The virtue of mercy is widely admired, but is now marginalized in contemporary public life. Yet for centuries it held a secure place in western public discourse without implying a necessary contradiction with justice. Alex Tuckness and John M. Parrish ask how and why this changed. Examining Christian and non-Christian ancient traditions, along with Kantian and utilitarian strains of thought, they offer a persuasive account of how our perception of mercy has been transformed by Enlightenment conceptions of impartiality and equality (...) that place justice and mercy in tension. Understanding the logic of this decline, they argue, will make it possible to promote and defend a more robust role for mercy in public life. Their study ranges from Homer to the late Enlightenment and from ancient tragedies to medieval theologies to contemporary philosophical texts, and will be valuable to readers in political philosophy, political theory, and the philosophy of law. (shrink)

Original, or 'old', institutional economics (OIE) – also known as 'institutionalism' – played a key role in its early stages; it could be said that it was once the 'mainstream economics' of the time. This period ran approximately from the first important contributions of Thorstein Veblen in 1898 to the implementation of the New Deal in the early 1930s, where many institutionalists played a significant role. However, notwithstanding its promising scientific and institutional affirmation, institutional economics underwent a period of marked (...) decline that spanned from the mid-1930s to the late 1980s, when a new season for institutional economics was set in motion. In order to cast some light on this complex issue – without any claim of completeness – we have organised the work as follows: in the first section we consider the main interpretations of this phenomenon. In the subsequent sections we analyse a number of 'endogenous' aspects which might have played a significant role in the period of decline: (i) the relations of institutional economics with Keynes's macroeconomic theory; (ii) the links between theoretical and empirical analysis and the supposed lack of a clear theory; (iii) the interdisciplinary orientation. (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss philosophy's decline, in the context of disciplinization, scientism, and specialization, as well as possible ways in which it might renew itself.

What happened to the doctrine of natural right in the nineteenth century? We know that it flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We know that something like it - the doctrine of human rights and new forms of social contract theory - flourished again in the second half of the twentieth century and continues to flourish in the twenty-first. In between there was a period of decline and hibernation - uneven, to be sure, and never complete - but a (...) period in which to invoke natural right was always to invite intellectual ridicule and accusations of political irresponsibility. Thus article asks: How far can the decline of natural right in the nineteenth century be attributed to the reaction against the revolution in France? How far it was the effect of independent streams of thought, like positivism and historicism? Why was radical thought so ambivalent about natural right throughout the nineteenth century, and why was socialist thought in particular inclined to turn its back on i? As a framework for thought, natural right suffered a radical decline in the social and political sciences. But things were not so clear in jurisprudence, and natural right lived on to a much riper old age in the writings of some prominent economists. So we have to ask: What is it about this theory that allowed it to survive in these environments, when so much of the rest of intellectual endeavor in the nineteenth century was toxic or inhospitable to it. Finally, I shall ask how far American thought represents an exception to all of this. Why and to what extent did the doctrine survive as a way of thinking in the United States, long after it had lost its credibility elsewhere. (shrink)

The story of liberal democracy over the last half century has been a triumphant one in many ways, with the number of democracies increasing from a minority of states to a significant majority. Yet substantial problems afflict democratic states, and while the number of democratic countries has expanded, democratic practice has contracted. This book introduces a novel framework for evaluating the rise and decline of democratic governance. Examining three mature democratic countries – Britain, Australia and New Zealand – the authors (...) discuss patterns of governance from the emergence of mass democracy at the outset of the twentieth century through to its present condition. The shared political cultures and institutional arrangements of the three countries allow the authors to investigate comparatively the dynamics of political evolution and the possibilities for systemic developments and institutional change. (shrink)

