Artificial gametes, derived from stem cells, have the potential to enable in vitro fertilization of embryos. Currently, artificial gametes are only being generated in laboratory animals; however, considerable efforts are underway to develop artificial gametes using human cell sources. These artificial gametes are being proposed as a means to address infertility through assisted reproductive technologies. Nonetheless, the availability of artificial gametes obtained from adult organisms can potentially expand the possibilities of reproduction. Various groups, such as (...) same-sex couples, post-menopausal women, and deceased donors, could potentially utilize artificial gametes to conceive genetically related offspring. The advent of artificial gametes raises significant bioethical questions. Should all these reproductive scenarios be accepted? How can we delineate the range of future reproductive choices? A normative bioethical framework may be necessary to establish a consensus regarding the use of human artificial gametes. This review aims to present the current state of research on the biological roadmap for generating artificial gametes, while also summarizing proposed approaches to establish a normative framework that delineates ethically acceptable paths for reproduction. (shrink)

According to Rivka Weinberg, gametes are like enriched uranium: both are hazardous materials. Exposing human beings to enriched uranium can result in radioactivity and decreased life expectancy, while exposing sperm and ova to each other can result in the creation of needy innocent persons with full moral status. Weinberg argues that when we engage in activities that put our gametes at risk of joining with others and growing into persons, we assume the costs of that risky activity. She (...) calls this the Hazmat Theory of parental responsibility. The theory is novel and important, and has far-reaching consequences for the ethics of procreation, parenting, and population, implying among other things that that the only way to avoid acquiring parental responsibilities may be to “abstain from sexual intercourse or surgically interfere with our gamete-release system.” For these reasons the theory merits careful scrutiny. In this article I criticize the theory's account of how parental responsibility is acquired and its treatment of the standard of care expected of gamete possessors, and argue that it fails to properly account for a distinction between procreative costs and parental responsibility. Even if gametes are hazardous, it does not follow that parental responsibility in Weinberg's sense is acquired whenever one brings new persons into existence. (shrink)

Gamete donation offers a unique opportunity to compare men and women's relationships to reproductive decision-making, unlike other reproductive processes, which typically involve women's bodies much more asymmetrically. I address medical and reproductive decision-making by examining how a gamete donor's partner may be involved in the donation process. Some countries explicitly involve a donor's partner by legally requiring spousal consent for donation, but this is not the case for the U.S. In the absence of any formal regulation, what are the expectations (...) for involving a donor's partner? Through a content analysis of materials from donation programs across the U.S., I examine how donation programs configure the partner's role. Overall, I find that there are quite different expectations for partner involvement in egg versus sperm donation. Such differences, I argue, both stem from and reinforce existing issues navigating boundaries between intimate relationships and women's medical and reproductive autonomy. (shrink)

A growing number of jurisdictions hold that gamete donors must be identifiable to the children born with their eggs or sperm, on grounds that being able to know about one's genetic origins is a fundamental moral right. But the argument for that belief has not yet been adequately made.

In debates on the ethics of artificial gametes, concepts of naturalness have been used in a number of different ways. Some have argued that the unnaturalness of artificial gametes means that it is unacceptable to use them in fertility treatments. Others have suggested that artificial gametes are no less natural than many other tissues or processes in common medical use. We suggest that establishing the naturalness or unnaturalness of artificial gametes is unlikely to provide easy answers (...) as to the acceptability of using them in fertility medicine. However, we also suggest that we should be cautious about repudiating any relationship between nature and moral evaluation. The property of being natural or man-made may not per se tell us anything about an entity’s moral status, but it has an important impact on the moral relationship between the creator and the created organism. (shrink)

This article surveys a range of recent media storiesabout human gametes, pinning them to a series of widerpreoccupations within late modern life. Threepreoccupations are singled out: first, kinship andrelational identity; secondly, Nature andglobalisation; and finally, sexual difference andequality. Each one of these preoccupations has beencharacterised as iconic; debates about them are saidto crystallise who we are, especially ouruncertainties, and what we will be in the future. Byindexing these preoccupations to the stories abouthuman gametes, the article aims to upset (...) both theincreasing attempts to present assisted reproductiontechnologies as `familiar' (as Nature's `helpinghand', for example) and the recurringassumptions about this technology's alleged`novelty' and `anomaly'. The article concludesthat treating reproduction technologies, and theirregulation, as `familiar' risks complacency:equally, assumptions about their `novelty' narrowsthe search for effective explanatory tools andregulatory mechanisms. The upshot is that it might bebest for us to view reproductive technologies as bothless `familiar' and less `novel'. (shrink)

