Was there a chant of swans? Greek and Latin poets had established the idea of the swan singing in the moment of its death as a part of their self- representation, while ancient zoologists argued for the reality of the phenomenon. How did medieval and early modern natural scientists and philosophers deal with the cantus cygnorum? Following his classical sources, a scholar like Albertus Magnus defended the singing swan in his zoology. The discussion was still alive when the Italian (...) anatomist Ulysses Aldrovandi in the late 16th century discovered the swan’s enlarged windpipe and interpreted it as the final demonstration of the chant’s reality. (shrink)

This article provides a strategic history of the role assigned by modern historians to visual representation in early modern science, an aspect of historiography that is largely ignored in the scholarly literature. Despite the current undervaluation of images and visual reasoning, historians in the 1940s and 1950s who established the 20th century concept of the Scientific Revolution, also assigned a conspicuous role to images, claiming 15th century art as a chapter in the history of science and identifying (...) the first modern scientists in artists such as Brunelleschi and Leonardo. My analysis of the writings that shaped the discourse on visual representation---by giants such as George Sarton, Herbert Butterfield, and Alexandre Koyré---shows that the handful of concepts introduced in these early discussions formed the foundations of the subsequent scholarly approach to early modern scientific images. However, close scrutiny during the 1970s defined these concepts as interesting but not as key elements for the emergence of modern science proposed earlier. The wave of social studies of science in the 1980s further diminished the importance of images, to the point that recent surveys of early modern science neither consider the role of visual representation nor include figures in their narratives. Several recent publications with suggestive titles such as The Power of Images in Early Modern Science promise to recover a significant role for images in the Scientific Revolution. The present inquiry into the earlier discourse seeks to clarify the historiographic framework into which these new efforts fit. (shrink)

Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and that it is time to discard this troublesome concept. In contrast, we hold that without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence. In order to defend the latter position, we focus on the explanatory role of representation in computation. We examine how the methods of digital and analog computation are used to model a relatively simple target system, (...) and show that representation plays an in-eliminable explanatory role in both cases. We conclude that, to the extent that biologic systems engage in computation, representation is destined to play an explanatory role in cognitive science. (shrink)

People perceive that if their memories and moral beliefs changed, they would change. We investigated why individuals respond this way. In Study 1, participants judged that identity would change more after changes to memories and widely shared moral beliefs versus preferences and controversial moral beliefs. The extent to which participants judged that changes would affect their relationships predicted identity change and mediated the relationship between type of moral belief and perceived identity change. We discuss the role that social relationships (...) play in judgments of identity and highlight implications for psychology and philosophy. (shrink)

People frequently gesture when problem-solving, particularly on tasks that require spatial transformation. Gesture often facilitates task performance by interacting with internal mental representations, but how this process works is not well understood. We investigated this question by exploring the case of mental abacus, a technique in which users not only imagine moving beads on an abacus to compute sums, but also produce movements in gestures that accompany the calculations. Because the content of MA is transparent and readily manipulated, the task (...) offers a unique window onto how gestures interface with mental representations. We find that the size and number of MA gestures reflect the length and difficulty of math problems. Also, by selectively interfering with aspects of gesture, we find that participants perform significantly worse on MA under motor interference, but that perceptual feedback is not critical for success on the task. We conclude that premotor processes involved in the planning of gestures are critical to mental representation in MA. (shrink)

Humans have cognitive mechanisms that allow them to keep track of time, represent past events, and simulate the future, but these capacities have intrinsic constraints. Here, we explore the role of material culture as an extension of internal time representations through anthropological and archeological case studies, focusing on Upper Paleolithic material culture. We argue that calendars complement and extend internal time representations, because they enable humans to project past events into the future more accurately than is possible with episodic (...) memory alone, making them one of the factors that significantly improved foraging success during the Upper Paleolithic. We discuss the implications of the epistemic use of material culture for our understanding of the causes of shifts in human behavior during the Upper Paleolithic. (shrink)

I argue that the construction of representation theorems is a powerful tool for creating novel objects and theories in mathematics, as the construction of a new representation introduces new pieces of information in a very specific way that enables a solution for a problem and a proof of a new theorem. In more detail I show how the work behind the proof of a representation theorem transforms a mathematical problem in a way that makes it tractable and (...) introduces information into it that it did not contain at the beginning of the process. (shrink)

Cet article discute le rôle des représentations dans les preuves mathématiques. Il est suggéré ici que les représentations nous permettent de diviser une preuve en plusieurs parties plus faciles à traiter. Nous illustrerons cela avec un exemple de la pratique mathématique actuelle qui consiste à trouver la valeur d'une expression en la divisant graduellement en parties plus simples. Par ailleurs, j'explique le rôle que jouent les icônes et les indices dans cette procédure. Les icônes assurent la similarité entre l'expression et (...) les résultats obtenus. En revanche, les indices agissent comme des indicateurs qui permettent de réinsérer les résultats aux emplacements appropriés. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 13, Issue 1, Page 187-205, January 2021.

