Although evidential reports of paranormal phenomena have been accumulating over the last 50 years, scepticism within the scientific community at large against the very existence of psi has not retreated in proportion. Strong criticism has been voiced and it is worth taking it under serious consideration while attempting to understand psi. This article reviews the micro- psychokinesis phenomenon, aiming to reconcile evidence that favours it with other evidence that seems to refute it. To achieve this challenging task, some seemingly (...) irrelevant observations will be invoked -- such as the often observed decline and differential effects, the ten-year-old statistical balancing effect, the longstanding reports for the experimental evidence of PK, the recent large-scale failure to replicate the conventional PK hypothesis -- alongside the austere arguments against PK. This paper argues that the evidence can withstand this serious criticism. (shrink)

Van Fraassen has presented in Scientific Representation an attractive notion of measurement as an important part of the empiricist structuralism that he endorses. However, he has been criticized on the grounds that both his notion of measurement and his empiricist structuralism force him to do the very thing he objects to in other philosophical projects—to endorse a controversial metaphysics. This paper proposes a defense of van Fraassen by arguing that his project is indeed a ‘metaphysical’ project, but (...) one which is very similar to Strawson’s ‘descriptive metaphysics’; if this is the case, van Fraassen’s project may be taken, following recent suggestions made by Ney and Paul, as a form of metaphysics that can potentially make a crucial contribution to scientific inquiry. (shrink)

In this paper, we empirically explore some manifestations of norms for the conduct of science. We focus on scientific research ethics and report survey results from 606 scientists who received funding in 1993 and 1994 from the Division of Molecular and Cellular Biology of the Biology Directorate of the National Science Foundation. We also report results for 91 administrators charged with overseeing research integrity at the scientists’ research institutions. Both groups of respondents were presented with a set of scenarios, (...) designed by fractional factorial methods, describing different kinds of scientific conduct that in the eyes of some would likely be unethical. Respondents then were asked to evaluate each of these scenarios for how unethical the behavior might be and what kinds of sanctions might be appropriate. We use the responses to consider the nature of consensus around norms related to the practice of science and in particular, similarities and differences between scientists and science administrators. Implications for policy are also discussed. (shrink)

This article is about a start-up problem in scientific practice. Specifically, it is about the problem of justifying paleontological correlation—the practice of using fossils to establish time relations among fossiliferous rocks. Paleontological correlation was the key to assembling a geological timescale during the nineteenth century and remains an important practice in stratigraphic geology to this day. Yet contrary to philosophical expectations, this practice lacked a robust theoretical justification during the first half of the nineteenth century. This article examines what (...) this lack of justification amounted to, as well as how the method of paleontological correlation was justified in practice. (shrink)

Scientific models are often said to be more or less general depending on how many cases they cover. In this paper we argue that the cardinality of cases is insufficient as a metric of generality, and we present a novel account based on measure theory. This account overcomes several problems with the cardinality approach, and additionally provides some insight into the nature of assessments of generality. Specifically, measure theory affords a natural and quantitative way of describing local spaces of (...) possibility. The generality of models can be understood as the measure of possibilities to which the models apply. In order to illustrate our view, we consider the example of structural genomics, the ongoing project of building three-dimensional models of biological macromolecules like proteins. Using measure theory, we interpret the practice of homology modeling, where such models are understood to apply widely but imperfectly to the space of possible proteins. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to point out significant and meaningful overlapping between several styles of scientific thinking, as they were proposed by Crombie (1981) and discussed by Hacking (1985; 2009). This paper is divided in four sections. First, I examine an interpretation made by Barnes (2004) about the incompatibility among scientific styles. As explained by its author, this interpretation denies any possibility of similarities between styles of scientific reasoning. In opposition, the following sections of this (...) paper include explanations of relevant characteristics of Geometry, as stated in Euclid's Elements, which are also present in other three scientific styles: modeling, experimental exploration and taxonomic style (and some of the shared characteristics are even used to define such styles). By stressing out these characteristics I argue that these four styles discussed by Hacking are not so different from each other, in fact, they overlap and may even be abridged into one foundational style: geometric. El objetivo de este artículo consiste en explicar traslapes importantes y significativos entre varios estilos de pensamiento científico, tal como fueron propuestos por Crombie (1981) y discutidos por Hacking (1985; 2009). El presente artículo está dividido en cuatro secciones. Primero, se examina la interpretación de Barnes (2004) sobre la incompatibilidad entre diversos estilos. Según este autor, no existe posibilidad alguna de encontrar similitudes en los estilos de razonamiento científico. En oposición a esta interpretación, las siguientes secciones explican características relevantes de la Geometría, tal como fueron plasmadas en Los Elementos de Euclides, y que están presentes en otros tres estilos: de modelación, de experimentación y taxonómico (las características compartidas incluso definen algunos de estos estilos). Destacar estas características me permite argumentar que estos cuatro estilos discutidos por Hacking no son tan diferentes entre sí, de hecho, se traslapan e incluso pueden ser condensados en un estilo fundacional: el geométrico. (shrink)

