Uchiyama et al. propose a unified model linking cultural evolutionary theory to behavior genetics (BG) to enhance generalizability, enrich explanation, and predict how social factors shape heritability estimates. A consideration of culture evolution is beneficial but insufficient for purpose. I submit that their proposed model is underdeveloped and their emphasis on heritability estimates misguided. I discuss their ambiguous conception of culture, neglect of social structure, and the lack of a general theory in BG.

Two eye-tracking experiments investigated how and when pointing gestures and location descriptions affect target identification. The experiments investigated the effect of gestures and referring expressions on the time course of fixations to the target, using videos of human gestures and human voice, and animated gestures and synthesized speech. Ambiguous, yet informative pointing gestures elicited attention and facilitated target identification, akin to verbal location descriptions. Moreover, target identification was superior when both pointing gestures and verbal location descriptions were used. These (...) findings suggest that gesture not only operates as a context to verbal descriptions, or that verbal descriptions operate as a context to gesture, but that they complement one another in reference resolution. (shrink)

We examine collective decision-making in a jury voting game under the unanimity rule when voters have ambiguous beliefs. Unlike in existing studies (Ellis in Theoretical Economics 11:865–895, 2016; Fabrizi et al., in: AUT Economics Working Paper, 2021; Ryan in Theory and Decision 90:543–577, 2021), the locus of ambiguity is the likelihood function (signal precision) rather than the prior. This significantly alters the properties of symmetric equilibria. While prior ambiguity may induce multiple equilibria (Fabrizi et al., in: AUT Economics Working (...) Paper, 2021; Ryan in Theory and Decision 90:543–577, 2021) we show that, under likelihood ambiguity, there exists a unique non-trivial symmetric responsive equilibrium that takes the same form as in the absence of ambiguity (Feddersen and Pesendorfer in The American Political Science Review 92:23–35, 1998). Moreover, likelihood ambiguity partially offsets the pernicious effects of pivotality on decision quality: the frequency of Type I error (convicting the innocent) is typically lower than in the absence of ambiguity. (shrink)

This paper explores the ambiguous impact of new information and communications technologies on the cultivation of moral skills in human beings. Just as twentieth century advances in machine automation resulted in the economic devaluation of practical knowledge and skillsets historically cultivated by machinists, artisans, and other highly trained workers , while also driving the cultivation of new skills in a variety of engineering and white collar occupations, ICTs are also recognized as potential causes of a complex pattern of economic (...) deskilling, reskilling, and upskilling. In this paper, I adapt the conceptual apparatus of sociological debates over economic deskilling to illuminate a different potential for technological deskilling/upskilling, namely the ability of ICTs to contribute to the moral deskilling of human users, a potential that exists alongside rich but currently underrealized possibilities for moral reskilling and/or upskilling. I flesh out this general hypothesis by means of examples involving automated weapons technology, new media practices, and social robotics. I conclude that since moral skills are essential prerequisites for the effective development of practical wisdom and virtuous character, and since market and cultural forces are not presently aligned to bring about the more salutary of the ambiguous potentials presented here, the future shape of these developments warrants our close attention—and perhaps active intervention. (shrink)

