We introduce the Bounded Axiom A Forcing Axiom . It turns out that it is equiconsistent with the existence of a regular ∑2-correct cardinal and hence also equiconsistent with BPFA. Furthermore we show that, if consistent, it does not imply the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom.

Suppose that T^∗ is an ω_1-Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain. We introduce a forcing axiom PFA(T^∗) for proper forcings which preserve these properties of T^∗. We prove that PFA(T^∗) implies many of the strong consequences of PFA, such as the failure of very weak club guessing, that all of the cardinal characteristics of the continuum are greater than ω_1, and the P-ideal dichotomy. On the other hand, PFA(T^∗) implies some of the consequences of diamond principles, such as (...) the existence of Knaster forcings which are not stationarily Knaster. (shrink)

If the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom BPFA holds, then Mouse Reflection holds at N₂ with respect to all mouse operators up to the level of Woodin cardinals in the next ZFC-model. This yields that if Woodin's ℙ max axiom (*) holds, then BPFA implies that V is closed under the "Woodin-in-the-next-ZFC-model" operator. We also discuss stronger Mouse Reflection principles which we show to follow from strengthenings of BPFA, and we discuss the theory BPFA plus "NS ω1 is (...) precipitous" and strengthenings thereof. Along the way, we answer a question of Baumgartner and Taylor. [2, Question 6.11]. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present some results which suggest that the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis follows from the Proper Forcing Axiom. What will be proved is that a form of simultaneous reflection follows from the Set Mapping Reflection Principle, a consequence of PFA. While the results fall short of showing that MRP implies SCH, it will be shown that MRP implies that if SCH fails first at κ then every stationary subset of reflects. It will also (...) be demonstrated that MRP always fails in a generic extension by Prikry forcing. (shrink)

We introduce the resurrection axioms, a new class of forcing axioms, and the uplifting cardinals, a new large cardinal notion, and prove that various instances of the resurrection axioms are equiconsistent over ZFC with the existence of an uplifting cardinal.

We construct creature forcings with strong Axiom A that specialize a given Aronszajn tree. We work with tree creature forcing. The creatures that live on the Aronszajn tree are normed and have the halving property. We show that our models fulfill ℵ1=d

Set Theory in Philosophy of Mathematics

Direct download (3 more)  

 

Export citation  

 

Bookmark   1 citation  

Various theorems for the preservation of set-theoretic axioms under forcing are proved, regarding both forcing axioms and axioms true in the Lévy collapse. These show in particular that certain applications of forcing axioms require to add generic countable sequences high up in the set-theoretic hierarchy even before collapsing everything down to ‮א‬₁. Later we give applications, among them the consistency of MM with ‮א‬ω not being Jónsson which answers a question raised in the set theory meeting at (...) Oberwolfach in 2005. (shrink)

We prove rigidity results for large classes of corona algebras, assuming the Proper Forcing Axiom. In particular, we prove that a conjecture of Coskey and Farah holds for all separable [Formula: see text]-algebras with the metric approximation property and an increasing approximate identity of projections.

We consider forcing axioms for suitable families of μ‐complete ‐c.c. forcing notions. We show that some form of the condition “ have a in ” is necessary. We also show some versions are really stronger than others.

We show that Bounded Forcing Axioms (for instance, Martin's Axiom, the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom, or the Bounded Martin's Maximum) are equivalent to principles of generic absoluteness, that is, they assert that if a $\Sigma_1$ sentence of the language of set theory with parameters of small transitive size is forceable, then it is true. We also show that Bounded Forcing Axioms imply a strong form of generic absoluteness for projective sentences, namely, if a $\Sigma^1_3$ sentence (...) with parameters is forceable, then it is true. Further, if for every real x, $x^{\sharp}$ exists, and the second uniform indiscernible is less than $\omega_2$ , then the same holds for $\Sigma^1_4$ sentences. (shrink)