The mathematical or theoretical approach to the theory of measurement (opposed to the operational approach) is usually accepted by philosophers, at least in its general lines. Some recent criticimsms against this theory can be answered by qualifying the requirements of the theoretical approach as "desiderata", not as strict impositions or prohibitions. Besides, it is shown that the use of this approach is instrumental in creating mathematically simple quantitative laws and in allowing the development of a "scientific intuition" concerning (...) the relevant phenomena. RESUMO: Os filósofos geralmente aceitam pelo menos as idéias gerais da abordagem matemática ou teórica da teoria da mensuração. Essa abordagem opõe-se ao operacionalismo. Algumas críticas recentes contra a abordagem teórica podem ser respondidas qualificando-se as normas que ela propõe como "desiderata", e não como imposições ou proibições estritas. Além disso, mostra-se que o uso dessa abordagem ajuda a criar leis quantitativas matematicamente simples, e permite o desenvolvimento de um tipo de "intuição científica" sobre os fenômenos relevantes. (shrink)

[First paragraph] According to a widely accepted opinion, the most typical characteristic and even the constitutive element of science is measurement, i.e., those processes of measuring upon which science is based. For a long time this has caused a general orientation of disciplines seeking to call themselves "science"; toward a certain form of quantification; in order to achieve the prestigious title of "science"; some form of measurement, of whatever kind, had to be introduced into the area of study.

In this paper, I argue for a distinction between two scales of coordination in scientific inquiry, through which I reassess Georg Simon Ohm’s work on conductivity and resistance. Firstly, I propose to distinguish between measurement coordination, which refers to the specific problem of how to justify the attribution of values to a quantity by using a certain measurement procedure, and general coordination, which refers to the broader issue of justifying the representation of an empirical regularity by means (...) of abstract mathematical tools. Secondly, I argue that the development of Ohm’s measurement practice between the first and the second experimental phase of his work involved the change of the measurement coordination on which he relied to express his empirical results. By showing how Ohm relied on different calibration assumptions and practices across the two phases, I demonstrate that the concurrent change of both Ohm’s experimental apparatus and the variable that Ohm measured should be viewed based on the different form of measurement coordination. Finally, I argue that Ohm’s assumption that tension is equally distributed in the circuit is best understood as part of the general coordination between Ohm’s law and the empirical regularity that it expresses, rather than measurement coordination. (shrink)

At the intersection of taxonomy and nomenclature lies the scientific practice of typification. This practice occurs in biology with the use of holotypes (type specimens), in geology with the use of stratotypes, and in metrology with the use of measurement prototypes. In this paper I develop the first general definition of a scientific type and outline a new philosophical theory of types inspired by Pierre Duhem. I use this general framework to resolve the necessity-contingency debate about type (...) specimens in philosophy of biology, to advance the debate over the myth of the absolute accuracy of standards in metrology, and to address the definition-correlation debate in geology. I conclude that just as there has been a productive synergy between philosophical accounts of natural kinds and scientific taxonomic practices, so too there is much to be gained from developing a deeper understanding of the practices and philosophy of scientific types. (shrink)

