Le lien mère/fille, ou éducatrice/danseuse, tel qu’il s’exprime au cours de l’apprentissage de la danse classique, est ici discuté à deux époques différentes, le xixe siècle et la période actuelle, à partir de témoignages écrits sur la vie des élèves dans l’Opéra ancien et d’enquêtes orales auprès de danseuses contemporaines. Il en ressort qu’au xixe siècle comme aujourd’hui, mères et éducatrices ne permettent pas à ces jeunes filles d’accéder facilement au statut de femme ; les jeunes danseuses du xixe (...) siècle n’avaient pour certaines pas de liberté dans leur choix matrimonial, devaient pour d’autres subvenir aux besoins de leur famille, tandis qu’aujourd’hui mères et éducatrices les maintiennent dans le statut de « fille ». (shrink)

Dans son livre d’anthropologie esthétique sur L’art chorégraphique occidental, une fabrique du féminin, inspiré de sa thèse soutenue en 2005 à l’Université de Toulouse 2, Virginie Valentin propose d’étudier le « nœud entre émotion esthétique et danse classique » (p. 11) qui donnerait aujourd’hui aux jeunes filles françaises l’envie de pratiquer le ballet. Croisant entretiens de danseuses professionnelles et amatrices sur leurs expériences de l’apprentissage du ballet, avec une analyse littéra...

À partir des principaux résultats d'une recherche sociologique réalisée en 1992, l'auteur montre dans ce texte quelles furent les pratiques et les théories du mouvement féministe français contemporain à l'égard des thèmes de la maternité et de l'éducation. En utilisant deux catégories de sources ­la presse de ce mouvement social et les témoignages actuels des militantes-, l'auteur conclut à la faible prise en compte de ces deux thèmes par les féministes, un silence qu'elle explique par des raisons tout à la (...) fois sociologiques (le statut social dominant des militantes), historiques (l'absence de transmission d'une génération de féministes à une autre) et idéologiques (la croyance en une libération immédiate des femmes). Puis elle révèle quelques-unes des pratiques pédagogiques que, en dépit d'un tel contexte, des militantes mères de petites filles et de petits garçons ont tenté d'élaborer et de mettre en pratique durant la même période (1970-1980). (shrink)

Cet article résume plusieurs projets concernant l'usage par des étudiants de ressources informatiques universitaires. Dans chaque cas, nous observons une discordance entre les attentes affichées par les décideurs des politiques éducatives et celles des architectes de la technologie. L'ensemble des cas discutés suggère que bien plus de recherches est nécessaire pour comprendre les cultures établies de l'apprentissage si les nouvelles technologies doivent y être introduites de façon productive dans un milieu réactif.This paper summarises a number of projects all concerned with (...) university students' use of institutional ICT facilities. In each case I note a discrepancy between the stated expectations of educational policy makers and technology architects. Together the cases discussed suggest that much more research is needed to understand established cultures of learning if new technologies are to be interfaced productively with a resilient status quo. (shrink)

Élie HALÉVY (1870-1937), philosophe et historien des idées, fut professeur à l'École libre des sciences politiques, l'ancêtre de l'actuel Sciences Po. Comme son autre grand ouvrage, l'Histoire du peuple anglais au XIXe siècle, paru en six tomes de 1913 à 1932, les trois tomes de La formation du radicalisme philosophique, parus en 1901 pour les deux premiers et en 1904 pour le troisième, reflètent pour partie ses enseignements de l'Ecole libre consacrés à l'histoire britannique. Le premier tome, La jeunesse (...) de Bentham 1776-1789, étudie la doctrine utilitariste non seulement chez celui qu'on regarde comme son fondateur principal, Jeremy Bentham, mais aussi chez les nombreux auteurs qui, en Grande-Bretagne et sur le continent, en dessinèrent avant lui les contours. Le deuxième tome, L’évolution de la doctrine utilitaire de 1789 à 1815, montre comment l'utilitarisme revêtit la forme non seulement d'une école de pensée, mais aussi d'un mouvement pour la réforme économique, sociale et politique. Le rôle coordonnateur nouveau de James Mill, ainsi qu'une convergence de vues avec les économistes, qui poussaient dans le sens des réformes, marquèrent notamment cette évolution. Le troisième tome, Le radicalisme philosophique, continue d'étudier la transformation de l'école en mouvement après la fin des guerres napoléoniennes, lorsque celle-ci commence à engranger ses premiers grands succès réformistes. Bentham, James Mill et les autres penseurs utilitaires sont alors réunis sous l'appellation de philosophic radicals. Le terme temporel de l'ouvrage est le Reform Act de 1932, première étape vers la modernisation du système électoral, que la propagande de ce groupe ne contribua pas peu à faire aboutir. Quoique l'ouvrage d'Halévy vaille en premier lieu par l'immense savoir qu'il déploie, et le nombre et l'excellence des citations qu'il propose, il comporte aussi des thèses historiques et philosophiques originales. On peut citer parmi les premières la thèse, qui relie les trois tomes, voulant que l'utilitarisme britannique trouve sa forme achevée dans l'intervention sur la société, lorsqu'il se mue en radicalisme philosophique, et parmi les secondes, la thèse, énoncée au début du premier tome, voulant qu'il existe trois modèles dominants de jonction des intérêts individuels (la fusion sympathique, l'identification naturelle et l'identification artificielle). Une autre grande thèse, à la fois historique et philosophique, affirme en substance que l'économie politique classique serait un département spécialisé de la pensée utilitaire. La question de savoir jusqu'à quel point Smith, Ricardo et Malthus ont pu adhérer au "principe d'utilité" de Bentham est toujours débattue. En même temps que les élucidations apportées à ce principe, elle contribue à expliquer l'intérêt que les historiens de la pensée économique continuent de porter à l'ouvrage. La réédition de La formation du radicalisme philosophique par les Presses Universitaires de France (P.U.F.) a impliqué un effort collectif. Monique Canto-Sperber en a conçu l'idée et assumé la direction, et l'ouvrage a paru en 1995 dans la collection Philosophie morale dont elle avait alors la responsabilité aux P.U.F. Chacun des trois tomes s'accompagne d'une postface, confiée au philosophe Jean-Pierre Dupuy pour le premier, au politologue Pierre Bouretz pour le second, et à l'économiste Philippe Mongin pour le troisième. Un travail de grande ampleur a été requis, d'une part, pour localiser les références de Halévy dans des sources plus récentes que celles dont il disposait, en particulier, s'agissant de Bentham, dans l'édition toujours en cours de ses œuvres, et d'autre part, pour traduire les très nombreux passages que Halévy citait en langue anglaise. Sophie Jallais et Mary Sokol se sont chargées de la première tâche et Jean-Pierre Cléro de la seconde. Prise après quelques années de circulation de l'ouvrage, la décision des P.U.F. d'en pilonner les exemplaires que ses responsables ne rachèteraient pas a semblé compromettre ce vaste travail. Mais grâce aux efforts du site québécois Les classiques des sciences sociales, et de son directeur Jean-Marie Tremblay, il est devenu possible d'accéder aux trois tomes électroniquement. Les adresses en sont : http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t1/radicalisme_philo_t1.html http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t2/radicalisme_philo_t2.html http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t3/radicalisme_philo_t3.html Avant la réédition de 1995, l'ouvrage de Halévy n'était facilement accessible que grâce à la traduction anglaise plusieurs fois rééditée de Mary Morris, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, New York, Macmillan, 1928. (shrink)