There is a widespread and largely unchallenged assumption within philosophy that the word ‘normal’ is ambiguous: i.e., that it can mean different things in different contexts. This assumption appears in work within topics as varied as the philosophy of biology, medicine, justification, causation, and more. In this paper I argue that we currently lack any independent reason for adopting such an assumption. The reason that would most likely be offered in its favour requires us to ignore an alternative and (...) equally plausible explanation for the seeming variety of different meanings that ‘normal’ is taken to have. Meanwhile, the well-known conjunction reduction test for ambiguity provides no evidence for the ambiguity of ‘normal’, and in fact suggests that maintaining this ambiguity claim is more difficult than has been initially supposed. Therefore, with the way things stand at present, it should not be assumed without argument that ‘normal’ is an ambiguous term. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to say something about why certain key psychoanalytic concepts, particularly that of the unconscious, are special because of a studied, and therapeutically important, ambiguity or paradoxicality which affects them. Before I examine these concepts, however, the first section of this paper discusses some of Sartre's views on psychological explanation. On the one hand, this gives me a way of introducing the dichotomy of self-evident irreducibility and existential lucidity which underlies my account of the unconscious. On (...) the other hand, it is important because I take Sartre to be addressing, less successfully, the very same question that Freud dealt with by introducing his ambiguous concepts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Oppression, Normative Violence, and VulnerabilityThe Ambiguous Beauvoirian Legacy of Butler’s EthicsLisa C. KniselyJudith Butler’s most recent writings are a sophisticated theorization of the significance of human vulnerability as a resource for “a non-violent ethics... that is based upon an understanding of how easily human life is annulled” (Butler 2004, xvii). Butler argues that recognition of the constitutive vulnerability of human existence provides the condition of possibility through which (...) we can respond to an ethical “appeal” or “call” for nonviolence (Butler 2009, 165, 170). This recent work carries on the feminist theoretical tradition of theorizing nonviolence via an attention to human vulnerability that has been strongly present in feminist care ethics (Held 2006; Kittay 1999; Ruddick 1989; Noddings 1984; Gilligan 1982). However, rather than turning to the care ethicists to think through the ethical relationship between vulnerability and violence, Butler produces an innovative feminist ethics by turning to a variety of thinkers in continental philosophy and psychoanalysis, such as Hegel, Freud, Cavarero, and especially Levinas. Butler’s recent discussion of the ethical import of human vulnerability therefore extends a long-standing feminist tradition of arguing for nonviolence while also helping to expand the theoretical resources feminists have used for this task.This article places Butler’s recent ethical focus on nonviolence1 in conversation with Simone de Beauvoir’s earlier existentialist feminist ethical writings2 [End Page 145] concerning the ethico-political import of violence. Together, these two thinkers reorient the dominant feminist conversation about violence away from an emphasis on women’s violent and oppressive victimization and toward an idea of gendered actors who are simultaneously ethically enabled and constrained by the bodily, historical, and political situations out of which they act. Ultimately, however, Beauvoir’s argument that ethics are always deeply contextual and are thus normatively ambiguous is a preferable feminist alternative to Butler’s attempt to delineate a specifically nonviolent ethics. This is because Beauvoir gives thorough attention to contexts of oppression as a major mitigating factor that shapes our ethical possibilities.For Beauvoir, there is no guarantee that a nonviolent response to vulnerability is a priori the most ethical response. Beauvoir does not insist on a nonviolent ethics because the ethicality of violence must be derived from within the embodied situations out of which people are acting. Ethicality cannot be determined prior to, or outside of, the lived contexts in which people are situated. Beauvoir’s ethics remind contemporary feminist theorists that both vulnerability, and responses to vulnerability, whether violent or nonviolent, are always contextually mediated by the forces of history, politics, and circumstance. This reminder is essential if we do not wish feminist ethical claims to override the feminist political goal of lessening oppression. Beauvoir’s attention to contextual specificity shows us that our possible responses to vulnerability are ethically ambiguous in the sense that no normative claim about how one ought to respond to human vulnerability, taken in the abstract, can be elucidated without the risk of making our ethics potentially oppressive.By returning to Beauvoir’s ethics, especially Beauvoir’s attention to oppression and freedom, the discussion here is meant to echo the concerns of a growing number of contemporary feminist theorists who express hesitation about the recent “turn” to vulnerability in feminist theory (Bergoffen 2001; Butler 2004, 2005, 2009; Fineman 2008; Oliver 2008)3 and more generally about moral claims that are made in the name of feminism (Murphy 2009; Dean 2008; Halley 2008; Mills 2007; Brown 1995). In addition, the emphasis on Beauvoir’s ethics here is meant to help return the contemporary feminist discussion of violence toward a more general emphasis on the importance of thinking about freedom as a primary feminist concern (Zerilli 2005; Willett 2001, 1995). Beauvoir’s ethics demonstrate that the ethicality of our responses to vulnerability cannot be judged without a thorough attention to the ethical freedom4 of oppressed ethical actors.Feminist ethicists have tended to undervalue attention to specific historico-political contexts in their discussions of violence as they develop normative arguments against violence. As Kimberly Hutchings notes in her article “Simone de Beauvoir and the Ambiguous Ethics of Political Violence,” there are two contemporary feminist positions on violence... (shrink)