After presenting a general setting in which to look at forcing axioms, we give a hierarchy of generalized bounded forcing axioms that correspond level by level, in consistency strength, with the members of a natural hierarchy of large cardinals below a Mahlo. We give a general construction of models of generalized bounded forcing axioms. Then we consider the bounded forcing axiom for a class of partially ordered sets Γ 1 such that, letting Γ 0 be (...) the class of all stationary-set-preserving partially ordered sets, one can prove the following: (a) $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma_1$ , (b) Γ 0 = Γ 1 if and only if NS ω 1 is ℵ 1 -dense. (c) If P $\notin \Gamma_1$ , then BFA({P}) fails. We call the bounded forcing axiom for Γ 1 Maximal Bounded Forcing Axiom (MBFA). Finally we prove MBFA consistent relative to the consistency of an inaccessible Σ 2 -correct cardinal which is a limit of strongly compact cardinals. (shrink)

We prove that MM (Martin maximum) is equivalent (in ZFC) to the older axiom SPFA (semiproper forcing axiom). We also prove that SPFA does not imply SPFA + or even PFA + (using the consistency of a large cardinal).

We show that under $\mathsf {BMM}$ and “there exists a Woodin cardinal, $"$ the nonstationary ideal on $\omega _1$ cannot be defined by a $\Pi _1$ formula with parameter $A \subset \omega _1$. We show that the same conclusion holds under the assumption of Woodin’s $(\ast )$ -axiom. We further show that there are universes where $\mathsf {BPFA}$ holds and $\text {NS}_{\omega _1}$ is $\Pi _1(\{\omega _1\})$ -definable. Lastly we show that if the canonical inner model with one Woodin (...) cardinal $M_1$ exists, there is a generic extension of $M_1$ in which $\text {NS}_{\omega _1}$ is saturated and $\Pi _1(\{ \omega _1\} )$ -definable, and $\mathsf {MA_{\omega _1}}$ holds. (shrink)

A $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ truth for λ is a pair 〈Q, ψ〉 so that Q ⊆ Hλ, ψ is a first order formula with one free variable, and there exists B ⊆ Hλ+ such that (Hλ+; ε, B) $(H_{\lambda +};\in ,B)\vDash \psi [Q]$ . A cardinal λ is $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ indescribable just in case that for every $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ truth 〈Q, ψ〉 for λ, there exists $\overline{\lambda}<\lambda $ so that $\overline{\lambda}$ is a cardinal and $\langle Q\cap H_{\overline{\lambda}},\psi \rangle $ is a (...) $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ truth for $\overline{\lambda}$ . More generally, an interval of cardinals [κ, λ] with κ ≤ λ is $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ indescribable if for every $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ truth 〈Q, ψ〉 for λ, there exists $??\leq \overline{\lambda}<\kappa,??\subseteq H_{\overline{\lambda}}$ , and π: $H_{\overline{\lambda}}\rightarrow H_{\lambda}$ so that $??$ is a cardinal, $\langle ??,\psi \rangle $ is a $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ truth for $??$ , and π is elementary from $(H_{\overline{\lambda}};\in,??,??)$ with $\pi \,|\,??={\rm id}$ . We prove that the restriction of the proper forcing axiom to c-linked posets requires a $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ indescribable cardinal in L, and that the restriction of the proper forcing axiom to c⁺-linked posets, in a proper forcing extension of a fine structural model, requires a $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ indescribable 1-gap [κ, κ⁺]. These results show that the respective forward directions obtained in " Hierarchies of Forcing Axioms I" by Neeman and Schimmerling are optimal. (shrink)

We prove a variety of theorems about stationary set reflection and concepts related to internal approachability. We prove that an implication of Fuchino–Usuba relating stationary reflection to a version of Strong Chang’s Conjecture cannot be reversed; strengthen and simplify some results of Krueger about forcing axioms and approachability; and prove that some other related results of Krueger are sharp. We also adapt some ideas of Woodin to simplify and unify many arguments in the literature involving preservation of forcing (...) axioms. (shrink)

We introduce a property of forcing notions, called the anti-, which comes from Aronszajn trees. This property canonically defines a new chain condition stronger than the countable chain condition, which is called the property . In this paper, we investigate the property . For example, we show that a forcing notion with the property does not add random reals. We prove that it is consistent that every forcing notion with the property has precaliber 1 and for (...) class='Hi'>forcing notions with the property fails. This negatively answers a part of one of the classical problems about implications between fragments of. (shrink)

