Invariantist ‘might’ and modal meaning change: A reply to Braun

Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (2):175-180 (2013)
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Abstract

Invariantism proposed by Braun (Linguistics and Philosophy 35(6):461–489, 2012) aims to maintain full identity of semantic content between all uses of ‘might’. I invoke well-known facts regarding diachronic change in meanings of modals to argue that invariantism commits us to implausible duplication of familiar processes of lexical semantic change on the level of “lexical pragmatics”, with no obvious payoff

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Citations of this work

Invariantism about 'can' and 'may' (as well as 'might').David Braun - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (2):181-185.

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References found in this work

Nonindexical contextualism.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):231-250.
An invariantist theory of 'might' might be right.David Braun - 2012 - Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (6):461-489.

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