Abstract The apparent decline of trust in our political and social communities is widely lamented by both social scientists and political analysts. Our newspapers now regularly feature new evidence indicating the decline of trust, as well as regular commentary worrying about the possible effects on the political and social institutions that matter to us. Of late, political philosophers have taken up the task of assessing what, specifically, is on the decline and what, further, might be the consequences of this decline. (...) The five books reviewed below all attempt to answer four central questions: What is trust? Is trust really on the decline? If it is, what are the possible effects on our communities? What possible solutions can halt the decline of trust? The competing answers offered by these philosophers are evaluated, revealing we are only part way to resolving these important issues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Decline of Literary CriticismRichard A. PosnerRónán McDonald, a lecturer in literature at the University of Reading, has written a short, engaging book the theme of which is evident from the title: The Death of the Critic. Although there is plenty of both academic and journalistic writing about literature, less and less is well described by the term "literary criticism." The literary critics of the first two-thirds or so (...) of the twentieth century, now dead, including poets and other creative writers, such as T. S. Eliot, journalists such as Edmund Wilson, and academic literary critics, as distinct from literary scholars, such as F. R. Leavis in England and Cleanth Brooks in the United States, have so few successors that the very genre, if not yet dead, is moribund.1 McDonald deplores the decline of literary criticism and seeks to explain its causes.In place of literary criticism, McDonald (and many others, such as John Ellis) argue, we have postmodern literary theory, an animal of quite a different color from literary criticism.2 "Texts... are interpreted and analysed with a view to unlocking the social norms and attitudes encoded therein, not assessed or evaluated as integral, self-contained creations" (McDonald, p. 21). "The 'best' [is regarded] as a politically dubious category, with selections made in its name often nurturing hidden and hierarchical agendas"(p. ix). "In a comparatively short time, [End Page 385] academic literary criticism has been transformed. Many [literary critics] now regard social activism as the major purpose of literary criticism." And "people who write about literature now write in a prose thick with impenetrable jargon," which erects a barrier between literary theory and literature.3 The well documented decline in the reading of literature has many causes but one may be the obscurantist and politicized style of teaching literature that is in vogue in many colleges.4But something deeper is involved. After all, most literary teachers are not postmodernists. What has happened is the professionalization, in not altogether a good sense, of literary studies. Let me illustrate. More than half a century ago, Cleanth Brooks published what became a famous book of literary criticism, consisting of close readings of famous poems.5 The New Critics were much taken with the metaphysical poets, the most prominent of whom was John Donne, and the high point of Brooks's book was his brilliant close reading of "Canonization," one of Donne's most famous love poems. Just this year (2008) a professor of literature named Ramie Targoff published John Donne, Soul and Body, which has an extensive treatment of Donne's love poetry, though it does not mention "Canonization." As far as I can judge, Targoff's book is a fine scholarly achievement—well written (and not defaced by jargon), thoroughly researched, thoughtful, imaginative. She argues that contrary to some scholars who have regarded Donne as a Neoplatonist who therefore believed that the highest love is purely spiritual (as it was for Plato), he was, throughout his career—even when he became a fiercely devout Anglican cleric writing fervid religious verse—a believer that body and soul were one in all activities, including sexual love; hence the religious imagery in "Canonization," emphasized by Cleanth Brooks, who would I think have found Targoff's analysis congenial. Her book is I would guess a model of modern literary scholarship.But here is the difference between Brooks's book, and specifically his discussion of Donne's poem, and Targoff's. Brooks, who though a distinguished Yale English professor did not have a Ph.D., wrote for a mixed audience—academics, students, the general reader—and he made the nonacademic members of that audience want to read Donne, or read more Donne, or re-read Donne with greater understanding and enjoyment. Targoff writes for other scholars of early modern English literature. Someone else who chances on the book (like me) may read it and think well of it, but unless one has esoteric religious or philosophical interests the experience of reading her book will not quicken one's [End Page 386] interest in reading Donne's poetry—which is a great shame, given the state of the literary culture... (shrink)

A new direction in philosophy Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy (...) with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science. Criticism and decline Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology. A resurgence of interest During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence. Hard-to-find core writings now available This collection makes available a selection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide importantbackground information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers. (shrink)

This book explores the steady decline in the status of the individual in recent years and addresses common misunderstandings about the concept of individuality. Drawing from psychology, neuroscience, technology, economics, philosophy, politics, and law, White explains how and why the individual has been devalued in the eyes of scholars, government leaders, and the public. He notes that developments in science have led to doubts about our cognitive competence, while assumptions made in the humanities have led to questions about our moral (...) competence. In this book, White goes on to argue that both of these views are mistaken and that they stem from overly simplistic ideas about how individuals make choices, however imperfectly, in their interests, which are multifaceted and complex. In response, he proposes a new way to look at individuals that preserves their essential autonomy while emphasizing their responsibility to others, inspired by the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the legal and political philosophy reflected in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution. This book explains how individuality combines both rights and responsibilities, reconciles the popular yet false dichotomy between individual and society, and provides the basis for a humane and respectful civil society and government. This book is part of White's trilogy on the individual and society, which includes The Manipulation of Choice and The Illusion of Well-Being. (shrink)

