Wavefunction collapse models modify Schrödinger's equation so that it describes the rapid evolution of a superposition of macroscopically distinguishable states to one of them. This provides a phenomenological basis for a physical resolution to the so-called “measurement problem.” Such models have experimentally testable differences from standard quantum theory. The most well developed such model at present is the Continuous Spontaneous Localization (CSL) model in which a universal fluctuating classical field interacts with particles to cause collapse. One “side effect” (...) of this interaction is that the field imparts energy to the particles: experimental evidence on this has led to restrictions on the parameters of the model, suggesting that the coupling of the classical field to the particles must be mass-proportional. Another “side effect” is that the field imparts momentum to particles, causing a small blob of matter to undergo random walk. Here we explore this in order to supply predictions which could be experimentally tested. We examine the translational diffusion of a sphere and a disc, and the rotational diffusion of a disc, according to CSL. For example, we find that the rms distance an isolated 10−5 cm radius sphere diffuses is ≈(its diameter, 5 cm) in (20 sec, a day), and that a disc of radius 2 ⋅ 10−5 cm and thickness 0.5 ⋅ 10−5 cm diffuses through 2πrad in about 70 sec (this assumes the “standard” CSL parameter values). The comparable rms diffusions of standard quantum theory are smaller than these by a factor 10−3±1. It is shown that the CSL diffusion in air at STP is much reduced and, indeed, is swamped by the ordinary Brownian motion. It is also shown that the sphere's diffusion in a thermal radiation bath at room temperature is comparable to the CSL diffusion, but is utterly negligible at liquid He temperature. Thus, in order to observe CSL diffusion, the pressure and temperature must be low. At the low reported pressure of 5 ⋅ 10−17 Torr, achieved at 4.2°K, the mean time between air molecule collisions with the (sphere, disc) is ≈(80, 45)min. This is ample time for observation of the putative CSL diffusion with the standard parameters and, it is pointed out, with any parameters in the range over which the theory may be considered viable. This encourages consideration of how such an experiment may actually be performed, and the paper closes with some thoughts on this subject. (shrink)

Collapse models predict the spontaneous collapse of the wave function, in order to avoid the emergence of macroscopic superpositions. In their mass-dependent formulation, they claim that the collapse of any system’s wave function depends on its mass. Neutral K, D, B mesons are oscillating systems that are given by Nature as superposition of two distinct mass eigenstates. Thus they are unique laboratory for testing collapse models that are sensitive to the mass. In this paper we derive—for (...) the single mesons and bipartite entangled mesons—the effect of the mass-proportional CSL (Continuous Spontaneous Localization) collapse model on the dynamics on neutral mesons. We compare the theoretical prediction with experimental data from different accelerator facilities. (shrink)

Two Experiments demonstrate the existence of a “collapse illusion”, in which reasoners evaluate Truthteller-type propositions (“I am telling the truth”) as if they were simply true, whereas Liar-type propositions (“I am lying”) tend to be evaluated as neither true nor false. The second Experiment also demonstrates an individual differences pattern, in which shallow reasoners are more susceptible to the illusion. The collapse illusion is congruent with philosophical semantic truth theories such as Kripke's (1975), and with hypothetical thinking theory's (...) principle of satisficing, but can only be partially accounted for by the model theory principle of truth. Pragmatic effects related to sentence cohesion further reinforce hypothetical thinking theory interpretation of the data, although the illusion and cohesion data could also be accounted for within a modified mental model theory. (shrink)

Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart explore the ability of complicated rules to generate simple behaviour in nature through 'the collapse of chaos'.

