I respond to Karin de Boer, Thomas Land, and Claudio La Rocca’s comments on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (CUP 2023). I first provide a quick outline of some of the main claims I make in the book. I then directly address their criticisms, which I group into three categories. The first group of comments raises doubts concerning my characterization of the central tasks of the critique of pure reason. The second targets the fact that (...) I downplay faculty analysis as an essential characteristic of the critique. The third has to do with my claim that the Critique of Pure Reason aims to show that metaphysics is capable of architectonic unity, where this unity is only achievable when we construe metaphysics according to the worldly concept of philosophy. (shrink)

This book focuses on a question issued from The Architectonic of Pure Reason, one of the most important sections of Kant's first Critique: what is the human being? It suggests that the answer to this question is tied to a particular account of the unity of reason - one that stresses its purposive character.

This is a revised version of a paper that was originally presented at the first Kant in Asia international conference (on the theme "The Unity of Human Personhood") in May of 2009. It was published as Chapter 64 in Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), pp.811-821. I argue that Kant and the Yijing both employ a form of architectonic reasoning, though their respective understandings of the logical structure of human (...) reasoning are incommensurable. A more thoroughly revised version of the paper was later published in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy and was followed by a series of several other articles arguing that there is a way of arranging the Yijing's 64 hexagrams such that their form is compatible with the form of Kant's table of categories. (shrink)

‘Human reason’, said Kant, ‘is by nature architectonic, that is, it considers all cognitions as belonging to a possible system’ (1998: 502). One task—maybe the task—of the Critique of Pure Reason i...

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), Kant tells us that.

In The Architectonic of Reason Lea Ypi argues that Kant ultimately fails in his attempt at grounding the systematic unity of reason because of the lack of the practical domain of freedom in the first Critique. I aim to advance a more nuanced reading of Kant’s alleged failure by (1) distinguishing between the schematism of the ideas in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and the schematism of pure reason in the Architectonic. (2) I suggest that, while (...) the practical domain of freedom is not established in the first Critique, the Canon and the Architectonic do account for its condition: the practical employment of reason and its unity with the theoretical. I point out that while (3) the schematism of the ideas accounts for the sole systematic arrangement of the understanding’s cognitions and the regulative role of the ideas and the ideal, in the Architectonic, (4) the schematism of pure reason instead bears more generally on systematicity as reason’s way of proceeding in framing its own unitary whole and the unity between its two lawful employments. (shrink)

This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in other (...) academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Architectonic, Truth, and RhetoricGlenn Alexander MageeScientists, we are often told, employ "aesthetic criteria" in their work: a scientific theory must be "simple" and "elegant" if it is to be a good candidate for truth.1 Is this also true of philosophers? Do philosophers rely (implicitly or explicitly) on aesthetic criteria in the development of their ideas, not simply in order to make their ideas accessible or palatable but also (...) as a guide to truth? This question bears on the relationship between art and philosophy, between art and truth, and between beauty and truth. If the answer is yes, then is there a point at which the line between art and philosophy becomes blurred? This is often claimed, though almost always in reference to the way in which philosophers use metaphor and rhetoric to express their ideas. However, I am suggesting in addition that the line may be blurred not just in the expression of their ideas but in the very form or structure they give to their philosophies. This aesthetic moment is not dispensable. On the contrary, philosophers make their thought into an aesthetic object because of a tacit, pre-reflective intuition that the beautiful is the true. In what follows, I will argue for this thesis and explore its implications.I.First of all, the philosophers I have in mind are philosophers in the classic sense: creators of systematic worldviews, those who aim at knowledge of the whole. I have in mind, therefore, thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, [End Page 59] Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, among others. All these thinkers are alike in that they do not approach philosophy piecemeal, as a set of disconnected "problems." Instead, they take the aim of philosophy to be to give a complete account of what is real. In the introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit, for instance, Hegel writes that philosophy is "actual cognition of what truly is" (1977, 46). This is a definition one can imagine Plato and Aristotle—indeed almost all of the great philosophers—agreeing with. Philosophical knowledge, in this classical understanding, becomes a whole of ideas in which each element depends on every other and nothing of significance is left out. (Perhaps the best example of such a philosophy is, again, Hegel's.) It is only to "systems" of philosophy that our question about aesthetic criteria in philosophy is applicable,2 for it is only when a number of ideas are taken together into an overall structure and given a fundamental unity that a philosophy can become "beautiful" or "ugly."The Greek word sustema literally means "things which stand together or are made to stand together so as to form a whole" or "a whole compounded of several parts" (Klein 1985, 201). The Greeks applied the word to many things but never, it seems, to thought. Then, as Jacob Klein writes, "from about the year 1600 on there is a sudden and most remarkable shift: book after book appears under titles like 'System of Logic,' 'System of Rhetoric,' 'System of Grammar,' 'System of Theology,' 'System of Ethics and Politics,' 'System of Physics,' 'System of Jurisprudence,' 'System of Astronomy,' of Arithmetic, of Geography, of Medicine and even 'System of Systems' " (1985, 201). According to Klein, systematic philosophy is a response to the peculiar anxiety of modernity expressed so well by Yeats: "Things fall apart"—and we need a philosophical system to put them back together again.The idea of a system of philosophy cannot, however, be dismissed merely as a "modern invention," for it is a legitimate extension of the Greek concept of sustema. The Greek philosophers would not have reflected on their activity as "systematic" because they regarded themselves as describing a reality that was itself a sustema. Pressed to explain what philosophers are, Pythagoras, according to legend, compared them to the theoroi or onlookers at the Olympic Games. As Werner Jaeger writes of the legend, "The comparison depends on the ambiguity of the word theorein, which means both watching a spectacle and contemplation and research in the ' theoretical' sense" (1962, 432). Reality is a sustema; the philosopher's account of reality is a reflection of it and thus is itself a sustema... (shrink)

Sympathetic interpretations of Kant’s frequently stressed characterizations of his "architectonic" approach to philosophy are rare. As much as such an approach seemed to gratify Kant, it has embarrassed commentators, who have complained for generations about the "Procrustean bed" or ad hoc quality of Kant’s meta-philosophical principles. The author of this book proposes to take quite seriously the idea of a "unity in Kant’s thinking," but his approach to such an issue is historical and, for the most part, unsystematic. (...) That is, rather than discuss the philosophical importance of a claim for architectonic unity, he instead announces that he will demonstrate that the "unity" of Kant’s entire corpus is the "unity of a problem-determined development in his thinking, not that of a pre-conceived or static system." The result of this approach is a well-informed, but only incidentally thematic summary of Kant’s occasionally continuous, occasionally radically altered views of various Hauptprobleme. (shrink)

