We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what (...) it intends? How do groups get to know their own mental states? This is the question of collective self-knowledge. I argue that collective self-knowledge is a distinct phenomenon that deserves our attention. In particular I suggest: that we should be interested in collective self-knowledge, because our behaviour indicates that we already engage with collective self-knowledge in practice; that groups can collectively avow, which indicates that they have privileged and peculiar access to their own intentional states; and that collective self-knowledge is not reducible to intentional states of individuals and therefore is an independent explanandum. (shrink)

Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an account of such collective self-knowledge. I suggest that (...) collective self-knowledge of vices is partially based on evidence that a group can generate by performing internal promptings. Whereas these promptings are done mentally in individual self-knowledge, these promptings are done by interactions of group members in the collective case. The group can then acquire inferential self-knowledge of their vices based on the evidence generated by the interactions within the group. Groups thereby bring themselves into a position from which they can combat and change those vices intentionally. (shrink)

Transparency accounts have become one of the main contenders for an adequate theory of self-knowledge. However, for the most part, work on transparent self-knowledge has solely focused on individual agents. In this paper, it is argued that transparency accounts have distinct advantages when we apply them beyond individual agents to social groups. It is shown that transparency accounts of self-knowledge are well-suited to apply to group agents by providing three arguments: the first argument shows (...) that transparency accounts of group self-knowledge can capture the relevant phenomenology well; the second argument suggests that transparency accounts of group self-knowledge are particularly economical. They do not need to posit any new capacities, or new properties of group mental states and therefore avoid commitment to dubious ontological features for social groups, such as distinct introspective faculties in groups. Finally, the third argument shows that transparency accounts are positioned well to explain the privilege and peculiarity of group self-knowledge. No single one of these arguments is decisive in favour of transparent group self-knowledge, but together they show that transparency accounts provide a promising route to understanding group self-knowledge. (shrink)

Cognition Through Understanding presents a selection of Tyler Burge's essays on cognition, thought, and language. The essays collected here use epistemology as a way of interpreting underlying powers of mind, and focus on four types of cognition that are warranted through understanding: self-knowledge, interlocution, reasoning, and reflection.

Written by an international team of leading scholars, this collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the philosophy of mind and (...) the philosophy of language, including 2D semantics, transparency views of self-knowledge, and theories of linguistic understanding, as well as epistemological debates on contextualism, contrastivism, pragmatic encroachment, anti-luminosity arguments and testimony. The scope of the volume will appeal to graduate students and researchers in epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, cognitive science, psychology and linguistics. (shrink)

Self-knowledge has always played a role in healthcare since a person needs to be able to accurately assess her body or behaviour in order to determine whether to seek medical help. But more recently it has come to play a larger role, as healthcare has moved from a more paternalistic model to one where patients are expected to take charge of their health; as we realise that early detection, and hence self-examination, can play a crucial role in (...) outcomes; as medical science improves and makes more terminal illnesses into chronic conditions requiring self-management; as genetic testing makes it possible to have more information about our futures; and with the advent of personal electronic devices that make it easy for a person to gather accurate real-time information about her body. It can be hard to get good information about oneself, and even harder to know what to do it. Sometimes self-knowledge is needed for a good outcome, but sometimes it is useless, or worse. For instance, breast self-examination can lead to over-treatment, learning that one has a predisposing gene can create a detrimental illusion of knowing more about the future than one does, and data about one’s vital signs can be meaningless if taken out of a context of interpretation. This collection explores how these and other issues play out in a variety of medical specialities. (shrink)

"Self-knowledge" is commonly used in philosophy to refer to knowledge of one's particular mental states, including one's beliefs, desires, and sensations. It is also sometimes used to refer to knowledge about a persisting self -- its ontological nature, identity conditions, or character traits. At least since Descartes, most philosophers have believed that self-knowledge is importantly different from knowledge of the world external to oneself, including others' thoughts. But there is little agreement about (...) what precisely distinguishes self-knowledge from knowledge in other realms. Partially because of this disagreement, philosophers have endorsed competing accounts of how we acquire self-knowledge. These accounts have important consequences for the scope of mental content, for mental ontology, and for personal identity. (shrink)

This paper closes a gap in joint acceptance accounts of the mental life of groups by presenting a theory of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework. I start out by presenting desiderata for a theory of group self-knowledge. Any such theory has to explain the linguistic practice of group avowals, and how self-knowledge can play a role in practical and moral considerations. I develop an account of group self-knowledge in the joint (...) acceptance framework that can explain these desiderata. I argue that a group has self-knowledge of its own attitude A if and only if (i) the operative members jointly accept that the group has attitude A; and (ii) that joint acceptance is non-deviantly caused by the operative group members’ belief that the members jointly accepted attitude A; and (iii) the group has attitude A. Together (i) to (iii) give us conditions for a group having a justified, non-lucky, true belief about its own attitude. (shrink)

Is it ethical to deceive the individuals who participate in psychological experiments for methodological reasons? We argue against an absolute ban on the use of deception in psychological research. The potential benefits of many psychological experiments involving deception consist in allowing individuals and society to gain morally significant self-knowledge that they could not otherwise gain. Research participants gain individual self-knowledge which can help them improve their autonomous decision-making. The community gains collective self-knowledge that, (...) once shared, can play a role in shaping education, informing policies and in general creating a more efficient and just society. (shrink)

The essays featured in this collection seek to deepen our understanding of self-knowledge, to solve some of the genuine (and to resolve some of the spurious) ...