I investigate the relationships between three hierarchies of reflection principles for a forcing class $\Gamma $ : the hierarchy of bounded forcing axioms, of $\Sigma ^1_1$ -absoluteness, and of Aronszajn tree preservation principles. The latter principle at level $\kappa $ says that whenever T is a tree of height $\omega _1$ and width $\kappa $ that does not have a branch of order type $\omega _1$, and whenever ${\mathord {\mathbb P}}$ is a forcing notion in $\Gamma $, (...) then it is not the case that ${\mathord {\mathbb P}}$ forces that T has such a branch. $\Sigma ^1_1$ -absoluteness serves as an intermediary between these principles and the bounded forcing axioms. A special case of the main result is that for forcing classes that don’t add reals, the three principles at level $2^\omega $ are equivalent. Special attention is paid to certain subclasses of subcomplete forcing, since these are natural forcing classes that don’t add reals. (shrink)

We introduce a new simple way of defining the forcing method that works well in the usual setting under FA, the Foundation Axiom, and moreover works even under Aczel's AFA, the Anti-Foundation Axiom. This new way allows us to have an intuition about what happens in defining the forcing relation. The main tool is H. Friedman's method of defining the extensional membership relation ∈ by means of the intensional membership relation ε .Analogously to the usual (...) class='Hi'>forcing and the usual generic extension for FA-models, we can justify the existence of generic filters and can obtain the Forcing Theorem and the Minimal Model Theorem with some modifications. These results are on the line of works to investigate whether model theory for AFA-set theory can be developed in a similar way to that for FA-set theory.Aczel pointed out that the quotient of transition systems by the largest bisimulation and transition relations have the essentially same theory as the set theory with AFA. Therefore, we could hope that, by using our new method, some open problems about transition systems turn out to be consistent or independent. (shrink)

We prove that a number of axioms, each a consequence of PFA (the Proper Forcing Axiom) are equivalent. In particular we show that TOP (the Thinning-out Principle as introduced by Baumgartner in the Handbook of set-theoretic topology), is equivalent to the following statement: If I is an ideal on ω 1 with ω 1 generators, then there exists an uncountable $X \subseteq \omega_1$ , such that either [ X] ω ∩ I = ⊘ or $\lbrack X\rbrack^\omega \subseteq I$.

I analyze the hierarchies of the bounded and the weak bounded forcing axioms, with a focus on their versions for the class of subcomplete forcings, in terms of implications and consistency strengths. For the weak hierarchy, I provide level-by-level equiconsistencies with an appropriate hierarchy of partially remarkable cardinals. I also show that the subcomplete forcing axiom implies Larson’s ordinal reflection principle atω2, and that its effect on the failure of weak squares is very similar to that of (...) Martin’s Maximum. (shrink)

We introduce the strongly uplifting cardinals, which are equivalently characterized, we prove, as the superstrongly unfoldable cardinals and also as the almost-hugely unfoldable cardinals, and we show that their existence is equiconsistent over ZFC with natural instances of the boldface resurrection axiom, such as the boldface resurrection axiom for proper forcing.

Martin's axiom is equivalent to the statement that the universe is absolute under ccc forcing extensions for Σ 1 sentences with a subset of $\kappa, \kappa , as a parameter.

We show that bounded forcing axioms are consistent with the existence of -gaps and thus do not imply the Open Coloring Axiom. They are also consistent with Jensen's combinatorial principles for L at the level ω2, and therefore with the existence of an ω2-Suslin tree. We also show that the axiom we call BMM3 implies 21=2, as well as a stationary reflection principle which has many of the consequences of Martin's Maximum for objects of size 2. Finally, (...) we give an example of a so-called boldface bounded forcing axiom implying 20=2. (shrink)

In this paper we study the question assuming MA+⌝CH does Sacks forcing or Laver forcing collapse cardinals? We show that this question is equivalent to the question of what is the additivity of Marczewski's ideals 0. We give a proof that it is consistent that Sacks forcing collapses cardinals. On the other hand we show that Laver forcing does not collapse cardinals.

We show that in a σ‐closed forcing extension, the bounded forcing axiom for Namba forcing fails. This answers a question of J. T. Moore.