Unlike surrogacy and cloning, reproduction via gamete donation is widely assumed to be morally unproblematic. Recently, a number of authors have argued that this assumption is mistaken: gamete donors, they claim, have parental responsibilities that they typically treat too lightly. In this paper I argue that the ‘parental neglect’ case against gamete donation fails. I begin by examining and rejecting the view that gamete donors have parental responsibilities; I claim that none of the current accounts of parenthood provides good reason (...) for ascribing parenthood to gamete donors. I then argue that even if gamete donors do have parental responsibilities for ‘their’ children, it is not clear that they treat these responsibilities too lightly. I conclude the paper by examining the wider question of just what kind of responsibilities gamete donors might have towards the children that they have a role in creating. (shrink)

A number of recent papers have described the successful derivation of egg and sperm precursor cells from mouse embryonic stem cells—so-called “artificial” gametes. Although many scientific questions remain, this research suggests numerous new possibilities for stem cell research and assisted reproductive technology, if a similar breakthrough is achieved with human embryonic stem cells. The novel opportunities raised by artificial gametes also prompt new ethical questions, such as whether same-sex couples should be able to access this technology to have (...) children who are genetically related to them both.THE CREATION OF “ARTIFICIAL” GAMETESOver the past two years, a number of papers have been published detailing the first successful attempts at differentiating mouse embryonic stem cells into egg1 and sperm2 precursor cells. Previously, researchers had used embryonic stem cells to generate tissues such as brain, liver, and pancreatic cells, but not germ cells of any kind. Production of gamete precursor cells was achieved initially through allowing stem cell lines to differentiate more or less randomly, but recent research has focused on identifying the precise ways in which differentiation into gametes can be precipitated and controlled. These breakthroughs make it seem likely that ongoing research on human stem cells will yield similar possibilities,3 raising questions over the practicalities of what might be achieved with such “artificial” gametes. In turn, the novel opportunities presented by artificial gametes raise a number of ethical concerns.The initial breakthrough, namely the obtaining of egg cells from mouse stem cells, was achieved by means of relatively simple science. Rather than coaxing stem cells to develop into eggs using complicated cocktails of growth factors, researchers adopted standard cell culture conditions, but grew the cells at higher density than usual.3–6 Growing the cells in this way led to the formation of ovary-like cell aggregates, which (when separated and stimulated with …. (shrink)

What is the relationship between the position that anonymous gamete donation is wrong (i.e. the anti-anonymity position) and the position that all gamete donation is wrong (i.e. the anti-donation position)? Some argue that people who accept the anti-anonymity position should also accept the anti-donation position on the grounds that the two positions share the same main arguments. But that’s not true. One argument in favor of anti-anonymity does not generate genuine dialectical pressure to accept the anti-donation position. The other anti-anonymity (...) arguments do generate dialectical pressure, but not in a way that pushes toward the anti-donation position. Instead, they push toward what we might call the ‘pro-known-donation’ position. So, either there is no dialectical pressure or, where there is, it doesn’t flow toward the anti-donation position. (shrink)

The recent success in generating live offspring from embryonic stem cell –derived gametes in mice sparked visions of growing tailor-made sperm for men faced with infertility. However, although this development will almost certainly lead to new insights into the processes underlying spermatogenesis and thus in the possible causes of male infertility, it is less certain if deriving sperm from ES cells, which are in turn derived from a sterile man, can make someone a genetic parent. As the gap between (...) newly envisioned reproductive technologies and natural reproduction widens, the question thus needs to be asked if these possible therapies still lead to genetic parenthood. (shrink)

In their paper Hortonet alargue that it is acceptable to contact an anonymous egg-donor to facilitate diagnostic genetic testing for the donor conceived child, despite the donor, ‘indicating on a historical consent form that she did not wish to take part in future research, and that she did not wish to be informed if she was found to be a carrier of a “harmful inherited condition”’. There are a number of claims embedded in Hortonet al’s position that it is acceptable (...) to contact the donor and request that she at least think about participating in genetic testing. In this response. I will go through their main claims and argue that the area of genomic medicine does not justify exceptions to general consent conditions as the authors suppose and conclude that the donor should not be contacted. I will then go on to suggest a policy change that would address Hortonet al’s concerns but would not involve over-riding any previously expressed wishes. (shrink)