Cognition Through Understanding presents a selection of Tyler Burge's essays that use epistemology to illumine powers of mind. The essays focus on epistemic warrants that differ from those warrants commonly discussed in epistemology--those for ordinary empirical beliefs and for logical and mathematical beliefs. The essays center on four types of cognition warranted through understanding--self-knowledge, interlocution, reasoning, and reflection. Burge argues that by reflecting on warrants for these types of cognition, one better understands cognitive powers that are distinctive of (...) persons, and of human beings. The collection presents three previously unpublished independent essays, in addition to substantial, retrospective commentary. The retrospective commentary invites the reader to make connections that were not fully in mind when the essays were written. (shrink)

This essay explores the connection between theories of the self and theories of self-knowledge, arguing (a) that empirical results strongly support a certain negative thesis about the self, a thesis about what the self isn’t, and (b) that a more promising account of the self makes available unorthodox – but likely apt – ways of characterizing self-knowledge. Regarding (a), I argue that the human self does not appear at a personal level (...) the autonomous (or quasi-autonomous) status of which might provide a natural home for a self that can be investigated reliably from the first-person perspective, independent of the empirical sciences. Regarding (b), I contend that the most promising alternative view of the self is revisionary: the self is to be identified with the cognitive system as a whole, the relatively integrated collection of mechanisms that produces intelligent behavior (Rupert 2009, 2010, 2019). The cognitive system teems with reliable, though not necessarily perfect, indicators (cf. Dretske 1988) of its own properties or of the properties of its proper parts, many of which are available for detection by, or the control of, further processes, such as motor control. I argue that indicating states should be treated as potential vehicles of self-knowledge, regardless of whether they are truth-evaluable states, such as beliefs. The investigation of self and self-knowledge frames discussion of a final topic, of some gravity: the way in which self-knowledge might contribute to self-improvement. In this regard, I emphasize the efficacy of certain forms of alignment between, on the one hand, elements of the cognitive system corresponding to a more commonsense-based conception of the self and, on the other hand, processes associated with what is frequently referred to as ‘implicit’ cognitive processing (Evans and Frankish 2009). (shrink)

The manuscript “Self-knowledge, self-consciousness and objectification” is the text of Sesemann’s manuscript collection, Vilnius University (F122-102). The manuscript in the notebook dates from the third quarter of 1954 (Krasnokamsk). The notes were made in ink, some in pencil. The text was written during Sesemann's stay in a labor camp in Taishet (Irkutsk region) in 1950-1955. Due to the limited volume of publications in the journal, only part of Sesemann's text is given.

This dissertation is a collection of three papers – “Knowing Oneself for Others,” “Stereotype Threat and the Value of Self-Knowledge,” and “Self-Knowledge, Epistemic Work, and Injustice” – in which I address the connections between self-knowledge production and social inequality. I explain, using a variety of contemporary political and cultural examples, that marginalized individuals are more likely to be required to know certain things about themselves than socially privileged individuals, especially about those aspects of their (...) lives and identities which are essential to their being marginalized. I argue that this should make us rethink our basic understanding of epistemic injustice, which is typically thought of as involving the prevention of marginalized individuals from producing knowledge. More specifically, in “Knowing Oneself for Others,” I introduce the notion of “compulsory self-disclosure,” a social phenomenon in which an individual is forced to reveal things about themselves, often in ways that further contribute to their oppression. “Stereotype Threat and the Value of Self-Knowledge” addresses how self-ignorance can actually be desirable for individuals facing stereotype threat, and I argue that treating stereotype threat as an epistemic injustice issue can actually harm rather than help individuals in certain cases. Finally, in “Self-Knowledge, Epistemic Work, and Injustice,” I assess the reasoning behind the assumption that marginalized people are self-ignorant; I argue that we need to appreciate the central role that epistemic work plays in self-knowledge production to understand why the standard assumption about marginalized self-ignorance is misguided. Ultimately, I would have us think of self-knowledge production as not just epistemic work but as work that is often emotionally difficult and even metaphysically transformative – coming to have self-knowledge in certain ways can quite literally change who you are. In light of this, the overarching aim of this work is to argue for there being an inextricable link between an individual’s knowledge of themselves and their social status, as well as to discourage readers from thinking of the production of self-knowledge as inherently desirable or as a wholly epistemic issue. (shrink)

It has been claimed that we need singular self-knowledge to function properly as rational agents. I argue that this is not strictly true: agents in certain relations could dispense with singular self-knowledge and instead rely on plural self-knowledge. In defending the possibility of this kind of ‘selfless agent’, I thereby defend the possibility of a certain kind of ‘seamless’ collective agency; agency in a group of agents who have no singular self-knowledge, (...) who do not know which member of the group they are. I discuss four specific functions for which singular self-knowledge has been thought indispensable: distinguishing intentional from unintentional actions, connecting non-indexical knowledge with action, reflecting on our own reasoning, and identifying which ultimate practical reasons we have. I argue in each case that by establishing certain relations between agents – relations I label ‘motor vulnerability’, ‘cognitive vulnerability’, ‘evidential unity’ and ‘moral unity’ – we would allow those agents to do everything a rational agent needs to do while relying only on plural, rather than singular, self-knowledge. Finally, I consider the objection that any agents who met the conditions I lay out for selfless agency would thereby cease to qualify as distinct agents, merging into a single agent without agential parts. Against this objection, I argue that we should recognise the possibility of simultaneous agency in whole and parts, and not regard either as disqualifying the other. (shrink)