The bounded proper forcing axiom BPFA is the statement that for any family of ℵ 1 many maximal antichains of a proper forcing notion, each of size ℵ 1 , there is a directed set meeting all these antichains. A regular cardinal κ is called Σ 1 -reflecting, if for any regular cardinal χ, for all formulas $\varphi, "H(\chi) \models`\varphi'"$ implies " $\exists\delta . We investigate several algebraic consequences of BPFA, and we show that the consistency strength (...) of the bounded proper forcing axiom is exactly the existence of a Σ 1 -reflecting cardinal (which is less than the existence of a Mahlo cardinal). We also show that the question of the existence of isomorphisms between two structures can be reduced to the question of rigidity of a structure. (shrink)

It is an old idea, lately out of fashion but now experiencing a revival, that quantum mechanics may best be understood, not as a physical theory with a problematic probabilistic interpretation, but as something closer to a probability calculus per se. However, from this angle, the rather special C *-algebraic apparatus of quantum probability theory stands in need of further motivation. One would like to find additional principles, having clear physical and/or probabilistic content, on the basis of which this apparatus (...) can be reconstructed. In this paper, I explore one route to such a derivation of finite-dimensional quantum mechanics, by means of a set of strong, but probabilistically intelligible, axioms. Stated very informally, these require that systems appear completely classical as restricted to a single measurement, that different measurements, and likewise different pure states, be equivalent (up to the action of a compact group of symmetries), and that every state be the marginal of a bipartite non-signaling state perfectly correlating two measurements. This much yields a mathematical representation of (basic, discrete) measurements as orthonormal subsets of, and states, by vectors in, an ordered real Hilbert space – in the quantum case, the space of Hermitian operators, with its usual tracial inner product. One final postulate (a simple minimization principle, still in need of a clear interpretation) forces the positive cone of this space to be homogeneous and self-dual and hence, to be the state space of a formally real Jordan algebra. From here, the route to the standard framework of finite-dimensional quantum mechanics is quite short. (shrink)

The purpose of this communication is to present some recent advances on the consequences that forcing axioms and large cardinals have on the combinatorics of singular cardinals. I will introduce a few examples of problems in singular cardinal combinatorics which can be fruitfully attacked using ideas and techniques coming from the theory of forcing axioms and then translate the results so obtained in suitable large cardinals properties.The first example I will treat is the proof that the proper (...) class='Hi'>forcing axiom PFA implies the singular cardinal hypothesis SCH, this will easily lead to a new proof of Solovay's theorem that SCH holds above a strongly compact cardinal. I will also outline how some of the ideas involved in these proofs can be used as means to evaluate the “saturation” properties of models of strong forcing axioms like MM or PFA.The second example aims to show that the transfer principle ↠ fails assuming Martin's Maximum MM. Also in this case the result can be translated in a large cardinal property, however this requires a familiarity with a rather large fragment of Shelah's pcf-theory.Only sketchy arguments will be given, the reader is referred to the forthcoming [25] and [38] for a thorough analysis of these problems and for detailed proofs. (shrink)

We give an affirmative answer to Brendle's and Hrušák's question of whether the club principle together with h > N₁ is consistent. We work with a class of axiom A forcings with countable conditions such that q ≥ n p is determined by finitely many elements in the conditions p and q and that all strengthenings of a condition are subsets, and replace many names by actual sets. There are two types of technique: one for tree-like forcings and one (...) for forcings with creatures that are translated into trees. Both lead to new models of the club principle. (shrink)

The text continues the translation series of William Whewell's (1794-1866) book «The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their history» (Book III The Philosophy of the Mechanical Sciences, Chapter VI On the Establishment of the Principles of Statics). The chapter devoted to the establishment of such concepts of statics and dynamics, as equilibrium, measure of statical forces, gravity, oblique forces, and the parallelogram of forces. Whewell substantiates the fundamental principles of mechanics by analogy with the axioms of geometry, but (...) his justification of the necessity of mechanical laws is based on the idea of causality. Translated by A.L. Nikiforov, comments by I.T. Kasavin and T.D. Sokolova. (shrink)