The segregation of image parts into foreground and background is an important aspect of the neural computation of 3D scene perception. To achieve such segregation, the brain needs information about border ownership; that is, the belongingness of a contour to a specific surface represented in the image. This article presents psychophysical data derived from 3D percepts of figure and ground that were generated by presenting 2D images composed of spatially disjoint shapes that pointed inward or outward relative to the continuous (...) boundaries that they induced along their collinear edges. The shapes in some images had the same contrast (black or white) with respect to the background gray. Other images included opposite contrasts along each induced continuous boundary. Psychophysical results demonstrate conditions under which figure-ground judgment probabilities in response to these ambiguous displays are determined by the orientation of contrasts only, not by their relative contrasts, despite the fact that many border ownership cells in cortical area V2 respond to a preferred relative contrast. Studies are also reviewed in which both polarity-specific and polarity-invariant properties obtain perceptual figure-ground grouping results. The FACADE and 3D LAMINART models are used to explain these data. Keywords: figure-ground separation, border ownership, perceptual grouping, surface filling-in, V2, V4, FACADE Theory. (shrink)

The “central aim” of this book is “to offer a nuanced and wide-ranging analysis of the complex and manifold ways in which British Romantic writers engaged with Rousseau” (3). To accomplish this, th...

In this paper, I argue that the different understandings of “harmony”, which are rooted in ancient Greek and Chinese thought, can be recapitulated in the name of “dialectic harmony” and “ambiguous harmony” regarding the representation of the beautiful. The different understandings of the concept of harmony lead to at least two kinds of aesthetic value as well as ideality – harmony in conciliation and harmony in diversity. Through an explication of the original meaning and relation between the concept of (...) harmony and beauty, we can learn more about the cosmo-metaphysical origins in Western and Eastern aesthetics, with which we may gain insights for future aesthetics discourse. (shrink)

Recent work in the philosophy of biology argues that we must rethink the biological individual beyond the boundary of the species, given that a key part of our essential functioning is carried out by the bacteria in our intestines in a way that challenges any strictly genetic account of what is involved for the biological human. The gut is a kind of ambiguous other within our understanding of ourselves, particularly when we also consider the status of gastro-intestinal disorders. Hegel (...) offers us theoretical tools to describe and understand our relationship to our gut. His description of our selves as continually mediated through otherness is strikingly compatible with the kind of structure contemporary biology presents us with. His accounts of digestion and habit, contextualized by his logic, help point toward an understanding of selfhood as porous and yet still capable of being sufficiently unified for us to make sense of ourselves, one which allows us to acknowledge otherness within us while still having enough unity for agency. (shrink)

The ordination of women in the Church of England has had a long hard road. Other denominations, and other parts of the Anglican Communion took the step, but it was not until the 1990s that the first women priests were ordained in the Church of England itself. Even then, Emma Percy describes the situation as an ‘ambiguous welcome’. Careful provision has been made at every stage for those who not only will not accept women as priests, but require the (...) service of bishops who have not participated in the ordination of women. The path to acceptance for women bishops has also been lengthy and subject to the same caveats and provisions. Percy argues that this reveals an underlying failure to think theologically about gender. She recognizes that there are still profound inequalities in the Church’s treatment of women in leadership. (shrink)

