Is volitional conceptual change feasible? Answering that question requires a theory of semantic change, which is sometimes thought elusive. Fortunately, much is known about semantic change as it occurs in the wild. While usage is chaotic and complex, changes in a word’s use can produce changes in its meaning. There are several under-appreciated empirical constraints on how meanings change that stem from the following observation: word use finely reflects equilibrium between various communicative pressures. Much of (...) the relevant work in linguistics has employed the methods of empirical pragmatics and diachronic semantics. In this way, the study of meaning change can be brought to bear on the conceptual engineer’s normative project. The picture that emerges tells against the sorts of engineering projects most likely to appeal to philosophers. Some may stand to succeed, but they have significantly different contours than the typical ones. (shrink)

This book explores the semantic and pragmatic mechanisms underlying grammaticalization. Regine Eckardt argues that language change frequently involves a structural reorganization at the phonological, morphological, and syntactic levels. Speakers not only master the structural aspect of such reanalyses, they also-as the author argues-keep a detailed mental record of what has happened to meaning. The author develops semantic reanalysis as the semantic correlate and tracks its effects in meaning change. Several case studies offer new insights in the (...) architecture of conceptual thinking that is part of the human language faculty. Professor Eckardt develops her approach in terms of formal semantic theory. She shows how neatly tailored analyses in truth-conditional compositional semantics can elucidate the structural mechanisms of meaning change. Her exposition is advanced in the context of several in-depth case studies containing data new to historical linguistics. This book will be of central interest to scholars and advanced students of historical and comparative linguistics and of formal semantics in departments of linguistics and philosophy. (shrink)

The linguistic meaning of a word in a language is what fully competent speakers of the language have a grasp of merely in virtue of their semantic competence. The meanings of words sometimes change over time. ‘Meat’ used to mean ‘solid food’, but now means ‘animal flesh eaten as food’. This type of meaning change comes with change of topic, what we are talking about. Many people interested in conceptual engineering have claimed that there is (...) also meaning change where topic is retained. For example, they claim that the meanings of ‘fish’ and ‘pasta’ have undergone such change, and that the meaning of ‘marriage’ would change this way after gay marriages become legal and widely accepted. In this paper, I relate two sets of relatively independent literatures: mainstream philosophy of language and conceptual engineering to argue that on a plausible and widely accepted Minimalist view of meaning that is part and parcel of anti‐descriptivism, none of the above sorts of cases involve meaning change with topic retention. I do this by showing how to distinguish minimalism about meaning from the related theses of externalism and anti‐individualism about intension and how to separate meaning from intension in a way that allows meaning and topic to remain the same despite changes in intension. The larger lesson is that much like we should not disregard the boundary between the narrowly meaning‐related (‘semantics’) and the more broadly communication‐related (‘pragmatics’), and we should not disregard the boundary between the former and the more broadly thought‐related, conceptual or cognitive (‘cognition’). (shrink)

Invariantism proposed by Braun (Linguistics and Philosophy 35(6):461–489, 2012) aims to maintain full identity of semantic content between all uses of ‘might’. I invoke well-known facts regarding diachronic change in meanings of modals to argue that invariantism commits us to implausible duplication of familiar processes of lexical semantic change on the level of “lexical pragmatics”, with no obvious payoff.