This book seeks to offer original answers to all the major open questions in epistemology—as indicated by the book’s title. These questions and answers arise organically in the course of a validation of the entire corpus of human knowledge. The book explains how we know what we know, and how well we know it. The author presents a positive theory, motivated and directed at every step not by a need to reply to skeptics or subjectivists, but by the need of (...) a rational individual to know the world. -/- The author draws heavily from Ayn Rand’s theory of concepts as presented in her book, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, but departs from her epistemology—especially as explicated by leading exponents of her philosophy—in important ways. Areas of departure include the perception of entities and the role of probability theory in epistemology. -/- A main idea in the book is to begin the validation of the law of causality by identifying that existence causes our consciousness of it. Another key idea is this: The very fact that we perceive entities is the most basic and most extensive evidence that causal forces and causal interactions are regular. -/- Applying Ayn Rand’s principle that characteristics are ranges of measurement, the book offers a philosophical validation of “nonparametric predictive inference,” in turn providing an objective basis for prior probabilities in Bayesian analysis. -/- This book is primarily for a specialized readership—familiar with epistemological ideas and with Ayn Rand’s theory of concepts in particular. The last third of the book uses probability theory and mathematics somewhat beyond basic calculus, but less mathematical explanations are also included to make the general ideas accessible to lay readers. (shrink)

We prove new upper bound theorems on the consistency strengths of SPFA (θ), SPFA(θ-linked) and SPFA(θ⁺-cc). Our results are in terms of (θ, Γ)-subcompactness, which is a new large cardinal notion that combines the ideas behind subcompactness and Γ-indescribability. Our upper bound for SPFA(c-linked) has a corresponding lower bound, which is due to Neeman and appears in his follow-up to this paper. As a corollary, SPFA(c-linked) and PFA(c-linked) are each equiconsistent with the existence of a $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ -indescribable cardinal. Our (...) upper bound for SPFA(c-c.c.) is a $\Sigma _{2}^{2}$ -indescribable cardinal, which is consistent with V = L. Our upper bound for SPFA(c⁺-linked) is a cardinal κ that is $(\kappa ^{+},\Sigma _{1}^{2})$ -subcompact, which is strictly weaker than κ⁺-supercompact. The axiom MM(c) is a consequence of SPFA(c⁺-linked) by a slight refinement of a theorem of Shelah. Our upper bound for SPFA(c⁺⁺-c.c.) is a cardinal κ that is $(\kappa ^{+},\Sigma _{2}^{2})$ -subcompact, which is also strictly weaker than κ⁺-supercompact. (shrink)

Saunders Mac Lane has drawn attention many times, particularly in his book Mathematics: Form and Function, to the system of set theory of which the axioms are Extensionality, Null Set, Pairing, Union, Infinity, Power Set, Restricted Separation, Foundation, and Choice, to which system, afforced by the principle, , of Transitive Containment, we shall refer as . His system is naturally related to systems derived from topos-theoretic notions concerning the category of sets, and is, as Mac Lane emphasises, one that is (...) adequate for much of mathematics. In this paper we show that the consistency strength of Mac Lane's system is not increased by adding the axioms of Kripke–Platek set theory and even the Axiom of Constructibility to Mac Lane's axioms; our method requires a close study of Axiom H, which was proposed by Mitchell; we digress to apply these methods to subsystems of Zermelo set theory , and obtain an apparently new proof that is not finitely axiomatisable; we study Friedman's strengthening of , and the Forster–Kaye subsystem of , and use forcing over ill-founded models and forcing to establish independence results concerning and ; we show, again using ill-founded models, that proves the consistency of ; turning to systems that are type-theoretic in spirit or in fact, we show by arguments of Coret and Boffa that proves a weak form of Stratified Collection, and that is a conservative extension of for stratified sentences, from which we deduce that proves a strong stratified version of ; we analyse the known equiconsistency of with the simple theory of types and give Lake's proof that an instance of Mathematical Induction is unprovable in Mac Lane's system; we study a simple set theoretic assertion—namely that there exists an infinite set of infinite sets, no two of which have the same cardinal—and use it to establish the failure of the full schema of Stratified Collection in ; and we determine the point of failure of various other schemata in . The paper closes with some philosophical remarks. (shrink)

_This inquiry joins the idea of a vital principle at work in two systems for spiritual liberation and medical treatment, South Asian Yoga and Āyurveda, to an interpretation of the second axiom of thermodynamics applied to open systems, a predictive mathematical account of matter. Though often first associated with philosophy or religion, Yoga and Āyurveda take human physiology as a function of the natural world, as does thermodynamics. The idea of “life force” or “vitality” emerges at the intersection of (...) these two epistemologies. The religious or philosophical principle of prā__ṇ__a__ (succinctly, life energy) has its roots in a naturalist perspective, and a principle from mathematics and physical science yields the abstract concept of entropy (succinctly, energy loss). The discussion reconsiders the philosophical idea of a life force, or vital principle, and its potential application in health care._. (shrink)