Ovarian tissue transplantation is an experimental procedure that can be used to treat both infertility and premature menopause. Working within the current legal framework in the USA, I examine whether ovarian tissue should be legally treated like gametes or organs in the case of ovarian tissue transplantation between two women. One option is to base classification upon its intended use: ovarian tissue used to treat infertility would be classified like gametes, and ovarian tissue used to treat premature menopause (...) would be classified like organs. In the end, however, I argue that this approach will not work because it engenders too many legal, cultural and logistical concerns and that, at least for the near future, we should treat ovarian tissue like gametes. (shrink)

There has been a troublesome anomaly in the UK between cash payment to men for sperm donation and the effective assumption that women will pay to donate eggs. Some commentators, including Donald Evans in this journal, have argued that the anomaly should be resolved by treating women on the same terms as men. But this argument ignores important difficulties about property in the body, particularly in relation to gametes. There are good reasons for thinking that the contract model and (...) payment for gametes are both inappropriate, and that a model based on altruism should be applied to both sexes. (shrink)

Purpose This paper presents an ethnographic study of gamete donation in Latvia. The aim of the study is to describe and analyse the practice of applying responsibility in gamete donation cases from the perspective of anthropology and ethics. Methods We performed thirty semi-structured interviews with laypeople and five focus group discussions among adolescents. The third source of data was media analysis: 57 articles discussing assisted reproduction in Latvian electronic popular media as well as internet discussions among ART participants. The data (...) were processed using Atlas.ti. Results The data showed that the situation of ART responsibility is formulated through defining one’s relationship to the gametes, to the nation and the relationship between parent and child. Conclusions The practice of gamete donation does not create new responsibilities but uses already existing relations in a situation marked by new knowledge. Relationships among ART users, donors and physicians often result in an imbalance of responsibility sharing. The framework of relational ethics is one possible way to change the practice of balancing and sharing responsibility in ART applications. (shrink)

In this paper we will look at the various ways in which infertility can be understood and at how need for reproductive therapies can be construed. We will do this against the background of research with artificial gametes. Having explored these questions we will attempt to establish the degree to which technologies such as AGs could expand the array of choices that people have to reproduce and/or become parents. Finally, we will examine whether and in what ways the most (...) promising developments of such technologies are likely to bring about the “end of infertility”. (shrink)

The recent in vitro derivation of gamete‐like cells from mouse embryonic stem (mES) cells is a major breakthrough and lays down several challenges, both for the further scientific investigation and for the bioethical and biolegal discourse. We refer here to these cells as gamete‐like (sperm‐like or oocyte‐like, respectively), because at present there is still no evidence that these cells behave fully like bona fide sperm or oocytes, lacking the fundamental proof, i.e. combination with a normally derived gamete of the opposite (...) sex to yield a normal individual. However, the results published so far do show that these cells share some defining features of gametes. We discuss these results in the light of the bioethical and legal questions that are likely to arise would the same process become possible with human embryonic stem (hES) cells. (shrink)

The proposal for reproducing human generations in vitro raises the question to what extent parenthood is possible in embryos and to what extent human rights and interests are dependent on conscious awareness. This paper argues that the interest in not being made a parent non-consensually for the benefit of others persists throughout the lifespan of the individual human organism. We do not become genetic parents by learning that we are parents; rather, we discover (or fail to discover) an existing genetic (...) relationship between our offspring and ourselves. The claim to genetic parenthood of an embryo used for reproduction in vitro is, if anything, clearer than the claim of the adult for whom gametes are derived via ips cells, in that an embryo’s cells, unlike an adult’s somatic cells, are already functionally geared to producing gametes (among other types of cell). An embryo used to make gametes that are used in reproduction is immediately and non-consensually made a genetic parent and to that extent is wronged whether or not the parent embryo survives – as some could survive – the harvesting of cells. All human individuals carry objective interests in benefits appropriate to the kind of being they are; these include the stake in not being made a parent without one’s consent, whether posthumously or otherwise. (shrink)