Élie HALÉVY (1870-1937), philosophe et historien des idées, fut professeur à l'École libre des sciences politiques, l'ancêtre de l'actuel Sciences Po. Comme son autre grand ouvrage, l'Histoire du peuple anglais au XIXe siècle, paru en six tomes de 1913 à 1932, les trois tomes de La formation du radicalisme philosophique, parus en 1901 pour les deux premiers et en 1904 pour le troisième, reflètent pour partie ses enseignements de l'Ecole libre consacrés à l'histoire britannique. Le premier tome, La jeunesse (...) de Bentham 1776-1789, étudie la doctrine utilitariste non seulement chez celui qu'on regarde comme son fondateur principal, Jeremy Bentham, mais aussi chez les nombreux auteurs qui, en Grande-Bretagne et sur le continent, en dessinèrent avant lui les contours. Le deuxième tome, L’évolution de la doctrine utilitaire de 1789 à 1815, montre comment l'utilitarisme revêtit la forme non seulement d'une école de pensée, mais aussi d'un mouvement pour la réforme économique, sociale et politique. Le rôle coordonnateur nouveau de James Mill, ainsi qu'une convergence de vues avec les économistes, qui poussaient dans le sens des réformes, marquèrent notamment cette évolution. Le troisième tome, Le radicalisme philosophique, continue d'étudier la transformation de l'école en mouvement après la fin des guerres napoléoniennes, lorsque celle-ci commence à engranger ses premiers grands succès réformistes. Bentham, James Mill et les autres penseurs utilitaires sont alors réunis sous l'appellation de philosophic radicals. Le terme temporel de l'ouvrage est le Reform Act de 1832, première étape vers la modernisation du système électoral, que la propagande de ce groupe ne contribua pas peu à faire aboutir. Quoique l'ouvrage d'Halévy vaille en premier lieu par l'immense savoir qu'il déploie, et le nombre et l'excellence des citations qu'il propose, il comporte aussi des thèses historiques et philosophiques originales. On peut citer parmi les premières la thèse, qui relie les trois tomes, voulant que l'utilitarisme britannique trouve sa forme achevée dans l'intervention sur la société, lorsqu'il se mue en radicalisme philosophique, et parmi les secondes, la thèse, énoncée au début du premier tome, voulant qu'il existe trois modèles dominants de jonction des intérêts individuels (la fusion sympathique, l'identification naturelle et l'identification artificielle). Une autre grande thèse, à la fois historique et philosophique, affirme en substance que l'économie politique classique serait un département spécialisé de la pensée utilitaire. La question de savoir jusqu'à quel point Smith, Ricardo et Malthus ont pu adhérer au "principe d'utilité" de Bentham est toujours débattue. En même temps que les élucidations apportées à ce principe, elle contribue à expliquer l'intérêt que les historiens de la pensée économique continuent de porter à l'ouvrage. L'auteur a participé à la réédition de La formation du radicalisme philosophique en 1995 par les Presses Universitaires de France (P.U.F.), suivant un projet collectif lancé par Monique Canto-Sperber. Dans le présent article, antérieur à cette réédition, l'auteur tentait de résumer brièvement un livre qui demeure irremplaçable en dépit d'une conception et d'un style quelque peu datés. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est l'hommage qu'une des deux filles de Jean Klein (1912-1998), Nita, comédienne et artiste, a décidé de rendre à son père, un des plus célèbres maîtres spirituels du XXe siècle, pour le centième anniversaire de sa naissance. Nita Klein a rassemblé ici de nombreux souvenirs de conversations avec Jean Klein, des inédits, des photographies autour de la question de l'art et de la spiritualité. Jean Klein a été philosophe et un maître spirituel remarquable auteur d'une oeuvre essentielle qui (...) a infuencé de nombreux enseignants contemporains comme Eric Baret, Jean-Bouchart D'Orval, Francis Lucille, Jean-Marc Mantel etc. Même si Jean Klein n'appartenait à aucune école, sa quête de la vérité a rencontré l'Advaïta Vedânta (Non-Dualité) dont il a dit lui-même que " ce n'est pas un système, une religion, une technique. Ce n'est même pas une philosophie, c'est simplement la vérité. " Mais Jean Klein était aussi violoniste (il pratiqua toute sa vie le violon) et s'intéressait à toutes les formes d'art : au théâtre, à la peinture (il était ami de Hans Hartung), à la danse (son autre fille, Malavika, est professeur de danse indienne). Il s'agit donc dans ce livre d'une rencontre entre l'intuition d'un artiste et la recherche indienne de la vérité, recherche plus orientée vers la perception globale de la Réalité que vers les certitudes offertes par le savoir. Nita Klein nous invite à découvrir comment la spiritualité authentique conduit à la création artistique ; comment, dans l'art du théâtre, l'interprétation d'un personnage, peut atteindre à la vérité, quand la personnalité du comédien consent à s'effacer. " En l'absence du "Moi", il y a seulement la vie. ", dit Jean Klein. Et pas seulement dans le théâtre, mais dans la peinture, le dessin, la danse. La Non-Dualité, avec Jean Klein, est une ouverture à la Beauté. (shrink)