We show that if N and M are transitive models of ZFA such that N M, N and M have the same kernel and same set of atoms, and M AC, then N is a Fraenkel-Mostowski-Specker (FMS) submodel of M if and only if M is a generic extension of N by some almost homogeneous notion of forcing. We also develop a slightly modified notion of FMS submodels to characterize the case where M is a generic extension of N (...) not necessarily by an almost homogeneous notion of forcing. (shrink)

If ZFC is consistent, then the collection of countable computably saturated models of ZFC satisfies all of the Multiverse Axioms of Hamkins.

We present an approach to forcing with finite sequences of models that uses models of two types. This approach builds on earlier work of Friedman and Mitchell on forcing to add clubs in cardinals larger than $\aleph_{1}$, with finite conditions. We use the two-type approach to give a new proof of the consistency of the proper forcing axiom. The new proof uses a finite support forcing, as opposed to the countable support iteration in the standard (...) proof. The distinction is important since a proof using finite supports is more amenable to generalizations to cardinals greater than $\aleph_{1}$. (shrink)

In this paper we show that the Proper Forcing Axiom is preserved under forcing over any poset PP with the following property: In the generalized Banach–Mazur game over PP of length , Player II has a winning strategy which depends only on the current position and the ordinal indicating the number of moves made so far. By the current position we mean: The move just made by Player I for a successor stage, or the infimum of all (...) the moves made so far for a limit stage. As a consequence of this theorem, we introduce a weak form of the square principle and show that it is consistent with PFA. (shrink)

We show that L absoluteness for semi-proper forcings is equiconsistent with the existence of a remarkable cardinal, and hence by [6] with L absoluteness for proper forcings. By [7], L absoluteness for stationary set preserving forcings gives an inner model with a strong cardinal. By [3], the Bounded Semi-Proper Forcing Axiom is equiconsistent with the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom , which in turn is equiconsistent with a reflecting cardinal. We show that Bounded Martin's Maximum is much (...) stronger than BSPFA in that if BMM holds, then for every X ∈ V , X# exists. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch’s interpreters have often tried to read her as putting forward an alternative form of ethical foundationalism. On this reading, Murdoch is taken to be proposing ‘loving attention’ or ‘the Good’ as a fundamental moral principle that would play the same unifying role as the principle of utility or the categorical imperative. Here, I argue that a careful reading of chapter 17 of Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals shows that the foundationalist reading is untenable. Murdoch, I suggest, is (...) better understood as a methodological descriptivist. She is not simply offering us an alternative moral theory, but a radically different approach to the business of moral philosophy itself. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel is almost as famous—one might say “notorious”—for his extreme platonist views as he is famous for his mathematical theorems. Moreover his platonism is not a myth; it is well-documented in his writings. Here are two platonist declarations about set theory, the first from his paper about Bertrand Russell and the second from the revised version of his paper on the Continuum Hypotheses.Classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived as real objects, namely classes as “pluralities of things” or (...) as structures consisting of a plurality of things and concepts as the properties and relations of things existing independently of our definitions and constructions.It seems to me that the assumption of such objects is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence.But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.The first statement is a platonist declaration of a fairly standard sort concerning set theory. What is unusual in it is the inclusion of concepts among the objects of mathematics. This I will explain below. The second statement expresses what looks like a rather wild thesis. (shrink)

We formulate C. Freiling's axioms of symmetry for general second-order structures with respect to a certain ideal of small sets contained in them and find several equivalent formulations of the principles. Then we focus on particular models, namely saturated and recursively saturated ones, and show that they are symmetric with respect to appropriate classes of small sets when their second-order part consists of definable sets. Some asymmetric models are also exhibited as well as partial asymmetric ones constructed by forcing.

