In a previous paper [ 21 ] all extensions of Johansson’s minimal logic J with the weak interpolation property WIP were described. It was proved that WIP is decidable over J. It turned out that the weak interpolation problem in extensions of J is reducible to the same problem over a logic Gl, which arises from J by adding tertium non datur. In this paper we consider extensions of the logic Gl. We prove that only finitely many logics over Gl (...) have the Craig interpolation property CIP, the restricted interpolation property IPR or the projective Beth property PBP. The full list of Gl-logics with the mentioned properties is found, and their description is given. We note that IPR and PBP are equivalent over Gl. It is proved that CIP, IPR and PBP are decidable over the logic Gl. (shrink)

R. J. Tarrant has remarked that ‘Latin poets from Ovid onward...felt an almost irresistible urge to mention the Isthmus of Corinth wherever possible’,2 and A. E. Housman admitted to a similar, though less urgent, inclination to introduce the city of Corinth into the passage quoted: ‘inter 295 et 296 excidisse uidetur uersus cuius clausula fuerit Corinthus’. Corinth would, of course, be very much at home in this list of depraved and wealthy Greek cities, and would suitably head the list.

The present article argues for the non-authenticity of l. 38 in the first Horatian Epistle. Together with the allusions to avarice and pride at ll. 33 and 36, it contains a reference to the cardinal sins, a concept that did not yet exist at the time of Horace. In particular, the sins listed in the line at issue appear to coincide with those discussed by Gregory the Great in his Moralia in Iob (31.45) and eventually adopted by medieval thought. The (...) metrical pattern and a check of the main medieval commentaries support the suspected spuriousness of the line. (shrink)

One of the two oldest manuscripts of Greek canon law, the Codex Patmiacus 172, sheds new light on the history of the Council in Trullo . Whereas from the other 45 extant manuscripts only 220 episcopal signatures to this Council have been known so far, the Patmiacus has preserved 6 additional signatures and thus raises the number of the hitherto known clerical participants to 226, representing a total of 227 bishoprics. Since these subscriptions are preceded by the signature of the (...) Emperor, the Patmiacus is the sole extant manuscript that bears in fact a total of 227 signatures, the number of participants assigned to this Council in the later canonistic tradition. Besides, this manuscript offers a great number of additions and corrections to the other 220 signatures. Due to the discovery of the six new episcopal signatures, however, the question of authenticity of the six position markers found in some manuscripts to indicate the place for the signatures of six episcopal sees which were present at the Sixth Ecumenical Council in 681/82 but apparently absent in 691/92 must be reconsidered. Whereas so far these markers have been considered original because it was only by their connumerating that the number of 227 could be achieved, this argument has become obsolete by the subscription list of the Patmiacus. Furthermore, the missing of the first three markers in the oldest extant manuscripts as well as their odd positions makes it very likely that they are not original but were interpolated at the times of the Seventh Ecumenical Council in order to assimilate the beginning of the subscription list of the Council of 691/92 to the one of 681/82 and thus substantiating Tarasios' claim that the Council in Trullo was a continuation of the Sixth Ecumenical Council. Whether the West and the metropolitan sees present in 681/82 - Rome, Thessaloniki, Sardinia, Ravenna and Corinth - were in fact invited as well to the Council in 691/92 is once again an open question and cannot be answered by reference to the manuscript tradition. Finally, the reasons for the western opposition to this Council are not so much to be sought in the form of the subscription list but more in the content of the canons and the Logos Prosphonetikos. (shrink)