La présence d’un représentant du public dans les CER est obligatoire depuis 1998. Le rôle de celui-ci consiste à « aider à élargir les perspectives et les valeurs du CER afin de favoriser le dialogue et la transparence avec les groupes locaux ». Cette exigence inscrite dans la perspective d’une démocratie représentative soulève néanmoins de délicates questions tant au niveau de l’interprétation du concept de représentation que sur le plan de son application pratique dans le cadre des CER. Le représentant (...) du public parle-t-il en sage à la place des membres de la communauté ou bien est-il leur mandataire en les rendant présents dans le processus de décision? La réponse comporte d’importantes retombées pratiques : qui peut être représentant du public? Sur quelles compétences et légitimités repose ce rôle? Quel est le mode de nomination le plus apte à satisfaire les exigences énoncées? Quels liens doivent exister entre le représentant du public et la communauté qu’il représente? Ces questions permettent de jeter un regard sur la façon dont les CER et la pratique de l’éthique de la recherche s’insèrent dans la démarche démocratique. (shrink)

A number of accounts of expert programming behavior have been advanced. These models of the programming activity have served to highlight the range of factors that are thought to underpin programming strategy. However, such accounts have tended to emphasize either the effects of the organization of the programmer's knowledge representation or the role played by features of the notation of the task language on the emergence, development, and support of particular forms of strategy. Such work has neglected to (...) (a) provide an account of the way in which these factors might interact to determine programming strategy, and (b) shed light upon the nature of the development of particular strategies as programming skill increases.This article presents the results of an empirical analysis of the strategies employed by programmers of varying skill levels using different programming languages. The development of particular forms of strategy is hypothesized to be related both to the development of systematic asymmetries in programmers' generic plan‐based representations of programming knowledge and to the way in which features of the notation of particular programming languages might differentially support particular strategies. However, the results of the study reported here suggest that these effects must be interpreted within a broad developmental context. Hence, as programming skill develops, it appears that the notation of the task language tends to take precedence as a determinant of strategy, but has less relevance at beginning stages of skill development and within the context of expert performance. This finding would not be predicted by current models of the programming activity because such models suggest that any notational effects will tend to be consistent regardless of the skill level attained by the programmer. This article endeavors to extend current models of programming by emphasizing the need to consider in detail not only the development of programming strategy, but also the way in which knowledge representation and features of the task langauge interact to give rise to particular forms of programming behavior. (shrink)

Theories of relations between language and conceptual development benefit from empirical evidence for concepts available in infancy, but such evidence is comparatively scarce. Here, we examine early representations of specific concepts, namely, sets of dynamic events corresponding either to predicates involving two variables with a reversible, asymmetric relation between them (such as the set of all events that correspond to a linguistic phrase like “a dog is pushing a car,”) or to comparatively simpler, one-variable predicates (such as the set of (...) events corresponding to a phrase like “a dog is jumping.”). We develop a non-linguistic, anticipatory eye-tracking task that can be administered to both infants and adults, and we use this task to gather evidence for the formation and use of such one-and two-place-predicate classes (which we refer to as event sortals) in 12–24-mo-old infants, and in adults with and without concurrent verbal prose shadowing. Using visually similar stimuli for both the simpler (one-place) and the more complex (reversible, asymmetric, two-place) concepts, we find that infants only show evidence for forming and generalizing one-place event sortals, and, while adults succeed with both kinds in the absence of verbal shadowing, shadowing hampers their ability to form and use the asymmetric two-place event sortals. In a subsequent experiment with adults, we find that if the shadowing material is grammatically impoverished, adults now succeed in forming and using both one- and two-place event sortals. We discuss implications of these results for theories of concept acquisition, and the role of language in this process. (shrink)