This is a thoroughly revised version of a paper that I originally presented at the "Kant in Asia" international conference on "The Unity of Human Personhood, held in Hong Kong in May of 2009. After explaining what Kant means by his "architectonic" form of reasoning, I argue that the Yijing (the Chinese "Book of Changes") exhibits the same type of reasoning. I contrast two uses of architectonic reasoning: divining the truth vs. divination. The article concludes with an (...) illustration of how the Yijing might be used as a guidebook for obtaining wisdom. (shrink)

Aristotle rejected the idea of a single, overarching super-science or “theory of everything”, and he presented a powerful and influential critique of scientific unity. In theory, each science observes the facts unique to its domain, and explains these by means of its own proper principles. But even as he elaborates his prohibition on kind-crossing explanations (Posterior Analytics 1.6-13), Aristotle points out that there are important exceptions—that some sciences are “under” others in that they depend for their explanations on the (...) principles of a superior (more architectonic) science. In this paper, I explore how subordination relations and architectonic structures apply to Aristotle’s scientific practice—including not only the works of theoretical philosophy, which have already been discussed in this connection, but also in and between these and the practical and productive sciences. (shrink)

This volume, an assemblage of essays previously published in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy, conveniently and strategically brings together some of the trenchant interpretations and analyses of the salient, structural aspects of the philosophy of the Yijing. They reveal how the ancient Classic offers a graphically vivid and conceptually dynamic dramaturgy of the ways in which the natural world works in conjunction with the human one. Its cosmological architectonics and philosophical worldview continue to have enormous purchase on our current imagination, (...) even though readerly imperatives and responses have rendered this classic into a text of multiple significances, catering to pluralistic readerships and clienteles. Nonetheless, the essays in this volume lay bare some of the original authorly visions and insights of the Yijing, clearly showing that their apparent truthfulness to our cosmic and human conditions inspire philosophical and even theological questions. The Yijing's authorial designs of the eight trigrams and hexagrams, which encapsulate the primordial state of homo-cosmic phenomena and situations, together with the yin-yang forces and the dao, are taken for granted as integers in a grand universal equation, factored out to represent a ceaselessly changing cosmos in which heaven, earth and humanity commingle, such that the whole and unity can be found in the individual and the opposite, and vice versa. (shrink)

The following analysis of the Protagoras intends: contrary to the traditional tendency to consider the dialogue comparatively amorphous and polythematic, to clarify its argumentative architectonic; contrary to the scholarly view accompanying this tendency that of concern is an early dialogue, to make plausible the genesis of this dialogue after the Symposium; and to lay the groundwork for a more detailed discussion of the thesis that Plato, in his “middle” dialogues, makes the transition from Eleatic logic in its Megarian refraction, (...) which forms the basis of the early dialogues as well as the Gorgias and incidentally also of the first book of the Republic, to that logic of the middle which is to be regarded as the immediate historical forerunner of Aristotelian syllogistic. Particular emphasis is placed in this context on the Protagoras insofar as Plato here not so much makes the discovery of the middle as he reflects it, a discovery which has after more than two thousand years of “classical logic” become inconspicuous to us, but which shattered his relation to the Megarian school and was the first to bury the fifth century logically. (shrink)

