¿Puede esperarse una globallzaclón política que esté en condiciones de hacer frente a lo globalizaclón económica de las multinacionales? Se presentan dos respuestas sobre las que vale la pena discutir. Las llamo, en lo que sigue, la respuesta populista y la respuesta federalista.

The following text aims to pose the question provoked by the of discrepancy between infancy as defined in the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard and childhood per se, and to do so in the epochal context of an educational temporality governed by the attributes of acceleration, “profitable,” knowledge, cognitivism, rampant inequalities, an ethos of “success” at any cost, a univocal relationship between knowledge and utilitarianism, and a severe conflict between egalitarian organization and experience and the demand for performance. The loss of (...) infancy in childhood is perhaps the loss of infancy in humanity, depriving it of free time, the possibility of fiction, creation, play, and art. The question that permeates the article is, what does it mean to listen to the voices of infancy in childhood? What is being articulated there? How might we appreciate those voices as a starting point for the reinvention of a different form of education? Our fundamental objective is to construct a politics and a poetics of time that, in their aesthetic and ethical expression, indicate the possibility of a different educational journey for children and childhood, based on the sense of the existence of a time for which it is never too late. (shrink)

Speaking about the influence Husserl had on his early thinking Heidegger later on always referred to Husserl's 'Logische Untersuchungen', emphasizing the attitude of critical distance he had towards the "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie" and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology pointed out there. Nevertheless, as shown in this paper, it is evident that in 'Being an Time' Heidegger took over some essential issues from Husserl's later work. But it is also clear that he was also essentially changing their character.

This paper seeks to perform a phenomenological analysis on the second chapter of section II of Being and Time, where one can find a thematic and explicit elucidation about such phenomena as the call, conscience, wanting-to-have-a-conscience and being-guilty. The main aim of this paper is to clarify the structural and methodic necessity of the Dasein’s notion of Selfhood.