The most serious objection to Beall and Restall’s case-based logical pluralism is the so-called collapse argument. According to the collapse argument, logical pluralism is not genuinely pluralistic and collapses into a single privileged relation of logical consequence. In response, Caret offered an account of logical contextualism that supposedly maintains the merits of Beall and Restall’s case-based logical pluralism while circumventing the collapse argument. In this paper, I first point out a gap in the collapse argument in (...) that it does not affect pluralists who assume that there is no uniquely strongest admissible consequence relation. This gap, then, is closed by an improved version of the collapse argument, which makes use of Eklund’s classification of types of pluralism. Finally, I discuss how Caret’s logical contextualism cannot hold up against this new formulation of the collapse argument unless implausible assumptions about the contents of normative operators are made. Moreover, by reformulating the collapse argument, I determine the extent to which logical monism and pluralism oppose each other, paving the way for fruitful future discussion. (shrink)

The thesis that nature is composed of metaphysical levels is commonly understood in terms of emergence. In this paper, I uncover a problem for accounts of emergence, the collapse problem. The collapse problem suggests that emergence merely tracks relations between arbitrary groups of properties and so cannot be used in service of the levels view. I reject several failed attempts to solve the collapse problem and argue for an alternative solution according to which emergence is not a (...) distinction between metaphysical levels, but instead tracks the unavailability of scientific explanations. (shrink)

According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than (...) the original view. It is a major improvement that should be embraced by all logical pluralists. (shrink)

In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non-conventional comparative relations cannot exist. Broome's argument has faced a lot of scrutiny and a certain type of counterexample has been used to undermine it. Most of the counterexamples focus on the Collapsing Principle which plays a central role in Broome's argument. In this article we will take a closer look at the most common type of counterexample and propose how to adjust the Collapsing Principle in (...) order to avoid objections based on these counterexamples. We argue that a weaker version of the Collapsing Principle is not susceptible to the classical counterexamples. Furthermore, after an explorative discussion about the intuitions behind the original principle, we show that this weaker formulation is at least as intuitive as the principle suggested by Broome. (shrink)

One of the most pressing objections against Divine simplicity is that it entails what is commonly termed a ‘modal collapse’, wherein all contingency is eliminated and every true proposition is rendered necessarily true. In this paper, I show that a common form of this argument is in fact famously invalid and examine three ways in which the opponent of Divine simplicity might try to repair the argument. I conclude that there is no clear way of repairing the argument that (...) does not beg the question against the doctrine of Divine simplicity. (shrink)

I critically examine the claim that modal collapse arguments against the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) are in general fallacious. In a recent paper, Christopher Tomaszewski alleges that modal collapse arguments against DDS are invalid, owing to illicit substitutions of nonrigid singular terms into intensional contexts. I show that this is not, in general, the case. I show, further, that where existing modal collapse arguments are vulnerable to this charge the arguments can be repaired without any (...) apparent dialectical impropriety. I conclude that the genuine debate over modal collapse and divine simplicity and modal collapse is substantially a controversy over the metaphysics of divine action, and that this constitutes a fruitful direction in which to take future discussions of the subject. (shrink)

In this book, one of the world's preeminent philosophers takes issue with an idea that has found an all-too-prominent place in popular culture and philosophical ...

GRW theory offers precise laws for the collapse of the wave function. These collapses are characterized by two new constants, \ and \ . Recent work has put experimental upper bounds on the collapse rate, \ . Lower bounds on \ have been more controversial since GRW begins to take on a many-worlds character for small values of \ . Here I examine GRW in this odd region of parameter space where collapse events act as natural disasters (...) that destroy branches of the wave function along with their occupants. Our continued survival provides evidence that we don’t live in a universe like that. I offer a quantitative analysis of how such evidence can be used to assess versions of GRW with small collapse rates in an effort to move towards more principled and experimentally-informed lower bounds for \. (shrink)

Recently a number of works in meta-ontology have used a variant of J.H. Harris's collapse argument in the philosophy of logic as an argument against Eli Hirsch's quantifier variance. There have been several responses to the argument in the literature, but none of them have identified the central failing of the argument, viz., the argument has two readings: one on which it is sound but doesn't refute quantifier variance and another on which it is unsound. The central lesson I (...) draw is that arguments against quantifier variance must pay strict attention to issues of translation and interpretation. The paper also has a substantial appendix in which I prove the equivalence of plural mereological nihilism and standard first-order atomistic mereology; results of this kind are often appealed to in the literature on quantifier variance but without many details on the nature or proof of the result. (shrink)

Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt theory opens new perspectives for understanding animal extinction. The umwelt is interpreted here as a sum of structural correspondences between an animal’s subjective experience, ecosystem, physiology, and behaviour. The global environmental crisis disturbs these meaning-connections. From the umwelt perspective, we may describe extinction as umwelt collapse: The disintegration of an animal’s umwelt resulting from the cumulative errors in semiotic processes that mediate an organism and ecosystem. The loss of umwelt-ecosystem integration disturbs “ecological memory,” which provides (...) the ecosystem with adaptive modelling and self-design capacities. Making a distinction between core and mediated umwelts, and describing different types of umwelt collapse, are suitable methods for more detailed analysis. The concept of umwelt collapse enables the reinterpretation of extinction, from an internal perspective, as a semiotic breakdown. Such an approach may help us map scenarios of animal extinction, and may lead to successful compensation strategies in adapting to environmental change. (shrink)

We introduce the Easton collapse and show that the two-stage iteration of Easton collapses gives a model in which the successor of a regular cardinal carries a strongly saturated filter. This allows one to get a model in which many successor cardinals carry saturated filters just by iterating Easton collapses.

We examine the differences between three standard classes of forcing notions relative to the way they collapse the continuum. It turns out that proper and semi-proper posets behave differently in that respect from the class of posets that preserve stationary subsets of \.

In this article, we claim that recent developments in climate science and renewable energy should prompt a reframing of debates surrounding climate change mitigation. Taken together, we argue that these developments suggest (1) global climate collapse in this century is a non-negligible risk, (2) mitigation offers substantial benefits to current generations, and (3) mitigation by some can generate social tipping dynamics that could ultimately make renewables cheaper than fossil fuels. We explain how these claims undermine familiar framings of climate (...) change, wherein mitigation is understood as self-sacrifice that individuals and governments must be morally persuaded or incentivized to undertake. [Open access]. (shrink)

We show that arithmetical transfinite recursion is equivalent to a suitable formalization of the following: For every ordinal \alpha there exists an ordinal /beta such that 1 + \beta \cdot (\beta + \alpha) admits an almost order preserving collapse into \beta. Arithmetical comprehension is equivalent to a statement of the same form, with \beta \cdot \alpha at the place of \beta \cdot (\beta + \alpha). We will also characterise the principles that any set is contained in a countable coded (...) ω-model of arithmetical transfinite recursion and arithmetical comprehension, respectively. (shrink)

It is commonplace today to hear climate change identified as the single most important challenge facing humanity. Consider the headlines from COP24, the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Poland in December 2018. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres opened the proceedings by calling climate change “the most important issue we face” (PBS 2018). The Secretary-General’s remarks paraphrase the opening line of the U.N.’s climate change web page, which announces that “[c]limate Change is the defining issue of our time and we (...) are at a defining moment” (United Nations n.d.). Such statements about the singular significance of climate change—the most important, the defining issue—are often followed by proclamations about what hangs in the balance, and this was the case at COP24. There, the celebrated British naturalist Sir David Attenborough warned that “collapse of our civilizations and the extinction of much of the natural world is on the horizons,” amounting to, in his words, “disaster of global scale, our greatest threat in thousands of years” (PBS 2018). (shrink)

We define what it means for a function on ω1 to be a collapsing function for λ and show that if there exists a collapsing function for +, then there is no precipitous ideal on ω1. We show that a collapsing function for ω2 can be added by forcing. We define what it means to be a weakly ω1-Erdös cardinal and show that in L[E], there is a collapsing function for λ iff λ is less than the least weakly ω1-Erdös (...) cardinal. As a corollary to our results and a theorem of Neeman, the existence of a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals does not imply the existence of precipitous ideals on ω1. We also show that the following statements hold in L[E]. The least cardinal λ with the Chang property ↠ is equal to the least ω1-Erdös cardinal. In particular, if j is a generic elementary embedding that arises from non-stationary tower forcing up to a Woodin cardinal, then the minimum possible value of j is the least ω1-Erdös cardinal. (shrink)