The article presents the key problems relevant to the issue of “transcendent Action,” as Peirce calls it. The author focuses on the relation between “belief” and the “transcendentals:” unity, truth, goodness, and beauty, in their peculiar Peirceian context. He considers firstly “belief” in the sense of “an original impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention” and, secondly, “Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, (...) Right, and Beauty.” Finally, he considers Peirce's defense again two popular accusations: one on the part of the logicians which “confounds psychical truths with psychological truths,” and the second one regarding hedonism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John DeweyFrank X. RyanJames A. Good A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John Dewey Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. xxx + 288 pp.Among the revelations of Dewey's rare moments of autobiographical reflection, none has generated more curiosity and investigative zeal than his 1930 claim (...) to have "drifted" from Hegel in the decade following his move from Michigan to Chicago in 1894. Beginning with Morton White's Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism (1943), biographers have divided on the question of whether Dewey's later philosophy was more strongly influenced by William James's experimental psychology or F. J. E. Woodbridge's Aristotelian naturalism. Despite their differences, both approaches are essentially empirical and realistic, and thus the majority of sympathetic commentators have agreed that Dewey was a realist, albeit of a decidedly unorthodox stripe. For them the notion that Dewey retained any significant commitment to idealism, given its virtual eradication at the beginning of the twentieth century, would damage his influence and legacy.It has been something of a puzzle, accordingly, that in the same autobiographical essay Dewey alludes to a "permanent Hegelian deposit." For years Richard Rorty has claimed this differentiates a "good" Dewey committed to "social flourishing" from a "bad" Dewey prone to metaphysical dalliance. But the first systematic inquiry into Dewey's enduring Hegelianism is John R. Shook's Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000). Shook argues convincingly that Dewey never abandoned idealism, but rather transformed it into an experimental naturalism by doing away with both "mind-stuff" and equally noxious "things-in-themselves." In many ways James Good's A Search for Unity in Diversity is a bookend to Shook's project, though Good further differentiates Anglo-American Neo-Hegelianism from Hegel himself. According to Good, Dewey endorsed a Humanistic/Historicist interpretation of Hegel rooted in the reciprocal engagement of individuals and societies, rather than the supernatural and architectonic absolute championed by Neo-Hegelians such as T. H. Green, and F. H. Bradley. With [End Page 216] top-notch scholarship and scrupulous attention to detail, A Search for Unity in Diversity is both an excellent intellectual biography and a penetrating plea for a radical reinterpretation of Dewey's contribution to philosophy. I'll briefly sketch the historical account before addressing the more controversial claims about the "permanent Hegelian deposit."Even readers familiar with the half-dozen book-length treatments of Dewey's development will find this account refreshing and informative. Good's professional credentials as a historian shine as he recreates the rough and bustling Burlington of Dewey's youth. In the 1870s, German idealism was considered the epitome of political liberalism and progressive education, and Dewey's journey toward the "inclusive philosophical idea" of the social began in an environment swirling with the crosscurrents of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. At the White Street Congregational Church, Lewis Barstow preached a liberal orthodoxy that was essentially "man-building" (102), and Good presents a convincing case for the likelihood that even in boyhood Dewey never viewed God as an aloof law-giver or cosmic architect, but as a process unifying the individual and the social within a natural world of unlimited potential. At the University of Vermont Dewey encountered a struggling rural college transformed into the first bastion of American transcendentalism by James Marsh, who inspired a "Burlington philosophy" that rejected atomistic empiricism for a holistic integrity of knowing and doing, facts and values, and pure and practical reasons (57–59).In noting the influence of the "St. Louis Hegelians" upon Dewey, most biographers have focused on W. T. Harris, the prominent founder of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy who published Dewey's earliest submissions and offered encouragement that led to his pursuit of graduate work at Johns Hopkins. Good augments this familiar tale with fascinating depictions of equally influential yet lesser-known Hegelians such as H. C. Brokmeyer, Denton Snider, and Thomas Davidson. At a time when European Hegelianism was polarized between, on the one hand, reactionary apologists for traditional Christianity and Prussian militarism and, on the other, radical... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John DeweyFrank X. RyanJames A. Good A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John Dewey Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. xxx + 288 pp.Among the revelations of Dewey's rare moments of autobiographical reflection, none has generated more curiosity and investigative zeal than his 1930 claim (...) to have "drifted" from Hegel in the decade following his move from Michigan to Chicago in 1894. Beginning with Morton White's Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism (1943), biographers have divided on the question of whether Dewey's later philosophy was more strongly influenced by William James's experimental psychology or F. J. E. Woodbridge's Aristotelian naturalism. Despite their differences, both approaches are essentially empirical and realistic, and thus the majority of sympathetic commentators have agreed that Dewey was a realist, albeit of a decidedly unorthodox stripe. For them the notion that Dewey retained any significant commitment to idealism, given its virtual eradication at the beginning of the twentieth century, would damage his influence and legacy.It has been something of a puzzle, accordingly, that in the same autobiographical essay Dewey alludes to a "permanent Hegelian deposit." For years Richard Rorty has claimed this differentiates a "good" Dewey committed to "social flourishing" from a "bad" Dewey prone to metaphysical dalliance. But the first systematic inquiry into Dewey's enduring Hegelianism is John R. Shook's Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000). Shook argues convincingly that Dewey never abandoned idealism, but rather transformed it into an experimental naturalism by doing away with both "mind-stuff" and equally noxious "things-in-themselves." In many ways James Good's A Search for Unity in Diversity is a bookend to Shook's project, though Good further differentiates Anglo-American Neo-Hegelianism from Hegel himself. According to Good, Dewey endorsed a Humanistic/Historicist interpretation of Hegel rooted in the reciprocal engagement of individuals and societies, rather than the supernatural and architectonic absolute championed by Neo-Hegelians such as T. H. Green, and F. H. Bradley. With [End Page 216] top-notch scholarship and scrupulous attention to detail, A Search for Unity in Diversity is both an excellent intellectual biography and a penetrating plea for a radical reinterpretation of Dewey's contribution to philosophy. I'll briefly sketch the historical account before addressing the more controversial claims about the "permanent Hegelian deposit."Even readers familiar with the half-dozen book-length treatments of Dewey's development will find this account refreshing and informative. Good's professional credentials as a historian shine as he recreates the rough and bustling Burlington of Dewey's youth. In the 1870s, German idealism was considered the epitome of political liberalism and progressive education, and Dewey's journey toward the "inclusive philosophical idea" of the social began in an environment swirling with the crosscurrents of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. At the White Street Congregational Church, Lewis Barstow preached a liberal orthodoxy that was essentially "man-building" (102), and Good presents a convincing case for the likelihood that even in boyhood Dewey never viewed God as an aloof law-giver or cosmic architect, but as a process unifying the individual and the social within a natural world of unlimited potential. At the University of Vermont Dewey encountered a struggling rural college transformed into the first bastion of American transcendentalism by James Marsh, who inspired a "Burlington philosophy" that rejected atomistic empiricism for a holistic integrity of knowing and doing, facts and values, and pure and practical reasons (57–59).In noting the influence of the "St. Louis Hegelians" upon Dewey, most biographers have focused on W. T. Harris, the prominent founder of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy who published Dewey's earliest submissions and offered encouragement that led to his pursuit of graduate work at Johns Hopkins. Good augments this familiar tale with fascinating depictions of equally influential yet lesser-known Hegelians such as H. C. Brokmeyer, Denton Snider, and Thomas Davidson. At a time when European Hegelianism was polarized between, on the one hand, reactionary apologists for traditional Christianity and Prussian militarism and, on the other, radical... (shrink)

Philosophy is the search for the large patterns of the world and of the large patterns of experience, perceptual, theoretical, . . . , aesthetic, and practical - the patterns that, regardless of specific contents, characterize the main types of experience. In this book I carry out my search for the large patterns of practical experience: the experience of deliberation, of recognition of duties and their conflicts, of attempts to guide other person's conduct, of deciding to act, of influencing the (...) physical world with one's doings, and the like. This is the experience that makes possible our social life, the formulation of plans for teamwork, the building of institutions, the development of nations, and the adoption of the ideal of morality. Here I develop a network of theories about the most fundamental aspects of practical thinking: what is thought in such thinking; what makes that thinking correct; what makes it practical; and the structure of the doings that accrue to the world when such thinking is effective. I have attempted to build each theory in sufficient detail, so that it il luminates its subject matter with a certain degree of fullness. But I have also aimed at producing an harmonious system of theories, so that the grand pattern of practical thinking can be admired, not only for the beauty of the separate structures of its parts, but also for its architectonic unity. Chapter 1 gives the details of the many facets of this project and discusses some methodological techniques. (shrink)

In two often neglected passages of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant submits that the Critique is a 'treatise' or a 'doctrine of method'. These passages are puzzling because the Critique is only cursorily concerned with identifying adequate procedures of argument for philosophy. In this book, Gabriele Gava argues that these passages point out that the Critique is the doctrine of method of metaphysics. Doctrines of method have the task of showing that a given science is indeed a science because (...) it possesses 'architectonic unity' – which happens when it realizes the 'idea' of a science. According to Gava's novel approach, the Critique establishes that metaphysics is capable of this unity, and his reading of the Critique from this perspective not only illuminates the central role of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method within it, but also clarifies the relationship between the different parts of the work. (shrink)