Inequality increased in Ethiopia from 2004 to 2015: The national income share of the lowest quintile of the population declined 40 % during that period. The national income share of the lowest 80 % has dropped 35 % during the same period, so that in 2015 it was lower than it was under the Communist-led Derg in 1981. While GDP per capita has increased in the country, the majority of the population is receiving a smaller percentage of national income than (...) in the 1990s, as the distance between them and the wealthy widens. Reciprocity, that is, cooperation among social classes, has declined since 2004. This study explains the anomaly where GDP per capita can rise but the share in national income of the majority of the population declines. It applies Aristotle’s critique of political economy and proposes a new metric for growth as a function of Aristotle`s measure of reciprocity and GDP per capita. (shrink)

In the preface to this very Scholarly – and sometimes almost confusingly well-informed - book the author tells us that his aim is to offer “a fresh view of the change in educated attitudes towards magical beliefs that occurred in Britain between about 1650 and 1750.” In this he unquestionably succeeds. Actually the book continues somewhat beyond the later date, but there can be no doubt that there were changes – mostly declines - during the designated period in many of (...) the miscellaneous human beliefs and activities that have for whatever reason been labelled as ‘magic’ or ‘magical’. Hunter begins the body of his book with a chapter–length Introduction entitled The Supernatural, Science and ‘Atheism’. This opens with an attempt to define what he means by ‘magic’, based, he says, on the similar attempt made by Sir Keith Thomas in his classic Religion and the Decline of Magic (1971), though unlike Thomas he very wisely does not include alchemy and astrology. Even so he includes quite a wide variety of topics, so wide indeed that it is hard to see what if anything these phenomena – if they do indeed occur – could have in common except that they are difficult to explain, or to explain away, in ordinarily accepted terms. The proposed list includes such matters as witchcraft, witch covens, involvement with the spiritual realm (good or evil, angelic or demonic, benevolent or pestilential) possession. conjuration, prophesies, ghosts, apparitions, fairies, omens and lucky charms, and what would now be called poltergeists. Other varieties of curious events linked to or supposedly similar to the above could in practice no doubt get included. (shrink)

The term 'therapeutic misconception' (TM) was introduced in 1982 to conceptualize how some psychiatry trial participants perceived and interpreted their involvement in research. TM has since been identified in many settings and is a major component in research ethics discussions. A qualitative study included a subgroup of interviews with five parents (two couples, one mother) who declined to enrol their baby in a neonatal trial. Analysis suggested the possibility of a counterpart to TM which, given the original terminology, we term (...) the 'injurious misconception' (IM). While TM is closely linked to the elision of care and research, and involves an over-stated sense of benefit and protection, IM may be a product of a particularly keen and discomforting sense of distinctions between care and research and a correspondingly over-stated sense of risk and threat. (shrink)

The ‘rise’ and ‘decline’ refer to the rationale behind Islamic attractiveness and its rejection. What I intend to write is a narrative based on theoretical intuitions and empirical facts very different from Olivier Roy’s thesis on the ‘failure’ of political Islam (1992) and Asef Bayat’s post-Islamism (1996). My theoretical intuition is that political Islam has for years at best taken advantage of a long-term series of failures. First, there is the failure of modernization, of secularity and of national ideology. Islamist (...) movements transformed this kind of ‘negative legitimacy’ into an electoral success. This is the case with En-Nahdha in Tunisia. Second, however, this electoral legitimacy was rapidly eroded. Third, post-Islamist expectations were not met: political Islam with its radicalism was not cut off and did not digest jihadism and terrorism. It is still worked out by a double-handed attempt: a neo-authoritarian politics and a religious anti-liberal zeal. Now, this project is failing, not because political Islam entered into a ‘post-Islamist’ area but thanks to a strong and heroic resistance of secular civil society. (shrink)