This paper raises the question under what circumstances a plurality forms a set. My main point is that not always all things form sets. A provocative way of presenting my position is that, as a result of my approach, there are more pluralities than sets. Another way of presenting the same thesis claims that there are ways of talking about objects that do not always collapse into sets. My argument is related to expressive powers of formal languages. Assuming classical (...) logic, I show that if all plurality form a set and the quantifiers are absolutely general, then one gets a trivial theory. So, by reductio, one has to abandon one of the premiss. Then, I argue against the collapse of the pluralities into sets. What I am advocating is that the thesis of collapse limits important applications of the plural logic in model theory, when it is assumed that the quantifiers are absolutely general. (shrink)

In this paper we we will argue against the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement which has been implicitly grounded on several widespread presuppositions which have no relation whatsoever to the formalism of QM. We will show how these presuppositions have been introduced through a naive interpretation of the quantum mathematical structure which assumes dogmatically that the theory talks about "small particles" represented by pure states which suddenly "collapse" when a measurement takes place. In the second part of this paper (...) we will present a non-collapse approach to QM which makes no use whatsoever of particle metaphysics, escaping the need to make reference to space-time separability or the restriction to certain predictions of definite valued binary properties. Our paper ends up concluding the essential need to redefine the notion of quantum entanglement, at least in the cases of: i) non-collapse interpretations of QM; or, ii) any other interpretation which abandons the idea that QM makes reference to "small particles". (shrink)

중세 대학은 진리를 추구하려는 학문에 대한 사랑(amor scientiae) 이라는 소중한 가치를 지키기 위한 ‘교수와 학생의 공동체’였다. 이가치를 지키기 위해 다양한 방법을 동원했고, 필요에 따라서 교황과 왕이나 귀족을 자신의 보호자로 삼기도 했다. 이를 통해 발전했던 대학들은 중세 후기에 들어서면서 서서히 몰락해서 오랫동안심한 침체기를 겪었다. 중세 후기 대학이 이처럼 침체된 이유는 무엇인가? 이를 찾기 위해 본 논문에서는 우선 새로운 대학들이 유럽 전역에서 설립되었던 중세 후기에 일어난 대학 환경의 변화를살펴보았다.(1장) 이 시기에는 국가가 대학 설립을 주도했으며, 이를 통해 대학의 자율성이 크게 침해되었음을 확인했다. 중세 (...) 후기대학이 침체된 보다 구체적 이유로는 대학이 부여된 특권을 남용하고 평등의 원리를 배반했음을 밝혔다. 또한 보호자 역할을 하던교회가 통제자로 변함으로써 신학부의 역할은 축소되었다. 더욱이페스트를 비롯해서 사회에 위기가 닥쳤을 때, 이를 해결하기 위한전문성을 발휘하지 못하고 경직된 전통에만 매달렸던 대학은 다양한 비판에 직면했다. 더욱이 권력을 추구하던 대학은 오히려 학문의 자유를 빼앗기고 정치권력에 예속되고 말았다.(2장) 이렇게 몰락해 간 중세 후기 대학들을 바라보면서, 우리는 현대 대학의 위기를 극복하기 위한 교훈을 얻을 수 있다. 진정한 학문의 발전을 위해서는 대학이 지닌 자율성이 얼마나 소중한가를 자각해야 한다. 또한 대학의 교수와 학생은 자신이 보유한 지식이 단순히 이기심을 채우기 위해 사용해도 좋은 도구가 아니라 사회의 발전을 위한‘공공재’라는 책임감을 느껴야 한다. 특히 대학은 사회 전체를 위협하는 경향에 대한 비판적 성찰을 멈추어서는 안 된다.(3장) 미래에도 대학이 제 역할을 올바로 수행하기 위해서는 대학들이 극심한경쟁에 따른 폐쇄성을 극복해야 한다. 학문의 자유를 보장하기 위해서는 교수의 신분 보장이 이루어져야 할 뿐만 아니라 비전임 교수, 학생, 교직원들의 권리 침해도 중지되어야 한다. 또한 국가는 무분별한 대학 서열화를 지양하고 사회 발전에 필요한 학문들이 균형 있게 성장하고 재능 있는 대학생이 공부에 집중할 수 있도록 지원해야 한다. 중세 후기 대학의 몰락에 대한 성찰이 우리나라의대학 지원 정책을 근본적으로 되돌아보기 위한 계기를 마련해 주기를 기대한다. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the attempt to develop practice dependence as a middle path between cosmopolitanism and social liberalism ultimately fails. In particular, I contend that the only type of practice dependence that can coherently be defended collapses into cosmopolitanism. I trace the origin of practice dependence theory from Cohen and Sabel’s work through Sangiovanni and Valentini. After discussing the various different types of practice dependence, I argue that the only type of practice dependence that stands up to (...) scrutiny is functionalism, but that if functionalism is true, it commits us to cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