       As is appropriate for an introductory text, Douglas Burnham’s book opens with a chapter providing general background information on Kant, a systematic overview of the whole Critical philosophy, a sketch of the basic issues dealt with in the third Critique, and an explanation of the overall structure of Kant’s book. Here and throughout Burnham’s book each section ends with a helpful summary, with diagrams and other convenient “lists†being supplied along the way for (...) added clarity. For the most part, these summaries are reliable. The author’s interpretations, however, occasionally suffer from some rather unfortunate mistakes. For example, when contrasting the categories with the principles (p.14), Burnham cites the principle of non-contradiction as the primary example; yet Kant’s expressed reason for mentioning this “principle†in A150- 3/B189-93 is to contrast it with the principles that function as applications of the categories. Likewise, while Burnham’s catalogue of the four “parts of sensibility†(pp.13-14), composed by grouping imagination (reproductive and productive) together with sensation and pure intuition, makes for an intriguing interpretation, especially as applied to the third Critique, he does not inform his (unknowing) student reader that the position he presents is far from being expressed so unambiguously in Kant’s text.        The main content of Burnham’s book is divided into five chapters that follow a more or less predictable – though sometimes rather idiosyncratic – order. Chapter 1 explains three of the four “moments†of beauty, but does so in a manner that wholly neglects Kant’s own understanding of their architectonic unity. Burnham discusses the second moment (universality) first, the first moment (disinterestedness) second, and the fourth moment (necessity) third! Moreover, he then devotes the entirety of Chapter 2 to a discussion of the third moment (purposiveness).. (shrink)

The Venezuelan poet and philosopher Ludovico Silva argues that much of the confusion around Marx's work results from a failure to understand his mode of expression. Through meticulous readings of key passages in Marx's oeuvre, Silva isolates the central elements of his style: the search for an architectonic unity at the level of the text, his capacity to express himself dialectically at the level of the sentence, and, above all, his great gift for metaphor.

In this chapter, I investigate a problem for Kant’s claim that metaphysics can reach the status of science. The problem arises when one considers Kant’s account of the “architectonic unity” of metaphysics in the Architectonic of Pure Reason. Attaining architectonic unity is a condition for becoming a science for any body of cognitions that purports to be such. This is achieved when the cognitions belonging to a science are systematically organized according to the “idea of (...) reason” which lies at the basis of that science. However, Kant suggests that nobody can ever legitimately claim to have matched the idea of the philosopher, where this appears to imply that nobody can justifiably claim that she has fully grasped the idea of metaphysics. This generates a problem. I suggest that when Kant claims that the idea of the philosopher must remain an ideal or an archetype, he has a particular conception of philosophy in mind, that is, philosophy as a doctrine of wisdom. According to this understanding, philosophy must provide an example of how one can become virtuous. However, this is only a partial solution to our problem, for reasons that will be illustrated. (shrink)

Gabriele Gava's new monograph makes sense of Kant's obscure claim that the Critique of Pure Reason is a "doctrine of method" for the science of metaphysics. Gava does this by offering a reading of the whole Critique as aiming to show that metaphysics can become an "architectonic" science. The book shows impressive range; it covers diverse topics throughout the Aesthetic, Analytic, Dialectic, and Method, brings out appealing parallels between them, and relates them to the task of exhibiting metaphysic's (...) class='Hi'>architectonic unity. But, I argue, it stops short of a full explanation of how the Critique is meant to outline or anticipate the whole of metaphysics in advance of actually completing that science. (shrink)

I raise three objections for Gava’s thesis that the primary task of the Critique of Pure Reason is to develop a doctrine of method for metaphysics, understood as an account of the special kind of unity that a body of cognitions must exhibit to count as a science. First, I argue that this thesis has difficulty accommodating Kant’s concern with explaining the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. This concern is motivated by a question that is prior to the (...) issue of scientific unity. Second, I argue that the context of the passage in which Kant calls the Critique a treatise on method makes clear that the remark concerns the Copernican Turn. This suggests that the method treated in the book is the procedure required by the Copernican Turn. Third, I dispute Gava’s claim that the idea that confers unity on metaphysics is the cosmopolitan concept of philosophy. (shrink)

At what is arguably the most significant turning point in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Immanuel Kant has just completed his exploration of the safe ground of possible experience and is about to embark on the Transcendental Dialectic’s exploration of the stormy sea of metaphysics, he introduces one of the greatest curiosities in the Kantian corpus: a “table … of the concept of nothing” (A290/B346-A292/B349). The brief passage, which is tacked on to the end of a “Remark” that supplements (...) an Appendix to a weighty chapter exploring “the Ground of the Distinction of all Objects [Gegenstände] in General into Phenomena and Noumena” (A235/B294), appears as an afterthought to an afterthought to an afterthought and is thus easily overlooked by interpreters. Indeed, the passage may seem to be little more than an amusing distraction, perhaps intended as light entertainment before Kant undertakes the real work of demolishing traditional metaphysics; or at best, it might be one of those annoying sections whose only reason for existing is to fill a perceived (but artificial) gap in the completeness of Kant’s systematic conception of reason’s architectonic unity. This chapter takes the argument seriously, notwithstanding its widespread neglect, by unpacking the specific purpose served by each perspective on “nothing” that appears in Kant’s table. Closer analysis shows how the table clarifies Kant’s notion of “something in general” by contrasting it with four distinct opposites. The passage thereby orients us to appreciate how the Critique secures the status of metaphysics as queen of the sciences. (shrink)

In The Architectonic of Reason, Lea Ypi provides an illuminating and innovative interpretation of the Architectonic in the first Critique. Ypi argues that Kant’s project of uniting practical and theoretical uses of reason in a critical metaphysics ultimately fails because practical reason does not have its own domain in which to legislate. This article challenges Ypi’s objection to practical reason’s lack of a domain in the first Critique. Its main contention is that reason’s need for unity in (...) legislation may be satisfied by a belief in God as a necessary practical presupposition rather than a dogmatic metaphysical reality. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt I. Unity and Hierarchy II. Beyond Unity towards Totality III. Cognition and Action IV. On some Transformations of the Concept of Ideal V. Ethics instead of the Dogmatic Dress VI. From Religion to Speculation VII. Religion and its Misplacement VIII. Will and Social Contract IX. Architectonics and Edifice Print-on-Demand-Nachdruck der Ausgabe von 1984.