According to the causal theory of parenthood, people incur parental obligations by causing children to exist. Proponents of the causal theory often argue that gamete donors have special obligations to their genetic offspring. In response, many defenders of current gamete donation practices would reject the causal theory. In particular, they may invoke the ‘too many parents problem’: many people who causally contribute to the existence of children – for instance, fertility doctors – do not thereby incur parental obligations. This article (...) argues that the conclusions commonly drawn by causal theorists, and by their critics, are premature. Causal theorists have a promising response to the too many parents problem. This response, however, defuses the moral concern that many causal theorists have raised about gamete donation. A similar point, it is argued, applies to Rivka Weinberg’s ‘Hazmat Theory’. -/- . (shrink)

Fertilization is the result of a series of successful recognition and binding events mediated by gamete surface molecules. Recent advances in the identification and characterization of some of these recognition molecules provide extremely valuable information necessary to understand sperm‐egg recognition and subsequent egg activation. We discuss these new data in the context of the model of gamete recognition first proposed by F.R. Lillie in the early part of the 20th century, and revisited periodically in the subsequent literature, which relates fortilization (...) events to those of immune cell recognition and activation events. Here we discuss the principles underlying the molecular recognition and activation mechanisms of gametes and immune cells. (shrink)

Brussen, Kerri Anne Children born through gamete donation can be genetically linked to one or neither parent. This article examines the practice of gamete donation, seeking to establish if there is cause for concern.

Some commentators indirectly challenge the ethics of using synthetic gametes as a way for same-sex couples to have children with shared genetics. These commentators typically impose a moral burden of proof on same-sex couples they do not impose on opposite-sex couples in terms of their eligibility to have children. Other commentators directly raise objections to parenthood by same-sex couples on the grounds that it compromises the rights and/or welfare of children. Ironically, the prospect of synthetic gametes neutralises certain (...) of these objections, insofar as they would ensure that children have parents whom they can know as their genetic parents, which outcome is not always possible when same-sex couples involve third parties as the source of gametes or embryos. Not all commentators in bioethics throw the use of synthetic gametes into doubt as far as same-sex couples are concerned, but even these commentators put parenting by gay men and lesbians at the conclusion of an argument rather than presupposing parental legitimacy from the outset. Synthetic gametes do raise questions of ethics in regard to parenthood for gay men and lesbians, but these are largely questions of access and equity, not questions of parental fitness and/or child welfare. (shrink)

The recent in vitro derivation of gamete‐like cells from mouse embryonic stem (mES) cells is a major breakthrough and lays down several challenges, both for the further scientific investigation and for the bioethical and biolegal discourse. We refer here to these cells as gamete‐like (sperm‐like or oocyte‐like, respectively), because at present there is still no evidence that these cells behave fully like bona fide sperm or oocytes, lacking the fundamental proof, i.e. combination with a normally derived gamete of the opposite (...) sex to yield a normal individual. However, the results published so far do show that these cells share some defining features of gametes. We discuss these results in the light of the bioethical and legal questions that are likely to arise would the same process become possible with human embryonic stem (hES) cells. (shrink)

Sophisticated arguments advanced by Harry Silverstein, David Boonin, and Jeff McMahan attempt to show that being responsible for an individual's existence need not result in an obligation to ensure that the needs of that individual are satisfied. While these arguments take place within the abortion debate, by extension they threaten causal accounts of procreative responsibility more generally. In this article, I defend causal accounts of procreative responsibility by showing that these arguments do not succeed, but without thereby undermining the permissibility (...) of abortion. Further, while being causally involved in the existence of a person is not sufficient for acquiring procreative responsibilities, I argue that there is an especially strong case for ascribing such responsibilities to gamete donors. (shrink)

This paper argues that the convention of allocating donated gametes on a ‘first come, first served’ basis should be replaced with an allocation system that takes into account more morally relevant criteria than waiting time. This conclusion was developed using an empirical bioethics methodology, which involved a study of the views of 18 staff members from seven U.K. fertility clinics, and 20 academics, policy-makers, representatives of patient groups, and other relevant professionals, on the allocation of donated sperm and eggs. (...) Against these views, we consider some nuanced ways of including criteria in a points allocation system. We argue that such a system is more ethically robust than ‘first come, first served’, but we acknowledge that our results suggest that a points system will meet with resistance from those working in the field. We conclude that criteria such as a patient's age, potentially damaging substance use, and parental status should be used to allocate points and determine which patients receive treatment and in what order. These and other factors should be applied according to how they bear on considerations like child welfare, patient welfare, and the effectiveness of the proposed treatment. (shrink)