L'article part du fait qui apparaît de plus en plus clairement dans la psychologie américaine moderne de la personnalité, qu’un certain type de domination de la mère dans la famille exerce une influence fâcheuse sur l’évolution psychique des garçons et des filles. L’auteur étudie les diverses interprétations, qu’on peut donner de ce fait.La première interprétation discutée est celle-ci : pour des raisons biologiques, l’amour naturel serait nécessaire à une évolution saine de l’enfant ; l’égoïsme de la mère exercerait une influence (...) nocive parce qu’elle serait en opposition avec cette nécessité biologique. L’article indique que les rapports naturels de la mère et de l’enfant sont, sous bien des rapports, remplacés par des relations culturelles (en particulier pour l’alimentation), ce qui montre l’incertitude de cette interprétation.La deuxième explication discutée est celle-ci : la tendance à dominer l’enfant, à l’élever en vue de succès conformes aux désirs maternels, serait signe du caractère „névrosé“ de la mère, la nocivité de cette conduite serait imputable à la névrose de la mère. Mais, à l’aide des faits ethnologiques, l’article montre qu’une mère agressive, ambitieuse d’autorité n’exerce pas nécessairement une action nocive sur l’évolution du caractère de l’enfant, mais tout au contraire est susceptible de conduire à l’adaptation la meilleure des enfants aux exigences futures de la société.M. Mead présente une troisième explication possible ; l’influence nocive ne tiendrait pas à la structure du caractère de la mère, mais à la contradiction entre le rôle effectif de la mère dans la famille et son rôle officiel dans la société. En Amérique, la mère a pris effectivement la direction dans la famille, cependant il serait entièrement faux de parler d’un matriarcat, puisque cette domination de fait n’a pas de caractère officiel et n’est pas reconnue par la société. Rien n’a été changé à l’organisation patriarcale de la société américaine, mais les formes patriarcales ont été partiellement privées de leur contenu et sont en contradiction avec les rapports de fait à l’intérieur de la famille. On pourrait dire que la mère exerce son autorité à la manière d’un tyran et non d’un maître légitime. Cette forme de pouvoir maternel non contrôlé par les institutions sociales offre un moyen d’expliquer l’influence nocive de ce pouvoir sur les enfants.Der Aufsatz geht von der in der modernen amerikanischen Persönlichkeitsforschung immer evidenter werdenden Tatsache aus, dass ein gewisser Typ der Vorherrschaft der Mutter in der Familie eine schädliche Wirkung auf die seelische Entwicklung von Knaben und Mädchen hat. Die Verfasserin untersucht, welche verschiedenen Interpretationen für diesen Tatbestand möglich sind.Zunächst wird eine Interpretation besprochen, die davon ausgeht, dass aus biologischen Gründen für die gesunde Entwicklung eines Kindes mütterliche Liebe notwendig ist und dass aus dem Gegensatz zu dieser biologischen Notwendigkeit heraus die egoistische Mutter einen schädlichen Einfluss darstellt. Durch den Hinweis darauf, dass die „natürliche“ Beziehung zwischen Mutter und Kind in vielen anderen Hinsichten durch kulturelle ersetzt werde, speziell in der Ernährung, wird die Fragwürdigkeit dieses Gesichtspunktes begründet.Dann wird die Erklärung diskutiert, nach der die Tendenz, das Kind zu beherrschen und gewaltsam zu im Sinne der Mutter liegenden Erfolgen anzutreiben, ein Symptom des neurotischen Charakters der Mutter und die Schädlichkeit dieses Verhaltens eben in der Neurose der Mutter zu suchen sei. Es wird an ethnologischem Material gezeigt, dass eine aggressive und herrschsüchtige Charakterstruktur der Mutter nicht notwendigerweise schädliche Wirkungen auf die Charakterentwicklung der Kinder hat, sondern ganz im Gegenteil zur optimalen Anpassung der Kinder an die sie später erwartenden gesellschaftlichen Anforderungen führen kann.M. Mead legt eine dritte Erklärungsmöglichkeit vor : dass der schädliche Einfluss nicht in der Charakterstruktur der Mutter an sich zu suchen ist, sondern in dem Widerspruch zwischen der faktischen Rolle der Mutter in der Familie und ihrer „offiziellen“ Rolle in der Gesellschaft. Während die amerikanische Mutter häufig tatsächlich die Herrschaft in der Familie an sich gerissen hat, wäre es doch ganz falsch, von einem Matriarchat in Amerika zu sprechen, da die faktische Herrschaft in der Familie in keiner Weise den Charakter einer offiziellen und gesellschaftlich anerkannten Herrschaft der Frau angenommen hat. Vielmehr hat sich an der patriarchalischen Organisation der amerikanischen Gesellschaft nichts Entscheidendes geändert, aber die patriarchalischen Formen sind zum Teil ihres Inhaltes beraubt worden und stehen im Gegensatz zu den faktischen Verhältnissen in der Familie. Die Mutter übt ihre Herrschaft gleichsam nicht als ein rechtmässiger Herrscher, sondern als ein Tyrann aus. In dieser durch gesellschaftliche Institutionen nicht kontrollierten Form mütterlicher Herrschaft wird eine Erklärungsmöglichkeit für den schädlichen Einfluss dieser Herrschaft auf die Kinder gesehen. (shrink)

Les parcours migratoires placent les familles migrantes, qui traversent la Méditerranée, face à des enjeux nouveaux de transmission de gestes et de discours en fonction de stratégies identitaires aussi diverses que mouvantes. Ces familles, qui refont le voyage sans cesse entre les deux rives, s’attachent à faire le pont entre deux espaces, à faire voyager des idées, des gestes, des mots, des objets, des danses. C’est à ces dernières, accompagnées de chants et de musiques, gestes et sonorités de mémoire, qui (...) marquent le lien ou la séparation, que je m’intéresse. À partir d’un questionnement sur l’élaboration, la rencontre, mais aussi la remise en cause des identités genrées à travers l’apprentissage et la mise en œuvre des danses migrantes berbères ahidous, je me demande dans quelle mesure on peut proposer une approche diachronique et dialogique des mouvements de danses partagées au féminin et au masculin, qui font le voyage avec les migrants et qui sont les supports de l’expression d’une loyauté vis-à-vis du pays d’origine, d’une légitimité passant au travers des liens revendiqués, ou bien encore d’une position en marge des usages convenus au moment du départ en lien avec un contexte de vie différent, saisi de nouveaux modèles esthétiques. (shrink)

Previous assurance-theoretic treatments of testimony have not adequately explained how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address – making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is not epistemic but merely psychological or action-theoretic. I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. In doing so I explain (a) how the illocutionary norm governing the speech act proscribes not lies but a species of bullshit, (...) in an extension of Harry Frankfurt’s sense, (b) how that norm makes testimony fully second-personal, in Stephen Darwall’s sense, or bipolar, in Michael Thompson’s sense, and (c) how that species of second-personality or bipolarity is more fundamental than the practical species that Darwall and Thompson discuss. One attraction of this new Assurance View of testimony is that it allows us to reconceptualize the natures of normativity and responsibility more generally, viewing the assurance as implicating us in normative relations of recognition, and therefore of justice, that are not yet moralized with reactive attitudes. (shrink)