The analysis of social networks has remained a crucial and yet understudied aspect of the efforts to measure Triple Helix linkages. The Triple Helix model aims to explain, among other aspects of knowledge-based societies, “the current research system in its social context” (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000:109). This paper develops a novel approach to study the research system from the perspective of the individual, through the analysis of the relationships among researchers, and between them and other social actors. We develop a (...) new set of techniques and show how they can be applied to the study of a specific case (a group of academics within a university department). We analyse their informal social networks and show how a relationship exists between the characteristics of an individual’s network of social links and his or her research output. (shrink)

Published with the aim of enriching the literature dealing with the measurement of scientific and technological activities.

I argue that the key to understand many fundamental issues in philosophy of science lies in understanding the subtle relation between the non-empirical cognitive values used in science and the constraints imposed by measurability. In fact, although we are not able to fix the interpretation of a scientific theory through its formulation, I show that measurability puts constraints that can at least exclude some implausible interpretations. This turns out to be enough to define at least one cognitive value that (...) is able to penalize, without damages, precisely those bad features that deceive purely empirical assessments. This leads to the formulation of a simple model of scientific progress, that is based only on empirical accuracy and conciseness. The model is confronted here with many possible objections and with challenging cases of real progress. Although I cannot exclude that the model might be incomplete, it includes all the cases of genuine progress examined here, and no spurious one. In this model, I stress the role of the state of the art, which is the collection of all the theories that are the only legitimate source of scientific predictions. Progress is a global upgrade of the state of the art. (shrink)

This book presents the concept of “complementary science” which contributes to scientific knowledge through historical and philosophical investigations. It emphasizes the fact that many simple items of knowledge that we take for granted were actually spectacular achievements obtained only after a great deal of innovative thinking, painstaking experiments, bold conjectures, and serious controversies. Each chapter in the book consists of two parts: a narrative part that states the philosophical puzzle and gives a problem-centred narrative on the historical attempts to (...) solve the puzzle; and the analysis part which provides in-depth analyses of certain scientific, historical, and philosophical aspects of the story. (shrink)

There is no prospect of discovering measurable cardinals by radio astronomy, but this does not mean that higher set theory is entirely irrelevant to applied mathematics broadly construed. By way of example, the bearing of some celebrated descriptive-set-theoretic consequences of large cardinals on measurable-selection theory, a body of results originating with a key lemma in von Neumann’s work on the mathematical foundations of quantum theory, and further developed in connection with problems of mathematical economics, will be considered from a philosophical (...) point of view. (shrink)

Following the first part of this article series, I will examine the notion of φ-sciences’ φ-ness on the example of Vihalemm’s early chemical studies on affinity and both early and later accounts of the periodic table. I analyse these cases as instances where he applies the term ‘measure’ or ‘qualitative quantity’ to denote a numerical assignment, presumably attained by some measurement procedures, that capture the essence of the studied phaenomenon. I will draw conclusions about measurement scales, the numericity (...) and mathematicity of these case studies and, more generally, make a further attempt to theoretically clarify measurement in φ-sciences. (shrink)

Rein Vihalemm has defined the concept of φ-sciences primarily through scientific models, while emphasising that they are empirical sciences. His specification of such sciences includes references to Galileo, Kant, and Heidegger, but lacks in detail and, most notably, fails to explicate how the models of these sciences are linked to the material world they aim to describe. I first analyse Galileo’s theoretical proceedings in terms of preplanning, the essence of phaenomena, and mathematicity, which can either explicitly or implicitly be (...) viewed as important characteristics of φ-sciences, acknowledged by Vihalemm. Based on this new clarification and additional sources, I will then explore φ-scientific measurement as the link between models and matter and discuss whether Galileo’s own measurements can be regarded as such. (shrink)