A review of 'The Self and Self-Knowledge', by Annalisa Coliva. Annalisa Coliva’s collection on self-knowledge brings together papers presented originally at two conferences, the first held in Bigorio, Switzerland in 2004 and the second at the Institute of Philosophy in London in 2008. The collection is divided into three sections. Part One addresses the nature and individuation of the self, with contributions from Carol Rovane, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Christopher Peacocke, and John Campbell. Part Two comprises (...) papers from Jane Heal, Conor McHugh and Lucy O’Brien, as well as a brief response from Peacocke to Heal and O’Brien, and focuses on explanation of our warrant in self-ascribing conscious mental states and actions. (shrink)

Knowing the content of art -- Consciousness, exemplars, and art -- Aesthetic theory, feminist art ,and autonomy -- Value, expression, and globalization -- Artistic creation, freedom, and self -- Aesthetics, death, and beauty -- Aesthetic experience, intentionality, and the form of representation -- Theories of art, and art as theory of the world -- Self-trust, disagreement, and reasonable acceptance -- Social reason, aggregation, and collective wisdom -- Knowledge, autonomy, and art in loop theory.

This collection contains twenty-one selections on various issues central to the problem of externalism and privileged self-knowledge. The problem these papers address is best characterized as follows. Externalism is the doctrine that the individuation of mental content depends in part on physical or social factors. While this position is extremely plausible, it unfortunately appears to undermine the equally plausible view that individuals have some kind of privileged access to their own mental states. After all, if mental content is (...) determined in part by social or physical factors, then self-knowledge appears to require knowledge of these very external factors, and this knowledge is presumably not privileged. Seminal attempts to reconcile externalism and self-knowledge by Donald Davidson and Tyler Burge in the 1980s led to a profusion of literature on this problem, and this volume is a useful guide to the major moves in the debate up to 1998. (shrink)

This book collects eighteen papers in philosophy of religion by Linda Zagzebski, spanning thirty-five years of her work. The papers are divided into eight topical categories: (1) foreknowledge and fatalism, (2) the problem of evil, (3) death, hell, and resurrection, (4) God and morality, (5) omnisubjectivity, (6) the rationality of religious belief, (7) rational religious belief, self-trust, and authority, and (8) God, Trinity, and the metaphysics of modality. All papers have been at least lightly revised. The introduction relates the (...) papers to the main themes of Zagzebski's books in philosophy of religion and epistemology. (shrink)

The knowledge and skills of employees could play a valuable role in organizational success. Organizations seek practices to create a knowledge-sharing culture to take full advantage of individual competencies. However, the knowledge-hiding behavior of individuals is a hurdle in the internal dissemination of knowledge and expertise. It becomes more critical in the case of teaching institutions, where the students are taught and trained. Scholars are now putting their efforts into seeking the antecedents and consequences of (...) class='Hi'>knowledge-hiding behavior. This study also attempts to determine the role of interpersonal distrust as an antecedent of knowledge hiding behavior of music education students. Based on the social exchange theory, the present study attempts to check the association of interpersonal distrust with emotional exhaustion and knowledge hiding. For empirical investigation, this study assumes that interpersonal distrust positively enhances knowledge hiding and emotional exhaustion, respectively. Moreover, the present study also attempts to check the association of emotional exhaustion with knowledge hiding. This study also assessed the mediating role of emotional exhaustion in the relationship between interpersonal distrust and knowledge hiding. This current study also aims to check the moderating role of mental health self-efficacy in the relationship between emotional exhaustion and knowledge hiding. For empirical investigation, the present study collected the data from 310 music learning students of various Chinese universities through a structured questionnaire method using a convenient sampling technique. This study applied partial least square structural equation modeling for empirical analyses using Smart PLS software. The findings of this study revealed that interpersonal distrust does not directly influence knowledge hiding; however, interpersonal distrust has a positive association with emotional exhaustion. The findings also acknowledged that emotional exhaustion positively correlates with knowledge hiding. The results also confirmed that emotional exhaustion positively mediates the relationship between interpersonal distrust and knowledge hiding. Further, the outcomes depicted that mental health self-efficacy negatively moderates the relationship between emotional exhaustion and knowledge hiding. In addition, this study’s findings also serve the literature of knowledge hiding by providing important theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

Introduction: Globally, vitamin D deficiency is one of the most common deficiencies, affecting nearly half the world's population. The objective of this survey was to assess and compare the knowledge about vitamin D and the perceived state of health in Emirati and international tourist female students in Dubai, UAE. Methods: This is a cross-sectional study that took place in universities in Dubai, UAE. This survey consisted of 17 multiple choice questions. The first part of the survey assessed levels of (...) supplementation, diet and UV exposure. Another section evaluated the participants’ self-assessed state of health regarding vitamin D testing, symptoms related to vitamin D deficiency and general welbeing. The collected data were statistically analyzed using SPSS statistics for windows version 26.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). Statistical significance was set at P<0.05. Results: 105 respondents were Emiratis and 65 were international students. The average age was 21, with an average BMI 23.3. Almost one-third of each group reported using Vitamin D supplements once weekly. The majority of both groups reported rarely getting tanned. Almost all participants reported regular consumption of Vitamin-D rich foods. In both groups, more than half reported consuming milk and cheese regularly and up to one-third reported consuming fish in a regular manner. Although more than half of the students rated their health as good; more than two-thirds reported experiencing muscle pain; only half reported having their blood Vitamin D levels measured once; half reported experiencing problems with concentration and more than three-quarters reported experiencing bad mood in the past month. The prevalence of these symptoms was almost similar across different categories of vitamin D supplementation, tanning habits, dietary intake, or nationality. No statistically significant differences were noted between the 2 groups. Conclusion: more Emirati students were aware of the association between vitamin D and osteoporosis than International tourist students (40% vs. 21.9%, respectively; p<0.05). On the other hand, both groups had lower knowledge about the relationship between vitamin D deficiency and depression, Rheumatoid Arthritis and Hypertension, and the optimal vitamin D level; however, no statistically significant differences were noted regarding this knowledge of Emiratis and international students. (shrink)