The consensus formulation of cumulative culture characterizes cumulative traditions as information transmitted by high-fidelity learning that generates incremental improvement over time. While this formulation is effective for studying paradigmatic cases (for example, Holocene-era hominin toolkits), it is less so at capturing and explaining putative cases at the margins—for instance, some recurrent behaviours observed in social animal species. This article argues against the consensus formulation in favour of a minimal one, which links cumulative culture to what we call ‘copying know-how’ and (...) the transmission of trait form. As we argue, these elements are better able to characterize putative instances of marginal cumulative culture. Yet by rejecting incremental improvement, the minimal formulation raises a tricky empirical problem we call ‘mere recurrence’: distinguishing cumulative culture from other processes that sustain recurrent behaviour. We highlight three broad types of processes that generate mere recurrence, distinguishing them from copying know-how. Finally, we put the assembled conceptual tools to use in a case study, distinguishing the accounts of cultural epidemiologists from those working on the zone of latent solutions—arguing against those that have tried to align the two. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Foucault’s Renaissance Episteme Reassessed: An Aristotelian CounterblastIan MacleanThere seem to me to be two good reasons for looking at Foucault’s Renaissance episteme again, even though specialists of the Renaissance have given it short shrift and Foucault himself does not seem to have set great store by it in his later writings. 1 The first is that in general books on Foucault accounts of it are still given in a (...) neutral or even approving way, as though neither the concept of episteme (which suggests both that mind-sets or paradigms or epistemes are all-constraining) nor the account of the Renaissance episteme in particular (which is given a predominantly Platonic and hermetic character) require modification, if not refutation. 2 I shall suggest that although in some sense we are all prisoners of our mind-sets, there are ways in which we can escape from this prison 3 ; and with respect to the Renaissance in particular, I shall claim that Aristotelianism, not Platonism, is the appropriate context in which to see the dominant universe of discourse of the day and that this philosophy can be shown to possess the resources for escaping its limitations. To do this I shall [End Page 149] give a brief resume of Foucault’s episteme in general and the Renaissance episteme in particular. Then I shall show first, that the Platonist features which he cites as typical are actively refuted at that time and cannot be described as dominant without severe qualification; second, that the versions of Aris-totelianism widely taught in universities and schools give quite different accounts of these features; and third, that this form of thinking can be shown to have the freedom of self-critique in the very areas in which Foucault chooses to see Renaissance philosophy as both constraining and constrained.In 1969 Foucault produced his “theoretical work” L’Archéologie du savoir as the methodological systematization of his earlier historical writings, L’Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (l961), La Naissance de la clinique (l963), and Les Mots et les choses (1966). In this work man is described as a modern self-invention, fashioned from a particular configuration of knowledge and destined soon to disappear. Foucault’s history of man is a story about the way he constituted himself as a subject and then made his body, his behavior, his reason, and his consciousness the object of his study and a field to be controlled, regulated, trained, and coerced. In this analysis man’s “rationality” becomes not a faculty but an authoritarian straitjacket. What Foucault sets out to investigate is a very fundamental form of ontology but not one associated with profound knowledge; it is a superficial and finite, if largely invisible, field, which is discontinuous, not defined by the agenda of the modern state of any associated discipline, and peopled by “utterances” (énoncés) which are only graspable in their differences and their dispersion. If coagulations of these “utterances” (formations discursives) occur at all, they appear only in the form of consistent relations: the objects to which they “refer” are no more than objectifications whose scientific status cannot be established and whose meaning cannot be recovered by semantic or rhetorical analysis. In calling his previous book Les Mots et les choses, he was being explicitly ironic, for neither the words nor the things of the title have any substance to them: they are not presences but absences. The description made by the historian is remote from his object, indirect, incomplete; it describes a “preconceptual field” in which the “preconcepts” are no more than organizing operators or functions revealing relationships of dependence, processes of validation, contingent theories of truth. The “utterances” which these “preconcepts” inform come together in “discourses” which are neither systems nor mere aggregations of knowledge; archaeological history as practiced by Foucault uncovers not a “mentality” but an “episteme,” which he defines as follows:By episteme we mean... the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, possibly formalized systems.... The episteme is not a form of knowledge or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries [End Page 150] of the most... (shrink)

Cet article aborde, à partir de la répétition des maltraitances sur enfant dans la relation mère-fille, la fonction du processus de cette répétition selon la théorie freudienne et lacanienne dans un dispositif de soin dans le cadre de la pjj. Une vignette clinique met en évidence que l’insistance de la répétition du fantasme d’infanticide dans la généalogie féminine ne se réduit pas à la narration du traumatisme infantile mais devient une interrogation à l’adresse du Grand Autre pour se définir comme (...) sujet désirant, différent, afin de se soustraire à ce fantasme. Si cette demande sous-jacente à cette répétition n’est pas entendue par les professionnels, les institutions qui sont mis à l’épreuve, dans le transfert et le contretransfert, au profit de la fonction victimaire chez le sujet, les réponses apportées dans la réalité ne pourront que contribuer à assurer la jouissance mortifère de ce dernier dans la transgression, mettant en échec la fonction symbolique de la Loi. Les auteurs montrent, à travers l’efficacité du transfert et de la fonction symbolique de la Loi, que la psychanalyse sans divan peut s’adapter à une clinique du réel, clinique qui peut parfois réinterroger la théorie. (shrink)

Résumé La lecture des quotidiens à La Réunion révèle la récurrence des crimes et délits sexuels intrafamiliaux, en particulier ceux commis par les pères et beaux-pères sur leurs filles et belles-filles mineures. Le passé colonial de l’île (esclavagisme, engagisme), les retards dans l’application de la départementalisation et la situation sociale difficile que connaît cette société créole ne peuvent seuls expliquer leur fréquence élevée. Analysant les 339 dossiers jugés aux assises sur la période 1980-2004, l’auteur montre qu’il est possible de discerner (...) trois modes de fonctionnement de l’agression sexuelle incestueuse impliquant le père ou le ti-père, la fille ou la belle-fille et la mère de ces dernières, et que, dans tous les cas, la mère apparaît comme l’un des personnages clés de ce drame familial. (shrink)

À partir de leur expérience de psychologues dans le champ de la prévention de la radicalité, les auteurs formulent des hypothèses concernant les fonctions psychiques de la radicalisation pour des adolescentes en grande souffrance psychique ayant subi des traumatismes intra et intergénérationnels. Les auteurs évoquent tout particulièrement les cas de jeunes filles pour qui la radicalisation serait une tentative de résolution identitaire en lien avec des traumatismes touchant les liens mère/fille. Ces hypothèses théorico-cliniques et l’analyse des souffrances psychiques et des (...) troubles manifestés conduisent les auteurs à ouvrir sur des préconisations en matière d’aide à apporter. (shrink)

Entre mère et fille se pose en psychanalyse la question du féminin. Qu’en est-il dans la construction subjective des filles excisées? Cette question les confronterait à une violence inédite dans le lien générationnel et groupal, au risque d’une position mortifère. Cet article interroge la croyance que « les femmes sont nées pour souffrir », très répandue en contexte d’excision. Modalité de la parole éducative, à côté des berceuses, devinettes, contes et mythes, elle est transmise entre mères et filles. L’objectif est (...) d’analyser, dans une approche clinique, les effets « porte-la-honte » de l’excision et les conditions de son élaboration, à partir du récit de deux femmes et de notre expérience d’accompagnement de femmes excisées. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est de questionner l’opposition classique entre la connaissance tacite et la connaissance explicite et de montrer qu’il n’existe pas de césure entre ces deux aspects de la connaissance, mais seulement des situations d’expression, de transmission et d’apprentissage de la connaissance plus ou moins complexes et plus ou moins exigeantes. Pour ce faire, la stratégie consistera à présenter certaines difficultés et contradictions auxquelles peut conduire le traitement de la notion de connaissance explicite dans le dernier ouvrage de (...) Harry Collins, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. (shrink)

Des revues et des ouvrages spécialisés ont préconisé l’exploitation des textes littéraires dans l’apprentissage du français langue étrangère. Mais les recherches et les pratiques pédagogiques axées sur les apports de la littérature dans l’enseignement de la prononciation sont rares. En didactique des langues, les enseignants ont tendance à négliger, très souvent, l’acquisition des compétences orales, face à la concurrence de la langue écrite, de la grammaire ou du vocabulaire. Dans cet article, nous présentons les expériences sur le développement de la (...) production orale et la correction de la prononciation en relation avec la littérature dans le dispositif de formation Campus Virtuel FLE à l’Université de León. À l’heure du numérique nous aurons recours aux multiples ressources, outils, environnements informatiques et médias sociaux en relation avec les domaines suivants : 1. Le projet Littérature Française Multimédia FLE, une base de données audiovisuelle en ligne sur la littérature française pour l’enseignement et apprentissage du FLE ; 2. Les tâches sur la littérature pour l’acquisition des compétences orales ; 3. Le corpus Oral FLE Prononciation des productions orales des apprenants hispanophones ; 4. Les techniques et méthodes de correction de la prononciation à l’aide des médias sociaux. (shrink)