An understanding of the roles and representations of women in classical Chinese philosophy is here derived from central texts such as the Analects, the Lienu Zhuan, and the I Ching. We argue that the roles of women during the classical period of Chinese philosophy tended to be as part of the “inner,” working domestically as a housewife and mother. This will be shown from three passages from the Analects. Women were represented as submissive and passive, as with the qualities ascribed (...) to yin energy, and therefore as rightfully subordinate to men. However, despite representations of women in philosophy being thus at this time, there were exceptions, specific women who could take a male “outer” political role. The story of Ling Liang from the Lienu Zhuan suggests that although women being involved in “outer” affairs was looked down on, there were still women who would be and who would occasionally get praised for doing so. This shows that it was realised, explicitly or otherwise, that women were capable of taking those roles, but also that they were not allowed to take such roles at that time. (shrink)

What role does the concept of representation play in the contexts of experimentation and explanation in cognitive neurobiology? In this article, a distinction is drawn between minimal and substantive roles for representation. It is argued by appeal to a case study that representation currently plays a role in cognitive neurobiology somewhere in between minimal and substantive and that this is problematic given the ultimate explanatory goals of cognitive neurobiological research. It is suggested that what is (...) needed is for representation to instead play a more substantive role. (shrink)

In the ancient Russian art of the XV–XVI centuries, there are often works with the image of St. St. Nicholas of Myra, represented in various iconographic types and accompanied by images of holy wives. These monuments have a similar compositional structure. Among them, the most significant are those icons where the image of the Myrlician saint is placed in the centerpiece, and the figures of selected saints are represented in the margins. The subject of the study in this work is (...) the corpus of monuments with the central image of St. Nicholas as well as the figures of the chosen saints in the fields and the images of female holiness in the margins. The purpose of this article is to determine the role of the figures of the holy women in these icon compositions by the example of monuments of a certain iconographic origin and to offer an interpretation of this previously insufficiently studied plot. To do this, we will resort to the iconographic method of research, which allows us to identify certain nuances of compositional construction, to reveal the spiritual content of the image. The method of comparative analysis is no less important in this work. The works of interest to us are united by the composition of the figures of the few holy women in the lower field, which are associated with evangelical events and the theme of steadfastness in faith (st. Paraskeva, st. Varvara or st. Ulyana), or have pronounced motives for appearing at the Last Judgment (St. Catherine). The stable tradition of depicting these holy women in the iconographic composition of these monuments suggests their correlation with the central image. We believe that they were designed to emphasize the idea of the intercession of the female saints and were organically into iconographic system. (shrink)

_Abstract_: The significance of neuroscientific findings for the analysis of central problems in cognitive science has long been a matter of debate. Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience have reignited this discussion, especially with regard to the study of cognitive representations and cognitive processes. The present paper focuses on multivariate analyses, a class of neuroscientific methods that promises to shed new light on the neural bases of cognitive representations. Multivariate approaches are both powerful and increasingly used. Yet, we argue that their (...) successful application in neuroscience requires significant theoretical and methodological clarification. After providing a preliminary assessment of the pros and cons of multivariate methods, we claim that their successful application crucially depends on how we conceptualize the relationships between representations, cognitive processes, and neural data, in other words, on the cognitive ontology we use to describe the human mind. Our discussion also highlights some general strengths and weaknesses of neuroscientific contributions to the program of classical cognitive science. _Keywords_: Cognitive Process; fMRI; Multivariate Analysis; Marr’s Three Levels of Analysis; Cognitive Ontology _Rappresentazioni e processi: quale ruolo per i metodi multivariati nelle neuroscienze cognitive?_ _Riassunto_: La rilevanza dei risultati neuroscientifici per quanto riguarda i problemi centrali delle scienze cognitive è motivo di discussione. Recenti sviluppi nelle neuroscienze cognitive hanno rianimato tale dibattito, in particolare rispetto allo studio delle rappresentazioni e dei processi cognitivi. Il presente articolo si focalizza sull’analisi multivariata, un insieme di metodi neuroscientifici che si promettono di studiare le basi neurali delle rappresentazioni cognitive. Nonostante le potenzialità e l’uso pervasivo degli approcci multivariati, in questo lavoro sosteniamo che prima di poter valutare il loro effettivo contributo nello studio delle rappresentazioni cognitive sia necessaria una chiarificazione teorica e metodologica. Dopo una discussione preliminare dei vantaggi e degli svantaggi dei metodi multivariati, evidenziamo come una loro efficace applicazione dipenda in maniera sostanziale da come viene intesa la relazione tra rappresentazioni, processi cognitivi e dati neurali o, in altre parole, dall’ontologia cognitiva che impieghiamo per descrivere la mente umana. Il presente lavoro affronta inoltre i generali punti di forza e gli elementi critici rispetto al contributo della ricerca neuroscientifica nel programma delle scienze cognitive classiche. _Parole chiave_: Cognitive Process; fMRI; Multivariate Analysis; Marr’s Three Levels of Analysis; Cognitive Ontology. (shrink)