This collection of John Mackie's papers on topics in epistemology, some of which have not previously been published, deal with such issues as: incorrigible empirical statements; rationalism and empiricism; the philosophy of John Anderson; self-refutation; Plato's theory of idea; ideological explanation; problems of intentionality; Popper's third world;; mind, brain, and causation; Newcomb's Paradox and the direction of causation; induction; causation in concept, knowledge, and reality; absolutism; Locke and representative perception; and anti-realisms.

The spontaneous organization of collective activities in animal groups and societies has attracted a considerable amount of attention over the last decade. This kind of coordination often permits group‐living species to achieve collective tasks that are far beyond single individuals' capabilities. In particular, a key benefit lies in the integration of partial knowledge of the environment at the collective level. In this contribution, we discuss various self‐organization phenomena in animal swarms and human crowds from the (...) point of view of information exchange among individuals. In particular, we provide a general description of collective dynamics across species and introduce a classification of these dynamics not only with respect to the way information is transferred among individuals but also with regard to the knowledge processing at the collective level. Finally, we highlight the fact that the individual’s ability to learn from past experiences can have a feedback effect on the collective dynamics, as experienced with the development of behavioral conventions in pedestrian crowds. (shrink)

This volume brings together Nussbaum's published papers on the relationship between literature and philosophy, especially moral philosophy. The papers, many of them previously inaccessible to non-specialist readers, explore such fundamental issues as the relationship between style and content in the exploration of ethical issues; the nature of ethical attention and ethical knowledge and their relationship to written forms and styles; and the role of the emotions in deliberation and self-knowledge. Nussbaum investigates and defends a conception of ethical (...) understanding which involves emotional as well as intellectual activity, and which gives a certain type of priority to the perception of particular people and situations rather than to abstract rules. She argues that this ethical conception cannot be completely and appropriately stated without turning to forms of writing usually considered literary rather than philosophical. It is consequently necessary to broaden our conception of moral philosophy in order to include these forms. Featuring two new essays and revised versions of several previously published essays, this collection attempts to articulate the relationship, within such a broader ethical inquiry, between literary and more abstractly theoretical elements. (shrink)

'I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.' These famous words of David Hume, on his inability to perceive the self, set the stage for JeeLoo Liu and John Perry's collection of essays on self-awareness and self-knowledge. This volume connects recent scientific studies on consciousness with the traditional issues about the self explored by Descartes, Locke and Hume. Experts in the field offer contrasting (...) perspectives on matters such as the relation between consciousness and self-awareness, the notion of personhood and the epistemic access to one's own thoughts, desires or attitudes. The volume will be of interest to philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists and others working on the central topics of consciousness and the self. (shrink)

Virtually every aspect of the current philosophical discussion of self-deception is a matter of controversy including its definition and paradigmatic cases. We may say generally, however, that self-deception is the acquisition and maintenance of a belief (or, at least, the avowal of that belief) in the face of strong evidence to the contrary motivated by desires or emotions favoring the acquisition and retention of that belief. Beyond this, philosophers divide over whether this action is intentional or not, whether (...) self-deceivers recognize the belief being acquired is unwarranted on the available evidence, whether self-deceivers are morally responsible for their self-deception, and whether self-deception is morally problematic (and if it is in what ways and under what circumstances). The discussion of self-deception and its associated puzzles gives us insight into the ways in which motivation affects belief acquisition and retention. And yet insofar as self-deception represents an obstacle to self-knowledge, which has potentially serious moral implications, self-deception is more than an interesting philosophical puzzle. It is a problem of particular concern for moral development, since self-deception can make us strangers to ourselves and blind to our own moral failings. (shrink)

PurposeSelf-efficacy has been argued theoretically and shown empirically to be an essential construct for students’ improved learning outcomes. However, there is a dearth of studies on its causal effects on performance in mathematics among university students. Meanwhile, it will be erroneous to assume that results from other fields of studies generalize to mathematics learning due to the task-specificity of the construct. As such, attempts are made in the present study to provide evidence for a causal relationship between self-efficacy and (...) performance with a focus on engineering students following a mathematics course at a Norwegian university.MethodThe adopted research design in the present study is a survey type in which collected data from first-year university students are analyzed using structural equation modeling with weighted least square mean and variance adjusted estimator. Data were generated using mainly questionnaires, a test of prior mathematics knowledge, and the students’ final examination scores in the course. The causal effect of self-efficacy was discerned from disturbance effects on performance by using an innovative instrumental variable approach to structural equation modeling.ResultsThe findings confirmed a significant direct effect of the prior mathematics knowledge test on self-efficacy, a significant direct effect of self-efficacy on performance, and a substantial mediating effect of self-efficacy between a prior mathematics knowledge test and performance. Prior mathematics knowledge and self-efficacy explained 30% variance of the performance. These findings are interpreted to be substantial evidence for the causal effect of self-efficacy on students’ performance in an introductory mathematics course.ConclusionThe findings of the present study provide empirically supports for designing self-efficacy interventions as proxies to improve students’ performance in university mathematics. Further, the findings of the present study confirm some postulates of Bandura’s agentic social cognitive theory. (shrink)