This article provides an overview of recent developments in solving the timing problem (discreteness vs. continuity) in cognitive neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies have been considered, with an emphasis on the framework of Operational Architectonics (OA) of brain functioning (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2005). This framework explores the temporal structure of information flow and interarea interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp EEG, on the millisecond scale. We conclude, based (...) on the OA framework, that brain functioning is best conceptualized in terms of continuity-discreteness unity which is also the characteristic property of cognition. At the end we emphasize where one might productively proceed for the future research. (shrink)

Kant considers unity of aim as connected to the form of a whole, what makes impossible to reject any of its parts. Science emerges a priori as an idea which, requiring for its own realization a scheme, due to unity of the aim architectonically makes the whole possible. Scheme of science divides the whole in connection with its idea. Kant opposes science and technic, i.e. accidental efficient deeds, which cannot constitute the whole. Plato considers the One to be (...) prior principle. Connection between the One and intelligible to the mind is indicated by scheme. Therefore, the author aims to compare two types of schematism. Need do divide the whole serves as a basis for comparison. Plato needs it to dialectically envisage scheme of division the whole. Kant – to divide the whole in connection to aim. (shrink)

In this thesis I investigate the notion of experience in German Idealist Philosophy. I focus on the exploration of an alternative to the transcendental model notion of experience through Schelling's insight into the notion of logogrif. The structural division of this project into two sections reflects the two theoretical standpoints of this project, namely the logic and the logogrif of experience. The first section - the logic of experience - explores the notion of experience provided in Kant's Critique of Pure (...) Reason, Critique of Judgement and Fichte's Science of Knowledge. I argue that Kant's fundamental question about the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements succeeds in thematising the aporia of cognitive experience but results in a subject-oriented, representational model which radically confines the notion of experience to the constitutive laws of the understanding or to the normative precepts of Reason. Experience is founded upon a sharp division between faith and knowledge, will and logic, desire and reflection, absolute and finitude. Fichte's endeavour to articulate a non-representational account of experience, does not succeed in extricating itself from the representational model, so long as experience is reduced to the ever-producing deeds of the self-positing ego. Despite the serious differences between Kant's and Fichte's notions of experience, both accounts, so long as they unfold from a transcendental standpoint, attempt to resolve experience into conceptual laws or determinations of the ego's absolute will. Experience is transformed into an object of the subject's cognitive or volitional faculties. The paradoxes of man's interaction with the world are intended to be accommodated either by the law-giving spontaneity of the understanding and the Architectonic of Pure Reason or by the overpowerful primordial act of the self-positing ego. This implies the conceptualisation of the self in terms of constant identity-through-time, or sheer self-determination. However, this conceptualisation remains at the normative or prescriptive level, which in turn is projected upon the world. The latter, though appears as the subject's property, essentially remains alien and opaque, confirming the radical limitations of the ego rather than its order-giving authority. Moreover, this notion of experience is ultimately founded upon a radical expulsion of the divine from the world, the de-spiritualisation of the sensual and the de-sensualisation of the spiritual, the sharp juxtaposition between absolute and finitude. This results in a self-defeating subjectivity, whose firm identity and rule-giving authority does not rescue it from its perennial unattainability to 'organise the conditioned' or 'conquer the unconditioned'. In Kant's and Fichte's thought, however, I detect elements that potentially transgress their transcendental account of experience. These are found in Kant's concept of spontaneity and free play between understanding and imagination, and Fichte's concept of productivity. I argue that these elements lose their potential dynamism, so long as they are absorbed by the transcendental demands for the solution of the aporias of logic. However, these elements point to the need for a radical re-conceptualisation of the notion of experience. This is provided by means of Schelling's logogriflic approach, which constitutes the theme of the second section. The second section - the logogrif of experience - attempts to articulate a different approach towards the notion of experience, through an exploration of Schelling's versatile and provocative thought. This section focuses on Schelling's original insight into the notion and act of logogrif, which opens the dialogue between logos and mythos, cosmic becoming and human soul, cosmic imagination and human reflection, faith and knowledge. This section attempts to illuminate Schelling's fascinating philosophical investigations and discoveries that have been rather overlooked, possibly, due to Hegel's overwhelming critique. This section, after a brief critical examination of the Identity Philosophy, attempts to elucidate Schelling's notion of experience through his middle works, Of Human Freedom, Ages of the World, The Deities of Samothrace, which are treated as a self-developing trilogy. Schelling re-addresses the aporias of logic not as part of Reason's self-interrogation but as part of the cosmic paradoxes and living experiences. In this way, Schelling resets the scene of the debate on the conditions of possibility for cognitive experience by putting on the stage the enigmas of the cosmos and life rather than the Tribunal of Reason. Logic itself is conceived as a potency in the cosmic becoming, and consequently can no longer attempt to establish the transcendental conditions for the possibility of cognitive experience. Cosmic becoming, in which man is an active part, is conceived as the process of the movement, the interaction, the transformations and transmutations of multiple potencies. These, far beyond any mechanical conceptualisation, appear as self-moving and yet interdependent, unknown yet familiar, inscrutable and yet manifest powers, describing the mystery of life itself. The latter is depicted as an ever-recurrent act of longing for self-expression as active unity. Experience is conceived as the lived process of a network of living potencies, which may not only resist rational powers but may also puzzle and seize them. In this context, reflection acquires a plastic dimension, as opposed to its rigidity in the representational model of experience. Reflection depicts cosmic longing's self-formation, whose man is part. This self-bending formation partially illuminates the nature of longing, and from this standpoint is the logic of the longing. However, this formation is movable, transmutable and mostly ineffable, and from this standpoint is the logic of a riddle: a logogrif. Logogrif is the transitive term that attempts to describe the transition of experience from its enacted phase to its allusive conceptual utterance, and in this sense the term itself participates in both phases, as both form of thought and form of life. The logogrific approach to experience in turn transposes us as from the realm of pure concepts to the realm of the mystery of life, from pure thought to acts of longing, from the Architectonic of Pure Reason to Cosmic Theurgy. The latter term attempts to grasp the paradox and dynamism of cosmic and non-cosmic becoming by means of multiple, vanishing and ever-recurring, transmutable potencies, or in Schelling's terms 'the magic of insoluble life'. Schelling's logogrific account consists in a powerful voice for the re-enchantment of the world, the introduction into the notion of experience of the imminence of the divine. This is not suggested in terms of the adoption of old religious doctrines but by means of the discovery and re-discovery of the theurgy of life, through the intensification of our artistic mood, the creative expansion of our deeds. This notion of experience allows for the reconsideration of the notion of the self, in terms of a dynamic, conflictual process between conscious and unconscious powers and the critical revaluation of the accounts of subjectivity which reduce it to the sphere of self-consciousness. The thesis concludes with the need for an investigation into the relation between logos and mythos, which only tangentially has been introduced by the present project. In this context it will be possible to re-appraise the potential that the logogrific approach opens for an alternative to both logical and traditional mythological patterns of thinking. (shrink)