According to Gilead and colleagues, to be efficient abstraction requires a hierarchical organization of information into long-term memory. But, how and when are abstract representations consolidated into long-term memory and how are they integrated with pre-existing abstracta are questions not discussed by Gilead and colleagues. Here, we propose that these processes occur preferentially during offline periods such as sleep.

In this paper, we explore the role of syntactic representations in set theory. We highlight a common inferential scheme in set theory, which we call the Syntactic Representation Inferential Scheme, in which the set theorist infers information about a concept based on the way that concept can be represented syntactically. However, the actual syntactic representation is only indicated, not explicitly provided. We consider this phenomenon in relation to the derivation indicator position that asserts that the ordinary proofs (...) given in mathematical discourse indicate syntactic derivations in a formal logical system. In particular, we note that several of the arguments against the derivation indicator position would seem to imply that set theorists could gain no benefits from the syntactic representations of concepts indicated by their definitions, yet set theorists clearly do. (shrink)

Stawarczyk, Bezdek, and Zacks offer neuroscience evidence for a midline default network core, which appears to coordinate internal, top‐down mentation with externally‐triggered, bottom‐up attention in a push‐pull relationship. The network may enable the flexible pursuance of thoughts tuned into or detached from the current environment.

The Enhanced Indispensability Argument (Baker [ 2009 ]) exemplifies the new wave of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. The new wave capitalizes on mathematics' role in scientific explanations. I will criticize some analyses of mathematics' explanatory function. In turn, I will emphasize the representational role of mathematics, and argue that the debate would significantly benefit from acknowledging this alternative viewpoint to mathematics' contribution to scientific explanations and knowledge.

People mentally represent the shapes of objects. For instance, the mental representation of an eagle is different when one thinks about a flying or resting eagle. This study examined the role of shape in mental representations of similes (i.e., metaphoric comparisons). We tested the prediction that when people process a simile they will mentally represent the entities of the comparison as having a similar shape. We conducted two experiments in which participants read sentences that either did (experimental sentences) (...) or did not (control sentences) invite comparing two entities. For the experimental sentences, the ground of the comparison was explicit in Experiment 1 (“X has the ability to Z, just like Y”) and implicit in Experiment 2 (“X is like Y”). After having read the sentence, participants were presented with line drawings of the two objects, which were either similarly or dissimilarly shaped. They judged whether both objects were mentioned in the preceding sentence. For the experimental sentences, recognition latencies were shorter for similarly shaped objects than for dissimilarly shaped objects. For the control sentences, we did not find such an effect of similarity in shape. These findings suggest that a perceptual symbol of shape is activated when processing similes. (shrink)

People mentally represent the shapes of objects. For instance, the mental representation of an eagle is different when one thinks about a flying or resting eagle. This study examined the role of shape in mental representations of similes (i.e., metaphoric comparisons). We tested the prediction that when people process a simile they will mentally represent the entities of the comparison as having a similar shape. We conducted two experiments in which participants read sentences that either did (experimental sentences) (...) or did not (control sentences) invite comparing two entities. For the experimental sentences, the ground of the comparison was explicit in Experiment 1 (“X has the ability to Z, just like Y”) and implicit in Experiment 2 (“X is like Y”). After having read the sentence, participants were presented with line drawings of the two objects, which were either similarly or dissimilarly shaped. They judged whether both objects were mentioned in the preceding sentence. For the experimental sentences, recognition latencies were shorter for similarly shaped objects than for dissimilarly shaped objects. For the control sentences, we did not find such an effect of similarity in shape. These findings suggest that a perceptual symbol of shape is activated when processing similes. (shrink)

Thelen et al. present a convincing explanation of the A-not-B error, but contrary to their own claims, their explanation essentially involves mental representations. As is too common among cognitive scientists, they equate mental representations with representations of external physical objects. They clearly show, however, that representations of bodily actions on physical objects are central to the dynamical system producing the error.