In this article, I intend to link four topics or essential acts of philosophical practice: listening, caring, writing and transmitting, with special attention to children--what they inspire and teach us about philosophical practice, with special attention to the situation of confinement caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. A first task is to recover the function of listening and desire, in the context of the concept and the game, and against any abuse or violence. Second, we emphasize the role of care--its expansion (...) and reformulation in these difficult circumstances, especially in interrupting the logic of servitude and of the activity-debt-reward circuit by way of the pleasure of inquiry. Third, we practice writing as a technology of self that overcomes the dichotomy between personal and academic form, in order to become a practice of care and transmission, along with other self-practices: abstinence, self-examination, exercises, etc. Finally, we consider the question of the “Name of the Father”--how to understand the decline of patriarchy in relation to love, self-esteem, the transmission and the use of a symbolic legacy, given that the decline in question is not merely a weakening, but an unfolding of a singular-generic power that binds us together: learning to decline names, words, concepts, and traditions, which is what drives true subject formation. (shrink)

La longue note consacrée par Max Weber aux danseuses traditionnelles indiennes dans son étude sur la sociologie religieuse de l'inde, Hindouisme et bouddhisme, est commentée ici à partir d'une comparaison avec une des premières études allemandes évoquant la danse de l'Inde, L 'Histoire universelle de la danse de Curt Sachs. Trois thématiques sont abordées: le rapport entre arts du corps et savoir lettré; la spécificité des arts sacrés, en l'occurrence des arts magiques et des formes qui leur correspondent, (...) ainsi que des modes d'apprentissage qui assurent leur transmission (entendue comme un « charisme héréditaire ») ; la vision des femmes et la notion du pur et de l'impur. (shrink)

The imagination is ubiquitous in our cognitive lives. You might imagine rotating a puzzle piece to determine whether it fits in an open space, or imagine what things are like from another person's perspective to figure out how they are feeling, or imagine a new rug in your living room to determine whether it matches the color of your sofa. These examples are mundane, but they point to a deep philosophical puzzle: how could merely imagining something give you any reason (...) to believe that it is true? After all, you can imagine anything you want to, from the fictional to the fantastical. This has led many philosophers to be deeply skeptical of the epistemic value of the imagination. When imagination is accorded a justificatory role, it is typically limited to beliefs about what is metaphysically possible. More recently, some philosophers have begun to push back against this orthodoxy by arguing that the imagination can justify empirical beliefs about the actual world. But even then, most contemporary discussions focus on whether the imagination can justify empirical belief, rather than on how the imagination justifies empirical belief, thereby leaving many central questions about the epistemology of the imagination unanswered. This dissertation attempts to fill this lacuna by canvassing the theoretical landscape of this exciting new literature and developing an account of the epistemic structure of the imagination. The first chapter sets the stage for the rest of the dissertation by reviewing extant arguments for and against the view that the imagination can justify empirical belief before posing a new argument in its favor. The second chapter argues that imaginative justification is mediate but non-inferential; it depends on one’s prior justification without depending on an inference from one’s prior beliefs. The third chapter argues that the imagination is informative—it can represent new content and generate new justification—in virtue of its analog representational format. The fourth and final chapter argues that some imaginings just are beliefs, and that this grounds their justificatory force. Together, the arguments of this dissertation suggest that the imagination is a distinctive kind of ampliative reasoning, and that it plays this cognitive and epistemic role by combining the analog representational format of imagery with the evidence-sensitive function of belief. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 42, no. 3. © 2016 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 575 Geneviève Pagé Gender at the Crossing: Ideological Travelings of US and French Thought in Montreal Feminism This article recounts a story about Montreal feminism using the narrative thread of its conceptual language. It is a story of language as a political choice that guides our actions, but also language as a political issue, a barrier, a tool (...) that structures our thinking and that reflects and reproduces relations of power in knowledge production and dissemination. Gender is the central character in this story—its role representing the way US, French, and Quebec theoretical traditions are deeply in dialogue with each other; yet this dialogue is arbitrary and filled with long silences. In reviewing the dialogue, this article identifies a few elements that play a significant role in favoring or impeding the traveling of ideas and concepts, focusing, in the case of Quebec, on how part of the feminist movement, comprised of radical or “revolutionary” feminists, engages with and constructs theory. The article begins by briefly tracing the evolving meanings of gender in the United States from the 1920s to the twenty-first century. Then, turning to France, a second section identifies elements limiting the traveling of US understandings of gender in French feminist theory, especially the predominance of specific traditions of thought, namely existentialism and Marxism, leading to different ways of thinking about oppression, patriarchy, sexism, and the idea of womanhood. In a third section, I shift the focus to Quebec, particularly Francophone Montreal, to survey its feminist thought, political traditions, and 576 Geneviève Pagé translation. Its history, its people, and its geographic location put it at the convergence of US and French influences, but with a distinct added local imperative: the struggle for national liberation. The specific ways in which Quebec nationalism has foregrounded power and politics around language has had a major impact on how Quebec feminists have negotiated relations with their southern feminist neighbors. In this sense, Quebec feminism presents an excellent case study of language operating as an axis of power. Furthermore, in the context of globalization and resistances to globalizing processes, Montreal provides a perfect example by which to highlight both transnational influences and local specificities. Montreal, as a classic example of Mary Louise Pratt’s cultural and linguistic “contact zone”—the space where communities of practices interact—is a city in which one can clearly identify “the intellectual and linguistic points of contact between cultures, and make visible the political pressure that activates them.”1 I treat translations that occur in this context as the process of connecting and communicating between communities. As queer theorist Juana María Rodríguez has noted in another context, “the process of translation involves more than merely translating languages; it involves translating cultures, values, and institutions of power.”2 Similarly, translation here involves an exchange between symbolic and semiotic structures of both the original and the new communities. Zooming out of Montreal, I then address the politics of translation on a more global scale, pointing out the particular ways the production and dissemination of knowledge is especially beholden to market relations. All these reflections help us understand the traveling of ideas, concepts, and ideologies across linguistic barriers. I conclude that it is in the interest of feminists to pay particular attention to what knowledge is produced from different standpoints and in different languages and what it can teach us. 1. Mary Louise Pratt, “Arts of the Contact Zone,” Profession (1991): 34; Sherry Simon, Gender in Translation: Cultural Identity and the Politics of Transmission (New York: Routledge, 1996), 36. 2. Juana María Rodríguez, Queer Latinidad: Identity Practices, Discursive Spaces (New York: NYU Press, 2003), 19. Geneviève Pagé  577 Gender in the United States It is among US feminists that the conceptualization of the gender/sex dichotomy first developed. However, gender—the word—ironically comes to English from the French genre and shares with that word its derivation from the Latin genus, meaning “kind,” “sort,” or “type.” The derivation is most visible in the borrowing in English of the French genre, for example, in literary forms such as fiction or poetry. Similarly, both the English... (shrink)