I discuss the interpretation of spontaneous collapse theories, with particular reference to Bell's suggestion that the stochastic jumps in the evolution of the wave function should be considered as local beables of the theory. I develop this analogy in some detail for the case of non-relativistic GRW-type theories, using a generalisation of Bell's notion of beables to POV measures. In the context of CSL-type theories, this strategy appears to fail, and I discuss instead Ghirardi and co-workers' mass-density interpretation and (...) its relation to Schrödinger's original charge-density interpretation. This discussion is extended to relativistic CSL-type theories. A few remarks on Everett's interpretation conclude the paper. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to bring clarity regarding the doctrine of quantifier variance (due to Eli Hirsch), and two prominent arguments against this doctrine, the collapse argument and the Eklund-Hawthorne argument. Different versions of the doctrine of quantifier variance are distinguished, and it is shown that the effectiveness of the arguments against it depends on what version of the doctrine is at issue. The metaontological significance of the different versions of the doctrine are also assessed. Roughly, quantifier (...) variance concerns there being different possible existential quantifier meanings, and often the doctrine involves a claim to the effect there is no unique “best” quantifier meaning. Much of the discussion in the paper concerns what it is to be an existential quantifier meaning in the sense at issue. (shrink)

I present and explain the Bohmian account of collapse in quantum mechanics.

Quantum mechanics, with its revolutionary implications, has posed innumerable problems to philosophers of science. In particular, it has suggested reconsidering basic concepts such as the existence of a world that is, at least to some extent, independent of the observer, the possibility of getting reliable and objective knowledge about it, and the possibility of taking (under appropriate circumstances) certain properties to be objectively possessed by physical systems. It has also raised many others questions which are well known to those involved (...) in the debate on the interpretation of this pillar of modern science. One can argue that most of the problems are not only due to the intrinsic revolutionary nature of the phenomena which have led to the development of the theory. They are also related to the fact that, in its standard formulation and interpretation, quantum mechanics is a theory which is excellent (in fact it has met with a success unprecedented in the history of science) in telling us everything about what we observe, but it meets with serious difficulties in telling us what is. We are making here specific reference to the central problem of the theory, usually referred to as the measurement problem, or, with a more appropriate term, as the macro-objectification problem. It is just one of the many attempts to overcome the difficulties posed by this problem that has led to the development of Collapse Theories, i.e., to the Dynamical Reduction Program (DRP). As we shall see, this approach consists in accepting that the dynamical equation of the standard theory should be modified by the addition of stochastic and nonlinear terms. The nice fact is that the resulting theory is capable, on the basis of a unique dynamics which is assumed to govern all natural processes, to account at the same time for all well-established.. (shrink)

This brief essay describes the significance of Hillary Putnam's "Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy" for Catholic thinkers who are inspired by Thomas Aquinas.

The First World War exerted a great influence on the course of twentieth-century history and transformed people’s perception of the world. The collapse of empires and the shipwreck of illusions found their reflection in various spheres of culture and art, including music. Scholars are familiar with how the trauma of war was reflected in the history of the works, lives, and collaboration of two outstanding composers of the twentieth century, Igor Stravinsky and Maurice Ravel. In this article, we explore (...) how, from different perspectives, these composers expressed in music their perception of the war trauma as part of the wider common cultural and social tragedy known as “the collapse of empires”. At the center of our discussion is musical text as a reflection of social phenomena, and how these two composers presented the upheavals that took place in society and their spiritual reaction to them with the help of their musical expressivity. The article focuses on war themes and their reflection in the music of the first half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

