Le concept de « beau » assume un rôle essentiel dans la philosophie platonicienne, puisqu’il exprime cette vision ou cette connaissance « supérieure » qu'on n’atteint qu’au terme de la démarche dialectique. Cette contribution examinera un aspect particulier de cette démarche, ce moment que l’on pourrait définir comme la « figure du milieu », puisqu’il se situe entre deux états de choses totalement différents, à l’apex du processus dialectique : l’exaiphnès. Exaiphnès représente pour Platon un « soudainement » très particulier. (...) À travers ce mot, en effet, s’exprime, selon nous, cet « instant » précis qui semble survenir « soudainement », mais qui, en réalité, a besoin d'une longue période d'incubation, au terme de laquelle, « soudainement », surgit un problème qui émergeait auparavant dans une optique totalement différente. En d’autres termes, Platon semble décrire un phénomène que le langage commun appelle habituellement « illumination », et qui, selon nous, a de nombreux points communs avec le phénomène que les psychologues nomment insight. (shrink)

The main purpose of the thesis is to identify and fill some gaps that are regularly found in the analysis of the Platonic concept of ἐξαίφνης. The word ἐξαίφνης, which appears 36 times in the Platonic dialogues, has primarily been examined and discussed in relation to what is said in Parmenides and, more rarely, in Symposium, Republic and Seventh Letter. However, as is known, the word is also found in Gorgias, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Statesman and Laws. Moreover, it is worth noting (...) that a history of criticism about the concept of ἐξαίφνης has never been provided, mainly due to the chronological and interpretive difficulties relating to Parmenides. This absence brought on a fragmentation and discontinuity in the study of the concept and it often prompted specialists to see in this notion a secondary or imprecise aspect of the Platonic theory. Regardless of the correctness of interpretations that have been proposed over the centuries, my work clearly shows that all these exegeses share two fundamental limits: the former is a necessarily partial analysis, almost exclusively based on what is written in Parmenides, the latter is the absence of a historical perspective . Cette thèse portant sur le concept d’ἐξαίφνης tel qu’on le trouve dans les textes de Platon se propose de combler les lacunes existantes relatives à l’analyse de ce concept. En effet, le terme d’ἐξαίφνης, dont on trouve trente-six occurrences dans les dialogues de Platon n’a été jusqu’à présent principalement envisagé et examiné qu’à travers ce qui en est dit dans le Parménide et, plus rarement, dans le Banquet, la République et la Lettre VII. Le terme, comme on le sait, se trouve pourtant aussi dans le Gorgias, le Cratyle, le Théétète, le Politique et les Lois. En outre, en raison notamment des difficultés chronologiques et interprétatives liées au dialogue du Parménide, aucune histoire critique du concept d’ἐξαίφνης n’a été entreprise. Cette absence d’histoire critique a pour effet une fragmentation et une discontinuité des études portant sur ce concept, effets qui ont souvent conduit les spécialistes à ne voir dans cette notion qu’un aspect secondaire ou à tout le moins imprécis de la théorie que développe Platon à son sujet. Aussi la thèse s’est-elle attachée à entreprendre une étude préalable de l’histoire de ces interprétations. Quelle que soit la justesse et la valeur des interprétations qui se sont succédées au cours des siècles, cette étude s’emploie à montrer clairement que ces tendances exégétiques se heurtent à deux limites fondamentales que la thèse s’applique à lever : la première est le caractère nécessairement partiel d’une analyse menée presque exclusivement à partir du Parménide, la seconde est l’absence de mise en perspective historique. (shrink)

In this book, Joseph Cimakasky examines Plato’s use of the term exaíphnēs, revealing a pattern that links Plato’s theory of Ideas with philosophical education.