À l’aide d’une autobiographie professionnelle de soixante ans de recherche en formation continue des adultes, l’article explicite les références qui ont ancré philosophiquement la construction d’une problématique rythmoformatrice des apprentissages adultes tout au long et dans tous les secteurs de la vie. Cette construction s’est opérée sur trois périodes transatlantiques : une période initiale en Europe (1959-1969) d’entrée dans la vie adulte (20-30 ans) en recherche-formation laborieuse de sens à la vie ; une seconde au Québec (1969-1985) de (...) conception, construction et conduite de programmes de recherche en éducation permanente à la Faculté de l’éducation permanente de l’Université de Montréal (30-45 ans) ; et enfin une troisième comme professeur-chercheur à l’Université de Tours (1985-2007) en co-création de diplômes et de groupes de recherche-formation universitaire pour adultes (45- 67 ans). Deux ancrages philosophiques préscolaires – la caverne de Platon et l’Émile de Rousseau – et un ancrage postscolaire et transdisciplinaire d’une épistémologie dialectique systémique, apparaissent progressivement contribuer de façon dominante à la conceptualisation d’une problématique rythmoformatrice du cours de la vie adulte, en deux temps (expérientiel/formel) et trois mouvements (auto, socio et écoformation). (shrink)

Mes recherches actuelles tendent ä croiser l'analyse epistemologique avec l'esthetique pour degager le röle du sujet historique dans Velaboration des savoirs universels. II s'agit, pour moi, de deplacer le point de vue transcendantal, formel, afin de renouveler la perspective epistemologique par le concept de diathese. Deux questions se posent. Quel est l'apport du sujet 1) dans le processus de structuration formelle des savoirs? (construction, deconstruction, reconstruction de la connaissance), 2) dans la transmission - transformation des savoirs? (decontextualisation et actualisation historique (...) des paradigmes successifs).En diathese, la conscience de soi - chacun, chacune d'entre nous - ne s'envisage que traversee par la conscience d'autrui. II suffit de rompre avec le solipsisme identitaire des formalismes classiques, et leur determinisme problematique, pour constater avec stupefaction que l'autre tient, en soi, la part constitutive de notre biographic- de la langue de la mere ä la langue des autres. Langue etrangere, qui est pourtant le vehicule de la connaissance de soi. D'oü mon interet pour une reconsideration ä la fois epistemologique et esthetique du cogito cartesien, place ä la fois au coup d'envoi des theories de la conscience et du renouvellement de la pensee scientifique moderne et contemporaine.Dans cette perspective, l'indice de verite des analyses et des syntheses produites par le chercheur, ne saurait prendre forme et force que dans la diathese d'une communaute de recherche, ä la fois specifique et historique. De lä, irresistiblement, le logos devient dialogos. Ce qui signifie que, d'une part, chaque conscience se voit de facto qualifiee pour participer ä l'elaboration ou ä la transmission des connaissances et que, d'autre part, pour qu'un acte de conscience individuel devienne epistemologiquement significatif, i l s'avere necessaire qu'il soit formule ä l'interieur d'une communaute de recherche. Laquelle, seule, peut ä la fois l'actualiser (et done le limiter) comme savoir historique, tout en l'universalisant comme savoir formel. Evitant ainsi le piege de l'hypostasier comme savoir absolu. Le concept de diathese ouvre done ä une epistemologie genetique, preoccupee autant de structure et de construction que d'histoire des sciences. Car ce n'est pas tant (mais aussi) la formalisation des enonces scientifiques que le degre de conscience de leur contenu conceptuel, qui determine avec le plus de rigueur le degre de verite des savoirs d'un individu au sein d'une communaute de recherche, ou d'une communaute de recherche dans l'histoire de la connaissance. (shrink)

In The State of Southern Illinois: An Illustrated History, Herbert K. Russell offers fresh interpretations of a number of important aspects of Southern Illinois history. Focusing on the area known as “Egypt,” the region south of U.S. Route 50 from Salem south to Cairo, he begins his book with the earliest geologic formations and follows Southern Illinois’s history into the twenty-first century. The volume is richly illustrated with maps and photographs, mostly in color, that highlight the informative and straightforward text. (...) Perhaps most notable is the author’s use of dozens of heretofore neglected sources to dispel the myth that Southern Illinois is merely an extension of Dixie. He corrects the popular impressions that slavery was introduced by early settlers from the South and that a majority of Southern Illinoisans wished to secede. Furthermore, he presents the first in-depth discussion of twelve pre–Civil War, free black communities located in the region. He also identifies the roles coal mining, labor violence, gangsters, and the media played in establishing the area’s image. He concludes optimistically, unveiling a twenty-first-century Southern Illinois filled with myriad attractions and opportunities for citizens and tourists alike. The State of Southern Illinois is the most accurate all-encompassing volume of history on this unique area that often regards itself as a state within a state. It offers an entirely new perspective on race relations, provides insightful information on the cultural divide between north and south in Illinois, and pays tribute to an often neglected and misunderstood region of this multidimensional state, all against a stunning visual backdrop. Superior Achievement from the Illinois State Historical Society, 2013. (shrink)

_Nulla dies sine linea_ « Regarde de tous tes yeux, regarde » « Travaille ton instrument » Essentielle à toute activité artistique, la pratique d’exercices est pourtant rarement interrogée en tant que telle. Qu’est-ce qu’un exercice artistique? Quelles perspectives la pensée de l’exercice permet-elle d’ouvrir sur la compréhension des pratiques artistiques, sur leurs liens avec les savoirs et les techniques, sur leur dimension historique et sociale, sur les valeurs de transmission qu’elles font vivre? Réactivée dans la philosophie contemporaine, la notion (...) d’exercice n’est pourtant que rarement confrontée aux pratiques artistiques et aux élaborations théoriques de ces pratiques. Or l’artiste, c’est d’abord une femme ou un homme qui, pour faire et pour produire, doit s’exercer, et s’exercer sans relâche. Exercices d’apprentissage et de formation, antérieurs à l’œuvre ; e... (shrink)

Dans The Elements of Drawing, le célèbre critique d’art anglais John Ruskin endosse le rôle de professeur pour livrer, en trois longues lettres adressées aux débutants, son enseignement sur l’art du dessin. De cet ouvrage hybride, mêlant exercices, observations sur les couleurs, commentaires de peintures et descriptions lyriques de la nature, la postérité retiendra principalement un court passage sur la formation de la perception. Dans une note de bas de page du premier chapitre, Ruskin nous dit en effet que (...) « toute la force de la technique picturale dépend de la possibilité pour nous de retrouver ce que nous pourrions appeler l’innocence de l’œil ». Cette note célèbre a fait l’objet de nombreux commentaires (chez E. Gombrich et N. Goodman notamment), qui viennent discuter, et souvent réfuter, la possibilité d’un regard vierge. À rebours des lectures de surplomb qui autonomisent ce passage et le transforment en « théorie », nous proposons de revenir au texte de Ruskin en pensant l’innocence de l’œil dans son articulation singulière et fondatrice aux exercices qui l’accompagnent. L’hypothèse que nous soumettons est la suivante : c’est l’exercice, dans sa conduite réitérée, qui permet de comprendre le sens de l’innocence perceptive. Bien loin d’un apprentissage scolaire, l’exercice du regard engage chez Ruskin une manière d’être au monde. (shrink)