Several threads of research towards developing artificial gametes are ongoing in a number of research labs worldwide. The development of a technology that could generate gametes in vitro has significant potential for human reproduction, and raises a lot of interest, as evidenced by the frequent and extensive media coverage of research in this area. We have asked researchers involved in work with artificial gametes, ethicists, and representatives of potential user groups, how they envisioned the use of artificial (...) gametes in human reproduction. In the course of three focus groups, the participants commented on the various aspects involved. The two recurring themes were the strength of the claim of becoming a parent genetically, and the importance of responsible communication of science. The participants concurred that (a) the desire or need to have genetic offspring of one’s own does not warrant the investment of research resources into these technologies, and that (b) given the minefield in terms of moral controversy and sensitivity that characterises the issues involved, how information is communicated and handled is of great importance. (shrink)

There is a lack of consensus on whether the derivation and use of human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) from embryos remaining after infertility treatment morally require the informed consent of third-party gamete donors who contributed to the creation of the embryos. The principal guidelines for oversight and funding of hESC research in the United States make minimal or no demands for consent from gamete donors. In this article, I consider the arguments supporting and opposing gamete donor consent for hESC research (...) and embryo research more broadly. I argue that it is not morally permissible to use leftover embryos in research without the informed consent of gamete donors, and that we should place restrictions on the use of existing hESC lines that may have been derived without informed consent. While the standard argument for this position relies on an appeal to gamete donors’ interest in controlling what happens with their genetic material, I identify shortcomings with the standard approach and seek instead to locate the deeper moral foundations for gamete donor consent in rights to bodily integrity. (shrink)

Procreation with donor gametes is widespread and commonly accepted, but it involves ethical questions about the child's best interest. Understanding the historical structures of the moral discussion of gamete donation may contribute to reflecting on the child's best interest. This is why I have analysed the debate on gamete donation in the Netherlands, and this analysis has uncovered some striking discontinuities. Notions of the child's best interest have undergone a radical swing. In the past, it was considered acceptable to (...) conceal the truth about the child's biological origin, but in the past two decades the general opinion has changed to the common belief that this information should be shared with the child. This changed notion of the child's best interest will be analysed using a framework encompassing three views of the child, which derive from the debate on children's rights. These three views each provide a different interpretation of the child's moral and political status. I conclude that the changed notion of the child's best interest results from a view of the child that focuses on autonomy and citizenship, and which frames the child's interests according to its legal status. I comment on this view and I champion an alternative one, namely ‘the embedded child’. This is a relational view based on care ethics that goes beyond what can be articulated in law, and that will help to establish a more balanced interpretation of the child's best interest at the practice and policy levels of gamete donation. (shrink)

This article discusses when it is ethically acceptable to withdraw consent for the storage and use of embryos and gametes. Currently, the law in the UK states that consent to use of a gamete or embryo can be withdrawn up to the point of the embryo's transfer to the recipient's uterus or when the gamete is used in providing treatment services; that is, the ‘point of no return’. In this article, we will consider other points of no return and (...) argue that having a single point of no return, a one size fits all form of consent can, in some cases, lead to restrictions on individuals’ autonomy and cause particular types of harm. Therefore, having different points of no return that fit different circumstances could extend autonomy and allow people to enter into agreements that are tailored more to their own particular needs and circumstances. (shrink)

The Significant Interest view entails that even if there were no medical reasons to have access to genetic knowledge, there would still be reason for prospective parents to use an identity-release donor as opposed to an anonymous donor. This view does not depend on either the idea that genetic knowledge is profoundly prudentially important or that donor-conceived people have a right to genetic knowledge. Rather, it turns on general claims about parents’ obligations to help promote their children’s well-being and the (...) connection between a person’s well-being and the satisfaction of what I call their “worthwhile significant subjective interests.” To put this view simply, the fact that a donor-conceived person—who knows she is donor-conceived—is likely to be very interested in acquiring genetic knowledge gives prospective parents a weighty reason to use an identity-release donor. This is because parents should promote their children’s well-being through the satisfaction of their children’s worthwhile significant interests. (shrink)