This article will study a class of deduction systems that allow for a limited use of the modus ponens method of deduction. We will show that it is possible to devise axiom systems α that can recognize their consistency under a deduction system D provided that: (1) α treats multiplication as a 3-way relation (rather than as a total function), and that (2) D does not allow for the use of a modus ponens methodology above essentially the levels of (...) Π1 and Σ1 formulae. Part of what will make this boundary-case exception to the Second Incompleteness Theorem interesting is that we will also characterize generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem that take force when we only slightly weaken the assumptions of our boundary-case exceptions in any of several further directions. (shrink)

Asperó and Schindler have completely solved the Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text] problem. They have proved that if [Formula: see text] holds then Axiom [Formula: see text] holds, with no additional assumptions. The key question now concerns the relationship between [Formula: see text] and Axiom [Formula: see text]. This is because the foundational issues raised by the problem of Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text] arguably persist in the problem of (...) class='Hi'>Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text]. The first of our two main theorems is that Axiom [Formula: see text] is equivalent to Axiom [Formula: see text], and as a corollary we show that Axiom [Formula: see text] fails in all the known models of [Formula: see text]. This suggests that [Formula: see text] actually refutes Axiom [Formula: see text]. Our second main theorem is that the [Formula: see text] Conjecture holds assuming [Formula: see text]. This is the strongest partial result known on this conjecture which is one of the central open problems of [Formula: see text]-theory and [Formula: see text]-logic. These results identify a fundamental asymmetry between the Continuum Hypothesis and any axiom which is both [Formula: see text]-expressible and which implies [Formula: see text], on the basis of generic absoluteness for the simplest of the nontrivial sentences of Third-Order Number Theory. These are the [Formula: see text]-sentences with no parameters. Such sentences are those which simply assert the existence of a set [Formula: see text] for which some property involving only quantification over [Formula: see text] holds. (shrink)

The Necessary Maximality Principle for c. c. c. forcing with real parameters is equiconsistent with the existence of a weakly compact cardinal. (© 2005 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim).

We define and investigate versions of Silver and Mathias forcing with respect to lower and upper density. We focus on properness, Axiom A, chain conditions, preservation of cardinals and adding Cohen reals. We find rough forcings that collapse $$2^\omega $$ 2 ω to $$\omega $$ ω, while others are surprisingly gentle. We also study connections between regularity properties induced by these parametrized forcing notions and the Baire property.

A new method is presented for constructing models of set theory, using a technique of forming pseudo-ultrapowers. In the presence of the axiom of choice, the traditional ultrapower construction has proven to be extremely powerful in set theory and model theory; if the axiom of choice is not assumed, the fundamental theorem of ultrapowers may fail, causing the ultrapower to lose almost all of its utility. The pseudo-ultrapower is designed so that the fundamental theorem holds even if choice (...) fails; this is arranged by means of an application of the omitting types theorem. The general theory of pseudo-ultrapowers is developed. Following that, we study supercompactness in the absence of choice, and we analyze pseudo-ultrapowers of models of the axiom of determinateness and various infinite exponent partition relations. Relationships between pseudo-ultrapowers and forcing are also discussed. (shrink)

The Axiom of Strong Condensation, first introduced by Woodin in [14], is an abstract version of the Condensation Lemma ofL. In this paper, we construct a set-sized forcing to obtain Strong Condensation forH. As an application, we show that “ZFC + Axiom of Strong Condensation +”is consistent, which answers a question in [14]. As another application, we give a partial answer to a question of Jech by proving that “ZFC + there is a supercompact cardinal + any (...) ideal onω1which is definable overH is not precipitous” is consistent under sufficient large cardinal assumptions. (shrink)