C’est dans le cadre du soutien à la parentalité auprès de familles qui « bénéficient » d’une mesure éducative et/ou de placement que nous avons été amenés à mettre en place un dispositif de prise en charge un peu particulier pour ce qui concerne essentiellement les familles monoparentales. Ce dispositif s’attache à prendre en compte les besoins tant de la mère que des enfants et a nécessité de travailler à partir de cadres séparés mais intégrés dans une dynamique d’ensemble. C’est (...) à partir de deux cadres d’élaboration que la symptomatologie familiale pourra être appréhendée : les entretiens individuels avec la mère suivi du cadre des entretiens familiaux à visée thérapeutique qui réunit mère et enfants. L’emploi du génogramme classique au sein du premier dispositif associé à l’emploi du génogramme libre dans le second cadre (qui met plus particulièrement en relief ce qui pour chaque participant fait famille ou empêche de faire famille) vont conjointement permettre de donner un éclairage sur ce qui va se donner à voir de la transmission transgénérationnelle et qui se présente sous la forme de points qui insistent et qui résistent, points traumatiques qui font symptôme. Points traumatiques qui se signalent par des blancs, des absences de représentation, des ratures qui sont autant de marques d’oubli ou de volonté d’oublier, d’effacer ce qui reste en souffrance, en mal d’être dit ou représenté. Au travers de ce dispositif, il est possible d’appréhender le symptôme dans sa structure composite et qui participe de l’individuel et du collectif. Charge aux thérapeutes de travailler à l’intégration des événements traumatiques, au « remaillage familial », pour que ce qui s’apparente à la fatalité ou à la prédétermination en tant que répétition transgénérationnelle à l’œuvre, ouvre de possibles vrais choix de vie. (shrink)

"Si la philosophie trouve en ta décision platonicienne de porter le regard vers le haut son acte originaire, elle ne connaît son épanouissement, avec Hegel et Bergson, que dans une pensée de l'esprit vivant. L'oeuvre de Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, professeur émérite de l'université de Poitiers, est toute entière ordonnée à cette manifestation de l'Esprit en son unité. Habité par la question du temps et celle, corrélative, de la transmission, assumant son statut de maillon dans l'aventure de la philosophie universelle, il convoque (...) les classiques allemands et le spiritualisme français au dialogue avec ses maîtres Corbin, Ricoeur, Bruaire ou le père Tilliette, pour offrir un aperçu éblouissant de quelques problèmes métaphysiques essentiels : l'âme, le beau, la création, la liberté, Dieu... Et d'accompagner le lecteur, au terme d'une méditation sur l'essence de la culture, vers ce degré où se réfléchit la liberté créatrice de l'homme."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Cet article permet de saisir le contexte d’application des lois Ferry en Guadeloupe, et ses conséquences dans la formation d’un corps enseignant laïc, des années 1880 à 1914. Il analyse les tensions entre les partisans républicains, en particulier les socialistes, et les autorités coloniales, réactionnaires ou cléricales autour de la sécularisation du personnel des écoles primaires et ce qu’elles révèlent des antagonismes liés à la race, la classe et au genre dans la société coloniale. Cette étude s’appuie sur les (...) résultats du traitement informatique des dossiers de carrière des instituteurs et institutrices des écoles primaires publiques, et d’autres sources de type qualitatif (presse, rapport émanant de l’instruction publique, Annuaires de la Guadeloupe, Bulletin de l’enseignement primaire de la Guadeloupe et des dépendances (1899 à 1909), procès-verbal des réunions des professeurs du cours secondaire de jeunes filles de Pointe-à-Pitre, etc.), pour une compréhension plus fine des enjeux autour de la laïcisation des écoles primaires publiques, fréquentées par la population la plus défavorisée. (shrink)

I set out the standard view about alleged examples of failure of transmission of warrant, respond to two cases for the view, and argue that the view is false. The first argument for the view neglects the distinction between believing a proposition on the basis of a justification and merely having a justification to believe a proposition. The second argument for the view neglects the position that one's justification for believing a conclusion can be one's premise for the conclusion, rather (...) than simply one's justification for the premise. Finally, the view is false since it is inconsistent with the closure of knowledge as closure is properly understood. (shrink)

Testimony is responsible, either directly or indirectly, for much of what we know, not only about the world around us but also about who we are. Despite its relative historical neglect, recent work in epistemology has seen a growing recognition of the importance and scope of testimonial knowledge. Most of this work has focused on two central questions, which will be the main topics of this article. First, is testimonial knowledge necessarily acquired through transmission from speaker to hearer, or can (...) testimony generate epistemic features in its own right? Second, is justified dependence on testimony fundamentally basic, or is it ultimately reducible to other epistemic sources, such as perception, memory, and reason? Testimony itself is typically understood quite broadly so as to include a variety of acts of communication that are intended or taken to convey information—such as statements, nods, pointings, and so on. (For a full development of this view, see Lackey 2008.) Knowledge that is distinctively testimonial requires belief that is based or grounded in, not merely caused by, an instance of testimony. For instance, suppose that I sing “I have a soprano voice” in a soprano voice and you come to believe this entirely on the basis of hearing my soprano voice. (This is a variation of an example found in Audi 1997.) While my testimony is certainly causally relevant to the formation of your belief, the resulting knowledge is based on your hearing my soprano voice rather than on what I testified to, thereby rendering it perceptual in nature. What is of import for distinctively testimonial knowledge is that a given belief be formed on the basis of the content of a speaker’s testimony. This prevents beliefs that are formed entirely on the basis of features about a speaker’s testimony from qualifying as instances of testimonial knowledge. (shrink)

Maswood and Rajaram examine the transmission of false memories across small and larger networks. While the spread of false memories is not inherently beneficial, Maswood & Rajaram argued that a better understanding of the formation and propagation of false memories has practical and societal implications. For example, by better understanding how false memories transmit across groups, we might be better equipped to prevent detrimental behaviors that arise as a result of “fake news.”.

