Objectives: This study explored a multidimensional model of the relationships between social media use, gender, peer bullying victimization experiences, and the onset of anxiety symptoms among children. We hypothesized that greater experience of bullying would be associated with greater onset of anxiety. We also expected that gender and social media use would be linked with anxiety among elementary school children. To test this hypothesis, a structural equation modeling approach was used.Methods: A total of 456 elementary children aged 11–13 years from (...) nine schools were recruited for this research. We used two psychological measures: The Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders and the Personal Experience Checklist as well as a sociodemographic questionnaire.Results: The social media usage survey found that all participants used social media. Instagram and YouTube were the platforms most used by the participants. The Structural Equation Model results suggest that bullying victimization and gender predicted the onset of anxiety in elementary school children. The model explained 32.1% of the variance of the outcome with very adequate fit indicators based on most indices, χ2 = 173.56, df = 52, p < 0.001; CFI = 0.92; TLI = 0.94; RMSEA = 0.07. Instagram use was correlated positively with generalized anxiety disorder. Gender was negatively correlated with Instagram use and positively correlated with YouTube use. Girls were found to use Instagram more and boys were found to use YouTube more. It was also found that girls had higher scores onSCARED dimensions, except for school avoidance. Girls were more prone to onset of anxiety than boys, except for school avoidance, which was not related to gender. Boys were found to experience significantly more physical bullying than girls. On the other hand, girls were found to experience more panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, separation anxiety disorder, and social anxiety than boys.Conclusion: This study found that bullying victimization significantly influences the onset of anxiety in children. Particular attention should be paid to cyberbullying in this context. This study also found a link between gender and anxiety—girls had a greater tendency to experience the onset of various types of anxiety, including panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, separation anxiety disorder, and social anxiety. Gender was also correlated with the form of bullying victimization. The findings of this study suggest that boys were more likely to experience physical bullying than girls. Interestingly, we found that Instagram use was significantly correlated with developing separation anxiety. In particular, children demonstrated school avoidance when experiencing cyberbullying. Limitations and future directions are discussed. (shrink)

Āsakti has its roots in the ancient Indian knowledge system. It precipitates the concept of attachment in the Indian perspective. The following paper explores the psychological perspective of āsakti from the Shrimad Bhagavad Gita while maintaining its philosophical purpose and nature. Āsakti hinders the path of self-realization; hence, from the psycho-philosophical lens, its inquiry with scientific understanding is important for spiritual growth. Āsakti can be understood as a river with five tributaries. Each tributary branches out of the river as an (...) independent water body, but has its traces though in the river. Āsakti is a combination of Rāga (approach), Dveṣa (aversion) and Ahaṁkāra (ego focus), is related to the operation of Triguṇa, moving from āsakti to anāsakti brings peace, happiness and health. In its unregulated form, āsakti leads to intellectual, mental and spiritual decay. Its control and regulation leads to anāsakti, spiritual growth, liberation from bondages and surrenderance to the supreme power. (shrink)

Business ethics of Javanese people in doing business in Indonesia.