Numerous studies have found that selective attention affects category learning. However, previous research did not distinguish between the contribution of focusing and filtering components of selective attention. This study addresses this issue by examining how components of selective attention affect category representation. Participants first learned a rule‐plus‐similarity category structure, and then were presented with category priming followed by categorization and recognition tests. Additionally, to evaluate the involvement of focusing and filtering, we fit models with different attentional mechanisms to the (...) data. In Experiment 1, participants received rule‐based category training, with specific emphasis on a single deterministic feature (D feature). Experiment 2 added a recognition test to examine participants’ memory for features. Both experiments indicated that participants categorized items based solely on the D feature, showed greater memory for the D feature, were primed exclusively by the D feature without interference from probabilistic features (P features), and were better fit by models with focusing and at least one type of filtering mechanism. The results indicated that selective attention distorted category representation by highlighting the D feature and attenuating P features. To examine whether the distorted representation was specific to rule‐based training, Experiment 3 introduced training, emphasizing all features. Under such training, participants were no longer primed by the D feature, they remembered all features well, and they were better fit by the model assuming only focusing but no filtering process. The results coupled with modeling provide novel evidence that while both focusing and filtering contribute to category representation, filtering can also result in representational distortion. (shrink)

Berkeley’s likeness principle states that only an idea can be like an idea. In this paper, I argue that the principle should be read as a premise only in a metaphysical argument showing that matter cannot instantiate anything like the sensory properties we perceive. It goes against those interpretations that take it to serve also, if not primarily, an epistemological purpose, featuring in Berkeley’s alleged Representation Argument to the effect that we cannot reach beyond the veil of our ideas. (...) First, in section 1, I raise some concerns about the traditional narrative concerning the likeness principle’s role in Berkeley’s argumentation. In section 2, I delineate an alternative narrative, arguing that there is no ‘missing premise’ in his alleged Representation Argument we need to explain simply because he advances no argument like that in the first place. In section 3–4, I provide a close reading of the relevant passages—first from the _Principles_, then the _Dialogues_—and their contexts, supporting textually a purely metaphysical interpretation of the likeness principle arguments. In section 5, I address some possible objections, based on the phrasing of the likeness principle passages and some related texts. (shrink)

There are individual and cultural differences in how memories of our emotions are cognitively represented. This article examines the cognitive representation of emotions in different cultures, as a result of emotional (in)consistency in different cultures. Using a continuous semantic priming task, we showed in two studies that individuals who were less emotionally consistent across relationships have stronger associations of their emotions within those relationships. Further, we found (in Study 2) that in a culture characterised by higher levels of emotional (...) inconsistency across relationships (Singapore), stronger associations between emotions within relationships were found than in a culture characterised by emotional consistency (USA). This cultural difference in cognitive representation was fully mediated by individual differences in cross-situational consistency levels. (shrink)

This book examines the origins and boundaries of Japanese digital role-playing games. A geographically diverse roster of contributors introduces English-speaking audiences to Japanese video game scholarship and applies postcolonial and philosophical readings to the Japanese game text.

The terms nested sets, partitive frequencies, inside-outside view, and dual processes add little but confusion to our original analysis (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995; 1999). The idea of nested set was introduced because of an oversight; it simply rephrases two of our equations. Representation in terms of chances, in contrast, is a novel contribution yet consistent with our computational analysis System 1.dual process theory” is: Unless the two processes are defined, this distinction can account post hoc for almost everything. In (...) contrast, an ecological view of cognition helps to explain how insight is elicited from the outside (the external representation of information) and, more generally, how cognitive strategies match with environmental structures. (shrink)

Representationalists have routinely expressed skepticism about the idea that inflexible responses to stimuli are to be explained in representational terms. Representations are supposed to be more than just causal mediators in the chain of events stretching from stimulus to response, and it is difficult to see how the sensory states driving reflexes are doing more than playing the role of causal intermediaries. One popular strategy for distinguishing representations from mere causal mediators is to require that representations are decoupled from (...) specific stimulus conditions. I believe this requirement on representation is mistaken and at odds with explanatory practices in sensory ecology. Even when sensory states have the job of coordinating a specific output with a specific input, we can still find them doing the work of representations, carrying information needed for organisms to respond successfully to environmental conditions. We can uncover information at work by intervening specifically on the information conveyed by sensory states, leaving their causal role undisturbed. (shrink)