Knowledge sharing is the major driving force to maintain enterprises’ competitiveness. This study extends the current knowledge-sharing research by considering knowledge sharing as comprising four types: automatic response, rational reflection, ridiculed reflection, and deprived reflection, based on Kahneman’s types of system thinking. Drawing on the motivation-action-outcome model, this study explored how individuals’ intrinsic motivation can guide the action of knowledge sharing and reflect the outcome of creative self-efficacy in intelligent transportation jobs. By snowball sampling in (...) intelligent transportation companies, a total of 232 effective questionnaires were collected, and confirmatory factor analysis with structural equation modeling was performed. The research results showed that: intrinsic motivation was positively related to the four types of knowledge sharing tendencies; automatic response was not significantly related to creative self-efficacy; rational reflection was positively associated with creative self-efficacy; but ridiculed and deprived reflection were negatively related to creative self-efficacy. These results can be applied to encourage employees to practice rational reflection in knowledge sharing to enhance their creative self-efficacy in intelligent transportation jobs. (shrink)

In this paper I want to introduce and defend what I call the "subject mode account" of collective intentionality. I propose to understand collectives from joint attention dyads over small informal groups of various types to organizations, institutions and political entities such as nation states, in terms of their self-awareness. On the subject mode account, the self-consciousness of such collectives is constitutive for their being. More precisely, their self-representation as subjects of joint theoretical and practical positions (...) towards the world – rather than as objects of such positions – makes them what they are. Members of such collectives represent each other as co-subjects of such positions and thus represent the world from the point of view of the collective. (shrink)

The paper evaluates Christopher Hookway's claim that individual epistemic vice can enhance the value of collective epistemic virtue. I suggest that this claim can be defended on the grounds of a dynamic account of collective intentional properties that is supplemented by an account of a spontaneous ordering mechanism such as the "intangible hand". Both these accounts try to explain how individual traits integrate into collective traits by way of aggregation. In this respect, they are different from normative (...) and summative accounts of plural subjects. I argue that it is the repeatable and self-amplifying nature of character traits that calls for a dynamic account of collective virtues. With regard to epistemic virtues and their role in the acquisition of knowledge I hold that their dynamic and self-amplifying character warrants their reliability, since it is this character that bottoms out in repeated acts of epistemally correct behavior that constitute a 'responsible practice'. The successful appliance of the latter amplifies the attitude it origins from. If epistemic virtues construed along these lines are attributed to collectives, a dynamic aggregate account supplemented by an account of an "intan-gible hand" device might explain how an aggregate of virtuous efforts of individuals can not only absorb a certain amount of vice but be even enhanced by the 'spice' of some non-intentional epistemically vicious side effects of epistemically virtuous en- deavor. (shrink)

Based on a qualitative study about expert musicianship, this paper distinguishes three ways of interacting by putting them in relation to the sense of agency. Following Pacherie, it highlights that the phenomenology of shared agency undergoes a drastic transformation when musicians establish a sense of we-agency. In particular, the musicians conceive of the performance as one single action towards which they experience an epistemic privileged access. The implications of these results for a theory of collective intentionality are discussed by (...) addressing two general questions: When several individuals share an intention, does this fact secure plural self-knowledge? And is it possible to have non-observational knowledge about a collective action? It is claimed that the results drawn from the study about expert musicianship supports negative answers to both questions. (shrink)

This volume brings together Nussbaum's published papers on the relationship between literature and philosophy, especially moral philosophy. The papers, many of them previously inaccessible to non-specialist readers, deal with such fundamental issues as the relationship between style and content in the exploration of ethical issues; the nature of ethical attention and ethical knowledge and their relationship to written forms and styles; and the role of the emotions in deliberation and self-knowledge. Nussbaum investigates and defends a conception of (...) ethical understanding which involves emotional as well as intellectual activity, and which gives a certain type of priority to the perception of particular people and situations rather than to abstract rules. She argues that this ethical conception cannot be completely and appropriately stated without turning to forms of writing usually considered literary rather than philosophical. It is consequently necessary to broaden our conception of moral philosophy in order to include these forms. Featuring two new essays and revised versions of several previously published essays, this collection attempts to articulate the relationship, within such a broader ethical inquiry, between literary and more abstractly theoretical elements. (shrink)

This is a collection of twenty-four articles evenly divided among five topical areas: skepticism, sensory perception, memory, self-knowledge, and the foundations of empirical knowledge. With the exception of an article by Meinong, all the selections belong to the twentieth century and, except for four other articles, to the past thirty years. The selections in each of the five parts compliment one another in content and are arranged chronologically. For example, the section entitled "Contemporary Skepticism" begins with Leonard (...) Nelson’s "The Impossibility of the ‘Theory of Knowledge'," moves into Moore’s early criticism and Lehrer’s recent defense of skepticism, examines Quine’s attempt to convert epistemology into psychology, and concludes with Rozeboom’s "Why I Know So Much More Than You Do." A similar format is followed in each of the other four sections. Many of the selections have never before appeared in an anthology. For example, the valuable Reichenbach-Goodman-Lewis 1952 debate on phenomenalism and the foundations of knowledge appears in its entirety. (shrink)

Collection of papers presented at the 2nd and 3rd Budapest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy.