샥티파타(śaktipāta)는 ‘샥티(śakti)의 하강(pāta, decent; to fall)’의 뜻이다. 샥티란 쉬바교의 절대 원리이자 종교적으로는 신(īśvara), 철학적으로는 의식(cit)으로 이해되는 쉬바(śiva)의 작용적 측면인데, 샥티가 하강한다는 것은 쉬바의 상태가 현전하는 것을 말한다. 즉 신이 개아에 현전하여 개아는 신의 상태가 된다. 본고는 아비나바굽타의 저작인 『탄트라정수』 제 11장을 통해 샥티파타에 대한 내용을 고찰한다. 10세기 인도 카쉬미르의 불이론 쉬바파의 대학자 아비나바굽타는 자신의 대작인 『탄트라광명』의 요약서 『탄트라정수』(TS)를 쓰면서 제 11장에 샥티파타의 내용을 다룬다. 그는 먼저 쉬바파 이원론의 샥티파타론을 제시하고 이를 논파한다. 그는 샥티파타는 바른 지식으로 생긴다는 주장을 소개하고, 바른 지식의 (...) 원인이 된다고 주장되는 신의 의지와 업이 바른 지식의 원인이 되지못함을 논증하여 이들의 샥티파타론을 논파한다. 다음으로 그는 쉬바파 이원론의 대표적인 샥티파타론인 업동일론과 염오이숙론을 제시하고 역시 이들의 주장을 논파한다. 이런 논의 후에 그는 불이론 쉬바파의 샥티파타론을 간결히 설명하면서 샥티파타가 발생하는 사람들의 근기에 따라 샥티파타를 9단계로 나누어 설명한다. 이를 통해 불이론 쉬바파의 샥티파타에 해당하는 것은 1-3단계에 속하는 상위에 위치시키고 쉬바파 이원론이나 여타 교설에서 주장되는 샥티파타는 그 하위에 위치시켰다. 이런 체계를 통해 그는 불이론 쉬바파의 교설을 정점으로 쉬바파 이원론을 그 하위에 위치시킴으로써 쉬바파 전체의 교설적 통합을 시도하였음을 알 수 있다. (shrink)

This book examines the theories of meaning or artha in different schools of philosophical thought highlighting the significant relationship between 'word' and 'meaning'. It demonstrates that classical Indian theory of language can inform and be informed by contemporary philosophy.

Some postcolonial theorists argue that the idea of a single system of belief known as "Hinduism" is a creation of nineteenth-century British imperialists. Andrew J. Nicholson introduces another perspective: although a unified Hindu identity is not as ancient as some Hindus claim, it has its roots in innovations within South Asian philosophy from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. During this time, thinkers treated the philosophies of Vedanta, Samkhya, and Yoga, along with the worshippers of Visnu, Siva, and Sakti, as (...) belonging to a single system of belief and practice. Instead of seeing such groups as separate and contradictory, they re-envisioned them as separate rivers leading to the ocean of Brahman, the ultimate reality. Drawing on the writings of philosophers from late medieval and early modern traditions, including Vijnanabhiksu, Madhava, and Madhusudana Sarasvati, Nicholson shows how influential thinkers portrayed Vedanta philosophy as the ultimate unifier of diverse belief systems. This project paved the way for the work of later Hindu reformers, such as Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan, and Gandhi, whose teachings promoted the notion that all world religions belong to a single spiritual unity. In his study, Nicholson also critiques the way in which Eurocentric concepts—like monism and dualism, idealism and realism, theism and atheism, and orthodoxy and heterodoxy—have come to dominate modern discourses on Indian philosophy. (shrink)

The paper concentrates on the most pressing question of Indian philosophy: what is the exact connotation of a word or what sort of entity helps us to identify the meaning of a word? The paper focuses on the clash between Realism (Nyāya) and Apoha vāda (Buddhist) regarding the debate whether the meaning of a word is particular/universal or both. The paper asserts that though Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁsakas challenged against Buddhist Apoha vāda, yet they realized that to establish an opinion in (...) support of a word that conceptually denotes a negative meaning first would be a very difficult task. (shrink)

This paper questions a few assumptions of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya’s theory of ordinary verbal cognition (laukika-śābdabodha). The meaning relation (vṛtti) is of two kinds: śakti (which gives us the primary referent of a word) and lakṣaṇā (which yields the secondary referent). For Gaṅgeśa, the ground (bīja) of lakṣaṇā is a sort of inexplicability (anupapatti) pertaining to the composition (anvaya) of word-meanings. In this connection, one notices that the case of lakṣaṇā is quite similar to that of one variety of postulation, namely, (...) śrutārtāthāpatti, where the subject hears only a part of a sentence and immediately grasps the words that are needed to render the sentential meaning complete. Unless he does that, sentential meaning, i.e., the composition (anvaya) of word-meanings shall suffer from the same inexplicability that characterizes instances of lakṣaṇā. In fact, in the ‘Śaktivāda’ section of Tattvacintāmaṇi, Gaṅgeśa himself draws a parallel between the cognition of sentential meaning in a śrutārthāpatti-like case and the cognition of sentential meaning in an instance of lakṣaṇā. However, Gaṇgesa himself treats Śrutārthāpatti as a piece of inferential cognition. If there is no fundamental difference between cases of śrutārthāpatti and cases of lakṣaṇā, then the cognition of sentential meaning in instances of lakṣaṇā must also be inferential in essence. In that case, we must admit, against Gaṅgeśa’s view, that such cognition of sentential meaning cannot be accommodated within the framework of verbal cognition (śābdabodha). Therefore, I conclude that some revision is needed in Gaṅgeśa’s theory of verbal cognition with respect to lakṣaṇā. (shrink)