Standard metasemantic frameworks render word meanings resistant to the control of ordinary speakers, and hinder our ability to exercise sovereignty over the denotations of words. The literature suggests three main responses to the problem: views on which ordinary denotational interventions cannot cause changes to semantic reality, views on which we should drop the metasemantic premises that generate the difficulty, and views on which denotational interventions boil down to operations on a non-recalcitrant region of the semantic spectrum. I review these responses (...) and argue that they face difficulties. Then, I draw on linguistic work on variation to make an alternative proposal. I suggest that part of the problem hinges on a tendency to think about standing meanings under heavily idealized assumptions of intra-linguistic homogeneity. To amend this, we should consider endorsing a localist ontology for semantic properties that allows individual vocabulary items to bear variable standing meanings at different communities of speakers of a public language. The result, I argue, is a middle-ground framework which accepts the difficulties of wide-scope meaning change while granting speakers semantic self-determination, and strikes an attractive balance between a few central desiderata. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn with his classic The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of the most influential and widely read philosophers of the 20th century. Kuhn's claim that the meanings of scientific terms change is often taken to be refuted by recent advances in the philosophy of language. Meaning Changes challenges this interpretation showing that meaning change in Kuhn has multiple aspects: Semantic, mental and historical. The author describes the traditional view with clarity, but demonstrates that Kuhn's (...) idea stems from his studies of history. The book explains how Kuhn's philosophy is supported by cognitive science and why meaning change is relevant to the history of ideas. It argues that Kuhn's case against Hilary Putnam's causal theory of reference constitutes serious criticism of the account. The book concludes by analysing Kuhn's 'historical perspective' in the coherentist epistemological framework, which regards the question of scientific progress ultimately as empirical. This book will be of particular interest to students and scholars of the history and philosophy of science. It also is valuable reading to anybody interested in philosophy or scientific change. (shrink)

Today, the tone of discussion in the public sphere is dominated by misunderstanding. A common assumption is that misunderstanding comes from a failure of understanding. This article argues that misunderstanding is in fact a type of meaning change. To fully understand the contrast between misunderstanding as a failure of understanding and misunderstanding as a type of meaning change, the article uses Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hans-Georg Gadamer as a starting point to tease out an unthought assumption. Both (...) thinkers challenge traditional preconceptions of how language shapes understanding and they make prominent use of the concept of misunderstanding to do so. Yet both rely on a de facto model of misunderstanding as a failure of understanding. To consider an alternative notion of misunderstanding, the article looks at examples from thinkers influenced by Wittgenstein's and Gadamer's philosophy. Finally, the article concludes by positing a new definition of misunderstanding. (shrink)

Some philosophers and historians of science have suggested that the meanings of scientific terms change in the course of the history of science in such a way that the comparison of successive theories becomes impossible. This claim of "incommensurability", usually associated with Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, has attracted attention for its relativist and anti-rationalist implications. It would seem to make the choice between two theories into a random affair, not one of direct comparison. ;The principal attempts to defeat (...) this claim are based either on Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam's causal theory of reference, first proposed as an account of the reference of proper names, or on Donald Davidson's general argument that all languages are inter-translatable. However, the former is inappropriate as a reply to incommensurability and the latter must be modified before it can serve as a procedure for theory-comparison. After looking at these two replies in detail, the dissertation proposes a method for comparing theories. ;Davidson's argument against incommensurability is adapted so that his interpretive method can serve as the basis of a procedure for comparing scientific theories. Certain constraints on interpretation are spelt out in order to arrive at a unique way of isolating the agreements and disagreements among theories. The main attraction of the interpretive approach is that it consists of a descriptional account of meaning which is also holistic. That is to say, it identifies a term from one theory with a term from another on the basis of the overlap between the two theories, but without relying on the analytic-synthetic distinction. ;A number of case studies are used to demonstrate how theories can be compared and their concepts matched up. One of the consequences of this approach is that transitivity in the translation of concepts will generally break down. But that does not force an anti-realist position in the philosophy of science. To justify this claim, a discussion of scientific taxonomy is undertaken and criticisms are made of the essentialist conception of natural kinds. (shrink)

This study investigated the relationship between death anxiety and experienced meaning in life. Six hundred and forty-eight Chinese college students were surveyed using the Death Anxiety Scale, the Prosocial Behavior Scale, and the Meaning in Life Scale. The results showed that death anxiety predicted experienced meaning through three pathways: the first one was through search for meaning singly; the second one was through prosocial behavior singly; and the third one was through search for meaning and (...) prosocial behavior serially, which accounted for the highest proportion of the total effect. This study highlights the positive side of death anxiety. (shrink)