The influence of pervasive cultural norms on people’s actions constitutes a longstanding problem for autonomy theory. On the one hand, such norms often seem to elude the kind of reflection that autonomous agency requires. On the other hand, they are hardly entirely beyond the pale of autonomy: people do sometimes reflect critically on them and resist them. This paper draws on phenomenological accounts of embodiment in order to reconcile these observations. We suggest that pervasive cultural norms exert a strong and (...) elusive, but occasionally resistible, influence because they are incorporated – they operate on the largely pre-reflective bodily level of human existence. As an illustration we discuss parental decisions about surgery for children born with unclear sex, decisions permeated by deeply entrenched norms about sexual difference and genital appearance. (shrink)

Looking to the popularity of superheroes, true crime stories, and anti-heroic characters like Tony Soprano, we investigated whether moral extremity, especially moral badness, piques curiosity. Across five experiments (N = 2429), we examine moral curiosity, testing under what conditions the moral minds of others spark explanation-seeking behavior. In Experiment 1, we find that among the most widely watched Netflix shows in the US over a five-month period, the more immoral the protagonist, the more hours people spent watching. In Experiments 2a (...) and 2b, we find that when given a choice to learn more about morally good, bad, ambiguous, or average others, people preferred to learn more about morally extreme people, both good and bad. Experiment 3 reveals that people are more curious for explanations about (vs. descriptions of) morally bad and ambiguous people compared to morally good ones. Finally, Experiment 4 tests the uniqueness of curiosity for moral ambiguity. We find that people are more drawn to moral rather than aesthetic ambiguity, suggesting that ambiguity, which is cognitively taxing and sometimes avoided, preferentially engenders information seeking in the moral domain. These findings suggest deviations from moral normativity, especially badness, spur curiosity. People are curious about immorality and agents who differ from the norm. (shrink)

I consider games with ambiguous payoffs played by non-Expected Utility decision makers. Three equilibrium solutions are studied. Nash equilibrium in which equilibrium mixed strategies must be best responses, Crawford equilibrium in beliefs and pure equilibrium in beliefs in which equilibrium strategies are mixtures of best responses, with the latter restricting best responses to pure actions. I study the interactions between ambiguity preferences on one side and equilibrium properties on the other. I show how the equilibrium concepts differ, computing necessary (...) and sufficient conditions for existence and equivalence. I also show how these solution concepts fare against two fundamental principles of Nash equilibrium in standard games: the principle of indifference and the reduction principle. Given both are central to the computation of Nash equilibrium in games with Expected Utility players, their failure indicates how relaxing the Expected Utility hypothesis may disrupt standard game theoretic results such as the characterization of equilibria in two-player games. (shrink)

Memory can play two quite different roles in grief. Memories involving a deceased loved one can make them feel either enjoyably present, or especially and painfully absent. In this paper, we consider what makes it possible for memory to play these two different roles, both in grief and more generally. We answer this question by appeal to the phenomenological nature of vivid remembering, and the context in which such memories occur. We argue that different contexts can make salient different aspects (...) of memory's phenomenological nature, thus making what is remembered sometimes feel pleasantly 'present' again, and sometimes painfully absent. (shrink)

In his dissertation, Wadge defined a notion of guessability on subsets of the Baire space and gave two characterizations of guessable sets. A set is guessable if and only if it is in the second ambiguous class, if and only if it is eventually annihilated by a certain remainder. We simplify this remainder and give a new proof of the latter equivalence. We then introduce a notion of guessing with an ordinal limit on how often one can change one’s (...) mind. We show that for every ordinal $\alpha$, a guessable set is annihilated by $\alpha$ applications of the simplified remainder if and only if it is guessable with fewer than $\alpha$ mind changes. We use guessability with fewer than $\alpha$ mind changes to give a semi-characterization of the Hausdorff difference hierarchy, and indicate how Wadge’s notion of guessability can be generalized to higher-order guessability, providing characterizations of ${\mathbf{\Delta}}^{0}_{\alpha}$ for all successor ordinals $\alpha\gt 1$. (shrink)