In today’s America the persistence of crushing poverty in the midst of staggering affluence no longer incites the righteous jeremiads it once did. Resigned acceptance of this paradox is fueled by a sense that poverty lies beyond the moral and technical scope of government remediation. The failure of experts to reach agreement on the causes of poverty merely exacerbates our despair. Are the causes internal to the poor – reflecting their more or less voluntary choices? Or do they emanate from (...) structures beyond their control? If both of these explanations are true, poverty experts will need to shift their focus to a hitherto under-theorized concept: coercion. I defend this claim by appealing to distinct areas of philosophical inquiry: social epistemology and moral theory. Poverty knowledge is directly related to both of these inquiries. The aim of poverty knowledge is clearly moral: to reduce suffering and to empower the weak. While the former aim is grounded in utilitarian thinking, the latter aim is grounded in the social contractarian insight that poverty is unjustly coercive, imposing excessive limits on the opportunities and choices of the poor that render them vulnerable to domination by others. Equally obvious is the social nature of poverty knowledge. All knowledge depends on the reliable testimony of others. Poverty knowledge not only ostensibly offers us the most reliable, scientific beliefs about the causes and effects of poverty, thereby determining how we morally judge the poor and their poverty, but it reciprocally bases its understanding of poverty on what the poor themselves have to say about it. What unites both social epistemology and moral theory – at least the social contract variants I will be examining here – is concern about the limits and possibilities of rational choice. As poverty knowledge came of age in the fifties and sixties, it absorbed the language of rational choice prevalent in economics, especially the Keynesian economics whose moral underpinnings can be found in Rawlsian social contract theory. Echoing a different economic theory supported by a different, more libertarian, brand of social contract theory, poverty expertise in the eighties continued to use an abstract model of rational choice. I submit that, in both early and later epochs of poverty expertise, reliance on rational choice reasoning prevented poverty experts from appreciating the coercive impact of poverty on the poor. Social epistemology explains this failure by demonstrating the poverty of rational choice thinking and its mistaken reliance on inflated commonsense expectations about the capacity of individuals to calculate their long-term interests, free from the distortions of social bias. Social epistemology not only exhibits the dangers of not relying on expert testimony, but it also exhibits the dangers of relying on an unreliable source of expert testimony that has removed itself from its human subject matter. In order for poverty experts to become more reliable educators about poverty’s coercive impact on the poor they must return to their discipline’s social epistemological roots. Only a more descriptive and explanatory sociology can narrate a comprehensive story about how the lived experience of poverty relates to the larger social system. The social contractarian model best suited to underwriting this kind of poverty knowledge, I submit, is the discourse theoretic model that has been championed by Jürgen Habermas. When applied as a pedagogical method of dialog and not as a social contractarian model of rational normative consent, discourse theory highlights the unique epistemological advantages of empathetic understanding that are so essential to dispelling stereotypes about the poor. Dispelling these stereotypes is the first step toward respecting the poor as free agents who are nonetheless forced to make suboptimal choices. My defense of these claims proceeds as follows: Part One argues that poverty expertise rightly deserves the opprobrium critics have heaped on it. The charge – leveled by progressives and conservatives alike - that such expertise is ideological is true to the extent that poverty knowledge has all-too-easily accommodated the political aims of the agency that has funded it: the federal government. The shift from the war on poverty to the war on the poor – and the resulting shift from blaming poverty on economic structures to blaming it on the culture of poverty – would not have been possible without an increased emphasis on data gathering aimed at measuring poverty rather than describing it. Part Two assesses the consequences of turning away from qualitative research to statistical analysis: the coercive nature of poverty becomes invisible beneath the surface of aggregate individual choices. The failure to grasp how voluntary choices, ostensibly based on rational, self-interested calculations, can be coerced by social structures - and thereby lead to sub-optimizing behavior – invites the conclusion that the poor have only themselves to blame for their misery. Part Three suggests that this pathologization of the poor directly controverts the major aim of poverty research: to empower the poor as free and equal parties to the social contract. I argue that the different varieties of social contract theory that have justified poverty expertise over the last forty years – the welfarist model pioneered by Rawls and the market-based model defended by Nozick – embrace the same rational choice models favored by poverty experts and so conspire with the latter in neglecting important dimensions of poverty-related coercion. While the welfarist model conceals the coercive nature of bureaucratically administered entitlement programs and top-down urban renewal policies, the market-based model conceals the coercive nature of economic class structures. The discourse-theoretic alternative proposed by Habermas endorses a populist, democratic response to the overly abstract rational choice assumptions embedded in these other models. Despite this advance over its counterparts, the chief advantage of discourse theory for poverty knowledge, I submit, resides less in its proposed procedure of rational collective choice than in its heuristic as a dialogical method of social learning. I demonstrate this claim in Part Four, where I turn to the social epistemological insights of Allen Buchanan. Social epistemology offers a much needed corrective to theories of knowledge that rely on the reasoning capacities of isolated individuals. By stressing the connection between moral response and social belief, on one hand, and the dependence of social belief on epistemic authorities, on the other, social epistemologists suggest ways in which we can learn to distinguish reliable from unreliable authorities and become aware of our own error-prone cognitive proclivities. Their insights need to be supplemented by moral epistemologists who stress the affective dimension of knowledge, above all, the role that empathy plays in understanding the plight of others. Drawing from victim narratives, Diana Meyers shows that switching between first-person experiences of one's own and third-person reconstructions of others' experiences is essential to appreciating the gravity of human rights violations and the seriousness of human rights claims. It goes without saying that such empathy is just as essential to understanding the plight of the poor. Meyers mainly has in mind empathetic understanding that has been facilitated by third-person observation and literary encounter, but the importance of visceral and corporeal representation suggests that face-to-face dialog may sometimes be a more effective way to facilitate empathetic understanding. (shrink)

