There are two primary arguments against scientific realism, one pertaining to underdetermination, the other to the history of science. While these arguments are usually treated as altogether distinct, P. Kyle Stanford's ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’ constitutes one kind of synthesis: I propose that Stanford's argument is best understood as a broad modus ponens underdetermination argument, into which he has inserted a unique variant of the historical pessimistic induction. After articulating three criticisms against Stanford's argument and the evidence that he offers, (...) I contend that, as it stands, Stanford's argument poses no threat to contemporary scientific realism. Nonetheless, upon identifying two useful insights present in Stanford's general strategy, I offer an alternative variant of the modus ponens underdetermination argument, one that, although historically informed by science, requires no inductive premises. I contend that this non-inductive but historically informed variant of the modus ponens clarifies and considerably strengthens the case against scientific realism. (shrink)

Some philosophers claim to "do philosophy historically." They study philosophers of the past not just to discover what they thought, but as a way of advancing their own philosophical agendas. In this paper, I offer an account of what it means to do philosophy historically. First, I examine a number of current views of the matter, and explain why I find them inadequate. Next, I ask what kind of understanding can be gained from a study of history. I (...) do so by drawing on John Herman Randall's discussion of the "genetic method." Finally, I extend Randall's discussion of the genetic method to philosophy, and use it to explain how a study of past philosophy might teach philosophical lessons. I also ask what assumptions we must make about philosophy if we are to learn such lessons, and I argue that these assumptions are plausible. (shrink)

This essay responds to the six essays on my thought above, doing so both directly on particularly important points and indirectly through my own reflections on how I understand my work and its development.

Since W. B. Gallie introduced the notion of essentially contested concepts (ECCs) in 1956, social science scholars have increasingly used his framework to analyze key concepts drawing “endless disputes” from contestant users. Despite its merits, the ECC framework has been limited by a neglect of social, cultural, and political contexts, the invisibility of actors, and its ahistorical character. To understand how ECCs evolve and change over time, I use a conceptual history approach to study the concept of philanthropy, recently labeled (...) as an ECC. Using France during classical modernity as a case study, I analyze key events and actors from the concept’s inception in 1712 as a virtue of the Enlightenment to its triumph after 1789 as a secular alternative to Catholic charity, until its decline at the end of the nineteenth century as a new consensus emerged around the concept of solidarity. By introducing the notion of historically contested concepts, I make several contributions to research on ECCs, conceptual contestation, and conceptual change. (shrink)

This brief response to Will Davies clarifies and expands a number of the core arguments of the article ‘The Emergence of Neoliberalism: Thinking through and Beyond Michel Foucault’s Lectures on Biopolitics’ (published in TCS 31(4): 3–27). It is argued that it is a mistake to treat Foucault as a neoliberal because his lectures on biopolitics centred on the emergence of different trajectories of neoliberal reason. Instead, Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberalism can be read as a critical history, one that is partial (...) and incomplete but which nonetheless can be used as a starting point to think historically and critically about neoliberalism. It is suggested that a more nuanced history of neoliberalism, however, can be developed by paying closer attention to the complex relationship between neoliberal reason and the earlier liberal ideas of the 19th century – in particular those of John Stuart Mill. Finally, a claim is made for the value of historical analysis for understanding and responding to the challenges of the post-crisis present, to a situation in which neoliberal ideas appear to have a near-hegemonic grip over popular politics and discourse. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the turning that occurs within the work of Martin Heidegger. In particular it seeks to reveal it as a turning that takes place within the notion of history as it is ela...

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Volume 78, Issue 1, Page 90-94, Winter 2020.

American intellectual history in the future will be embodied, embedded, and extended. Building on a sturdy foundation of past practices, intellectual historians will consolidate the advances of the last half-century and continue to study ideas articulated in multiple registers, by multiple historical actors, for multiple purposes.

To address, as Miller does, the text of Catcher particularly, we would argue that Holden's experiences of old age, physical repulsiveness, sex, aloneness and isolation, and even death are embedded in his full experience of society, and that his responses, moment by moment, bear the imprint of his total response to the competitive, dehumanizing world he is in the process of rebelling against and rejecting. He finds old Spencer pathetic not just because he is elderly and arthritic and snuffy with (...) flu, but because he is relatively powerless, not very well off, and naïve in urging upon Holden his teacherly prescriptions for life: be sensible, do your lessons, take care for your future—as if with one's own efforts alone could guarantee one's worldly future. This essay is a reply to disagreements raised by James E. Miller, Jr. to the Ohmanns' “Reviewers, Critics, and The Catcher in the Rye” . Carol Ohmann has also contributed "Virginia Woolf's Criticism: A Polemical Preface" with Barbara Currier Bell. (shrink)