We introduce a realist, unextravagant interpretation of quantum theory that builds on the existing physical structure of the theory and allows experiments to have definite outcomes but leaves the theory’s basic dynamical content essentially intact. Much as classical systems have specific states that evolve along definite trajectories through configuration spaces, the traditional formulation of quantum theory permits assuming that closed quantum systems have specific states that evolve unitarily along definite trajectories through Hilbert spaces, and our interpretation extends this intuitive picture (...) of states and Hilbert-space trajectories to the more realistic case of open quantum systems despite the generic development of entanglement. We provide independent justification for the partial-trace operation for density matrices, reformulate wave-function collapse in terms of an underlying interpolating dynamics, derive the Born rule from deeper principles, resolve several open questions regarding ontological stability and dynamics, address a number of familiar no-go theorems, and argue that our interpretation is ultimately compatible with Lorentz invariance. Along the way, we also investigate a number of unexplored features of quantum theory, including an interesting geometrical structure—which we call subsystem space—that we believe merits further study. We conclude with a summary, a list of criteria for future work on quantum foundations, and further research directions. We include an appendix that briefly reviews the traditional Copenhagen interpretation and the measurement problem of quantum theory, as well as the instrumentalist approach and a collection of foundational theorems not otherwise discussed in the main text. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Theopompos Not Theophrastos:Correcting an Attribution in Plutarch Demosthenes 14.4Brad L. CookModern reconstructions of Theopompos' presentation of Demosthenes are based on five passages, all of which are found in Plutarch's Demosthenes.1 Of these passages, two are favorable to the orator and two are starkly negative, with the fifth being neutral.2 In the negative passages Theopompos attacked the orator with such harshness, branding him unstable, unjust, and unworthy, that the two (...) favorable passages are often overshadowed in modern reconstructions of Theopompos' opinion of Demosthenes.3 Moreover, some scholars, both in the past and again recently, go one step further and argue that one of the favorable texts, Demosthenes 14.4 (F 327), should be attributed to Theophrastos. I argue that the attribution to Theophrastos in this passage is the mistake of a meddlesome scribe in one manuscript and that the reading "Theopompos" of most manuscripts should be accepted. This means that what little survives of Theopompos' opinion of the orator remains complex and not simply negative. The changes made to the other positive text, Demosthenes 18.2 (F 328), I hope to deal with on another occasion.In Demosthenes 14.4 (F 327), Demosthenes stands up to defy the cruel whim of the Athenian mob:[End Page 537]And, in addition,4 Theopompos recounts that when the Athenians were proposing him for a certain prosecution then, when he would not listen, made a commotion, he rose and said "As a counsellor, o men of Athens, even if you don't want to, you will use me; but as a false accuser, not even if you want to."The difficulty with this passage is that not all the manuscripts attribute the statement to Theopompos. The primary dissenting manuscript is Madrid 4685 (14th c.), previously known as Codex Matritensis 55 and commonly cited as N.5 Modern editions of Plutarch follow N and print "," whereas works on Theopompos follow the other manuscripts and print "." This disagreement has not received thorough examination in recent publications.6 A brief review of the arguments [End Page 538] for and against the reading of N, considering first the intrinsic character of the manuscript and then its standing in the manuscript tradition will indicate that we should reject the reading of N and keep the attribution to Theopompos.Every known manuscript and every printed text of Demosthenes 14.4 read "" until 1880. In that year Charles Graux published his examination of N and its reading in Demosthenes 14.4 of "."7 N consists of two parts. The first part contains Nikias–Crassus (the Nikias is from 24.2), Alcibiades–Coriolanus, Demosthenes–Cicero, and Agesilaos–Pompey.8 This first part of N has many readings that are distinct from the other manuscripts, and Graux argued that these readings are superior to those of the other manuscripts, especially in the Demosthenes–Cicero.9 Graux therefore not only accepted "." in Demosthenes 14.4 because of the readings in N but also supported "" by claiming that Theopompos was always hostile to Demosthenes and would never say anything favorable to him; thus Graux saw the reading "" in the other manuscripts as an error in transmission.10 [End Page 539]Response to the Madrid manuscript and Graux's high opinion of it was generally favorable.11 Several scholars, however, rejected Graux's unrestrained praise of N and argued that among the many improved readings there were interpolations.12 Gudeman complained that the scribe of N, a "semilearned librarius," was particularly intrusive with proper names and altered and interpolated the received text. Gudeman listed some of these intrusions in Demosthenes and Cicero; of note are Demosthenes 5.7, 10.3, and 23.6 as well as Cicero 36.7.13 In Demosthenes 5.7 Plutarch attributes a certain detail to Hermippos. N has a semieducated but incorrect gloss on Hermippos, calling him. But the Hermippos here is certainly Hermippos of Smyrna of the third century B.C., a writer of Lives, not the homonymous fifth–century poet.14 In [End Page 540] Demosthenes 10.2 Plutarch quotes Ariston of Chios who records an anecdote of Theophrastos about the orator. At Demosthenes 10.3 Plutarch continues, ""; N replaces with. But... (shrink)