In this paper, we will discuss the prospect of human reproduction achieved with gametes originating from only one person. According to statements by a minority of scientists working on the generation of gametes in vitro, it may become possible to create eggs from men’s non-reproductive cells and sperm from women’s. This would enable, at least in principle, the creation of an embryo from cells obtained from only one individual: ‘solo reproduction’. We will consider what might motivate people to (...) reproduce in this way, and the implications that solo reproduction might have for ethics and policy. We suggest that such an innovation is unlikely to revolutionise reproduction and parenting. Indeed, in some respects it is less revolutionary than in vitro fertilisation as a whole. Furthermore, we show that solo reproduction with in vitro created gametes is not necessarily any more ethically problematic than gamete donation—and probably less so. Where appropriate, we draw parallels with the debate surrounding reproductive cloning. We note that solo reproduction may serve to perpetuate reductive geneticised accounts of reproduction, and that this may indeed be ethically questionable. However, in this it is not unique among other technologies of assisted reproduction, many of which focus on genetic transmission. It is for this reason that a ban on solo reproduction might be inconsistent with continuing to permit other kinds of reproduction that also bear the potential to strengthen attachment to a geneticised account of reproduction. Our claim is that there are at least as good reasons to pursue research towards enabling solo reproduction, and eventually to introduce solo reproduction as an option for fertility treatment, as there are to do so for other infertility related purposes. (shrink)

The growing scope of gamete donation and themanipulation of gametes makes it essential to developa coherent theory of the nature of gametes and theclaims which may be made in relation to them. Thenature of gametes is ambiguous, they blur thedistinctions between persons and property, but thecurrent legal framework which governs gamete donationand manipulation fails to address their status. Thisleaves unanswered fundamentally important questionsabout control of processes involving gametes andrights to use or control the gametes themselves (...) andthe information which they represent. These areclaims which are rooted in the concept ofproperty. A property based analysis highlights thethemes of autonomy, personhood and control which lieat the heart of the claims made in relation to gametesand an account based on the notion of property forpersonhood offers a more coherent justification forrecognising claims in gametes and mediating disputes. This perspective exposes the inadequacies andinconsistencies of the legal construction of gametesand the legal regulation of gamete donation. Thepresent legal framework has not sought to develop acoherent construction of gametes, but to constrain thepractices of the assisted reproductive technologies(including gamete donation) within a framework whichis presented as least damaging to the traditionalideologies of the creation of the family. (shrink)

Current developments in reproductive technology forecast that in the foreseeable future artificially generated gametes might be presented as a possible fertility treatment for infertile couples and for homosexual couples desiring to have children genetically originating from both partners. It is important to evaluate the ethical issues connected to this technology before its emergence. This article first reviews the meaning that gametes (sperm and eggs) might have to those who procreate, as well as their ontology. From this, suggestions are (...) made as to what qualities artificially generated gametes need to be truly called gametes. Finally, different proposed routes for artificial gamete generation are examined on the basis of these qualities, with their prospective problems and advantages highlighted. Autotransplanted gametes (or their progenitors) generated solely from patient-derived tissue are deemed to be the most ethically suitable route for the development of this technology. (shrink)

The recent in vitro derivation of gamete‐like cells from mouse embryonic stem (mES) cells is a major breakthrough and lays down several challenges, both for the further scientific investigation and for the bioethical and biolegal discourse. We refer here to these cells as gamete‐like (sperm‐like or oocyte‐like, respectively), because at present there is still no evidence that these cells behave fully like bona fide sperm or oocytes, lacking the fundamental proof, i.e. combination with a normally derived gamete of the opposite (...) sex to yield a normal individual. However, the results published so far do show that these cells share some defining features of gametes. We discuss these results in the light of the bioethical and legal questions that are likely to arise would the same process become possible with human embryonic stem (hES) cells. (shrink)

In France, since the approval of the first bioethics laws in 1994, the principle of the anonymity of sperm donors has prevailed. This choice is regularly challenged, namely by children who have been conceived under these conditions and have now reached adulthood. In this paper, we will briefly describe the reasons that led practitioners of assisted reproduction to endorse the anonymity principle in 1994. Secondly, we will elaborate on the reasons why this principle is becoming so controversial today. Finally, we (...) shall examine two possible outcomes of the debate, highlighting their respective legitimacy as well as their consequences, as far as the rights of children, the notion of the family, and medical practice are concerned. (shrink)