Thomas S. Kuhn claimed that the meanings of scientific terms change in theory changes or in scientific revolutions. In philosophy, meaning change has been taken as the source of a group of problems, such as untranslatability, incommensurability, and referential variance. For this reason, the majority of analytic philosophers have sought to deny that there can be meaning change by focusing on developing a theory of reference that would guarantee referential stability. A number of philosophers have (...) also claimed that Kuhn’s view can be explained by the fact that he accepted and further developed many central tenets of logical empiricism. I maintain that the genesis of Kuhn’s meaning theorising lies in his historical approach and that his view of meaning change is justified. Later in his career he attempted to advance a theory of meaning and can be said to have had limited success in it. What is more, recent cognitive science has unexpectedly managed to shed light on Kuhn’s insights on the organisation of information in the mind, concept learning, and concept definition. Furthermore, although Kuhn’s critique of Putnam’s causal theory of reference has often been dismissed as irrelevant, he has a serious point to address. Kuhn thought that the causal theory that works so well with proper names cannot work with scientific terms. He held that conceptual categories are formed by similarity and dissimilarity relations; therefore, several features and not only one single property are needed for determination of extension. In addition, the causal theory requires universal substances as points of reference of scientific terms. Kuhn was a conceptualist, who held that universals do not exist as mind-independent entities and that mind-dependent family resemblance concepts serve the role of universals. Further, at the beginning of his career, Kuhn was interested in the question of what concepts or ideas are and how they change in their historical context. Although he did not develop his theorising on this issue, I demonstrate that this is a genuine problem in the philosophy of history. Finally, Kuhn argued that scientists cannot have access to truth in history because we cannot transcend our historical niche, and as a consequence, the truth of a belief cannot be a reason for theory choice. Instead of truth, we can rely on justification. I also discuss Kuhn’s idea that problem-solving is the main aim of science and show that this view can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology. (shrink)

Mary Hesse was one of the most significant figures in 20th Century history and philosophy of science, not only because of her academic research, but also for the role she played in further developing and enhancing the field at the institutional level. She was instrumental in the formation of the Division of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Leeds, where she was a lecturer in mathematics, before she moved to University College, London and from there to the (...) Dept. of History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge where she was eventually appointed to a Professorship. She was not only Vice-President of the British Society for the History of Science and President of the Philosophy of Science Association, as well as being elected to the British Academy, but was also Editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science during a time of considerable change for the field as a whole. This is the introduction to a selection of her papers, together with some notable responses, from the pages of the British Journal for Philosophy of Science. (shrink)

I argue against the currently popular view that a radical change in theory affects the meaning of theoretical terms, and hence render pre- and post-shift theories incomparable. I first show how to pose the meaning-change issue without appeal to meanings reified. I contend that arguments against theory-neutral observation languages are faulty, but that even if they were sound, there are semantic devices that allow a theory to refer to the factual basis of a competitor. This suggests (...) a picture of science as the accumulation of truths, with each successive stage being more stable. (shrink)

Dongchundang Songjoongil (1606-1672) was a scholar who represented Gihoyeahak and Sanlim (山林) influencing the society of Chosŏn dynasty since the middle of 17th century. This report focus on its contemporary purport and reconciliation spirit on the Kyoung (敬) of Dongchundang. The Kyoung is the core idea that elucidates Dongchundang's philosophy and its characteristic. Dongchundang tried to continue to live the life of 'according knowledge and action' (知行一致) and dreamed the world of 'harmonization but not same' (和而不同) which indicates the principle (...) of heaven, meaning the harmony never following suit without reflection and a just and great cause, going through with his original idea through the Kyoung. In addition, Dongchundang expanded the Kyoung from personal existential problems to social ethic practical ones in the viewpoint of more reason than vitality, and aimed to build the ethic kingdom that came the harmony andreconciliation of all the communities together, interacting his subjectivity and the universal. The Kyoung and reconciliation spirit of Dongchundang is the orthodoxy of Dohak(道學), and it made him live moral intention and through real life and summarized the manner and spirit pursuing the just and great cause beyond factions. In this sense, Dongchundang's philosophy is the concentration of the Kyoung and philosophical expression of reconciliation spirit. As the peculiarity of Dongchundang's philosophy is based on the Kyoung, it is the everlasting principle of what one should do and practice in human life. (shrink)