The relevance of the research reflects the unity of the requirements of the Beijing Philosophical Congress "Learning to be a man" and the anniversary report of the "Rome Club" "Come On! Capitalism, myopia, population and destruction of the planet", which the transformation processes of the socio-sphere are revealed from the standpoint the need for a radical breakdown of the spiritual and moral world of man and his worldview. The foundation of these transformations is the transition in education, as the (...) hippocrine of our knowledge, the source that quenches thirst in them to the "new Enlightenment" as a decisive factor in the learning of a person to be him. This determined the purpose and objectives of the article. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the natural and necessary character of the formation of the "new Enlightenment", to reveal the architectonics of its content. Research objectives : in the context of the goal to uncover the factors that determine the need for a transition in education to the "new Enlightenment", its qualitative difference from the Enlightenment of the 17th-18th centuries; to characterize the new content of "connectedness" in education based on the use of new information technologies; analyze the process of formation of a new spiritual and moral outlook of a specialist on the universal values of humanity; focus the learner’s attention on focusing knowledge of sustainable development as a determining factor of the global problems of mankind through the interrelation of academic disciplines; an important component presents the demand for the formation of a new integral thinking, innovative in its essence and qualitatively different from the analytical one. It is noted that the transition to the path of integral thinking contributes to the connection, coordination and organization into a single whole of the fragments of the object under study. Such thinking is characterized by stability, reliability, variability; it is original in its connections with science and education, and methodological influence on individual and social consciousness. Integral thinking reflects a qualitatively new level of intelligence. Research methods: to achieve the stated goal and constructive solution of the tasks, the article used the method of abduction, analysis and synthesis, historical and logical, synergistic approach. The results of the research: a new paradigm of education is represented – the noospheric-information one corresponding to the factuality of the “new Enlightenment”, as its ability to reproduce itself on a changing scale. The change in the scale of the socio-sphere is due to its globalization processes. The content of the “new Enlightenment” is explicated as a qualitatively new level of formation of students' sustainable knowledge based on the integral innovative type of thinking based on the information resources of society, the use of modern educational technologies, as well as on the values of society, as the quintessence of its wisdom and public intelligence. Conclusions. Thus, the formation of a "new Enlightenment" is natural and necessary. This follows from the requirements of the “learn to be human” program, as well as from the development of an internally ordered education process. “New Enlightenment” also has an attribute of uniqueness, since it does not have anything to compare with, identify; it is an objective, essential, unique phenomenon; it is single, relative, determined by the previous development of education. It is based on the processes of intellectualization, innovation, informational content, humanism and is capable of solving constructively the tasks facing society. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the development of Kurt Walter Zeidler's argument for a reformulation of Kant's transcendental dialectic as a theory of the foundation of transcendental logic. It therefore examines his doctoral dissertation "Logik des Erkenntnisprozesses. Dedukton - Induktion - Abduktion" (1979), where he discusses Norwood Russell Hansons 'logic of discovery' and finds an analogy between Charls S. Peirce's definiton of 'abduction' and Hegel's defintion of 'analogy', as well as his early papers, collected in "Grundlegungen. Zur Theorie der Vernunft und Letztbegründung" (...) (2015), and his habilitation dissertation "Vernunft und Erfahrung. Untersuchungen zum Erkenntnisproblem in Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie" (1986), where he first seeks to verify the claim of Hegel and Peirce, that the synthetical unity of apperception is to be analyzed as a unity of three forms of syllogism corresponding to Aristotle's three figures of syllogism, through a close study of Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories as well as of the transcendental ideas, before he comes to reformulate these deductions in the light of the original unity of sensuality and understanding. The development of this argument is critically examined in three respects, first, in reference to Zeidler's reading of Peirce, Hegel and Schelling, second, with respect to Zeidler's analysis of scientific rationality as well as of the architectonic of the Critique of pure reason, and third, in view of the influence of Erhard Oeser and Erich Heintel on Zeidler's thought. (shrink)

Kant’s dualism in anthropology and morality is said to be bridged only by means of a teleology that seems to betray the historical constitution of its subjectivity. And yet the Kantianarticulation of problems of theoretical and practical reason can be explored only insofar as they help us understand the correlated issues of the unity of reason, the relation of aesthetics and ethics in the light of the three Critiques, and the teleological conception of history. In this paper, I argue (...) for a teleological reading of the systematic architectonic so as to make sense of the concept of purposiveness as the a priori principle of judgment in its logical, aesthetic, and teleological reflection and of the unifying, a priori principles of each faculty–namely, conformity to law, final purpose, and conformity to purpose or purposiveness – respectively dealt with in the three Critiques. (shrink)

I argue for a new delimitation of what Kant means by ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’, on the basis of the intermediate, transitional place that Kant gives to cognition in the ‘progression [Stufenleiter]’ of our representations and our consciousness of them. I show how cognition differs from mental acts lying earlier on this progression—such as sensing, intuiting, and perceiving—and also how cognition differs from acts lying later on this progression—such as explaining, having insight, and comprehending. I also argue that cognition should not be (...) confused with ‘knowledge [Wissen]’, insofar as knowledge represents the culmination of a separate orthogonal progression of acts of ‘holding-true’. Along the way, I show how having in focus the specific progression from representation, to consciousness, to cognition (and beyond) allows us to better appreciate the architectonic significance of the progression of Kant’s analysis in the first Critique (and beyond), and also helps to illuminate the unity of Kant’s account of cognition itself across its variety of (empirical, mathematical, philosophical) forms. (shrink)

Human reason consists of all the patterns of individuation and order, of a priori concepts, principles, ideas and the ideal, as well as interests, needs, imperatives, postulates, and ends, whether embodied in theory, in practice, or in aesthetic judgment. Our reason is not an aggregate but a system. In other words, the unity of all these aspects, parts, and activities of reason is determined a priori and, therefore, necessarily. This multiplicity is subordinated to the unity of the end (...) of reason as a whole. Kant deals with this problem in “The Architectonic of Pure Reason” of the Critique of Pure Reason. Architectonic is the art of systems, a theory about the scientific nature of our knowledge, since there is no science without systematic unity. (shrink)