We argue that inductive analysis and operational assessment of the scientific process can be justifiably and fruitfully brought together, whereby the citation metrics used in the operational analysis can effectively track the inductive dynamics and measure the research efficiency. We specify the conditions for the use of such inductive streamlining, demonstrate it in the cases of high energy physics experimentation and phylogenetic research, and propose a test of the method’s applicability.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“What Is Actually Being Measured?”: Causality and Underlying Scientific Thinking Process in the Assessment of DepressionGreta Kaluzeviciute-Moreton, PhD (bio)Depression is a complex mental health phenomenon due to its multifaceted nature. For one, depression is thought to have a significant genetic component, with studies suggesting that heritability is a significant factor in the development of the disorder (Sullivan, Neale, Kendler, 2000). In clinical psychology, environmental factors such as childhood (...) trauma, chronic stress, social isolation and negative life events (e.g., the loss of a loved one) have been documented as significant risk factors for the development of depression or as trigger events for depressive episodes (Fu & Parahoo, 2009; Kendler, Kuhn, & Prescott, 2004; Neitzke, 2016). Despite this, causal theories of mental health conditions are often tricky and/or scarcely reflected in both diagnostic and rating scales. For instance, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders classifies mental health disorders primarily based on observable symptoms and behaviors, rather than on the underlying psychological and neurobiological processes that may contribute to these symptoms (Kendler, 2006).Similarly, rating scales for depression are typically designed to assess the severity of symptoms, rather than their underlying causes, that is, most rating scales are used as screening tools to identify individuals who may require further evaluation and treatment. Some rating scales may include items related to causal factors, such as the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) includes an item that asks about “loss of interest in sex,” which could be related to either biological or psychological factors. Several rating scales include items assessing risk factors for depression, such as family history of depression or personal history of trauma. This may be indicative of both genetic and environmental risk factors, such as the Patient Health [End Page 255] Questionnaire-9, includes an item that asks about family history of depression. However, while risk and causal factors are related, they are distinct in the assessment of depression. Risk factors refer to factors that increase the likelihood of developing depression, while causal factors refer to factors that directly contribute to the development of the condition. The presence of a risk factor does not necessarily mean that an individual will develop depression (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). However, the two are frequently blurred and equated in psychotherapy research (Westen & Bradley, 2005).As such, the historical issues of rating and diagnostic scales, aptly depicted by the Le Moigne (2023) as full of “composite, if not contradictory, heritage, weaving together the classificatory and discontinuous tradition of psychiatry, on the one hand, and the psychometric and continuous tradition of psychology, on the other” (p. XX ), suffer from an epistemological oversight when it comes to the assessment of causal factors in complex mental health conditions, such as depression. In turn, this contributes to a wider psychometric issue: what is actually being measured? Le Moigne’s detailed overview predominantly focuses on “superficial” symptomatology of depression (which contributed to two distinct forms of evaluation: hetero- and self-evaluation), and its subsequent impact on the classification and taxonomy of depression throughout history. However, the overarching conceptualization of depression (including a more detailed consideration of causal factors and their assessment) and the usefulness of rating scales in applied research (such as psychotherapy) remain in the background.The question of “what is actually being measured” is obviously not new in psychometrics. However, it is important to continuously revisit this issue, given that rating scales (such as the BDI) are considered to be universally applicable “evidence-based” tools (Rogers, Adler, Bungay, & Wilson, 2005) as well as a common and well-accepted form of scientific thinking in psychotherapy research (Kaluzeviciute & Willemsen, 2020). From an epistemological point of view, a scientific thinking style entails not only cognitive operations common to methodology, but also practices of generating, sharing, assimilating and transforming knowledge(Hacking, 2012).Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that any scientific tool, including rating scales, encompasses not just what but also how researchers find out about their studied phenomena (i.e., a scientific thinking style conveys a performative quality) (Kaluzeviciute & Willemsen, 2020). As identified by Le Moigne (2023), taxonomy leads toward a category-based logic in that it considers the examined phenomenon to be shared by only a... (shrink)