Through a detailed examination of the basis of the idea of communication - with its semantic core of "commonality" or the transcendence of difference - Chang argues against the tendency of theorists to value understanding over misunderstanding, clarity over ambiguity, order over disorder. To this end the author revisits the thought of Derrida and considers deconstruction in general. Specifically, he uses the critique of the phenomenological tradition emerging from poststructuralism to clarify the commitments and assumptions inherent in models of communication. (...) A seminal work, Deconstructing Communication will serve as the guiding framework for a constructive debate about the future direction of communication theory. Situated at the intersection of current debates regarding meaning and representation, Deconstructing Communication casts doubt on the seeming innocence of the activity of communication. Using poststructuralist literary theory and philosophy, Briankle G. Chang argues that modern theories fail to provide an adequate explanation for how communication is possible. (shrink)

The direct use of a physical law for the purpose of measurement creates a problem of circularity: the law needs to be empirically tested in order to ensure the reliability of measurement, but the testing requires that we already know the value of the quantity to be measured. This problem is discussed through some detailed examples of energy measurements in quantum physics; three major methods are analyzed in their interrelation, with a focus on the method of “material retardation.” It seems (...) that the only reasonable solution is to establish the law needed for the measurement by relying on an alternate method of measurement. This solution is also circular, since it amounts to letting different measurement methods justify each other. However, this circularity can be fruitful for the process of concept building; meaning can be created in a web of interconnected measurement methods. (shrink)

Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to involve special descriptive/informational content (however conveyed), and those which understand them to encode special emotive/expressive content. Our view is that both offer essential insights, but that part of what sets slurs apart is use-theoretic content. In particular, we urge that slurring words belong at the intersection of a number of categories in a sociolinguistic register taxonomy, one that usually includes [+slang] and [+vulgar] and always (...) includes [-polite] and [+derogatory]. Thus, e.g., what distinguishes ‘Chinese’ from ‘chink’ is neither a peculiar sort of descriptive nor emotional content, but rather the fact that ‘chink’ is lexically marked as belonging to different registers than ‘Chinese’. It is, moreover, partly such facts which makes slurring ethically unacceptable. (shrink)

This qualitative research focuses on Dong's Wind and Rain Bridges in Chengyang Bazhai in Liuzhou, China. This research explores the academic issue of public space and meaning change in the process of minority development, through the Dong's Wind and Rain Bridges phenomenon. The findings of this research are that public space in all societies in the world is a fusion of space production and meaning and constructs identity and social relations. It has changed in the context of (...) the times and has produced new functions for different groups of people, constantly generating new meanings superimposed on the old meanings. As an important public space in the community, Dong's Wind and Rain Bridges include the physical space production of the surrounding area and the social and mental space production of the Dong ethnic group, emphasizing the close relationship between "space production" and "ethnic identity". In the process of minority development in China, the use of the wind and rain bridge's public space has changed socially, responding to the new needs of different groups. It, therefore, has been constantly undergoing "meaning change". (shrink)

Considered by many Taoists and non-Taoists alike to be an essential guide to living, Lao-tzu's Treatise on the Response of the Tao was written by the twelfth-century sage Le Ying-chang. Presenting foundational teachings and practices of the Action and Karma school of Taoism, it is replete with folk stories illustrating the teachings and an introductory essay that discusses the more esoteric meaning of the passages. Told with clarity and depth, these seminal Taoist teachings offer guidance on leading a balanced (...) healthy life. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 5, Page 40-41, May 2012.