Neuroadaptive technology (NAT) is a closed-loop neurotechnology designed to enhance human–computer interaction. NAT works by collecting neurophysiological data, which are analysed via autonomous algorithms to create actions and adaptations at the user interface. This paper concerns how interaction with NAT can mediate self-related processing (SRP), such as self-awareness, self-knowledge, and agency. We begin with a postphenomenological analysis of the NAT closed loop to highlight the built-in selectivities of machine hermeneutics, i.e., autonomous chains of algorithms that convert (...) data into an assessment of psychological states/intentions. We argue that these algorithms produce an assessment of lived experience that is quantitative, reductive, and highly simplistic. This reductive assessment of lived experience is presented to the user via feedback at the NAT interface and subsequently mediates SRP. It is argued that congruence between system feedback and SRP determines the precise character of the alterity relation between human user and system. If feedback confirms SRP, the technology is regarded as a quasi-self. If there is a disagreement between SRP and feedback from the system, NAT is perceived to be a quasi-other. We argue that the design of the user interface shapes the precise ways in which NAT can mediate SRP. (shrink)

Green entrepreneurial self-efficacy refers to individuals’ conviction that they can contribute to solving environmental issues and shows self-assurance in their efforts to protect the environment. The present investigation attempts to determine the role of employees’ green ESE in the green innovation of SMEs. It is also proposed that GI positively impacts organizational environmental, economic, and social performance. This study also evaluates the mediating role of GI and moderating role of the green knowledge-sharing culture. This study tested the (...) hypothesis using a partial least squares structural equation modeling by applying smart PLS software. A total of 289 employees from SMEs in China were targeted for data collection. The results confirmed that green ESE positively impacts GI. Additionally, the findings verified that GI positively enhances firms’ environmental, economic, and social performance. The results validate the mediating role of GI. The moderating results revealed that green knowledge-sharing culture does not play a moderating role in proposed relationships. This study serves the existing body of literature by providing empirical evidence on the significance of green ESE. The study outcomes highlighted the bridging role of employees’ green ESE for firms’ GI. The results also offer companies a road map for how staff members’ green ESE might help the businesses to improve their performance in terms of the environment, economy, and society. (shrink)

The authors in this collection pursue a number of questions concerning self-consciousness, self and consciousness. Although the essays range rather broadly, there is a good deal of unity. In her introduction Liu organises the chapters under three headings: the Humean denial of self-awareness, the issue of self-knowledge, and the nature of persons or selves. This is helpful although it is worth bearing in mind that some chapters fall under more than one heading (for example, Shoemaker) (...) and some don't fall neatly under any (for example, O'Brien). (shrink)

This book offers a unified collection of published and unpublished papers by Robert Audi, a renowned defender of the rationalist position in ethics. Taken together, the essays present a vigorous, broadly-based argument in moral epistemology and a related account of reasons for action and their bearing on moral justification and moral character. Part I details Audi's compelling moral epistemology while Part II offers a unique vision of ethical concepts and an account of moral explanation, as well as a powerful model (...) of moral realism. Part III extends this account of moral explanation to moral responsibility for both actions and character and to the relation between virtue and the actions that express it. Part IV elaborates a theory of reasons for action that locates them in relation to three of their traditionally major sources: desire, moral judgment, and value. Clear and illuminating, Audi's introduction outlines and interconnects the self-contained but cumulatively arranged essays. It also places them in relation to classical and contemporary literature, and directs readers to large segments of thematically connected material spread throughout the book. Audi ends with a powerfully synthetic final essay. (shrink)

This is collection of four philosophical texts written exclusively by women. It contemplates in chronological order The Dialogue by Catherine of Siena, The Interior Castle by Teresa of Avila, An Essay in Defence of the Female Sex by Judith Drake, and An Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion by Susanna Newcome. As such, the collection includes works in value theory, practical reason, theology, metaphysics, and epistemology. It encompasses eminently philosophical topics such as self-knowledge, prudence vs. morality, (...) the pursuit of perfection, the cosmological argument, Cartesianism, the psychology of religious experience, reason vs. faith, and an array of topics in Early Modern feminism. (shrink)

This volume brings historians of science and social historians together to consider the role of "little tools"--such as tables, reports, questionnaires, dossiers, index cards--in establishing academic and bureaucratic claims to authority and objectivity. From at least the eighteenth century onward, our science and society have been planned, surveyed, examined, and judged according to particular techniques of collecting and storing knowledge. Recently, the seemingly self-evident nature of these mundane epistemic and administrative tools, as well as the prose in which (...) they are cast, has demanded historical examination. The essays gathered here, arranged in chronological order by subject from the late seventeenth to the late twentieth century, involve close readings of primary texts and analyses of academic and bureaucratic practices as parts of material culture. The first few essays, on the early modern period, largely point to the existence of a "juridico-theological" framework for establishing authority. Later essays demonstrate the eclipse of the role of authority per se in the modern period and the emergence of the notion of "objectivity." Most of the essays here concern the German cultural space as among the best exemplars of the academic and bureaucratic practices described above. The introduction to the volume, however, is framed at a general level the closing essays also extend the analyses beyond Germany to broader considerations on authority and objectivity in historical practice. The volume will interest scholars of European history and German studies as well as historians of science. Peter Becker is Professor of Central European History, European University Institute. William Clark is Lecturer in History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University. (shrink)