Résumé Après quelques remarques préliminaires sur l’emploi par Platon de l’adverbe nun, j’explore la nature du nun à travers une lecture approfondie du passage où la notion est spécifiquement examinée (Parm. 151e3–153b7). Sa nature metaxu, située entre la durée et la limite, conduit à examiner l’autre notion temporelle de la deuxième partie du Parménide qui est metaxu, c’est-à-dire l’exaiphnês. J’explique pourquoi le nun et l’exaiphnês doivent être distingués et pourquoi il n’existe pas de modèle où les deux notions (...) s’inscrivent simultanément, mais plutôt un modèle rendant compte d’un saut et un modèle rendant compte d’un changement continu. (shrink)

Damascius’ discussion of the Platonic notions of the sudden (to exaiphnēs) and the now (to nun) occurs in the context of his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. His view is that the Platonic sudden should be identified not with the timeless essence of the individual human soul, as Proclus suggested, but with the cohesive element that holds the individual human soul together through the cycles of reincarnation. For Damascius, the human soul is so thoroughly intertwined with time, when it descends to (...) the realm of Becoming, that its very essence gets altered. Damascius also maintains that the Platonic now is not a dimensionless boundary or temporal limit but an indivisible stretch of extended time. For Damascius, time progresses by ‘leaps’, and those leaps, determined once for all by the Demiurgic Intellect, are the atomic nows. Behind the flowing atomic nows there lies a numerically identical non-flowing now that is their eternal origin and form. The paper addresses the issue of the relationship of the sudden as the cohesive element of the soul to the now as the cohesive element of time, in the context of Damascius’ views about timeless Being and ever-flowing Becoming. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate central temporal and spatial notions in the second part of Plato’s Parmenides and argue that also these notions, and not only the metaphysical ones usually discussed in the literature, can be understood as a response to positions and problems put on the table by Parmenides and Zeno. Of the spatial notions examined in the dialogue, I look at the problems raised for possessing location and shape, while with respect to temporal notions, I focus on the (...) discussion of ‘being in time’ and exaiphnês (the latter notion will be shown to be also an important influence for Aristotle’s Physics). In displaying a paradoxical character and taking up crucial notions from Parmenides, the second part of the Parmenides seems to display some resemblance to Zeno’s paradoxes. I will show, however, that in contrast to Zeno, the second part of Plato’s Parmenides also demonstrates Parmenides’ One to be problematic on its own terms. Furthermore, the dialogue presents not only important problems that these spatial and temporal notions seem to lead us into, but also establishes some positive features necessary to think of time and space. In this way, Plato’s Parmenides can be seen as contributing to the development of temporal and spatial conceptualisations in ancient Greek thought. (shrink)

The paper will study an unpublished 1930–31 seminar where Heidegger reads Plato’s Parmenides, showing that in spite of his much-criticized habit of dismissing Plato as the progenitor of “idealist” metaphysics, Heidegger was quite aware of the radical potential of his later dialogues. Through a temporal account of the notion of oneness (to hen), the Parmenides attempts to reconcile the plurality of beings with the unity of Being. In Heidegger’s reading, the dialogue culminates in the notion of the “instant” (to exaiphnēs, (...) Augenblick)—a high point in the entire metaphysical tradition—where the temporal plurality of presence and un-presence converges into a unified disclosure. (shrink)

Plato’s dialogue Parmenides remains one of—if not, the—most perplexing text in the Platonic corpus. Specifically, it examines the difficulties surrounding the concepts of unity, multiplicity, and Being that are required for participation in the Ideas. One of the problems forced upon the young Socrates by Parmenides and Zeno in the second half of the dialogue concerns the relationship between Being (ὄν) and the One (ἕν), namely, how defensible is the oneness, or the unity, of the Idea if it also partakes (...) of Being? The text culminates in an aporia as to how to articulate the difference between the One (ἕν) and the many (πολλά), since if the one is, it becomes many. How do many beings share in the one mode of Being? Crucially, how are we to articulate the difference between the One and the many, or Being and beings? Where Plato’s answer invoking the enigmatic concept ‘exaiphnēs’ (ἐξαίφνης), the temporal becoming of the unity and plurality of the One, seems to contradict the privileging of presence that Heidegger charges him with, he nonetheless fails to offer an understanding of difference that has neither Being nor unity. I argue that Heidegger’s engagement with the problem of the ontological difference, and its development into the identification of Being with difference itself, offers solutions to this aporia in Plato’s Parmenides by addressing a difference that is irreducible to the one or the many, the relational or the derivative. This has significant consequences for understanding Heidegger’s critique of Plato as not just consisting of the privileging of presence but also the failure to respond to the problem of difference. (shrink)