This research examines wearable, fashionable interaction design to mediate the narrative and semiotic concepts found in technology and fashion. We discuss the principles of design anthropology using Taiwan proverbs to transmit the “people-situation-reason-object” method and analyze five case studies that provide new approaches for designers engaged in future industry. Design anthropology attempts to engage physiological and psychological design through technological function, meaning formation, and fashion aesthetics to achieve cognition between people and the environment. The wearable, fashionable interaction displays characteristics (...) of narrative and semantics transmitted through craft culture as well as collective, cheerful, and creative performance. It is a confident and innovative attempt, which bears a joyful and fundamental interface. This study takes two directions, with cultural thinking serving as the basis to establish a set of traditional craft designs and interactive objects that assist designers in using the senses to inform and initiate new lifestyle values. (shrink)

This paper defends a conception of analysis on which analysis can be revisionary of ordinary or expert belief, without thereby changing meaning or replacing one concept with another. On this view, analyses play a role in determining not only what we will go on to mean, but also what we meant all along. The argument appeals to our epistemic engagement with revisionary theorising, focusing on Haslanger's ameliorative accounts of race and gender.

ABSTRACT In recent debates about conceptual engineering, it appears that the internalist has an explanatory advantage when it comes to accounting for meaning change and conceptual change. In this paper, I argue against this impression. I show how two different varieties of externalism, originalism and anti-individualism, can coherently explain various cases of meaning change, irrespective of whether they involve proper names or kind terms; and also irrespective of whether they occur in everyday, legal, or scientific (...) contexts. I point out which mechanisms and interpretational strategies the originalist and anti-individualist can invoke, relative to their respective background assumptions about the nature of concepts. Furthermore, I offer an argument in favour of the claim that externalism as such has no implications concerning whether concepts can undergo change. I establish this by showing that originalism allows for conceptual change while anti-individualism insists on conceptual stability. (shrink)

Words are changing their meanings in natural language. A word can change its referent, and even when its extension remains the same, its connotation or intension may evolve. Similarly, a sentence can alter its meaning without changing the meanings of its individual words. These are curious but common phenomena that have been attracting the attention of both linguists and philosophers. However, meaning change is something more than a mere linguistic phenomenon because it sometimes reflects the transformation (...) of the “world” itself – at least for us. Furthermore, it is highly relevant to what happens to those who use language to think and live. In this book, I explore the change of meaning in a broad context, not only from the perspective of language but also from an analysis of what is happening in our minds. Although the semantic dimension has historically provided the foundation of contemporary philosophy, the objectivity of meaning is contradicted to some degree by its sheer changeability. It is therefore necessary to observe how the change of meaning is compatible with the objectivity of the semantic dimension – an observation that is inseparable from the question of what “meaning” is, as well as from the problems concerning the self, events, and facts. Chapters 1 and 2 clarify the problem of meaning changes by exploring the concept of meaning in a broad context. According to the standard contextualist explanation, a sentence’s content is determined by its context of utterance, and its truth value is further determined by its circumstance of evaluation. This standard framework, notably with its focus on indexicals, cannot smoothly explain many cases of meaning change, such as the change in meaning in a predicate or the alteration that occurs in the inferential nexus. To understand these phenomena, I expand the perspective of the modern philosophy of language to merge it with the theory of emptiness in the East Asian Buddhist tradition. This must be considered as one of the original aspects of the book. Based on this preparation, the following two chapters explain the meaning change through an analysis of the self. It has been shown that a thought expressed in a sentence undergoes substantial transformation whenever the meaning of its predicate changes, or when the inferential nexus itself is altered; however, this is a time when the world in which we live correspondingly changes. To illustrate this, I developed a theory of semantic determination to describe and explain how our selves and the world simultaneously change – a theory that consists of such elements as perspective extension, epistemic restriction by our “mental walls,” and role-playing volition, all of which jointly constitute a multi-layered standpoint. In short, the constitution of a multi-layered standpoint allows for—and brings about—changes in meaning. (shrink)

We argue that the meaning of smiles is interpreted from physical/contextual cues, and simulation may simply reinforce the information derived from these cues. We suggest that, contrary to the claim of the SIMS model, positive and negative smiles may invoke similar simulation processes. Finally, we provide alternative explanations for the role of eye contact in the processing of smiles.