Glastonbury Abbey was the wealthiest and most influential monastery in later Anglo-Saxon England. It was a noted centre of scholarship, and claimed ancient origins which were later extravagantly embellished to link the house with such luminaries as St Patrick, St David and King Arthur. The historiographical evidence for Glastonbury is particularly challenging, because the accounts of the monastery's early history were revised and interpolated over centuries, as the legends grew. There are also complications in the study of its archive: (...) the manuscripts are mostly late and corrupt, and the whole is overshadowed by the contents list of a lost cartulary, which included many more early charters than now survive. The present volume is the first critical edition of the sixty-one surviving charters from the abbey's pre-Conquest archive, which date from the later seventh century to the reign of Cnut. The texts are edited to a high standard, with comprehensive commentaries that include translation and elucidation of the Old English boundary clauses, and authoritative assessments of authenticity. There is a long introduction with analysis and synthesis of the documentary evidence for Glastonbury's history in the Anglo-Saxon period and for the accumulation of its endowment, including a section on William of Malmesbury's works on Glastonbury. The volume concludes with a series of appendixes which present all the evidence for the lost charters in the Liber Terrarum and in other sources. (shrink)

Ioulios Polydeukes, more commonly known as Pollux, was a Greek sophist and lexicographer active in the closing decades of the second century a.d. His Onomasticon is one of the most important lexicographical texts of the Imperial period. It is essentially a set of word lists dedicated to collecting clusters of related words on topics from a vast range of different areas of intellectual activity and everyday life. The text survives only in epitomized form, and shows signs of interpolation as (...) well as abridgement. Nevertheless, the consensus is that the bulk of what survives is Pollux’ own work, and that reading it in Eric Bethe's Teubner edition gives an accurate cumulative impression of Pollux’ standard procedures and preoccupations, even if we cannot be entirely confident that any particular cluster of words had exactly the same form within the text's original design. It is divided into ten books, each with its own dedicatory preface addressed to the Emperor Commodus. Each book has its own distinctive focus on certain key themes, although the ordering principles are much clearer in some than in others. (shrink)

У статті визначено основні загрози збереження культурної спадщини країн, що виникають при переміщенні їх культурних цінностей через митний кордон. Обґрунтовано, що для України такими загрозами є: а) відсутність нормативно-правових актів, які б регулювали питання проведення митного контролю за ввезенням культурних цінностей в Україну; б) відсутність системи розрізнення культурних цінностей та предметів культурного призначення; в) неврегульованість у законодавстві принципів ідентифікації культурних цінностей; г) відсутність спеціалізованого органу, який вирішує питання можливості переміщення культурних цінностей через митний кордон країни; д) невідповідність національного свідоцтва на (...) право вивезення культурних цінностей міжнародним стандартам та встановленим відповідним документам; е) відсутність електронного реєстру виданих свідоцтв на право вивезення культурних цінностей з України; є) слабкість та неефективність організації митного та іншого видів контролю за ввезенням культурних цінностей, що сприяє розвитку нелегального ринку культурних цінностей та використання України як транзитної території. Проаналізовано заходи Інтерполу, ЮНЕСКО та Міжнародної ради музеїв щодо боротьби із незаконним обігом культурних цінностей. Здійснено оцінку існуючого порядку переміщення культурних цінностей через митний кордон України та обґрунтовано ймовірні ризики. (shrink)

The most prominent argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism is Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. I offer a new diagnosis of what is wrong with this argument. Proponents and critics typically accept the way the argument is framed, and only disagree on whether the premisses and rules of inference are true. I suggest that the argument involves a category mistake: it conflates two different levels of description, namely, the physical level at which we describe the world from (...) the perspective of fundamental physics and the agential level at which we describe agents and their actions. My diagnosis is based on an account of free will as a higher-level phenomenon. I call this account ‘compatibilist libertarianism’, for reasons that will become clear. Although the paper addresses a primarily metaphysical question, it uses tools similar to those employed in philosophy-of-science work on determinism and indeterminism, higher-level phenomena, and dynamical systems. (shrink)

This is an edited transcript of a conversation to be included in the collection "Conversations on Rational Choice". The conversation was conducted in Munich on 7 and 9 February 2016.

Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individuals that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should explain the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable on the model of individual agents. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, to a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. (...) Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them, and that a proper approach to the social sciences, law, morality, and politics must take account of this fact. Unlike some earlier defences of group agency, their account is entirely unmysterious in character and, despite not being technically difficult, is grounded in cutting-edge work in social choice theory, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophers have argued about the nature and the very existence of free will for centuries. Today, many scientists and scientifically minded commentators are skeptical that it exists, especially when it is understood to require the ability to choose between alternative possibilities. If the laws of physics govern everything that happens, they argue, then how can our choices be free? Believers in free will must be misled by habit, sentiment, or religious doctrine. Why Free Will Is Real defies scientific orthodoxy and (...) presents a bold new defense of free will in the same naturalistic terms that are usually deployed against it. -/- Unlike those who defend free will by giving up the idea that it requires alternative possibilities to choose from, Christian List retains this idea as central, resisting the tendency to defend free will by watering it down. He concedes that free will and its prerequisites—intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control over our actions—cannot be found among the fundamental physical features of the natural world. But, he argues, that’s not where we should be looking. Free will is a “higher-level” phenomenon found at the level of psychology. It is like other phenomena that emerge from physical processes but are autonomous from them and not best understood in fundamental physical terms—like an ecosystem or the economy. When we discover it in its proper context, acknowledging that free will is real is not just scientifically respectable; it is indispensable for explaining our world. (shrink)

Giorgio Agamben’s work on the power of sovereignty has been greatly influential in recent political thought. However, it has also overshadowed the independently original contributions of his two primary theoretical sources, Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin. In this article, I argue that Agamben’s political defeatism can be traced back to a double misconception in his reception of these two authors: first a formalistic reduction of Schmitt, and second a Schmittian reduction of Benjamin. Through this reduction to juridical formalism, the radicality (...) of Benjamin’s historical materialist critique is replaced by a messianic nihilism, leading to the colonization of society by the logic of the concentration camp. Though Agamben’s theory of sovereignty and its implications for a positive political project have been contested, this origin of the decline of radical philosophy has not previously undergone a systematic critique. (shrink)

Many groups make decisions over multiple interconnected propositions. The “doctrinal paradox” or “discursive dilemma” shows that propositionwise majority voting can generate inconsistent collective sets of judgments, even when individual sets of judgments are all consistent. I develop a simple model for determining the probability of the paradox, given various assumptions about the probability distribution of individual sets of judgments, including impartial culture and impartial anonymous culture assumptions. I prove several convergence results, identifying when the probability of the paradox converges to (...) 1, and when it converges to 0, as the number of individuals increases. Drawing on the Condorcet jury theorem and work by Bovens and Rabinowicz , I use the model to assess the “truth-tracking” performance of two decision procedures, the premise- and conclusion-based procedures. I compare the present results with existing results on the probability of Condorcet’s paradox. I suggest that the doctrinal paradox is likely to occur under plausible conditions. (shrink)

The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and (...) a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical. (shrink)

One of the hallmark themes of Karl Popper’s approach to the social sciences was the insistence that when social scientists are members of the society they study, then they are liable to affect that society. In particular, they are liable to affect it in such a way that the claims they make lose their validity. “The interaction between the scientist’s pronouncements and social life almost invariably creates situations in which we have not only to consider the truth of such pronouncements, (...) but also their actual influence on future developments. The social scientist may be striving to find the truth; but, at the same time, he must always be exerting a definite influence upon society. The very fact that his pronouncements do exert an influence destroys their objectivity.” (Popper 1963. (shrink)

Suppose that the members of a group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, and imagine that the group itself has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that (...) difficulty illustrates. Our paper describes this impossibility result and provides an exploration of its significance. The result naturally invites comparison with Kenneth Arrow's famous theorem (Arrow, 1963 and 1984; Sen, 1970) and we elaborate that comparison in a companion paper (List and Pettit, 2002). The paper is in four sections. The first section documents the need for various groups to aggregate its members' judgments; the second presents the discursive paradox; the third gives an informal statement of the more general impossibility result; the formal proof is presented in an appendix. The fourth section, finally, discusses some escape routes from that impossibility. (shrink)

I model sequential decisions over multiple interconnected propositions and investigate path-dependence in such decisions. The propositions and their interconnections are represented in propositional logic. A sequential decision process is path-dependent if its outcome depends on the order in which the propositions are considered. Assuming that earlier decisions constrain later ones, I prove three main results: First, certain rationality violations by the decision-making agent—individual or group—are necessary and sufficient for path-dependence. Second, under some conditions, path-dependence is unavoidable in decisions made by (...) groups. Third, path-dependence makes decisions vulnerable to strategic agenda setting and strategic voting. I also discuss escape routes from path-dependence. My results are relevant to discussions on collective consistency and reason-based decision-making, focusing not only on outcomes, but also on underlying reasons, beliefs, and constraints. (shrink)

Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. In this paper, I propose a unified framework for modelling levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and show that it can accommodate descriptive, explanatory, and ontological notions of levels. I further illustrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some salient philosophical questions: (1) Is there a linear hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the bottom? And (...) what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? (2) Are there emergent properties? (3) Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? (4) Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be viewed as one involving levels? Although I use the terminology of “levels”, the proposed framework can also represent “scales”, “domains”, or “subject matters”, where these are not linearly but only partially ordered by relations of supervenience or inclusion. (shrink)

Consider the hypothesis H that a defendant is guilty, and the evidence E that a majority of h out of n independent jurors have voted for H and a minority of k:=n-h against H. How likely is the majority verdict to be correct? By a formula of Condorcet, the probability that H is true given E depends only on each juror's competence and on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority h-k, but neither on the number n, nor (...) on the proportion h/n. This paper reassesses that result and explores its implications. First, using the classical Condorcet jury model, I derive a more general version of Condorcet's formula, confirming the significance of the absolute margin, but showing that the probability that H is true given E depends also on an additional parameter: the prior probability that H is true. Second, I show that a related result holds when we consider not the degree of belief we attach to H given E, but the degree of support E gives to H. Third, I address the implications for the definition of special majority voting, a procedure used to capture the asymmetry between false positive and false negative decisions. I argue that the standard definition of special majority voting in terms of a required proportion of the jury is epistemically questionable, and that the classical Condorcet jury model leads to an alternative definition in terms of a required absolute margin between the majority and the minority. Finally, I show that the results on the significance of the absolute margin can be resisted if the so-called assumption of symmetrical juror competence is relaxed. (shrink)

Most accounts of welfare aggregation in the tradition of Arrow's and Sen's social-choice-theoretic frameworks represent the welfare of an individual in terms of a single welfare ordering or a single scalar-valued welfare function. I develop a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's and Sen's frameworks, representing individual welfare in terms of multiple personal welfare functions, corresponding to multiple 'dimensions' of welfare. I show that, as in the one-dimensional case, the existence of attractive aggregation procedures depends on certain informational assumptions, specifically about the (...) measurability of welfare and its comparability not only across individuals but also across dimensions. I state several impossibility and possibility results. Under Arrow-type conditions, insufficient comparability across individuals leads to dictatorship of a single individual, while insufficient comparability across dimensions leads to dominance of a single dimension. Given sufficient comparability both across individuals and across dimensions, a range of possibilities emerges. I discuss the substantive implications of the results. (shrink)

This article examines the methodology of a core branch of contemporary political theory or philosophy: “analytic” political theory. After distinguishing political theory from related fields, such as political science, moral philosophy, and legal theory, the article discusses the analysis of political concepts. It then turns to the notions of principles and theories, as distinct from concepts, and reviews the methods of assessing such principles and theories, for the purpose of justifying or criticizing them. Finally, it looks at a recent debate (...) on how abstract and idealized political theory should be, and assesses the significance of disagreement in political theory. The discussion is carried out from an angle inspired by the philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this note, I correct an error in List (2003). I warmly thank Ron Holzman for drawing my attention to this error, and Franz Dietrich for giving me some key insights that have led to the present correction, particularly the formulation of assumption (a*) below. Theorem 2 (speci…cally, the claim that (i) implies (ii) and the associated Proposition 2) in List (2003) requires an additional assumption on the set X of propositions under consideration (the agenda). Let me use the de…nitions (...) and notation from List (2003). Also, de…ne a set of propositions to be satis…able if some truth-value assignment makes all its members true, and, for each Y X, de…ne Y : := f: : 2Yg. In List (2003), I assumed that (a) X contains at least two distinct atomic propositions P; Q and their conjunction (P ^ Q), and (b) X contains proposition-negation pairs (i.e. if 2 X, then : 2 X, where :: is identi…ed with ). While assumption (b) is correct as stated, Theorem 2 requires assumption (a*) instead of (a). (shrink)

This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment aggregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this introduction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We first translate a proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concepts and conditions leading to analogous (...) impossibilities, as discussed in the symposium. We then consider each of four possible escape-routes explored in the symposium. (shrink)

Discussion Christian List, Philip Pettit, Episteme, FirstView Article.