This volume contains new papers addressing a number of new and traditional issues pertaining to the roles of representations in visual perception. Among these issues is the one concerning the nature of the perceptual state itself – e. g. on the issue of whether the perceptual state, like its distal objects, is structured, for instance by possessing a spatial character. Other issues include those of whether at least aspects of the distal object are presented immediately to us visually, whether (...) class='Hi'>representation plays any (interesting) role in disjunctivist and naïve realist accounts of visual experience and the relationship among visual perception, attention and representation. The anthology includes a wide variety of positions on the subject of the roles of representations in visual perception, which would help to close the literature gap and will be of interest to scholars from all schools and trends of philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This paper offers a short and biased overview of the history of discussion and controversy about the role of different forms of representation in intelligent agents. It repeats and extends some of the criticisms of the `logicist' approach to AI that I first made in 1971, while also defending logic for its power and generality. It identifies some common confusions regarding the role of visual or diagrammatic reasoning including confusions based on the fact that different forms of (...) representation may be used at different levels in an implementation hierarchy. This is contrasted with the way in the use of one form of representation (e.g. pictures) can be {\em controlled} using another (e.g. logic, or programs). Finally some questions are asked about the role of metrical information in biological visual systems. (shrink)

In this commentary I discuss the role of types of knowledge and conceptual structures in lexical representation, revealing the explanatory potential of frame-based knowledge. Although frame-based lexical semantics is not alien to the theoretical model outlined in Jackendoff's conceptual semantics, testing its relevance to the analysis of the lexical evidence presented in his book has been left out of consideration.

Steve Stich used to be an eliminativist. As far as I can tell, he renounced eliminativism about the time that he moved from the west to the east pole.1 Stich was right to reject eliminativism, though I am not convinced that he rejected it for the right reasons. Stich 1983 contains a comprehensive attack on representational content, a central feature of both folk psychology and the Representational Theory of Mind, the leading philosophical construal of scientific psychology. Stich’s current position on (...) the role of content in psychological explanation is not entirely clear. One of my aims in this chapter is simply to invite Stich to clarify his views on representational content; the question that forms the title of this chapter is therefore addressed directly to Stich. I begin by sketching his original anti-content argument. I then trace some later developments in his thinking about content. I argue that content does play an important role in scientific psychology, for precisely the reasons that Stich identified in his original argument against content. I conclude with some general remarks on eliminativism. (shrink)

De nombreuses études sur l'apprentissage des langues étrangères montrent que l'apprenant est incapable d'atteindre le niveau d'un locuteur natif. Des phénomènes de fossilisation et de nativisation demeurent, même à un niveau très avancé (Selinker & Lamendella, 1980 ; Selinker & Lakshamanan, 1992 ; Andersen, 1983 ; Narcy-Combes, 2005). Cet article met en évidence le rôle limitatif des représentations cognitives chez l'apprenant dans un contexte où il est possible d'isoler chronologiquement la construction des représentations cognitives et celle d'une première langue. Ce (...) contexte est celui de la surdité profonde prélinguistique, et plus spécifiquement celui de l'oralisme : l’acquisition de la langue y est différée de quelques mois ou années sans qu'il n'y ait de système linguistique préalable puisque les oralistes sont tenus à l'écart des langues signées. Les jeunes sourds développent des représentations cognitives dans leurs premières années de vie, préalablement à l'accès à une première langue. Or, des études expérimentales (ex. Vinter, 2000) montrent que les sujets sourds ont une approche inhabituelle du spatial et du temporel, approche pouvant être mise en rapport avec l'absence de perception auditive. Du fait des liens entre perception sensorielle et conception (ex. Talmy, 1988 & 2000), les représentations cognitives des sujets sourds relativement à l'espace et au temps seraient donc spécifiques. La langue orale produite par ces sujets à l'adolescence présente quant à elle des caractéristiques inhabituelles dans les domaines de la langue qui sont liés à l'espace et au temps, et ce, aussi bien chez les anglophones que chez les francophones dont les productions orales ont été analysées (ex. Vincent-Durroux, 2009 & 2008). Les représentations cognitives influent donc sur l'appropriation de la langue par les sourds. La discussion porte sur le fait que, dans le contexte de l'apprentissage de langues étrangères par des entendants, les représentations cognitives sous-jacentes à la langue maternelle pourraient avoir un rôle limitatif et ainsi expliquer la persistance des phénomènes de fossilisation et de nativisation. (shrink)

It is argued that there is a role for the representational conception of vision, and that this is compatible with the task-level account advocated by Pessoa et al. However, the role of representations must be understood independently of our conscious experience of vision.