Slurs are derogatory words; they seem to express contempt and hatred toward marginalized groups. They are used to insult and derogate their victims. Moreover, slurs give rise to philosophical questions. In virtue of what is the word “chink,” unlike “Chinese,” a derogatory word? Does “chink” refer to the same group as “Chinese”? If “chink” is a derogatory word, how is it possible to use it in a non-derogatory way (e.g., by Chinese comedians or between Chinese friends)? Many theories of slurs (...) answer these questions by assuming that slurs communicate derogatory messages. However, little attention has been paid to the speech acts slurs are used to perform. In this dissertation, I argue that slurs are illocutionary force indicators: words to perform the speech acts of derogation. “Chink” is a derogatory word because its use is to derogate the Chinese, just like the phrase “I promise” has the use to make a promise. To derogate the Chinese is to enforce a norm which assigns to them an inferior normative status. Slurs are also propositional indicators: words that contribute to the truth-conditions. “Chink” has the same referent as “Chinese,” its neutral counterpart. Appealing to speech act theory enables my theory to answer questions about slurs, e.g., slurs can be used in non-derogatory ways because the felicity conditions of derogation are not met. To illustrate the advantage of my theory, I will explain how other theories of slurs fall short because they take positions opposite to mine on certain issues. For instance, Mark Richard’s theory, unlike mine, takes utterances of slurs to have no truth values. It follows from his theory, I will argue, that lying with “Chang is a chink” is impossible. Finally, I will defend the force indicator theory from common objections. My force indicator theory provides a case study of the use theory of meaning and a framework for political philosophers to study the harm of slurs. (shrink)

Argues that throughout the classical period in China, the word `fa' consistently means measurable, publicly accessible standards for the application of terms used in behavioral guidance. Review of the Daoist analysis of the meaning of fa; Original philosophical role of fa; Detail of Chinese philosopher Han Feizi's theories on the legal use of the term `fa.'.

The outbreak and impact of COVID-19 alert humans to the fragility of life and interpersonal bonds. The pandemic and its aftermath bring us not only disease and death but fear and suspicion. Enforced lockdown, quarantine, and isolation worldwide hampered and slowed down human interaction. However, epidemics also prompt us to rediscover valuable qualities inherent in our everyday lives despite the many problems. The retrieval of love in Maugham’s The Painted Veil (1925) is a case in point. By reading Maugham’s The (...) Painted Veil via the lens of epidemics and their impact on humanity, this paper discusses how disease can precipitate rather than impede human interaction. The discussion will help shed light on the meanings and implications of love during and after epidemics. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to identify how older Korean people seek information and their desire to participate in decision making about their health care. A total of 165 elderly people living in Seoul, South Korea, participated in the study. Data were collected during individual interviews using the Autonomy Preference Index. The mean information-seeking score was high. The mean score for their desire to participate with a physician in decision making was lower, but this was higher when family members (...) were involved. The study indicates that many older people want to receive information about their health care. Families (or guardians), as well as older people themselves, should be included in the decision-making process. Nurses can encourage older people to express their wishes, while treating each individual with respect. (shrink)

Naming, according to Sebeok, constihttes the first stage of zoosemiotics. This special but common use of language acrually inaugurates more complicated procedures of human discourse on non-human kingdom, including classification of its members. Because of language's double articulation in sound and sense, as well as the grapheme's pleremic (meaning-full) rather than cenemic (meaning-empty) characteristic (according to Hjelmslev). Chinese script is capable of naming and grouping animals randomly but effectively. This paper attempts to describe the said scriptorial "necessity of (...) naming" (Kripke) in classical Chinese by citing all the creatures, real or fabulous, with a /ma/ (horse) radical. (shrink)