Gamete donation from third parties is controversial in China as it severs blood ties, which are considered of utmost importance in Confucian tradition. In recent years, infertile couples are increasingly demonstrating a preference for the use of gametes donated by family members to conceive children—known as “intra-family gamete donation.” The main advantage of intra-family gamete donation is that it maintains blood ties between children and both parents. To date there is no practice of intra-family gamete donation in China. In (...) this paper, we investigate intra-family adoption in China in order to illustrate that intra-family gamete donation is consistent with Confucian tradition regarding the importance of maintaining blood ties within the family. There are several specific ethical issues raised by intra-family gamete donation. It may, for example, result in consanguinity and the semblance of incest, lead to confused family relationships, and raise concerns about possible coercion of familial donors. Confucian tradition provides a new approach to understand and deal with these ethical issues in a way that Western tradition does not. As a result, we suggest intra-family gamete donation could be an acceptable solution to the problem of infertility in China. However, further discussion and open debates on the ethical issues raised by intra-family gamete donation are needed in China. (shrink)

Cancer rates in men and women of reproductive age have continued to increase in recent years; however, therapy has dramatically decreased the mortality rates. Since 1990, the prevalence of cancer survivors in young adults increased from 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 250 patients due to more aggressive therapies. Current therapies may have profound toxic effects on gamete function with infertility as an expected consequence of cancer therapy. Depending on the site and stage of cancer, age of the patient, and (...) the type of treatment, approximately 90% of men and women diagnosed with cancer may be at risk of permanent infertility.Fertility preservation has emerged as a discipline dedicated to improving the future reproductive potential of cancer survivors. Significant progress in the advancement of fertility preservation therapies and a heightened awareness of the availability of therapies has occurred in the past 10 years. The American Society of Clinical Oncology and the American Society of Reproductive Medicine have advanced these efforts by formally recognizing the importance of fertility awareness. (shrink)

Three-way baby making is not new: genetic surrogacy existed in Biblical times and donor insemination was recorded in Britain over 200 years ago. However, the gift of gametes between women breaks all social conventions. This paper examines the phenomenon of gamete-donation questioning whether a ‘gift’ of such magnitude can ever be ‘free’ (as the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority advocates), or a ‘true’ gift (in Derridian terms). Exploration of this unprecedented ‘gift’ from a psychoanalytic approach is supplemented by an (...) interdisciplinary one, drawing on the gift literature in philosophy, anthropology, ethnography and socioeconomics, as well as neonatal research and reproductive medicine. Critics note the dearth of analyses that take seriously the psychological ramifications of contemporary treatments, protocols and expectations in reproductive medicine. Based on psychoanalytic therapy within a clinical practice devoted to reproductive issues, the author argues that institutionalised asexual reproduction alters unconscious conceptualisations of the act of procreation – converting the passionate intimacy of primal scene into a clinical coupling of gametes in a mechanised arena. The author argues that, too charged to contemplate, the gamete's transcendent quality and blurring of elementary personae/res distinctions leads protagonists, including professionals, to defensive commodification. Multiple emotional meanings are ascribed to gifted gametes by each in the triangle of donor, recipient and offspring, illustrated here with verbatim material. This article addresses some of the far-reaching socio-political consequences for class, race, age, gender and sexuality of asexual reproduction, related to selection procedures and uneven global and local distribution of fertility treatment and its cost in financial, physical, practical and emotional terms. Similarly, feminist unease over (patriarchal) reproductive control and gatekeeping policies are considered, as well as ethical concerns over genetic manipulation, pre-implantation screening, sex selection, selective foetocide and potential exploitation of transnational donors and surrogates. (shrink)

In this paper I explore some of the moral issues that could emerge from the creation of human–nonhuman chimeras capable of human gamete production and human pregnancy. First I explore whether there is a cogent argument against the creation of HNH-chimeras that could produce human gametes. I conclude that so far there is none, and that in fact there is at least one good moral reason for producing such types of creatures. Afterwards I explore some of the moral problems (...) that could emerge from the fact that a HNH-chimera could become pregnant with a human conceptus. I focus on two sets of problems: problems that would arise by virtue of the fact that a human is gestated by a nonhuman creature, and problems that would emerge from the fact that such pregnancies could affect the health of the HNH-chimera. (shrink)