Pandit Gopinath Kaviraj of Varanasi, India was a well-known interpreter of the Hindu Tantric traditions, who also practiced kundalini yoga according to his own understanding of four sequential paths. This study attempts to reconstruct the stages of Kaviraj's system of Tantric yoga by analyzing and integrating innumerable partial discussions scattered throughout his writings, in an effort to reveal the hidden structure of transformations. Primary research materials include collections of Kaviraj's essays on the Hindu Tantric traditions written in Bengali and Hindi, (...) and his philosophical notebook, Svasambedana . ;The concepts of formal and material ontologies, developed for linguistic theory by Ashok Kumar Gangadeen, are adopted in analyzing the category structure of Kaviraj's four paths. A synchronic methodology is used to present Kaviraj's interpretations of the Kashmir Saiva, S akta Tantric and Sahajiy a Vaisnava traditions in relation to known Tantric concepts and practices, found in the classical texts and secondary literature on these traditions. Categories that belong to the material ontologies of the various Tantric sects are examined for trans-sectarian thematic unity and for explicating the processual patterns that constitute the formal ontology which Kaviraj sees as underlying his own four paths. This formal ontology is based on the principle of increments of consciousness by which kundalini/ develops. ;Each of Kaviraj's Tantric paths incorporates orthodox Hindu forms of spiritual realization, but utilizes different means to them, as well as moves beyond them to uniquely Tantric forms of integral realization. Technical terms are discussed from the relevant traditional Hindu perspective and then from their revalorization in relation to uniquely Tantric forms of yogic realization. ;Kaviraj's systemic perspective on the architectonics of his four Tantric paths is also reconstructed and systematized from various schemata found in Svasambedana. Analyses are concerned both with structural replication and with understanding the series of paths as a single continuum based on laws of dialectical synthesis. Finally, there is a discussion of Kaviraj's supreme integral yoga , his own advanced practice for universal integral Self-realization, as taught by his guru and other adepts of the Jnanaganj asram of Tibet. An inquiry is made into its kala-structure, and it is suggested to be an innovative fifth path which utilizes the structure of the other four paths for the bestowal of universal grace. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe main subject examined in this paper is Immanuel Kant's controversy withPhilosophisches Magazinregarding Kant's new theory of judgments. J. A. Eberhard, editor ofPhilosophisches Magazin, and his colleagues wanted to vindicate the Wollfian traditional concept of judgments by undermining Kant's claims. As will be demonstrated, their arguments were effective mainly in exposing the ambiguity that was inherent in Kant's concept of the synthetic a priori; an ambiguity that resulted from Kant's desire—central to his critique of metaphysics—to present judgments pertaining to (...) mathematics, (dogmatic) metaphysics, and pure natural science as judgments which shared a common form. Exposing this ambiguity was not the intended result, and it was insufficient for the purpose of vindicating the Wollfian tradition. The contributors toPhilosophisches Magazinignored the important properties shared by the class of judgments falling under Kant's concept of synthetic a priori judgments. They also ignored the fact that their position was unable to account for the logical phenomena that motivated Kant to present a new theory of judgments. On the other hand, Kant's theory of judgments was insensitive to the important differences that exist among the distinct types of judgments falling under his concept of a synthetic a priori judgment. This latter point is clearly shown in the controversy regarding the novelty of Kant's concept of a synthetic a priori judgment, and in the controversy regarding the function of intuitions within synthetic judgments.A result of the controversy was that Kant's concept of the synthetic a priori, which he believed to be an exact concept, was revealed to be a metaphor: no more than an invitation to view certain intellectual fields in the light of others. On the other hand, Eberhard and his colleagues failed to come up with satisfactory answers to Kant's questions within their traditional concept of judgment. Both parties refused to acknowledge this result. Consequently, the search for a new logic, a new architectonic order, and a new unity within reason became a general problem for the new generation of philosophers. (shrink)

Hegel had taken the Kantian categories of thought to be merely formal, without content, since, he argued, Kant abstracted the conditions of thought from the world. The Kantian categories can, as such, only be understood subjectively and so are unable to secure a content for themselves. Hegel, following Fichte, tried to provide a content for the logical categories. In order to reinstate an objective status for logic and conceptuality he tries to affirm the unity of thought and being. The (...) idea that this unity is established by reinstating a pre-Kantian metaphysics has in most of the recent Hegel literature been discredited. In the wake of this non-metaphysical Hegel there is a concern that the architectonic of concepts which is taken as the organizing principle of consciousness offers an account of experience which is too schematic. While Hegel disputes the intuition/concept distinction as it is played out in Kant and Fichte, he does nevertheless retain some residue of a notion of intuition in his theory of the Concept. This is central to understanding his notion of experience as it can't simply be equated with rule governed conceptuality. Satisfying the demands of reason for Hegel requires more than conceiving our experience solely as judgments. (shrink)

This paper argues that to progress with philosophical issues concerning brain-mind relations one needs to combine philosophical reflection and empirical research with theoretical model building. Philosophy and abstract theorizing alone do not carry us far, as will be illustrated by analyzing the views about panpsychism by the quantum physicist David Bohm, who builds his reasoning on quantum mechanical analogies. His reflection around the notion of active information, adopted in his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics to replace the Newtonian notion of (...) force, turns out to be a fallacy of equivocation. His other line of reasoning to specify matter-mind unity in terms of soma-significance and signa-somatic processes yields problems of its own. To illustrate empirical investigations on brain-mind relations, I shall present the tripartite model of the experiential selfhood and the related Self-Me-I index as proposed by the neuroscientists Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, along with their background theory called operational architectonics (OA) of brain-mind functioning. The model states that the three components of selfhood, Self, Me, and I, correlate to three distinct operationally synchronized cortical areas, the frontal cortex, the right posterior cortex, and the left posterior cortex. The philosophical and practical benefits of their framework will be exemplified by presenting the results of a series of studies with the philosopher Tarja Kallio-Tamminen about the effects of meditation reflected in the Self-Me-I index. (shrink)

History plays an important part internally to the Kantian architectonic. In what follows, I argue that Kant’s conception of history as a unified whole presents distinctive features that are illuminating about the critical and moral commitments of his philosophy, and also conversely, that his conception of philosophy makes specific demands that his philosophical history aims to fulfill. The argument is structured around four questions, each of which I take in turn: Why does Kant believe it important that history be (...) seen as forming a whole? How does he argue for the unity of the whole? What are the specific claims he makes about history? And why should anyone care for philosophical history? (shrink)

Reilly approaches his topic by presenting the spirit of science and the phases of scientific inquiry as Peirce saw it, keeping before the reader, at all times, Peirce’s overarching view of man and the universe. The two prevailing themes guiding Peirce’s thought are 1) that there is a special conformity of the human mind to nature and of nature to God, and 2) that there is an architectonic qualifying all the various types and levels of treatment which occupy the (...) philosopher’s interest. The first question examined is the nature of the scientific concern. For Peirce, the scientist’s spirit is marked by the pure love of knowledge. It is important to note the theoretical aspect because it explains the possibility of holding belief in abeyance while examining nature: the purity of motive allows that proper questions will be asked and errors will be readily corrected. The scientist’s purpose is the real truth of things; he begins with questions about the world. There are four stages of scientific method: 1) The scientist observes nature as a thinking, analytic inquirer. Observation presupposes that nature is intelligibly structured. 2) He formulates an explanatory hypothesis which is a process of bringing a manifold of characters to a unified whole. 3) By deduction, the inquirer gathers experiential consequents of the hypothesis. 4) By induction the question is put to nature and observed phenomena are matched to the predicted phenomena, resulting in either truth or a modified hypothesis. Peirce’s principle of the kinship of man’s mind to nature supports his dictum to follow instinct over reasoned likelihood in choosing hypotheses. Also important is the doctrine of moderate fallibilism which holds that there is a convergence upon the truth founded upon the regularity of nature, but that chance is a real factor due to nature’s evolution. Reilly’s book gives an adequate account of the aspects of Peirce’s scientific method sacrificing specific and detailed analysis to a more general approach wherein he shows the unity operative throughout Peirce’s thinking. A good index and copious notes are provided.—W. A. F. (shrink)