Dreams were a topic of study even in ancient times, and they are a special spiritual phenomenon. Generations of literati have defined the meaning of dreams in their own way, while Zhu Xi was perhaps the most outstanding one among them. He made profound explanations of dreams from aspects such as the relationship between dreams and the principles li and qi, the relationship between dreams and the state of the heart, and the relationship between dreams and an individual’s moral (...) improvement. He summarized previous generations’ understanding of dreams and infused a new dimension from the School of Principles, pointing out a direction for individuals’ moral cultivation and spiritual pursuit. Zhu Xi also examined the opinions of Zhang Zai, Cheng Yi, Hu Hong and other thinkers on Confucius not dreaming of Duke Zhou in his later years, revealing differences between thinkers in the School of Principles. An analysis of Zhu Xi’s thoughts on dreams will provide deeper insight into the research on the School of Principles. (shrink)

I present philosophical reflections arising from a study of laboratory measurement methods in quantum physics. More specifically, I investigate three major methods of measuring kinetic energy, from the period during which quantum physics was developed and came to be widely accepted: magnetic deflection, electrostatic retardation, and material retardation. The historical material serves as a provocative focus at which many broader philosophical topics come together: the empirical testing of theories, the universal validity of physical laws, the interaction between theoretical and experimental (...) traditions, incommensurability, meaning and definition, realism and instrumentalism, the process of scientific change, and the unity of science. ;I begin the discussion by noting that the measurement methods in question were based on classical theory. Chapter 1 asks how the classical reasoning in measurements can be interpreted in quantum-mechanical terms, and concludes that only a "surface interpretation" is possible, since the classical methods involve many assumptions that conflict with quantum mechanics. Chapter 2 attempts to give a quantitative assessment of the inaccuracies that might result from using the "incorrect" classical theory in the design of measurement methods. Chapter 3 asks how we can know whether a measurement method is reliable, and investigates how different methods of measuring the same quantity can ground each other; this mutual grounding is also seen as a process of concept-formation. Chapter 4 argues that the customary quantum theories of measurement do not describe actual measurements well, and originate from an overly literal interpretation of the operator formalism of quantum mechanics. Chapter 5 examines how the classically reasoned measurement methods were incorporated into quantum physics; that history suggests a model of scientific development which can introduce fundamental changes while preserving much continuity with the old tradition. Chapter 6 develops a philosophical framework which allows a synthetic view of the concrete results presented in the earlier chapters: my work is an attempt to establish "conceptual coherence," creating and clarifying noncontradictory connections among the various conceptual activities that make up quantum physics. (shrink)

We often use language creatively, introducing new expressions on the fly. That we can successfully communicate with novel expressions without antecedent semantic knowledge has led many to a dynamic meaning hypothesis: namely, we can actively renegotiate extant semantic conventions to better suit our communicative, practical, and even normative concerns. We argue that this hypothesis is a mistake: meanings are non-negotiable, and so, lexical innovation cannot proceed by way of meaning-negotiation.

ArgumentMuch of the long controversy concerning the workings of electric batteries revolved around the concept of the contact potential (especially between different types of metals), originated by Alessandro Volta in the late eighteenth century. Although Volta’s original theory of batteries has been thoroughly rejected and most discussions in today’s electrochemistry hardly ever mention the contact potential, the concept has made repeated comebacks through the years, and has by no means completely disappeared. In this paper, I describe four salient foci of (...) its revivals: dry piles, thermocouples, quadrant electrometers, and vacuum phenomena. I also show how the contact potential has maintained its presence in some cogent modern scientific literature. Why has the death of the Voltaic contact potential been such an untidy affair? I suggest that this is because the concept has displayed significant meaning and utility in various experimental and theoretical contexts, but has never been successfully given a simple, unified account. Considering that situation, I also suggest that it would make sense to preserve and develop it as a multifarious concept. (shrink)