Schopenhauer is widely recognized as the Western philosopher who has shown the greatest openness to Indian thought and whose own ideas approach most closely to it. This book examines his encounter with important schools of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy and subjects the principal apparent affinities to a careful analysis. Initial chapters describe Schopenhauer’s encounter with Indian thought in the context of the intellectual climate of early nineteenth-century Europe. For the first time, Indian texts and ideas were becoming available and the (...) belief that they could bring about a second Renaissance—an “Oriental Renaissance”—was widespread. Schopenhauer shared in this enthusiasm and for the rest of his life assiduously kept abreast of the new knowledge of India. Principal sections of the book consider the two main pillars of Schopenhauer’s system in relation to broadly comparable ideas found, in the case of Hindu thought, in Advaita Vedānta, and within Buddhism in the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools. Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the world as representation, or a flow of impressions appearing in the consciousness of living beings, is first considered. The convergence between this teaching and Indian idealism, especially the doctrine of illusory appearance, has long been recognized. Schopenhauer himself was aware of it, emphasizing that it was the result not of influence but of a remarkable convergence between Eastern and Western thought. This convergence is subjected to a much more detailed examination than has previously been carried out, undertaken in the light of twentieth-century Indology and recent studies of Schopenhauer. The second main pillar of Schopenhauer’s system, the doctrine of the world as will, is then examined and its relationship to Indian thought explored. This section of the work breaks new ground in the study of Schopenhauer, for although the similarity of his ethical and soteriological teaching to that of Indian religions has long been noted the underlying reasons for this have not been grasped. It is demonstrated that they are to be found in hitherto unrecognized affinities, of which Schopenhauer himself was largely unaware, between the metaphysics of the will and Indian ideas relating to karmic impressions, the store-consciousness, the causal body, and śakti as the “force” or “energy” that maintains the existence of the world. Final chapters discuss the controversial and difficult question of the relation of the will to final reality in Schopenhauer’s thought in the light of Indian conceptions, and suggest that the two central pillars of his philosophy may be seen, to a greater extent than previously supposed, as a bridge by which the Eastern and Western traditions of philosophical thought may be brought into a closer and more creative relationship. (shrink)

It is a well-known fact that the Śaiva nondualistic philosopher Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) adopted the Sāṃkhya principle according to which the effect must exist in some way before the operation of its cause (satkāryavāda). Johannes Bronkhorst has highlighted the paradox inherent in this appropriation: Utpaladeva is a staunch supporter of the satkāryavāda, but whereas Sāṃkhya authors consider it as a means of proving the existence of an unconscious matter, the Śaiva exploits it so as to establish his monistic idealism, (...) in perfect contradiction with the Sāṃkhya dualism of matter and consciousness. How does Utpaladeva achieve this complete reversal of meaning of the satkāryavāda? The present article argues that the elliptical verses of the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā dealing with this issue have been partly misunderstood so far due to the loss of Utpaladeva’s own detailed commentary (Vivr̥ti) on this passage: Abhinavagupta’s two commentaries, however terse in this respect, clearly show that a crucial part of Utpaladeva’s reasoning remains implicit in the verses. The article therefore attempts to reconstruct the gist of Utpaladeva’s strategy by having recourse to various other Śaiva sources, including Somānanda’s Śivadr̥ṣṭi and Utpaladeva’s own commentary thereon. This examination shows that Utpaladeva’s appropriation of the satkāryavāda rests on a profound transformation of the Sāṃkhya notions of manifestation (abhivyakti) and potentiality (śakti), and that his criticism of the Sāṃkhya understanding of causality might target the Śaiva dualists as well as Sāṃkhya authors. (shrink)