The paper offers the first and the most comprehensive outline of perichronosophy, i.e. a theory of timelessness and its practicing, which are to be taken as a theoretical(perichronology) and practical (atemporalistics) grounds of syncriticism. The fundamental concept of perichronosophy is perichrony expressed by the term perichronosopheme. This concept has been articulated in recent years by applying the syncritic method in the examination of various pre-temporal, intratemporal, and beyond-temporal units of timelessness, as well as their various timeless qualities, linkages and processes (...) taking place in various spheres of timelessness: in pretemporality, intra-temporality as well as between time and timelessness. Perichronosophy goes back mainly to Plato’s theory of timelessness oscillating around the notions of exaiphnes and metaxy. (shrink)

Este artigo discute a influência da segunda parte do Parmênides de Platão, e mais especificamente a sua 3ª hipótese, na obra de Plotino e Jâmblico. Ou seja, a inter- elação entre a apropriação do conceito central da 3ª hipótese, o instante (exaiphnes), (1) em Plotino através da apropriação original do conceito de presença (parousia) e (2) em Jâmblico quando da modificação da estrutura das hipóteses parmenidianas, ao introduzir antes da primeira hipótese, o Inefável, e deslocar a alma para a 4ª (...) hipótese, alocando na 3ª hipótese, os daemons, os anjos e os heróis. A posição da alma na estrutura das hipóteses irá determinar a ascese proposta por cada um deles: se para Plotino a ascese é intelectual, para Jâmblico a mesma se realiza, depois de esgotados os recursos filosóficos, através da teurgia, entendida como um complemento e não em oposição à filosofia, sendo esta a sua novidade. (shrink)

This essay strives to illustrate the unusual philosophical category of exaiphnēs (“sudden ; instant”) which is testified in Damascius’ De principiis ; Damascius is the last diadochus of Neoplatonic Academy. It will be illustrated how Damascius takes up a rare idea contained in Plato’s Parmenides on the sudden, rigorously adjusting this notion to describe the irreducible transcendence of the ineffable principle with respect to the One, just like the sudden bursts into time without belonging to it. It will therefore be (...) shown how this specificity of exaiphnēs appears to be taken up and enhanced in a Christological key about the Incarnation by Dionysius ps.‑Areopagite, turning somehow the theoretical reflection of the contemporary pagan philosopher Damascius into a Christian one. (shrink)

Cet article étudie la notion platonicienne d’instant. Je soutiens que dans leParménide, «maintenant» (nun) et «soudain» (exaiphnês) renvoient à la même entité, envisagée à partir des perspectives distinctes de l’Être éternel et du Devenir temporel. Cette interprétation complète et éclaire les notions platoniciennes de temps et d’éternité présentées dans leTimée. L’article met enfin en évidence le rôle décisif de la troisième déduction — où apparaît la notion d’instant — dans la compréhension de l’exercice dialectique duParménidedans son ensemble.

Il presente testo intende proporre una riflessione lungo il cammino teoretico proposto da Salomon Maimon ed Emmanuel Lèvinas, prendendo spunto dall’aporia filosofica del dialogo Parmenide di Platone riguardante il tema dell’ exaìphnes. Certamente entro le riflessioni di Lèvinas che in Maimon agisce fortemente una vis giudaica, che ne ispira i temi: per Maimon la risoluzione completa dell’empirico può aver luogo solo nella terra promessa dell’intelletto infinito, per Lèvinas il chiasmo tra l’assolutamente Altro, che si manifesta sottraendosi al tempo stesso nel (...) volto dell’altro, ci chiama continuamente a far esodo da noi stessi. Nel concreto, in ciò che non ha luogo, nella pausa, nell’assenza e nella discontinuità, nel sommamente contingente, si trova il vero trascendentale quale elemento di mediazione che lega la realtà, non nelle categorie dell’intelletto che ci forniscono solo una realtà valida per la Wahrnhemung e la objektive Vorstellung , ovvero una realtà postuma, fittizia. Come tertium non datur tra queste due posizioni - l’intelletto infinito di Maimon o l’esodo perenne da se stessi in Lèvinas – intenderemo porvi lo xynòn, ovvero un cum assente che coniuga in un paradossale intreccio il nominalismo assoluto di Hume con il mondo delle idee di Platone: il luogo assurdo di una patria assente. (shrink)