Approximately 15% of couples are affected by infertility worldwide. Subsequently, the use of assisted reproductive technologies is becoming increasingly popular, including the use of donor eggs, sperm and embryos. Despite ongoing ethical debate surrounding gamete donation, this is now a widely accepted practice in Western countries. Assisted reproductive technology is becoming more commonly utilised within the Muslim population; however, gamete donation remains a relatively controversial and taboo topic within this religion. Interestingly, there are significant differences in beliefs between Sunni and (...) Shi’a Muslims. Whilst Sunni Islam absolutely forbids the use of third-party reproductive assistance, Shi’a Islam is somewhat more lenient towards this practice. Reproductive tourism has therefore become prevalent in Shi’a Middle Eastern countries that permit the use of donor gametes in assisted reproductive technologies; however, this continues to evoke a strong bioethical debate, particularly around sperm donation. With the increased influx of reproductive tourism, this is beginning to weaken the regional Sunni Islam ban on the use of donor technologies, questioning the morality of their current beliefs. Consideration of religious beliefs is also crucial for patient-centred care in UK patients treated by the National Health Service for fertility issues. Of note, there is a lack of non-Caucasian donors in the United Kingdom. Reproductive tourism is also becoming increasingly common in the United Kingdom and needs to be considered in terms of future patient management in delivering good obstetric care. (shrink)

Luc Bovens, in his 2006 article, argues that it can be shown that the ‘rhythm' method of birth control results in a larger number of embryonic deaths than the IUD, the morning after pill or the combination oral contraceptive pill, just so long as one accepts his three ‘plausible’ assumptions. In this brief response I will argue that Boven's third assumption is not plausible when one takes into account a basic knowledge of human reproductive biology. Thus, his argument, in both (...) of its possible reconstructions, fails. (shrink)

In Canada, laws and policies consistently reject the commodification of human organs and tissues, and Canadian practice is consistent with international standards in this regard. Until the Assisted Human Reproduction Act of 2004, gamete donation in Canada was an exception: Canadians could pay and be paid open market rates for gametes for use in in vitro fertilization. As sections of the AHR Act forbidding payment for gametes and permitting only reimbursement of receipted expenses gradually came into effect in (...) 2005, Canada did away with this anomaly. Medical practice and legal prohibitions in assisted human reproduction are now consistent with other areas of medicine where tissues and organs are taken from one person to benefit others: Altruistic donation, rather than selling and buying, will be the norm. (shrink)

The dominant philosophical view of gamete donation as morally permissible rests on two premises: parental obligations are triggered primarily by playing a causal role in procreation, not by genetic ties, and those obligations are transferable—that is, they are obligations to make adequate provision for the child’s needs, not necessarily to raise the child oneself. Thus while gamete donors are indeed agent causes of the children that their donation helps to bring into existence, most think that donors’ obligations are discharged insofar (...) as they know that competent others intend to care for those children. In this article, I call into question this dominant view by challenging both of its premises. Challenging the first premise, I argue that genetic parenthood is what primarily triggers parental obligations. Challenging the second premise, I claim that those obligations are non-transferable—i.e., that they are obligations not simply to ensure that someone will raise one’s genetic child, but to raise that child oneself . The implication of my argument is that gamete donation is inherently wrong insofar as it involves acquiring non-transferable obligations that one has no intention of fulfilling. (shrink)

It has been suggested that future application of stem-cell derived gametes might lead to the possibility for same-sex couples to have genetically related children. Still, for this to become possible, the technique of gamete derivation and techniques of reprogramming somatic cells to a pluripotent state would have to be perfected. Moreover, egg cells would have to be derived from male cells and sperm cells from female cells, which is believed to be particularly difficult, if not impossible. We suggest a (...) more plausible scenario to provide same-sex couples with the possibility to parent a child who is genetically related to both parents. Although technical feasibility is an advantage, disadvantages are that cooperation of a donor of the opposite sex is still required and that the partners are genetically linked to the resulting child in a different degree. However, since in our scenario the donor's genetic contribution would not outweigh any of the parents' genetic contribution, this alternative route may ease the fear for a possible parental claim by the donor. Like many other applications in the field of infertility treatment, the goal to create SCD-gametes for reproductive purposes is largely based on the high value attributed to genetic parenthood. Although we believe that genetic relatedness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for ‘good’ parenthood, we do believe that many people may consider our scenario a welcome alternative. (shrink)