El Mokṣopāya (s. X d.n.e), mejor conocido como Yogavāsiṣṭha, nos adentra en el universo del idealismo subjetivo a través de historias extraordinarias, narradas por Vasiṣṭha, en las que la imaginación es la protagonista. La filosofía que subyace a este voluminoso poema muestra que todo lo que hay es la conciencia (cit-mātra) formada por el vacío supremo. La mente individual solo es un destello del poder de esta conciencia (cit-śakti), un teatro donde se proyecta el mundo externo, con todos sus objetos (...) perceptibles. Leyendo este texto a la luz de una de las obras más célebres del teatro español del Siglo de Oro, La vida es sueño de Calderón de la Barca, este ensayo tiende puentes entre la angustia existencial de Segismundo, que ignora si está dormido o despierto, y el pensamiento sereno de Vasiṣṭha cuando explica que la vigilia y el sueño son ambos igual de vacíos e ilusorios. (shrink)

AbstractŚaṅkara’s Brahma-advaita-vāda and Abhinavagupta’s Śiva-advaita-vāda are well-known non-dualistic systems in Indian philosophy.1In Advaitavedānta, Brahman-Ātman is the sole reality, and there is unanimity about the fact that all the Upaniṣads speak of an attribute-less non-dual reality that is consciousness, existence and bliss. In Trika, Paramaśiva is the only reality with the nature of sat, cit and ānanda.2 This non-dual reality is self-luminous (sva-prakaśa) in both the schools. Both the schools, in different ways, accept the world as an appearance. In Advaitavedānta, the (...) world-illusion is a superimposition on Brahman whereas according to Trika, the world is a spontaneous self-projection of Paramaśiva. Both the systems agree that there is total identity between individual self and the Absolute, ajñāna as the cause of bondage, and jñāna as the means to self-realization. Jīvanmukti as the state of complete freedom and realization of one’s unity with the ultimate reality have been accepted in both the schools. The focus of this paper is to dwell upon the concept of non-dualism (Advaita) from the Trika angle as enunciated by Abhinavagupta and Advaitavedānta as propounded by Śaṅkara. Abhinava has envisaged a non-dualistic dimension of consciousness with the inclusion of prakāśa and vimarśa, which means that within the format of non-dualism, Trika accepts a second in the form of Śakti without compromising the non-dualistic dimension of the school whereas Śaṅkara’s Advaitic non-dualism has no space for anything other than the self, i.e., Brahman-Ātman. (shrink)

The specificity of tantric soteriology consists of a combination of three basic principles - unity, salvation, and bliss. This article explores the principle of salvation. Spiritual liberation implies the final overcoming of obstacles hindering the new worldview. Unlike the principle of unity, the principle of salvation focuses on difference, not on identity, drawing a sharp line between the desired state of liberation and the present state of dependence. The main obstacles to spiritual liberation are expressed in the well-known triad “avidyā (...) - karma - saṃsāra”. The principle of salvation appears in Tantrism in two interrelated forms, the ascetic and śaktic ones. Both of them agree with each other in rejection of spiritual ignorance. Spiritual ignorance is the main “negative goal”; without deliverance from it there is no freedom. The state of ignorance is existential one and endowed with powerful protective “forces”. The principle of salvation implies the deliverance not only from everything that is usually considered negative, but also of “positive” things. In the śaktic mode of the principle of salvation, it is assumed that an incorrect view of reality is eliminated by a correct view of it. Due to the fact that, according to the tantric adepts, the energies of the divine Śakti act in the world, the understanding of this fact leads the adept to stop perceiving himself as a dependent being even in the midst of an infinite variety of processes and events of the world. Life is then perceived as an unconditioned, spontaneous “divine play”, a stream of divine pleasure. Ascetic form can be reduced to an ontological interpretation of the principle of salvation, and śaktic form to a cognitive one. (shrink)