BackgroundDeciphering the amount of work provided by different co-authors of a scientific paper has been a recurrent problem in science. Despite the myriad of metrics available, the scientific community still largely relies on the position in the list of authors to evaluate contributions, a metric that attributes subjective and unfounded credit to co-authors. We propose an easy to apply, universally comparable and fair metric to measure and report co-authors contribution in the scientific literature. MethodsThe proposed Author Contribution (...) Index (ACI) is based on contribution percentages provided by the authors, preferably at the time of submission. Researchers can use ACI to compare the contributions of different authors, describe the contribution profile of a particular researcher or analyse how contribution changes through time. We provide such an analysis based on contribution percentages provided by 97 scientists from the field of ecology who voluntarily responded to an online anonymous survey.ResultsACI is simple to understand and to implement because it is based solely on percentage contributions and the number of co-authors. It provides a continuous score that reflects the contribution of one author as compared to the average contribution of all other authors. For example, ACI(i) = 3, means that author i contributed three times more than what the other authors contributed on average. Our analysis comprised 836 papers published in 2014-2016 and revealed patterns of ACI values that relate to career advancement.ConclusionThere are many examples of author contribution indices that have been proposed but none has really been adopted by scientific journals. Many of the proposed solutions are either too complicated, not accurate enough or not comparable across articles, authors and disciplines. The author contribution index presented here addresses these three major issues and has the potential to contribute to more transparency in the science literature. If adopted by scientific journals, it could provide job seekers, recruiters and evaluating bodies with a tool to gather information that is essential to them and cannot be easily and accurately obtained otherwise. We also suggest that scientists use the index regardless of whether it is implemented by journals or not. (shrink)

Trust in the scientific enterprise — in science as an institution — is arguably important to individuals’ and societies’ well-being. Although some measures of public trust in science exist, the recipients of that trust are often ambiguous between trusting individual scientists and the scientific community at large. We argue that more precision would be beneficial — specifically, targeting public trust of the scientific community at large — and describe the development and validation of such an instrument: the (...) Scientific Community Trust Index (SCTI). We show the results of initial field testing to establish instrument reliability and validity. We then demonstrate certain advantages of the SCTI against other measures of trust and deference, and present correlations between the SCTI and participant scores in two trust-in-science scenarios. Our results suggest that the SCTI is a useful and compact tool for measuring public trust in the scientific community. (shrink)

ArgumentJohann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777) developed a very detailed theory of science and experiment. Using Lambert's hygrometric studies, this article provides an introduction to Lambert's theory and its practice. Of special interest is his well-founded theory on the emergence and definition of concepts and his neat eye for heuristics that should ultimately lead to a mathematization of physical phenomena. His use of visualizations in this context is especially remarkable.

Scientific realism has been advanced as an interpretation of the natural sciences but never the behavioral sciences. This book introduces a novel version of scientific realism, Measured Realism, that characterizes the kind of theoretical progress in the social and psychological sciences that is uneven but indisputable. It proposes a theory of measurement, Population-Guided Estimation, that connects natural, psychological, and social scientific inquiry. Presenting quantitative methods in the behavioral sciences as at once successful and regulated by the (...) world, the book will engage philosophers of science, historians of science, sociologists of science, and scientists interested in the foundations of their own disciplines. Part I introduces measured realism beginning with a novel realist theory of measurement (Population-Guided Estimation, or PGE). It examines two other versions of scientific realism — minimal (Hacking) and robust (Boyd, Putnam, and Newton-Smith) — and advances measured realism as best supported by the evidence in the behavioral sciences. It also critically evaluates the anti-realist arguments of van Fraassen, Laudan, and Fine. Part II formulates and develops a version of epistemological naturalism most appropriate to measured realism. Drawing upon the realist theory of measurement developed earlier, it favorably appraises a variety of statistical methods in the behavioral sciences against selected criticisms. It concludes that traditional, narrative methods in the behavioral and social sciences are unreliable by the measures of epistemological naturalism. (shrink)

