of metaphysical merit and its purported link to intensionality. That link, I argue, should not be supported by adopting an intensional theory of semantic content. (...) Rather, I give a general strategy for supporting claims about metaphysical merit and examine whether that strategy can be used to link merit and intensionality. Though I don’t deliver a definitive verdict, the discussion provides a clearer framework for articulating and evaluating claims about metaphysical merit. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers accept Hume's Dictum, according to which there are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct, intrinsically typed entities. Tacit in Lewis 's work is a potential motivation for HD, according to which one should accept HD as presupposed by the best account of the range of metaphysical possibilities---namely, a combinatorial account, applied to spatiotemporal fundamentalia. Here I elucidate and assess this Ludovician motivation for HD. After refining HD and surveying its key, recurrent role in Lewis ’s work, (...) I present Lewis ’s appeal to HD as providing a broadly axiomatic generating basis for the space of metaphysical modality, and canvas the prima facie advantages of the resulting combinatorial principle---HD ---as being principled, extensionally adequate and modally reductive. Most criticisms of Lewis 's combinatorialism have targeted seeming ways in which the theory overgenerates the desired space; I rather argue that HD seriously undergenerates the desired space in three different ways. For each way I argue that available means of overcoming the undergeneration either fail to close the gap, undermine the claim that HD is a principled generator of metaphysical modal space, undermine the reductive status of Lewis 's combinatorialism, or call into question the truth of HD. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that not only is metaphysical modal normativism an attractive view but that, as a matter of fact, many of us have, all along, been metaphysical modal normativists of a particular stripe. Namely, we have been the kinds of modal normativists, in the form of counterpart theorists, who are robust realists about possibility simpliciter. Having introduced modal normativism as Thomasson does in Norms and Necessity, I go on to recast it in somewhat different terms. (...) With this re-casting in place we can see that while the view offers a pleasingly deflationary account of metaphysical necessity and possibility it does so only against the backdrop of robust realism about possibility simpliciter. If that is right, then Lewis’ counterpart theory turns out to be a potent version of metaphysical modal normativism. So many of us have, all along, been metaphysical modal normativists, and so much the better for it. (shrink)

Clive Bell’s Art, published in 1913, is widely seen as a founding document in contemporary aesthetics. Yet his formalism and his attendant definition of art as “significant form” is widely rejected in contemporary art discourse and in the philosophy of art. In this paper I argue for a reconsideration of his thought in connection with current discussions of “the aesthetics of everyday life.” Although some, notably Allen Carlson, have argued against application of Bell’s formalism to the aesthetics of everyday life, (...) I claim that this is based on an interpretation of the concept that is overly narrow. First, Li Zehou offers an interpretation of “significant form” that allows in sedimented social meaning. Second, Bell himself offers a more complex theory of significant form by way of his “metaphysical hypothesis,” one that stresses perception of significant form outside the realm of art. Bell’s idea that the artist can perceive significant form in nature allows for significant form to not just be the surface-level formal properties of things. It stresses depth, although a different kind than the cognitive scientific depth Carlson wants. This is a depth that is consistent with the anti-dualism of Spinoza, Marx and Dewey. Reinterpreting Bell in this direction, we can say we are moved by certain relations of lines and colors because they direct our minds to the hidden aspect of things, the spiritual side of the material world referred to by Spinoza and developed by Dewey in his concept of experience. Bell hardly “reduces the everyday to a shadow of itself,” as Carlson puts it, since the everyday, as experienced by the artist or the aesthetically astute observer, has, or potentially has, deep meaning. If we reject Bell’s dualism and his downgrading of sensuous experience, we can rework his idea of pure form to refer to an aspect of things detached, yes, from practical use, but not from particularity or sedimented meaning, not purified of all associations. (shrink)

The metaphysical commitments of quantum field theory are examined. A thesis of underdetermination as between field and particle approaches to the "elementary particles" is argued for but only if a disputed notion of transcendental individuality is admitted. The superiority of the field approach is further emphasized in the context of heuristics.