I argue that Kant’s four Paralogistic conclusions concerning (a) substantiality; (b1) unity and (b2) immortality, in the famous “Achillesargument”; (c) personal identity; and (d) metaphysical idealism, in the first edition Critique of Pure Reason (1781), are all connectedby being grounded in a common underlying rational principle, an a priori (universal and necessary) presupposition, namely, that boththe mind and its essential attribute of thinking are immaterial and unextended, i.e., simple. Consequently, despite Kant’s predilectionfor architectonic divisions and separations, I show (...) that in fact the simplicity assumption grounds all four Paralogisms and reinforcesKant’s corresponding commitments to the principles of continuity and coherence. Further, I maintain that Kant, under the influence ofhis earlier Leibnizian and subjective idealist leanings, continued to be guided in the first edition Critique, not only in the Paralogismsbut also in certain sections of the Analytic, by emphasizing unconscious activities, which once more reinforced his commitments to aparadigm of the simplicity, unity, and identity of self-consciousness or apperception. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS God Encountered: A Contemporary Catholic Systematic Theology. Vol. I: Understanding the Christi.an Faith. By FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989. Pp. xiii + 338. $27.95. Frans Jozef van Beeck has written an excellent first volume of a projected three-volume opus of systematic theology, a book at once erudite and elegant, complicated in articulated structure yet simple in synthetic viewpoint. The work's (...) class='Hi'>architectonic themes are: theology as an objective interpretive understanding which occurs within and also extends the "Great Tradition," and which has as its object a real God, not simply theology itself and its practitioners (who increasingly see themselves as merely meta-theologians) ; the explanatory category of encounter/experience as denoting the locus of human contact with the divine; the Greek theological motif of grace as divinization, and the Eastern understanding of Christology's exchange principle, together with the Western emphases on creation's exitus from God and reditus to God, all of which van Beeck uses to illumine a catholic interpretation of what our encounter with the divine involves. In addition, pleasingly sprinkled throughout the book are lapidary phrases such as "[theology's] pursuit of pi.a veritas amounts to vera pietas" (p. 26) and " understanding is... more humane and peaceful than coin and cannon" {p. 33). One may grasp the central insights and concerns of the book by comprehending how well its three titles synopsize and synthesize its basic themes. Its main subtitle shows that it is a systematic theology whose nourishing forms are catholicity and contemporaneity. Section 6 underlines just how systematic van Beeck wants his work to be; it is divided into chapters, numbered sections, and lettered subsections so that its arrangement supports " an internal reference system inde· pendent of pagination" (p. 11). The work is unabashedly catholic in the sense of a universal and ecumenical catholicity which is normative for all theology, comprising as it does both an integrity with the past and an openness to the present and future; it is also forthrightly Catholic in the more "positive " sense of advancing ideas peculiarly evident in Catholicism. In both senses, van Beeck sees a Catholic systematics as respecting the " Great Tradition " and desiring to understand it more deeply and as stressing the organic unity of Christian theology, which 141 142 BOOK REVIEWS current emphases on pluralism and specialization jeopardize. Sections 21-22 discuss the catholicity of theology as a pluriform, hierarchical system of truths and briefly describe some of the current pluralism within theology, concluding that "if systematic theology is to be catholic, it must be an exercise in dialogue, that is to say, in mutual trust" (p. 82). Still, one must find footing somewhere in this age of pluralism, and so section 23 displays the central convictions which will inform the entire opus: worship as fundamental to doctrine; christology and its "exchange principle" as the central focus of Christian theology; the theological importance of fundamental theology as an interpretation of the Christian faith in terms of grace and nature; creation and incarnation, together with the exitus/reditus theme, as determining the shape of the system; Vatican II, especially in its attention to history, as the single most important vantage point from which to offer a catholic and contemporary interpretation of the Christian Tradition; ecumenism as a crucial dimension of the system; Christian doctrine as interpreted by the structural relatedness between worship, conduct, and creed. There is no doubt as to the book's contemporaneity; it is evident on every page. The book's main title is significant since it expresses God as the work's unifying objective reference (section 5) and encounter/experience as the primary way of getting to know this God: " The central reality of the Christian faith... is encounter in ecstatic immediacy " (p. 161). It is extremely difficult to explain, without falling into reductionistic subjectivism, how one can experience God in this life. Enlisting Otto and Rabner against just such a tendency in Schleiermacher, van Beeck defends the objectivity and "otherness" of God within religious experience (section 35 and pp. 258-60). He does not discuss in any detail, however, how experience of God is related to faith and to... (shrink)

The two introductory chapters are short, well written, and engaging. Chapter 1 constitutes an eloquent introduction to the state of Stoic philosophy. Naturalism and eudaimonism are central to Becker's new Stoic ethics, and his repeated use of the adjective “our” to describe Stoic remedies suggests that he preserves the ancient role of Stoic philosophy as a therapeutic ethics of diminished expectations. He might resist this characterization however, since he goes on to reject explicitly this vein within ancient Stoicism. Chapter 2 (...) seeks to correct the unfortunate fact that philosophers generally reject Stoic therapy along with “tranquilizers and prefrontal lobotomies as means to a good life”. Becker identifies five important features of his new Stoic ethics: eudaimonism, intellectualism, naturalism, the formal unity of the virtues, and particularity, that is, role or self-mastery. He distances his new Stoicism from that of his ancient forerunners by reconsidering the problem of cosmic teleology. Given the continuity of Stoic thought through modernity, “it is reasonable to suppose that stoics would have found a way to reject teleological physics and biology when scientific consensus did; that they would have found ways to hold their own against the attacks on naturalism launched in the modern era. And it is reasonable to suppose that the sheer variety of self-identified stoics over the centuries would have prevented, as it did in antiquity, the view that a stoic life is typically a bleak one'. The author disclaims the extremes of architectonic theoretical system and therapeutic encheiridion as characterizations of his book· It is, rather, an “investigation of neglected possibilities” which tries to show the viability of stoicism as an ethical system. (shrink)