This commentary responds to the recent enthusiasm for the idea of interregnum, revived by Gramsci in the 1930s and now by Zygmunt Bauman and Carlo Bordoni. While sympathetic to its impulse, the suggestion is made here that rather than being trapped in between, the West is entering a new authoritarian normal, where innovation as well as repetition are apparent. Trump Fever, in particular, may be a kind of smokescreen or western liberal obsession, not because the problems involved are less than (...) fully serious, but because we allow their anxieties to disable us. Meantime, the serious global contender for global hegemony, The People’s Republic of China, is often occluded from vision. Ergo Spengler: this may be not only the epoch of the decline of the West, but also the rise of the New China. (shrink)

Drawing from a four-year study of US science institutions that support biological control of arthropods, this article examines the decline in biological control institutional capacity in California within the context of both declining public interest science and declining agricultural research activism. After explaining how debates over the public interest character of biological control science have shaped institutions in California, we use scientometric methods to assess the present status and trends in biological control programs within both the University of California Land (...) Grant System and the California Department of Food and Agriculture. We present available data on the number of scientific positions and the types of positions to discuss the impact on the amount of public interest research on biological control in California. We use sociograms to depict how biological control science networks have been reconfigured over time. Our quantitative and qualitative analyses indicate that the following factors contributed to the decline of biological control science in California over the 45-year period analyzed: (1) the institutional reconfiguration of university research priorities; (2) the fraying networks within and increasing specialization of biological control science; (3) the transformation of the social organization of the life science work, including privatization; and (4) the abandonment of this thematic area by civil society activist groups. This broad array of forces suggests that biological control, as a public interest science, will require a deliberate intervention, based on advocacy of clear public interest criteria. (shrink)

Institutions are the formal or informal 'rules of the game' that facilitate economic, social, and political interactions. These include such things as legal rules, property rights, constitutions, political structures, and norms and customs. The main theoretical insights from Austrian economics regarding private property rights and prices, entrepreneurship, and spontaneous order mechanisms play a key role in advancing institutional economics. The Austrian economics framework provides an understanding for which institutions matter for growth, how they matter, and how they emerge and can (...) change over time. Specifically, Austrians have contributed significantly to the areas of institutional stickiness and informal institutions, self-governance and self-enforcing contracts, institutional entrepreneurship, and the political infrastructure for development. (shrink)

In The Decline and Fall of the Catholic Church in America, the sociologist David Carlin offers insightful explanations for why Catholicism began to unravel in the 1960s. Facing the aftershocks of Vatican II, the collapse of their cohesive urban neighborhoods, and the onslaught of the cultural revolution, American Catholics experienced a “perfect storm” from which they have yet to recover. Carlin sees little reason for optimism about the future. Among other things, he notes thebishops’ “appallingly poor” handling of the sex (...) abuse scandal and their tolerance of homosexuality in the seminaries. While agreeing with mostof Carlin’s analysis, this reviewer is more optimistic about the future prospects of the Church in America. (shrink)

The concept of decline has been a constant in the historical thinking of all societies. This chapter discusses this concept, the possible socio-psychological reasons for this concept, and the implications for the understanding of history. Though a belief in a Golden Age is often caused by and sustained by pessimism or nostalgia, it does not follow that there is no truth in such beliefs. The chapter presents some secular counterparts which also harbor same nostalgia for a remote past when everything (...) was perfect. It is also not necessary to believe that the past was a period of absolute perfection in order to hold that the present is in important ways a period of decline. (shrink)

America's supposed moral decline from an imagined golden age, and the threat of divine punishment for the sin of straying from the path of righteousness, have been consistent themes in its political and religious rhetoric. In Prodigal Nation, Andrew Murphy investigates the jeremiad's historical roots and probes the ways in which it continues to illuminate themes and tensions in American social and political life.