The existence of spacetime singularities is one of the biggest problems of nowadays physics. According to Penrose, each physical singularity should be covered by a “cosmic censor” which prevents any external observer from perceiving their existence. However, classical models describing the gravitational collapse usually results in strong curvature singularities, which can also remain “naked” for a finite amount of advanced time. This proceedings studies the modifications induced by asymptotically safe gravity on the gravitational collapse of generic Vaidya spacetimes. (...) It will be shown that, for any possible choice of the mass function, quantum gravity makes the internal singularity gravitationally weak, thus allowing a continuous extension of the spacetime beyond the singularity. (shrink)

Does consciousness collapse the quantum wave function? This idea was taken seriously by John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner but is now widely dismissed. We develop the idea by combining a mathematical theory of consciousness (integrated information theory) with an account of quantum collapse dynamics (continuous spontaneous localization). Simple versions of the theory are falsified by the quantum Zeno effect, but more complex versions remain compatible with empirical evidence. In principle, versions of the theory can be tested by (...) experiments with quantum computers. The upshot is not that consciousness-collapse interpretations are clearly correct, but that there is a research program here worth exploring. (shrink)

review essay on Gaukroger, Collapse of Mechanism and Rise of Sensibility (OUP).

Probability distributions are seen to be observer dependent. The probability function ψ†ψ can be put into an observer-dependent form. This eliminates the acausal behavior of the collapse of the wave function.

Sections 1 and 2 respectively raise and settle the question of whether, if an affirmative modality collapses (reduces to the null modality, that is) in a normal modal logic, then all modalities of the same length collapse in that logic, while Section 3 considers some special cases of an analogous phenomenon for congruential modal logics, closing with a general question about collapsing modalities in this broader range of logics.

This article proposes that cosmetic minimally-invasive procedures – Botox injections, soft-tissue fillers, microdermabrasion, chemical peels and laser treatments – are an under-researched area and provide a number of promising paths for skin studies research. I argue that cosmetic minimally-invasive procedures collapse the difference between the surfaces of the photograph and the skin – the primary surfaces of cosmetic surgery – more successfully than cosmetic surgical procedures. More precisely, I maintain that the difference between photograph and skin is collapsed in (...) two ways: first, through narrating the transformation of the skin’s surface in a way that more closely matches the photographic promises of the cosmetic surgery industry; and, second, by depicting the surgical penetration of the skin through advertising photography. The article concludes by suggesting that further investigation into cosmetic minimally-invasive procedures could offer a new way to think about relationships between ‘normative’ and ‘non-normative’ skin modification practices. (shrink)

This essay redefines the crisis of historicism as a collapse of trust. Following Friedrich Jaeger, it suggests that this crisis should be understood, not as a crisis caused by historicist methods, but as a crisis faced by the classical historicist tradition of Ranke. The "nihilism" and "moral relativism" feared by Troeltsch's generation did not primarily refer to the view that moral universals did not exist; rather, they expressed that the historical justification of bildungsbürgerliche values offered by classical historicism did (...) no longer work. In Niklas Luhmann's vocabulary, this is to say that moral values could no longer be trusted on historical grounds. But when the "reduction of complexity" offered by classical historicism collapsed, Troeltsch's generation faced a justification problem: what other modes of justification, if any at all, were available in a time of increasing secularization and growing feelings of discontinuity with the past? In identifying the crisis of historicism with this moral justification problem, this essay helps explain why such debts of despair could be reached in the early-twentieth-century disputes over historicism. (shrink)

The honeybee, Apis mellifera, has excited both literary and scientific interest since ancient times, and even modern entomological investigation has not entirely dispelled the mystery surrounding the corporate intelligence of the beehive. Yet this lingering mystique has not prevented the wholesale exploitation of the honeybee as pollinator of choice in present-day industrial agriculture. In the context of this industrialization of the apiary, honeybees around the world are succumbing to the condition known as “colony collapse disorder.” The consequent disappearance of (...) honeybees on a massive scale poses the question, what do honeybees mean to us? Is their loss a moral loss, and if so, is it merely a moral loss, or something more? Does the loss of honeybees portend further losses that will amount to the loss of the basic conditions for meaning, and hence for morality, per se? (shrink)