This paper suggests that the classic of Indian theology, the Nyāya-kusumâñjali is in fact two texts: an earlier treatise in 65 ślokas, and Udayana’s commentary on it. Internal evidence consists in: the ślokas read as a continuous text; there are extremely long prose passages without verses; Udayana does not comment on his own verses, only on the ślokas; the basic plan of the two texts are markedly different; different content of some chapters: ch. 1 about karma vs. rituals to reach (...) heaven, ch. 2 about creation vs. eternality of sound, and in ch. 5 Udayana doubles the arguments for God; Udayana deals extensively with atoms and yogic perception and rejects the concept of śakti, in contrast to the verses; there are a few manifest disagreements. External evidence for the thesis: there are mss. of the verses only; there are many commentaries on the verses only; these commentators—with a single exception—do not seem to take Udayana for the author of the verses; the first commentary on Udayana names his own work a subcommentary; in his other works, it is atypical of Udayana to insert ślokas in his text; a legend of the Bhāduṙī Brahmins stating that Udayana “received” the Kusumâñjali. (shrink)

Because of the widespread feminine priority that makes it the receptacle of śakti, India is definitely “one of the last bastions of the Mother,” as is pointed out in a recent book. If in fact there is a “maternalistic” culture it is certainly that of India, in spite of the legal regime, in which the element of affectionate magic characterizing all life and all organic intimacy is affirmed through the warm symbiosis of mother-child love. A miracle of that absolute love (...) incarnated with a natural serenity by millions of mothers dispensing a felicitous affectionate security, instilled in the Indian soul throughout its entire life. The traits of the Hindu personality and the principle content of its culture are organized and ordered around this center, characterized by an extraordinary coherence. Since its construction begins with this “dual unity” the Hindu personality has necessarily the popolarity of fusion-separation as a pivot. This is the central theme of S. Kakar, who, basing his conclusions on results of clinical psychoanalyses of Hindu individuals as well as on contributions from the collective imagination (folklore and myths) claims to discern the ontogenetic source of the supreme ideal of deliverance (mokṣa) in early childhood and, more specifically, in the strong unconscious desire to find again the benevolent presence of the “good mother”. (shrink)

The primary concern in this paper is to examine the nature of Śiva’s aruḷ—his generative and salvific energy—as portrayed in Tiruvācakam, Māṇikkavācakar’s important but understudied text of medieval bhakti poems. Close attention is paid to the poet’s description of Śiva’s aruḷ as inducing seemingly incongruous ontological states of being—one of ecstatic possession that results in rapturous dance and one of spiritual bondage. In doing so, this paper posits that Māṇikkavācakar is using aruḷ as śakti is used in the philosophy of (...) the Sanskrit Śaiva Siddhānta tradition and argues that this is an early attempt to localize the Śaiva Siddhānta in a Tamil milieu, as Tiruvācakam appears several centuries prior to the initial Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta text. In doing so, this paper also highlights the ways in which poetic narratives can embody a broader philosophical debate rather than serving merely as a vehicle for philosophical ideas. (shrink)

This paper in an elementary level expresses the inevitable relation between the word and meaning from the prominent Indian philosophical trends by giving stress on Vyakti-śakti-vāda and Jāti-śakti-vāda, the two contender doctrines. The first one puts emphasis on the semantic value of a predicate whereas the latter draws attention to the generic uses of nouns. The second part of the writing underpins Navya Nyāya and Kumārila’s positions on the word-meaning reliance and the debate initiate when we look back to the (...) question whether the word-meaning relation sounds conventional or eternal. I propose a position (śabda-vivarta-vāda) on these issues derived from the works of Patan᷈jali and Bhartṛharị, two grammarians of classical Indian tradition. They defend eternal verbum as the material cause of the word and objects. This doctrine advocates uniforism by giving up bifurcation between the word and the world. (shrink)