The ``doctrinal paradox'' or ``discursive dilemma'' shows that propositionwise majority voting over the judgments held by multiple individuals on some interconnected propositions can lead to inconsistent collective judgments on these propositions. List and Pettit (2002) have proved that this paradox illustrates a more general impossibility theorem showing that there exists no aggregation procedure that generally produces consistent collective judgments and satisfies certain minimal conditions. Although the paradox and the theorem concern the aggregation of judgments rather than preferences, they invite comparison (...) with two established results on the aggregation of preferences: the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's impossibility theorem. We may ask whether the new impossibility theorem is a special case of Arrow's theorem, or whether there are interesting disanalogies between the two results. In this paper, we compare the two theorems, and show that they are not straightforward corollaries of each other. We further suggest that, while the framework of preference aggregation can be mapped into the framework of judgment aggregation, there exists no obvious reverse mapping. Finally, we address one particular minimal condition that is used in both theorems – an independence condition – and suggest that this condition points towards a unifying property underlying both impossibility results. (shrink)

Asymmetric distribution of function between the cerebral hemispheres has been widely investigated in the auditory modality. The current approach borrows heavily from visual local–global research in an attempt to determine whether, as in vision, local–global auditory processing is lateralised. In vision, lateralised local–global processing likely relies on spatial frequency information. Drawing analogies between visual spatial frequency and auditory dimensions, two sets of auditory stimuli were developed. In the high–low stimulus set we manipulate frequency information, and in the fast–slow stimulus set (...) we manipulate temporal information. The fast–slow stimuli additionally mimic visual hierarchical stimulus structure, in which the arrangement of local patterns determines the global pattern. Unlike previous auditory stimuli, the current stimulus sets contain the experimental flexibility of visual local–global hierarchical stimuli allowing independent manipulation of structural levels. Previous findings of frequency and temporal range priming were replicated. Additionally, by presenting stimuli monaurally, we found that priming of frequency ranges (but not temporal ranges) was found to vary by ear, supporting the contention that the hemispheres asymmetrically retain traces of prior frequency processing. These results contribute to the extensive literature revealing cerebral asymmetries for the processing of frequency information, and extend those results to the realm of priming. (shrink)

How can the friction between genesis and validity be understood? Is it possible to »dissolve« it? This paper argues that the genesis/validity-problem reflects the fundamental epistemological differences between History and Philosophy, and it takes Michel Foucault's »Archeology« as a model case for this problem. Since Foucault's »archaeological« methodology, i.e. his discourse analysis, is deeply affected by these tensions, I will show, firstly, that the epistemological model for Foucault's anti-hermeneutical and genealogical approach was rooted not in philosophy, but in medicine, especially (...) in anatomy. Secondly, I will argue that the »paradoxical« position of discourse analysis, in Foucault's eyes, is necessarily a political one – i.e. as a position within political struggles. (shrink)

This short paper proposes an application of Condorcet's jury theorem to animal group decisions.

Drawing on the so-called “doctrinal paradox”, List and Pettit (2002) have shown that, given an unrestricted domain condition, there exists no procedure for aggregating individual sets of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions into corresponding collective ones, where the procedure satisfies some minimal conditions similar to the conditions of Arrow’s theorem. I prove that we can avoid the paradox and the associated impossibility result by introducing an appropriate domain restriction: a structure condition, called unidimensional alignment, is shown to open up a (...) possibility result, similar in spirit to Black’s median voter theorem. Specifically, I prove that, given unidimensional alignment, propositionwise majority voting is the unique procedure for aggregating individual sets of judgments into collective ones in accordance with the above mentioned minimal conditions. (shrink)

Much recent philosophical work on social freedom focuses on whether freedom should be understood as non-interference, in the liberal tradition associated with Isaiah Berlin, or as non-domination, in the republican tradition revived by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. We defend a conception of freedom that lies between these two alternatives: freedom as independence. Like republican freedom, it demands the robust absence of relevant constraints on action. Unlike republican, and like liberal freedom, it is not moralized. We show that freedom as (...) independence retains the virtues of its liberal and republican counterparts while shedding their vices. Our aim is to put this conception of freedom more firmly on the map and to offer a novel perspective on the logical space in which different conceptions of freedom are located. (shrink)

This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (as in (...) Condorcet's paradox) are in large electorates. (shrink)

The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled. After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic decision making is possible. We argue that deliberation can promote (...) these conditions, and hence that social choice theory suggests not that democratic decision making is impossible, but rather that democracy must have a deliberative aspect. (shrink)

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ (...) first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness. (shrink)