This paper begins by asking a simple question: can a farmer own and fully utilise precisely five tractors and precisely six tractors at the same time? Of course not. He can own five or he can own six but he cannot own five and six at the same. The answer to this simple question eventually led this author to Alfred Marshall's historically-ignored, linguistically-depicted 'cardboard model' where my goal was to construct a picture based on his written words. More precisely, (...) in this paper the overall goal is to convert Marshall's ('three-dimensional') words into a three-dimensional picture so that the full import of his insight can be appreciated by all readers. After a brief digression necessary to introduce Euclidean three-dimensional space, plus a brief digression to illustrate the pictorial problem with extant theory, the paper turns to Marshall's historically- ignored words. Specifically, it slowly constructs a visual depiction of Marshall's 'cardboard model'. Unfortunately (for all purveyors of extant economic theory), this visual depiction suddenly opens the door to all manner of Copernican heresy. For example, it suddenly becomes obvious that we can join the lowest points on a firm's series of SRAC curves and thereby form its LRAC curve; it suddenly becomes obvious that the firm's series of SRAC curves only appear to intersect because mainstream theory has naively forced our three-dimensional economic reality into a two-dimensional economic sketch; and it suddenly becomes obvious that a two-dimensional sketch is analytically useless because the 'short run' (SR) never turns into the 'long run' (LR) no matter how long we wait. (shrink)

This essay argues for the historicity of applied science as a contested category within laissez-faire Victorian British science. This distinctively pre-twentieth-century notion of applied science as a self-sustaining, autonomous enterprise was thrown into relief from the 1880s by a campaign on the part of T. H. Huxley and his followers to promote instead the primacy of “pure” science. Their attempt to relegate applied science to secondary status involved radically reconfiguring it as the mere application of pre-existing pure science. This new (...) notion of extrinsically funded pure science that would produce only contingently future social benefits as a mere by-product came under pressure during World War I, when military priorities focused attention once again on science for immediate utility. This threatened the Cambridge-based promoters of self-referential pure science who collectively published Science and the Nation in 1917. Yet most contributors to this work discussed forms of “applied” science that had no prior “pure” form. Even the U.K.'s leading government scientist, Lord Moulton, dismissed the book's provocative distinction between pure and applied science as unhelpfully “vague and artificial.”. (shrink)

(1996). The role of the intellectual: Historically and in the present crisis. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 782-785.

In my paper, I try to summarize Hannah Arendt’s reflections on the method of political thinking, following them through their genesis. My fundamental assumption is that although she had been preoccupied with the issue before (at least from 1957), she became more seriously interested in it after the controversy following the publication of the Eichmann volume. It is generally known that Arendt believed to have found the pattern for the method of political thinking in Kant’s third critique, the one about (...) judgment; more precisely in the Kantian description of the reflective judgment. This served as a pattern for Arendt for what she sometimes called representative thinking or opinion. If, on the other hand, we examine Arendt’s referring thoughts in their genesis we also come to realize why that was the case. In my opinion, Arendt looked in Kant’s work for a form of political thinking that remained impartial, in other words, it was not committed to one political cause or another, yet did not break its relations to politics, remaining entirely political. (shrink)

After the publication of my book Authenticities in 1995 I began toreceive criticisms of it based on the growing currency of the phrase ‘the historically informed performance’, which was supposed to be describing a kind of musical performance that differed significantly from the kind that had been known previously as the ‘historically authentic performance’ and which had been the object of my critique in the book. The argument was that the historically informed performance was different enough from (...) the historically authentic one to evade my critique while enough like it to retain its ‘historical spirit’. Through a series of analyses of the concept of the historically informed performance, I tentatively conclude in the present paper that, construed one obvious way, the concept does indeed evade my critique, but at the cost of losing, so to speak, its historical credentials and, construed in another obvious way, the concept of the historically informed performance simply collapses into the concept of the historically authentic performance. In neither case is philosophical progress made, but what we are involved with here is a classic case of what the late Charles Stevenson called a ‘persuasive definition’. (shrink)

Book Review: Samuel Lebens (2017) "Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement".

According to the mainstream view in the philosophy of music, the only way to authentically perform works of past centuries is according to the ideal of Historically Authentic Performance (HAP). This paper aims to show that, despite recent defences of the mainstream view, it lacks motivation, and hence should be abandoned or revised. As we shall see, first, there is no plausible account of HAP as a final and intrinsic value consistent with the work-focused teleology of work-performance. Second, a (...) plausible account of the value of HAP in work-performance regards HAP as a way of performing works of past centuries convincingly. However, this approach does not support the mainstream view because this only leaves HAP as an interpretive option. Finally, an alternative defence of the value of HAP in the form of an indispensability argument is considered: HAP is indispensable to accurately comply with a work’s score, and thus to perform it faithfully. This strategy supports the demands of the mainstream view, but we will see that, if we take this option seriously, HAP must be understood in a substantively different manner than the mainstream view does, such that it ultimately amounts to the second option analysed above. (shrink)

Futabatei Shimei (1864-1909) was an early modern Japanese novelist, translator, and critic. He wrote what is now generally conceived of as the first Japanese ‘modern’ novel, Drifting Clouds (1887-89). He translated works by Turgenev, Leo Tolstoy, Garshin, Gorky, and others. He also published a number of critical essays, treatises on literary theory, political papers, and so forth. His early translation of Turgenev’s short stories: Aibiki (Rendevous, 1888) and Meguriai (Three Trysts, 1889) were extremely influential on the contemporary literati, who were (...) amazed at the fresh, poetic prose used in stark contrast to the traditional Japanese fiction in the pre-Reformation period. These translations, seen in the light of the present-day readers, were unique in what we might term today ‘foreignizing translation’. Lawrence Venuti in Invisibility of the Translator argues that the ideal of (English) translation has been to conceal itself as a translation, i.e. to present itself as an original text (chap I and passim). In that sense, Futabatei’s translations, scandalously presenting itself as a translation, that is to say, as an alien text, is extremely ‘foreignizing’. (shrink)