Mindfulness, derived from Buddhist psychology and philosophy, has gained broad popularity in the last decades, due importantly to scientific interest and findings. Yet Buddhist mindfulness developed in Asian pre-scientific culture and religion, and is predicated upon long-term cultivation of introspective awareness of lived experience, not highly accessible to empirical study. Further complicating the ‘science' of mindfulness, mindfulness's very definition is multifaceted, resistant to dismantling and requires substantial amounts of personal practice to gain expertise. Most scientists investigating mindfulness have (...) not achieved a high level of this expertise. Here I address how mindfulness is currently being invented as a scientific fact or object of inquiry. The intrinsic porosity of subjective and objective factors influencing the investigation of mindfulness is highlighted: the evolving body of ‘scientific' experts, instruments used to measure mindfulness, the alliances of funders and other supporters of mindfulness research, and the public representation of the related findings. (shrink)

The development of nineteenth-century geodetic measurement challenges the dominant coherentist account of measurement success. Coherentists argue that measurements of a quantity are epistemically successful if their numerical outcomes converge across varying contextual constraints. Aiming at numerical convergence, in turn, offers an operational aim for scientists to solve problems of coordination. Geodesists faced such a problem of coordination between two indicators of the earth’s ellipticity, which were both based on imperfect ellipsoid models. While not achieving numerical convergence, their measurements (...) produced novel data that grounded valuable theoretical hypotheses. Consequently, they ought to be regarded as epistemically successful. This insight warrants a dynamic revision of coherentism, allowing to judge the success of a metric based on both its coherence and fruitfulness. On that view, scientific measurement aims to coordinate theoretical definitions and produce novel data and theoretical insights. (shrink)

Patient-reported outcome measures are now common endpoints in clinical trials. In 2009 in an effort to standardize and streamline their use in medical product labeling, the FDA published FDA Guidance for Industry Patient-Reported Outcomes Measures: Use in Medical Product Development to Support Labeling Claims. This publication drew attention to the need to ensure that PROMs are methodologically sound. Nonetheless, in this paper I discuss how many of these measures continue to fall short in terms of validity, interpretability, and responsiveness. As (...) a reaction to these shortcomings, researchers increasingly call for the development of more scientific measures. I argue that although improving PROMs’ measurement properties is a worthy endeavor, we should not be uncritical of these attempts. Calling for improved measures in the name of science should not blind us to the way that even our best measures employ values in their development—values that may further the marketing needs of industry. When values are needed to further our scientific ends, it behooves us to examine them in terms of their social consequences. Thus I argue that we ought to consider not only the scientific advances that new PROMs may bring but also the values that are used to develop them. (shrink)

In this paper we describe the development and initial psychometric evaluation of a new measure, the values in scientific work. This scale assesses the level of importance that investigators attach to different VSW. It taps a broad range of intrinsic, extrinsic, and social values that motivate the work of scientists, including values specific to scientific work and more classic work values in the context of science. Notably, the values represented in this scale are relevant to scientists regardless of (...) their career stage and research focus. We administered the VSW and a measure of global values to 203 NIH-funded investigators. Exploratory factor analyses suggest the delineation of eight VSW, including autonomy, research ethics, social impact, income, collaboration, innovation and growth, conserving relationships, and job security. These VSW showed predictable and distinct associations with global values. Implications of these findings for work on research integrity and scientific misconduct are discussed. (shrink)