The Theme. Strong forcing axioms like Martin’s Maximum give a reasonably satisfactory structural analysis of $H(\omega _2)$. A broad program in modern Set Theory is searching for strong forcing axioms beyond $\omega _1$. In other words, one would like to figure out the structural properties of taller initial segments of the universe. However, the classical techniques of forcing iterations seem unable to bypass the obstacles, as the resulting forcings axioms beyond $\omega _1$ have not thus far been (...) strong enough! However, with his celebrated work on generalised side conditions, I. Neeman introduced us to a novel paradigm to iterate forcings. In particular, he could, among other things, reprove the consistency of the Proper Forcing Axiom using an iterated forcing with finite supports. In 2015, using his technology of virtual models, Veličković built up an iteration of semi-proper forcings with finite supports, hence reproving the consistency of Martin’s Maximum, an achievement leading to the notion of a virtual model.In this thesis, we are interested in constructing forcing notions with finitely many virtual models as side conditions to preserve three uncountable cardinals. The thesis constitutes six chapters and three appendices that amount to 118 pages, where Section 1 is devoted to preliminaries, and Section 2 is a warm-up about the scaffolding poset of a proper forcing. In Section 3, we present the general theory of virtual models in the context of forcing with sets of models of two types, where we, e.g., define the “meet” between two virtual models and prove its properties.The main results are joint with Boban Veličković, and partly appeared in Guessing models and the approachability ideal, J. Math. Log. 21 (2021).Pure Side Conditions. In Section 4, we use two types of virtual models (countable and large non-transitive ones induced by a supercompact cardinal, which we call Magidor models) to construct our forcing with pure side conditions. The forcing covertly uses a third type of models that are transitive. We also add decorations to the conditions to add many clubs in the generic $\omega _2$. In contrast to Neeman’s method, we do not have a single chain, but $\alpha $ -chains, for an ordinal $\alpha $ with $V_\alpha \prec V_\lambda $. Thus, starting from suitable large cardinals $\kappa <\lambda $, we construct a forcing notion whose conditions are finite sets of virtual models described earlier. The forcing is strongly proper, preserves $\kappa $, and has the $\lambda $ -Knaster property. The relevant quotients of the forcing are strongly proper, which helps us prove strong guessing model principles. The construction is generalisable to a ${<}\mu $ -closed forcing, for any given cardinal $\mu $ with $\mu ^{<\mu }=\mu <\kappa $.The Iteration Theorem. In Section 5, we use the forcing with pure side conditions to iterate a subclass of proper and $\aleph _2$ -c.c. forcings and obtain a forcing axiom at the level of $\aleph _2$. The iterable class is closely related to Asperó–Mota’s forcing axiom for finitely proper forcings.Guessing Model Principles. Section 6 encompasses the main parts of the thesis. We prove the consistency of the guessing principle $\mathrm {GMP}^+(\omega _3,\omega _1)$ that states for any cardinal ${\theta \geq \omega _3}$, the set of $\aleph _2$ -sized elementary submodels M of $H(\theta )$, which are the union of an $\omega _1$ -continuous $\in $ -chain of $\omega _1$ -guessing, I.C. models is stationary in $\mathcal P_{\omega _3}(H(\theta ))$. The consistency and consequences of this principle are demonstrated in the following diagram. We also prove that one can obtain the above guessing models in a way that the $\omega _1$ -sized $\omega _1$ -guessing models remain $\omega _1$ -guessing model in any outer transitive model with the same $\omega _1$, and we denote this principle by $\rm{SGMP}^+(\omega_3,\omega_1)$.In the following diagram, $\mathrm{TP}$ stands for the tree property; $w\mathrm{KH}$ stands for the weak Kurepa Hypothesis; $\mathrm{MP}$ stands for Mitchell property, i.e., the approachability ideal is trivial modulo the nonstationary ideal; $\mathrm{AP}$ stands for the approachability property; $\mathrm {AMTP}(\kappa ^+)$ states that if $2^\kappa <\aleph _{\kappa ^+}$, then every forcing which adds a new subset of $\kappa ^+$ whose initial segments are in the ground model, collapses some cardinal $\leq 2^{\kappa }$. The dotted arrow denotes the relative consistency, while others are logical implications.Appendices. Appendix A includes merely the above diagram. Appendix B presents a proof of the Mapping Reflection Principle with finite conditions under $\mathrm {PFA}$. Appendix C contains open problems. Finally, the thesis’s bibliography consists of 42 items.Abstract prepared by Rahman MohammadpourE-mail: [email protected]: https://theses.hal.science/tel-03209264. (shrink)

The resurrection axioms are forms of forcing axioms that were introduced recently by Hamkins and Johnstone, who developed on earlier ideas of Chalons and Veličković. In this note, we introduce a stronger form of resurrection and show that it gives rise to families of axioms which are consistent relative to extendible cardinals, and which imply the strongest known instances of forcing axioms, such as Martin’s Maximum++. In addition, we study the unbounded resurrection postulates in terms of consistency lower (...) bounds, obtaining, for example, failures of the weak square principle. (shrink)