In this paper, I investigate backward-looking accounts of death's badness. I begin by reviewing deprivationism—the standard, forward-looking account of death's badness. On deprivationism, death is bad for its victims when it deprives them of a good future. This account famously faces two problems—Lucretius’s symmetry problem and the preemption problem. This motivates turning to backward-looking accounts of death's badness on which death is bad for its victim (in a respect) when it involves a decline from a good life. I distinguish three (...) different backward-looking accounts of death's badness in terms of decline, and I argue for the attractiveness of one in particular. I conclude by considering how the backward-looking consideration of decline might factor into our overall account of death's badness. (shrink)

The serviceability of the doctrine is apparent. Those who hope to understand world affairs will naturally resist it. The February elections in Nicaragua are a case in point. The forces at work within Nicaragua are surely worth understanding, the reactions to the elections here no less so -- far more so, in fact, in terms of global import and long-term significance, given the scale and character of U.S. power. These reactions provide quite illuminating insight into the dominant political culture. They (...) provide further and quite dramatic evidence that the concept of democracy is disappearing even as an abstract ideal. (shrink)

On April 2, 1987, Professor of Philosophy, Judith Jarvis Thomson of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s seventh Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: "The Decline of Cause." Judith Jarvis Thomson works in ethics and metaphysics. Her book, The Realm of Rights (Harvard University Press, 1990) is a study of the questions what it is to have a right, and which ones we have. An article entitled "Self-Defense" appeared in Philosophy and Public Affairs (Fall 1991); another entitled (...) "On some ways in which a thing can be good" appeared in Social Philosophy and Policy (Spring 1992). Her work in metaphysics has largely been on the ontology of events, and the identity across time of people and other physical objects. An article entitled "People and their bodies," which takes issue with views expressed by Derek Parfit in Part III of his Reasons and Persons, has recently appeared in a collection of essays (edited by Jonathan Dancy) written on topics dealt with in that book. She is currently working on the question what it is for one event to cause another. (shrink)

By using instrumentation initially designed for counting white blood cells, sperm counts have been utilized by clinicians since 1929, particularly to evaluate cases of suspected infertility. Although this basic biological parameter might be assumed to be stable over time, several studies over the past 20 years have suggested a decline in sperm count or density. The most controversial of these analyses was published in 1992. A flood of criticism followed this analysis of 61 studies that found a 50% decline in (...) sperm density between 1938 and 1990. Critics suggested that historical methods (of counting sperm or conducting studies) were variable and unreliable, differing from modern methods both qualitatively and quantitatively. To address this issue we analyzed these studies for trends in counting methods or their variability. We found neither. Alternative analyses produced some differences in trend estimates, but statistical factors alone could not account for the total decline in sperm density. We reviewed study populations to identify trends in population characteristics, such as abstinence time, that might explain the decline. However, controlling analytically for such factors only increased the rate of decline. We conclude that historical data on sperm density, despite large random error, are surprisingly reliable. Nonetheless, understanding causes of temporal and geographic differences in sperm density must await contemporary data. BioEssays 21:614–621, 1999. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Haack classifies Spengler’s views on the end of science as what she terms annihilationist in that he forecasts the absolute termination of scientific activity as opposed to its completion or culmination. She also argues that in addition to his externalist argument that Western science, as cultural product, cannot survive the demise of Western Culture, Spengler also puts forward an internalist argument that science, regardless of the imminent demise of Western Culture, is in terminal decline as evidenced by its diminishing returns. (...) I argue against Haack that Spengler’s argument for the diminishing returns of modern science is in fact an externalist one, in that he locates the sources of science’s current decline outside the discipline of science itself, attributing them to a change in cultural attitude towards scientific endeavours. I further argue that Spengler’s prediction of the imminent end of science was directed specifically at pure science, and that he in fact held that applied science would continue to develop. I also take issue with Haack’s suggestion that Spengler’s views on science were outmoded at the time that he wrote them. (shrink)

Human-eyelid conditioning was the principal source of information on Pavlovian conditioning, especially human, in the 1950s and 1960s, but it suffered a sharp decline in productivity, beginning in the late 1960s. The present article treats the decline as a case study with potential implications concerning the survival contingencies of research specialties. We make use of questionnaire data from eyelid-conditioning researchers and examine a variety of publication, topic-of-investigation, and institutional data to identify the major factors in the decline of human-eyelid conditioning.

Truthout, August 5, 2011 "It is a common theme" that the United States, which "only a few years ago was hailed to stride the world as a colossus with unparalleled power and unmatched appeal is in decline, ominously facing the prospect of its final decay," Giacomo Chiozza writes in the current Political Science Quarterly.