In his Scientific Representation (2008), van Fraassen argues that measuring is a form of representation. In fact, every measurement pinpoints its target in accordance with specific operational rules within an already-constructed theoretical space, in which certain conceptual interconnections can be represented. Reichenbach’s 1920 account of coordination is particularly interesting in this connection. Even though recent reassessments of this account do not do full justice to some important elements lying behind it, they do have the merit of focusing on (...) a different aspect of his early work that traditional interpretations of relativized a priori principles have unfortunately neglected in favour of a more “structural” role for coordination. In Reichenbach’s early work, however, the idea of coordination was employed not only to indicate theory-specific fundamental principles such as the ones suggested in the literature on conventional principles in science, but also to refer to more “basic” assumptions. In Reichenbach, these principles are preconditions both of the individuation of physical magnitudes and of their measurement, and, as such, they are necessary to approach the world in the first instance. This paper aims to reassess Reichenbach’s approach to coordination and to the representation of physical quantities in light of recent literature on measurement and scientific representation. (shrink)

Scientific misconduct is usually assumed to be self-serving. This paper, however, proposes to distinguish between two types of scientific misconduct: ‘type one scientific misconduct’ is self-serving and leads to falsely positive conclusions about one’s own work, while ‘type two scientific misconduct’ is other-harming and leads to falsely negative conclusions about someone else’s work. The focus is then on the latter type, and three known issues are identified as specific forms of such scientific misconduct: biased quality (...) assessment, smear, and officially condoning scientific misconduct. These concern the improper ways how challenges of the prevailing opinion are thwarted in the modern world. The central issue is pseudoskepticism: uttering negative conclusions about someone else’s work that are downright false. It is argued that this may be an emotional response, rather than a calculated strategic action. Recommendations for educative and punitive measures are given to prevent and to deal with these three forms of scientific misconduct. (shrink)

At a meeting of the Physical Society of London in 1925 participants expressed their concerns regarding a recent suggestion by the Australian physicist T. H. Laby for replicating the established value of the mechanical equivalent of heat. This rather controversial discussion about the value of redetermining this numerical fact brings to light different understandings of the moral economy of accuracy in scientific work; it signals a distinctive new stage in the historical understanding of accuracy and precision and the moral (...) integrity in conducting research. (shrink)

According to the realist interpretation, measurement commits us not just to the logically independent existence of things in space and time, but also to the existence of quantitatively structured properties and relations, and to the existence of real numbers, understood as relations of ratio between specific levels of such attributes. Measurement is defined as the estimation of numerical relations (or ratios) between magnitudes of a quantitative attribute and a unit. The history of scientific measurement, from antiquity (...) to the present may be interpreted as revealing a progressive deepening in the understanding of this position. First, the concept of ratio was broadened to include ratios between incommensurable magnitudes; second, the concept of a quantitative attribute was broadened to include non-extensive quantities; third, quantitative structure and its relations to ratios and real numbers were elaborated; and finally, the issue of empirically distinguishing between quantitative and non-quantitative structures was addressed. This interpretation of measurement understands it in a way that is continuous with scientific investigation in general, i.e., as an attempt to discover independently existing facts. (shrink)

In the last few decades the role played by models and modeling activities has become a central topic in the scientific enterprise. In particular, it has been highlighted both that the development of models constitutes a crucial step for understanding the world and that the developed models operate as mediators between theories and the world. Such perspective is exploited here to cope with the issue as to whether error-based and uncertainty-based modeling of measurement are incompatible, and thus alternative (...) with one another, as sometimes claimed nowadays. The crucial problem is whether assuming this standpoint implies definitely renouncing to maintain a role for truth and the related concepts, particularly accuracy, in measurement. It is argued here that the well known objections against true values in measurement, which would lead to refuse the concept of accuracy as non-operational, or to maintain it as only qualitative, derive from a not clear distinction between three distinct processes: the metrological characterization of measuring systems, their calibration, and finally measurement. Under the hypotheses that (1) the concept of true value is related to the model of a measurement process, (2) the concept of uncertainty is related to the connection between such model and the world, and (3) accuracy is a property of measuring systems (and not of measurement results) and uncertainty is a property of measurement results (and not of measuring systems), not only the compatibility but actually the conjoint need of error-based and uncertainty-based modeling emerges. (shrink)