Bioethics is not merely a theoretical discipline but a practice as well. Indeed, bioethics is a sort of moral trade. Bioethicists serve on ethics committees, give expert testimony to courts, provide guidance for healthcare policy, and receive payment for these services. The difficulty is that their role as experts able to guide clinical choice and public policy formation is brought into question by the diversity of moral understandings regarding central moral issues at the heart of the culture wars in (...) healthcare. The disconfirmation of the expert role of bioethicists by their apparent actual role as partisans of particular moral schools and perspectives could be set aside, were there an avenue to moral consensus, a door to a common moral vision to guide this new profession of moral experts. This brief article addresses the hunger for consensus in bioethics, its impossibility with respect to the controversial issues that mark the field, and the inclination nevertheless to deny this manifest diversity by appeals to a consensus that could allow bioethicists to function as ethics experts able substantively to guide clinical choices and public policy. (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

Ministerial formation is a multifaceted activity involving critical thinking, the acquisition of knowledge, skills development, religious identity formation and the development of ministerial and spiritual maturity expected of church ministers. Education is not merely the accumulation of a prescribed set of academic credits but includes the holistic formation of all aspects of the individual. However, theological educators are concerned about the capacity to foster such values and skills in the distance and electronic environment. Some see distance education (...) as ‘distancing’ the students in more significant ways than simply geographic distance. These issues are of fundamental importance for they reflect the deeper convictions of theologians that distance education may not be a suitable medium for ministerial formation. This article creates a conceptual map of the theological and pedagogical challenges for ministerial formation and highlights how the possibility of formation is being carried out in the distance-learning environment. (shrink)

Some years ago Edward Regis, Jr. pointed to a serious gap in Aristotelian studies: "The centrality of the . . . 'problem of universals' to epistemology and metaphysics is hardly an issue for argument. Questions regarding the metaphysical status of universals and their relation to individuals, the process of 'concept formation,' and the epistemological function of universals in predication are classic ones in philosophy . . . In view of the contemporary interest in these problems as well as the (...) numerous studies of other topics treated of by Aristotle, it is a matter for at least initial surprise that there exists no systematic account of his views on universals." This essay attempts to fill this gap in Aristotelian studies partially. ;Aristotle's view of the universal went through three phases, and the essay attempts to give a systematic account of his early concept of it, as well as briefer accounts of his middle and late views. His early concept may be defined as 'an existent by nature asserted of several existents'. The essay attempts to explain this concept by explicating the two major terms of its definition, 'an existent' and 'is asserted of'. 'An existent' is explained on the basis of his doctrine of the categories and 'is asserted of' on the basis of some fundamentals of his early theory of the simple statement. His middle view of the universal may be defined as 'an existent which by nature belongs to several existents'. According to his late view, however, the universal is a mere potency, no longer an actually existing thing. ;After its account of Aristotle's three views, the essay reconsiders the commonly-held view that he is a moderate realist, arguing that, although moderate realism can be truly ascribed to him, it gives us neither an accurate nor an adequate statement of the nature of his universal. It concludes by briefly tracing the movement of thought on universals in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. (shrink)

We consider the implications of analyzing teaching as a sociocultural form. We suggest that the internalization of mediations includes not only concepts but a complex of dimensions of mediations. These dimensions enable us to define a form. Each students, building on previously subjectivated microforms, tries to give a personal meaning to the transmitted knowledge and to his experiences. The theoretical and professional training enables however the elaboration of a subjectivated sociocultural form. Regarding teacher training, the process is even more complex (...) due to the different origin of the transmitted knowledge. We conclude by outlining some consequences resulting from taking into account this notion of form in teacher training. (shrink)

Cet article remet en question les fondements théoriques et pédagogiques de la notion de compétence éthique ainsi que la conception de l’éthique qu’elle préfigure. Après une analyse du contexte d’émergence de cette notion, notamment dans le champ de la santé, nous verrons en quoi l’approche socioconstructiviste de l’apprentissage, à laquelle se réfèrent de nombreux dispositifs de formation, fait de l’éthique une ressource d’action visant l’adaptation passive des professionnels au contexte organisationnel et socioprofessionnel. Nous proposerons dès lors de revisiter l’apprentissage (...) de l’éthique dans une approche pragmatiste plus critique et plus émancipatrice. Nous en exposerons les principales orientations pédagogiques et insisterons, pour conclure, sur la responsabilité des environnements socioprofessionnels. Ces derniers sont appelés à devenir plus capacitants, c’est-à-dire à créer les conditions favorables au développement de cet apprentissage de l’éthique. (shrink)

Résumé L’article analyse la série photographique Danse macabre avec jeune fille de Birgit Jürgenssen selon deux axes : le concept de masque et l’enchevêtrement de deux thèmes iconographiques. En s’inscrivant dans un espace archaïsant, où apparaissent des éléments burlesques, les photographies de Jürgenssen des années 1979 et 1980 sont, comme chez Bakhtine, un éclat de rire contre la culture dominante.

L'expression « jeune fille » n'est pas très fréquente avant le XIXe siècle, tout au moins dans son sens actuel désignant spécifiquement une « fille nubile » ou une « femme jeune non mariée » (Robert). Mais ces définitions elles-mêmes restent approximatives : va-t-on prendre en compte la « nubilité » biologique liée à la menstruation, si variable selon les peuples, les climats, les personnes, et qui semble avoir été nettement plus tardive qu'aujourd'hui ? Ou une nubilité juridique, par..

Newly accessible source material calls for a revision of our picture of the more technical transmission of sceptical epistemologies in the intellectual landscape of early Islam. Abū al‐Qāsim al‐Balkhīʼs (ninth/tenth century) Book of Doctrines shows that naẓar as the basic argumentative method of kalām is defined by the encounter with a broad spectrum of sceptical strategies. By the beginning of the tenth century, Greek traditions were amalgamated in a complex way with other intellectual traditions, most notably dualist ontologies. This situation (...) has shaped the evolution of kalām methodology decisively. Based on extensive paraphrases in Ibn al‐Malāḥimī (twelfth century) going back to Nawbakhtī (tenth century), it can be seen that arguments of the Greek sceptical tradition were accessible in Arabic in the early tenth century. The scarcity of coherent information on sceptical approaches before that time rather has to do with the problem that in general few sources of this earlier formative period of Islamic theology are preserved. Early Muʿtazilī treatises from this period are superseded by Ashʿarī texts in the later transmission. Sceptical approaches, being systematically involved in the very formation of early Muʿtazilī theology, are particularly invisible due to this process. (shrink)

Drawing on 10 years of activism in Turkey’s trans movement and seven months of fieldwork in Istanbul on mutually formed mother and daughter relationship among trans women, this article looks at alternative understandings of ‘inter-generational’ transmission of memory. How can we engage alternative family making processes and non-normative formations of time with memory transmission rather than merely identify ‘inter-generational’ memory in advance with pre-established non-normative systems? Or can we talk about ‘inter-generational’ memories without knowing what ‘generation’ really means? Inspired by (...) these questions, Marianne Hirsch’s work on postmemory and narratives of self-identified trans mothers and daughters, in this article the author discusses the conceptualization of ‘queer postmemory’ in order to think critically on unmarked temporal and familial dimensions in the study of collective and personal memory. While refusing to position memory as an outcome of predetermined temporal frameworks within normative understandings of family, the author looks at strangely remembered things through glimpses of other types of time, other types of relationalities and other types of inheritability. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

Il est certes difficile de trouver, parmi les femmes musiciennes, interprètes ou compositrices capables de transmettre leur art, une figure qui puisse servir de référence indiscutable. Cette quête infructueuse peut donner lieu à deux interprétations différentes. L'opinion traditionnelle en déduira l'absence de femmes assez exercées dans l'art musical pour être reconnues et transmettre leurs connaissances, considérées comme inexistantes. La perspective féministe, que je partage, fera remarquer...