Eugene Wigner and others have speculated that the “collapse of the state vector” during an observation might be a physically real process so that some modification of current quantum theory would be required to describe the interaction with a conscious observer appropriately.Experimental reports on the “psychokinetic effect” as a mental influence on the outcome of quantum jumps suggest that perhaps this effect might be vital for an understanding of the observer's role in quantum mechanics.Combining these two speculations we introduce (...) a reduction principle that provides for the gradual reduction of a macroscopically ambiguous state and allows simultaneously for the occurrence of some psychokinetic effect in the process of observation.The resulting model leads to many of the paradoxical, but logically consistent, features of the psychokinetic effect that have been reported, and makes further testable predictions.The model does not touch on the more profound questions of consciousness. But the model implies that the result of a conscious observation, the collapse of the state vector, becomes accessible to the experimenter, with the psychokinetic effect as probe: Whether Schrödinger's cat has not or has collapsed the state vector determines whether or not the later human observer can still exert a psychokinetic influence on the result. (shrink)

After introductory reminder of and comments on Gödel’s ontological proof, we discuss the collapse of modalities, which is provable in Gödel’s ontological system GO. We argue that Gödel’s texts confirm modal collapse as intended consequence of his ontological system. Further, we aim to show that modal collapse properly fits into Gödel’s philosophical views, especially into his ontology of separation and union of force and fact, as well as into his cosmological theory of the nonobjectivity of the lapse (...) of time. As a result, modal collapse should not be conceived in Gödel so much as a deficit, but rather as a kind of the rise of modalities to the “perfect” being. We further show that, in accordance with Gödel’s ontology, the concepts of modality and time should be derived in terms of the “fundamental philosophical concept” of cause. To give an example of how a formalization of such causative Gödelian ontology and ontological proof might look, we propose the transformation of GO into a kind of causally re-interpreted justification logic. (shrink)

How did we come to have a scientific culture -- one in which cognitive values are shaped around scientific ones? Stephen Gaukroger presents a rich and fascinating investigation of the development of intellectual culture in early modern Europe, a period in which understandings of the natural realm began to fragment.

Orthodox quantum mechanics is built upon psychophysical collapse events that are the close analogs, within contemporary physical theory, of the the Whiteheadian actual occasions, with their mental and physical poles. This article describes the way in which these events enter into quantum theory, and mediate the emergence of actuality from potentiality.

It is shown that data on the dissociation rate of deuterium obtained in an experiment at the Sudbury Neutrino Observatory provides evidence that the Continuous Spontaneous Localization wavefunction collapse model should have mass–proportional coupling to be viable.

This paper makes an analysis of the recent collapse of Fortis, a major European bank, from the perspective of shareholder activism and social movement theory to illustrate the limits of corporate governance. Some specific issues of the Fortis affair – and more especially the chaotic events at the general assembly - illustrate the application of social movement theory to shareholder activism, besides agency theory problems and conflicts of interests. Paradoxes between legal constraints and principles of good corporate governance are (...) presented. The Fortis case illustrates the limits of the juridical bureaucracy in situations of urgency. The case illustrates the limits of corporate governance. Governance systems need to find appropriate mechanisms to align the voting rights with the long-term interests of the company. We argue for new criteria that will restrict representation to loyal shareholders with a long-term commitment. Good governance mechanisms should prevent opportunistic behaviour and encourage a responsible attitude. (shrink)

I critically evaluate the influential new wave account of theory reduction in science developed by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker. First, I cast doubt on claims that the new wave account enjoys a number of theoretical virtues over its competitors, such as the ability to represent how false theories are reduced by true theories. Second, I argue that the genuinely novel claim that a corrected theory must be specified entirely by terms from the basic reducing theory is in fact too (...) restrictive for scientific practice and should be rejected. Basic theories co-evolve with nonbasic theories in a mutually interactive way, and thus the basic theories incorporate the concepts and concerns of nonbasic theories. Third, I show that once its ontological consequences are duly noted, the reductive part the new wave account collapses into the classical theory developed within the logical empiricist tradition. As such, it still falls prey to standard anti-reductionist argument based upon multiple realizability and the cross-classification of special science and physical science terms. (shrink)