Sebastian Rödl's Self-Consciousness and Objectivity is one of the most original and thought-provoking books in philosophy of mind for the last several years. An ambitious defence of absolute idealism, Rödl rejects the idea that reality is simply something given, and instead advances the position that all reality is accessible to thought because reality is already included in judgment. In this outstanding collection, a roster of international contributors critically examine the significance of Rödl's arguments and take the themes of his (...) book in new directions. The volume concludes with an extensive response by Sebastian Rödl to his critics, making it essential reading for those interested in contemporary debates in analytic philosophy, philosophy of mind and philosophical idealism. (shrink)

Reviews the books, Philosophical papers, volume I: Human agency and language by Charles Taylor and Philosophical papers, volume II: Philosophy and the human sciences by Charles Taylor. Professor Taylor of McGill University is one of a number of thinkers who are attempting the difficult and important task of taking the social sciences "beyond objectivism and relativism." One of the foremost philosophers of his generation, Taylor has long devoted himself to study of the foundations of the social sciences, especially psychology and (...) political science. Now the Cambridge University Press has issued, in a two-volume set, a selection of Taylor's essays written over the last twenty years. The essays cover a wide variety of topics. Some are focussed critiques—of mainstream cognitive psychology, of Piagetian developmental psychology, and of Michel Foucault's social studies of knowledge and power, for example. Others are historical studies which trace the development of theories of language and meaning from the Renaissance to the present day. Several essays discuss the nature of the self, and seek to show the incoherence of positions which fail to take into account the human capacity for self-consciousness, choice and responsibility. "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," perhaps the best-known essay in the collection, is a closely argued demonstration of the irreducability of human meanings and the consequent necessity for a "hermeneutic" social science. Despite their historical range and disciplinary breadth, not to mention their casual familiarity with the Anglo-Saxon, French and German philosophical traditions, Taylor's essays form an organic, if sprawling whole. No psychologist interested in the epistemological foundations of his science should neglect these stimulating and cogent articles. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Value Co-Creation plays a major role in engaging knowledgeable individuals in a community via innovation, problem solving, and new service/product development. This study investigates the personal factors that influence individuals’ engagement in value co-creation in Higher Education Institutions through the use of online platforms. Some higher education institutions have successfully established or used appropriate online platforms, such as online forums, web applications, and mobile applications to engage their community in ideation or crowdsourcing as a part of the value co-creation process. (...) On the other hand, some HEIs have failed to engage their community in value co-creation activities, and even if they managed to engage some individuals in value co-creation once, they failed to sustain these individuals’ engagement in value co-creation using online platforms. Using the Stimulus Organism Response framework, this study examines the relationship between relevant personal factors and other motivational factors that provide perceived benefits with value co-creation engagement. Data was collected from 308 respondents at five Malaysian research universities. The software analysis tool Smart PLS is used for data analysis and validation. The results demonstrate that personal factors and perceived benefits as a motivational factor has a significant effect on individual engagement in value co-creation. However, the significance of these findings varies from one individual to another. The implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

Introspection stands at the interface between two major currents in philosophy and related areas of science: on the one hand, there are metaphysical and scientific questions about the nature of consciousness; and on the other hand, there are normative and epistemological questions about the nature of self-knowledge. Introspection seems tied up with consciousness, to the point that some writers define consciousness in terms of introspection; and it is also tied up with self-knowledge, since introspection is the (...) distinctive way in which we come to know about ourselves and, in particular, about our own conscious mental states, processes and events. Each of these topics – consciousness and self-knowledge – has generated an extensive philosophical literature in its own right. But despite some notable exceptions, the relationship between consciousness and self-knowledge has been curiously neglected and remains poorly understood. Indeed, until quite recently, the sub-fields of philosophy of mind and epistemology were pursued largely in isolation from one another. Recent philosophy of mind has been dominated by metaphysical questions about the nature of consciousness and its place in the physical world, while much less attention has been devoted to questions about the epistemic role of consciousness as a source of knowledge and justified belief. Similarly, recent epistemology has been organized around questions about the nature of knowledge and justified belief, but much of this discussion has developed independently of recent work in philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. The impetus behind this volume is to bring together these two lines of research by exploring the nature of introspection, which lies at the intersection between consciousness and self-knowledge. This volume collects fourteen new essays and one reprinted essay in which the interplay between concerns in epistemology and the philosophy of mind is a major focus. (shrink)

This collection of John Mackie's papers on topics in epistemology, some of which have not previously been published, deal with such issues as: incorrigible empirical statements; rationalism and empiricism; the philosophy of John Anderson; self-refutation; Plato's theory of idea; ideological explanation; problems of intentionality; Popper's third world;; mind, brain, and causation; Newcomb's Paradox and the direction of causation; induction; causation in concept, knowledge, and reality; absolutism; Locke and representative perception; and anti-realisms.