One debate that occupied Pratyabhijñā philosophers and their Buddhist interlocutors was the question of the reality of _sambandha_, or relation. A central treatise on the topic is Utpaladeva’s (∼10th c.) _Sambandhasiddhi_ [SS] (‘_Proof of Relation_’), a response to Dharmakīrti’s (∼7th c.) _Sambandhaparīkṣā_ [SP] (‘_Analysis of Relation_’). As the contrasting titles suggest, Dharmakīrti held that relations are merely conceptual constructions (_kalpanā_), inferred _post hoc_ from discrete perceptual cognitions (_pratyakṣa_)—and thus ultimately _unreal_. Utpaladeva, on the other hand, attempted to ‘prove’ (_siddhi_) the (...) truth (_satya_) of relation as a genuine ‘division-non-division,’ or ‘unity-in-diversity’ (_bhedābheda_). In this article, I reconstruct Utpala’s ‘proof’ as a pragmatic argument to the effect that Dharmakīrti, in virtue of his nominalist metaphysics, mistakenly treats the general form of relation as an inferential _concept_, rather than the mode of ‘intentional’ _action_ (_śakti_) manifest in reflexive judgment (_vimarśa_). In doing so, Utpala suggests that Dharmakīrti inadvertently renders the relational conditions for the recognition of determinate intentional content unintelligible. (shrink)