Two views on the direction of time can be distinguished—primitivism and non-primitivism. According to the former, time’s direction is an in-built, fundamental property of the physical world. According to the latter, time’s direction is a derivative property of a fundamentally directionless reality. In the literature, non-primitivism has been widely supported since most our fundamental dynamical laws are time-reversal invariant. In this paper, I offer a way out to the primitivist. I argue that we do have good grounds to support a (...) primitive direction of time in the quantum realm. The rationale depends on exploiting the metaphysical and dynamical underdetermination of quantum theories to make a case in favor of primitivism. In particular, primitivism can be grounded in spontaneous collapse theories. The specific sense in which these theories capture a primitive direction of time is that, when the ontology of the theory is seriously taken into account, it does not remain invariant under time reversal. In taking GRW with a matter-density field, I will argue that primitivism about the direction of time can be defended in the quantum case. (shrink)

In this chapter, I will discuss what it takes for a dynamical collapse theory to provide a reasonable description of the actual world. I will start with discussions of what is required, in general, of the ontology of a physical theory, and then apply it to the quantum case. One issue of interest is whether a collapse theory can be a quantum state monist theory, adding nothing to the quantum state and changing only its dynamics. Although this was (...) one of the motivations for advancing such theories, its viability has been questioned, and it has been argued that, in order to provide an account of the world, a collapse theory must supplement the quantum state with additional ontology, making such theories more like hidden-variables theories than would first appear. I will make a case for quantum state monism as an adequate ontology, and, indeed, the only sensible ontology for collapse theories. This will involve taking dynamical variables to possess, not sharp values, as in classical physics, but distributions of values. (shrink)

On some views, we can be sure that parties to a dispute over the logic of ‘exists’ are not talking past each other if they can characterise ‘exists’ as the only monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying a certain set of rules of inference. Otherwise, we ought to be suspicious about the reality of their disagreement. This is what we call a proof- theoretic argument. Pace some critics, who have tried to use proof-theoretic arguments to cast doubts about the (...) reality of disagreements about the logic of ‘exists’, we argue that proof-theoretic arguments can be deployed to establish the reality of several such disagreements. Along the way, we will also utilise this technique to establish similar results about some disagreements over the logic of identity. (shrink)

The collapse of society is inevitable, even if it is in the distant future. When it collapses, it is likely to do so within the lifetimes of some people. These people will have matured in pre-collapse society, experience collapse, and then live the remainder of their lives in the post-collapse world. I argue that this group of people—the transitional generation—will be the worst off from societal collapse, far worse than subsequent generations. As the transitional generation, (...) they will suffer disparately. This intergenerational disparity in suffering is inequitable. Given that other disparities in suffering are worthy of remediation, this intergenerational disparity in suffering is worthy of remediation. However, the only way to do so is to target the mental states of the members of the transitional generation. (shrink)

Experiments are described, using electroencephalography (EEG) and simple tests of performance, which support the hypothesis that collapse of a quantum field is of importance to the functioning of the brain. The theoretical basis of our experiments is derived from Penrose (1989) who suggested that conscious decision-making is a manifestation of the outcome of quantum computation in the brain involving collapse of some relevant wave function. He also proposed that collapse of any wave function depends on a gravitational (...) criterion. As different brain areas are known to subserve different functions, we argue that `Penrose collapse' must occur in a particular brain area when performing a task that uses it. Further, taking an EEG from the area should amplify the gravitational prerequisite for collapse, so affecting task performance. There are no non-quantum theories which could lead one to expect that taking an EEG could directly affect task performance by subjects. The results of both pilot and main experiments indicated that task performance was indeed influenced by taking an EEG from relevant brain areas. Control experiments suggested that the influence was quantum mechanical in origin, and was not due to any experimental artefact. The results are statistically significant and merit attempts at replication in an independent laboratory, preferably with more sophisticated equipment than was available to us. (shrink)