In France, Fair Trade arrived on the scene in the late twentieth century, and since then has passed through several experimental phases before becoming an enduring "realistic" economic alternative. To understand the transformation, this article defines Fair Trade as a social construct issues and tensions of which change depending on the point of entry. By conducting a secondary analysis of several data sets from varied sources, including documentary material, interviews, and observations, the authors trace the history of Fair Trade in (...) France, define its introduction as a system, describe its institutionalization, and contribute to a greater understanding of how its ideals have changed and become more professional over time. The analyses reveal that the term "Fair Trade" has become ambiguous, spanning divergent and conflicting ideas and projects, including opening and closing conventional market systems and alter-globaliza-tion and anti-globalization. (shrink)

The World Professional Association for Transgender Health guidelines Standards of Care 8 draw on ethical arguments based on individual autonomy, to argue that healthcare and other professionals should be advocates for trans people. Such guidelines presume the presence of medical services for trans people and a degree of consensus on medical ethics. Very little is known, however, about the ethical challenges associated with both providing and accessing trans healthcare, including gender affirmation, in the Global South. In light of the challenges (...) associated with medical and legal gender affirmation in Indonesia, we conducted a qualitative study to understand the views of trans people, healthcare providers, and legal practitioners. In this qualitative study, we drew on a participatory methodology to conduct 46 semi-structured interviews between October and December 2023, with trans people (10 trans feminine people and 10 trans masculine people, each interviewed twice) and key informants (three healthcare providers and three lawyers and paralegals). Trans people were a central part of the research team from inception through to analysis and writing. Participants were recruited via community-led sampling. Data analysis of interview data took place through an immersion/crystallisation technique and preliminary inductive coding which highlighted key quotes. We focused on an inductive analysis using participant narratives to identify key concepts in the ethics of gender affirmation in Indonesia. We characterize the ethics of supportive healthcare workers, community members, and family members, as that akin to “accomplices,” a concept of ethics used in theories of racial justice which evaluate a willingness to support people to navigate laws and regulations which perpetuate injustices and violence. Overall, both trans people and key informants shared an understanding that the legal status of gender-affirming medical care was particularly ambiguous in Indonesia due to a lack of clarity in both laws and regulations. For trans participants, ethical arguments for the validity of legal and medical gender affirmation was premised on evidence that their gender identity and expression was already recognized within society, even if limited to immediate friends and family. Given that all participants expressed a desire for gender affirmation, but such services were widely unavailable, accomplices played a crucial role in supporting trans people to access healthcare. An empirical study based on an “ethics from below” helps to show that arguments grounded in autonomy, or based on biomedical evidence, are unlikely to alter unjust laws or facilitate a change to pathologizing guidelines governing understanding of trans people’s healthcare and legal needs in Indonesia. We provide an analysis that is sensitive to the ethics of facilitating gender affirmation in a context where that process is inherently social, and often articulated in relation to a prevailing religious morality. (shrink)

Steven Hales and Jennifer Johnson—building off their (2014) work as well as Hales (2015, 2016)—have recently conducted two studies in Philosophical Psychology (2018) that show that there is a relationship between optimism and folk assessments of luck. Hales and Johnson use these results to argue that there is no such thing as luck. Instead, they claim that the concept is highly subjective and a cognitive illusion and that what we are in need of is an error theory. After reviewing Hales (...) and Johnson’s position, I levy four objections against their view. First, they ignore the fact that luck involves a chanciness condition. Second, their standards for what it means to be a useful philosophical theory are too high. Third, their view ignores the fact that there are various accounts of value in the literature and assumes a kind of relativism that few people would be willing to accept. Lastly, their error theory is not supported by the empirical evidence. Because of these problems, Hales and Johnson’s argument is not a serious threat to extant accounts of luck. (shrink)