Lima gagasan yang dapat mengubah Indonesia itu tentu Pancasila. Sebagaimana ditulis Jakob Oetama dalam kata pengantar buku Profesor Sastrapratedja, sudah sangat mendesak untuk mengaktualisasikan kembali Pancasila. Pancasila sudah lama berada dalam bahaya, bukan karena masih ada kekuatan politik yang mempersoalkannya, melainkan karena dukungan terhadap Pancasila cenderung menguapkan maknanya. Di masa Demokrasi Terpimpin Pancasila semakin dikesampingkan oleh semboyan-semboyan lain di mana yang paling tragis adalah NASAKOM. Di masa Orde Baru Pancasila dinyatakan sakti dan sesudahnya jutaan saudara dan saudari sebangsa dibunuh, (...) dikucilkan, dan dihancurkan eksistensinya; Pancasila menjadi payung salah satu kejahatan terbesar dalam sejarah umat manusia. Dan kemudian, melalui manipulasi, seperti dalam Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Pancasila di-jawa-kan—dalam pidatonya di Pekanbaru Suharto mengatakan bahwa untuk memahami Pancasila orang perlu tahu falsafah honocaroko—dan dibonsai menjadi anjuran untuk bersikap baik-baik, bebas bertanggungjawab di bawah naungan pemerintah. Pancasila bonsai itu diindoktrinasikan melalui kursus-kursus BP7 kepada masyarakat. Maka waktu Suharto meninggalkan tahta kekuasaannya, Pancasila seakan sudah masuk kotak, orang sepertinya malu berbicara mengenai Pancasila. Panggung ideologis yang kosong segera mulai diisi oleh ideologi-ideologi picik-agamis-eksklusivis yang betul-betul mau membersihkan Indonesia dari sisa Pancasila. Maka pada 2006 AIPI (Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia) menyerukan kepada Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono agar Pancasila kembali dijadikan acuan akhir eksplisit segala kebijakan kenegaraan. Karena itu, pemahaman kembali tentang arti Pancasila sangat mendesak. Itulah aktualitas buku Professor Sastrapratedja. Judulnya bukan sekedar kata keren. Sastrapratedja menunjukkan bahwa Pancasila bukan sebuah dokumen sejarah saja—seperti Declaration of Independence Amerika Serikat—atau sebuah pilar di atasnya bangsa Indonesia meneruskan perjalanannya. Sastrapratedja memperlihatkan bahwa Pancasila mempunyai gigi; artinya, Pancasila merupakan petunjuk tajam tentang kebijakan mana yang boleh dan tidak boleh diambil oleh negara yang mewujudkan bangsa Indonesia. Sastrapratedja menunjukkan dengan rinci bahwa kalau kita mengaku mendasarkan kehidupan bangsa pada lima sila Pancasila maka ada konsekuensinya. Ada kebijakan yang wajib diambil dan ada kebijakan yang wajib ditolak. Kalau negara kita mengikuti petunjuk Pancasila maka negara kita akan berubah. Buku ini terdiri dari dua puluh tiga makalah yang ditulis penulis dalam lima belas tahun terakhir. Bentuk itu menguntungkan karena pembaca tidak perlu membaca 393 halaman teks ini dari permulaan sampai akhir. Daftar isi yang cukup jelas, sebuah indeks nama dan sebuah indeks analitis rinci membantu pembaca untuk menemukan persis apa yang dicarinya. Sastrapratedja tentu tidak hanya membicarakan Pancasila. Di antara sekian masalah yang dibicarakan ada, misalnya, ”etika ilmu pengetahuan“—yang menurut Sastrapratedja memuat lima prinsip: harus menghormati martabat manusia sebagai pribadi, berpegang pada prinsip ”tidak merugikan,” terarah pada kesejahteraan bagi manusia dan masyarakat seluruhnya, pada pengurangan penderitaan, serta pada pemerataan hasil-hasilnya—, ”nasionalisme,“ ”jati diri manusia Indonesia,“ ”globalisasi“ dan tantangannya, pelbagai arti kata ”ideologi,“ ”etika politik,“ arti ”budaya politik,“ ”multikulturalisme,“ ”krisis modernitas“ sampai ”keamanan pangan“ sebagai tantangan etis........ Satu muatan Pancasila yang diangkat oleh Sastrapratedja adalah bahwa ”Pancasila menjadikan kehidupan masyarakat dan negara lebih manusiawi.” Mempancasilakan Indonesia berarti membuat bangsa Indonesia hidup bersama dengan lebih manusiawi. Hal itu eksplisit dituntut dalam sila kedua, tetapi memancar ke semua sila. Lebih manusiawi berarti penolakan terhadap kekerasan sebagai sarana untuk menyelesaikan masalah. Pancasila mendorong untuk mengusahakan “penghalusan perasaan” dan “transformasi keagresifan” manusia Indonesia. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa memanusiakan manusia dengan mengajak menghormati perbedaan, mengakui identitas semua warga dan komunitas masyarakat, dan dengan menjamin kebebasan beragama dan ”toleransi” terhadap kemajemukan. Menjunjung tinggi Pancasila membawa kewajiban untuk menjamin hak-hak asasi manusia. Demokrasi membawa ”komitmen pada kesamaan.” Usaha mewujudkan keadilan sosial berakar dalam solidaritas. Bahwa Pancasila merupakan suatu etika politik, menurut Sastrapratedja, tidak berarti bahwa Pancasila tidak menyangkut sikap etis manusia Indonesia masing-masing. Pancasila dapat menjadi etika politik apabila nilai-nilai Pancasila dihayati oleh masyarakat masing-masing. Sesuai dengan lima silanya karakter manusia Pancasilais ditandai oleh lima kemampuan: kemampuan untuk menghargai perbedaan, untuk membawa diri secara manusiawi dan santun, untuk mencintai tanah airnya, untuk bersikap demokratis, serta bersikap adil dan solider. Pendidikan Pancasila dengan demikian adalah pendidikan yang mendukung perkembangan sikap-sikap Pancasilais itu. Sesuatu yang masih dapat dimasukkan ke dalam edisi berikut buku ”Lima Gagasan…” adalah tanggapan terhadap pelbagai paham tentang Pancasila yang selama ini muncul di Indonesia. Ada sebuah koreksi kecil. Catatan Delanty, yang dikutip Sastrapratedja, yang mengatakan bahwa Ayatullah Khomeini dulu menyebarkan gagasannya lewat internet (hlm. 85) tentu keliru. Waktu Khomeini di Paris—dan sampai ia meninggal dunia—belum ada internet. (Franz Magnis-Suseno, Guru Besar Ilmu Filsafat Emeritus, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat, Driyarakra, Jakarta ). (shrink)