This chapter contains sections titled: Ranke's Troubling Legacy Ranke's Methodology The Secret Fellowship Hidden Differences Ranke's Polemic against Hegel Hegel's Attack on Ranke and Niebuhr.

The absence of Islam from recent scholarship on Hegel's account of world religions is puzzling. In the first part of the article, we argue that Hegel's neglect of Islam in his systematic account of religious phenomena is not accidental and that he did not think of Islam as a determinate religion. Its size and believers aside, we suggest that it is not possible to assign any determinacy to Islam as a world-historical phenomenon under Hegel's rubric, because such (...) determinacy that applies to other religions would be in conflict with what Hegel takes to be Islam's emphasis on the negative moment of truth, its revolutionary tendencies, and its lack of any novel conceptual content as a response to Christianity. In the second part of the article, we point out how one could respond to Hegel's characterization of Islam when it is mentioned in relation to other religious traditions. First, we argue that Hegel overemphasizes the significance of Islam qua religion in explaining the history of Muslim peoples. More than that, Hegel does not see that the history of Islamic philosophy and science can be characterized by sublation and that it can be integrated into conceptual developments in the West on these terms. However, our critique of Hegel's Eurocentrism does not remain at this level, for in the third part of the article we argue for the significance of considering the response of Muslim philosophers to Hegel. In particular, we look at the responses by Mohammed al-Khosht and Mahmoud Haider, respectively. We conclude that Hegel's exclusion of Islam from any involvement in the history of the Concept indicates an undialectical commitment on his part and that to this extent being Hegelian today requires that we rectify this oversight. (shrink)

The question of Hegel's views on Buddhism and its place within his system must be asked again as the history of effects, transmission, and reception continues to unfold. This unfolding highlights not only Hegel's effect on the Western European reception and understanding of Buddhism (and its sharp orientalist critique), but also the canny use of Hegel's philosophy by certain members of the so-called Kyoto School of Japanese neo-Buddhist philosophy, who, though primarily concerning themselves with (...) Heidegger, were notable in their creative use of Hegel's philosophy of spirit (especially Nishida, Nishitani, Tanabe, and Abe). Our present task is likewise to look back to Hegel's own writing on Buddhism through the lens of the history of its effects—that is, to read Hegel again with his legacy in mind—so that we might, as strange as it may perhaps seem, see things more clearly. Our goal is relatively modest, as it aims only to seek out and coordinate Buddhism within Hegel's history of philosophy. Thus, as we have a proximate goal in mind, we also have an order of importance with respect to Hegel's texts, which, of course, brings the Lectures on the History of Philosophy to the fore. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for the existence of pathologies of juridicism. I attempt to show that the Western regime of right tends to colonize our intersubjective relations, resulting in the formation of affective and habitual dispositions that actually hinder participation in social life. Speaking of pathologies of juridicism is to claim that the legal form fundamentally contaminates the way in which we relate to ourselves, to others, and to the world, resulting in an ethically deformed, distorted or deficient form (...) of subjectivity. To support my thesis I consult a philosopher, whose work still provides a powerful analysis and critique of juridicism, namely, Hegel. Hegel provides an historic and a systematic theory of the pathologies of juridicism. His historical theory locates the origin of the abstract subjectivity of right in Roman antiquity. His systematic theory understands the negative effects of an absolutization of the legal domain as a persistent threat to social integration and an individual’s pursuit of the good life. I clarify these argumentative dimensions in two steps, beginning with Hegel’s historical analysis of right in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History. I then reconstruct Hegel’s critique of the subjectivity of right in the short chapter on the ‘Condition of Right’ in his Phenomenology of Spirit. In conclusion, I argue that, although Hegel’s diagnosis is correct, his prescribed therapy must fail: instead of radically altering abstract right in terms of content and form, it only recommends its complementation through other ethical spheres. (shrink)

The question of Hegel's views on Buddhism and its place within his system must be asked again as the history of effects, transmission, and reception continues to unfold. This unfolding highlights not only Hegel's effect on the Western European reception and understanding of Buddhism (and its sharp orientalist critique), but also the canny use of Hegel's philosophy by certain members of the so‐called Kyoto School of Japanese neo‐Buddhist philosophy, who, though primarily concerning themselves with (...) Heidegger, were notable in their creative use of Hegel's philosophy of spirit (especially Nishida, Nishitani, Tanabe, and Abe). Our present task is likewise to look back to Hegel's own writing on Buddhism through the lens of the history of its effects—that is, to read Hegel again with his legacy in mind—so that we might, as strange as it may perhaps seem, see things more clearly. Our goal is relatively modest, as it aims only to seek out and coordinate Buddhism within Hegel's history of philosophy. Thus, as we have a proximate goal in mind, we also have an order of importance with respect to Hegel's texts, which, of course, brings the Lectures on the History of Philosophy to the fore. (shrink)

Hegel's Philosophy of Right represents a unique theory type in the history of political philosophy. It is a normative theory that departs in its construction from an empirical facticity without reducing norms to facts. It unifies teleological and deontic considerations. It is a theory of the normatively requisite institutional structures able to realize the demands of a historically particular form of individuality, and simultaneously it presents the phenomenology of modern subjectivity committed to the ultimate value of (...) true freedom. In this way it aims to transform into genuine self-knowledge the illusory social-political self-image of its addressees. The paper discusses the connection between this phenomenological method and Hegel's conception of freedom - his critique of unconditional, abstract normativity, his solution to the problem of collision between equally valid norms and the possible relevance of his methodological principles to contemporary political philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 29.4 (1999) 58-83 [Access article in PDF] Imagi-Nation: The Imagined Community and the Aesthetics of Mourning Marc Redfield Of the many relics of the Romantic era that continue to shape our (post)modernity, the nation-state surely ranks among the most significant. Two decades ago Benedict Anderson commented that "'the end of the era of nationalism,' so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight" [IC 3], and the intervening years (...) have made it increasingly clear that the developments and processes we summarize as "globalization" operate in mingled synchrony and tension with the political form of the nation-state. 1 That the nation-state should remain the premier vehicle of political and economic legitimation in an era dominated by American imperialism and international capital--forces that, of course, regularly and flagrantly violate the sovereignty of disadvantaged nations--is unsurprising if one accepts the continuing pertinency and power of a Western master-narrative of modernity, according to which the nation represents the emergence of a people into history and prefigures the global achievement of universal human concord. As the proper subject of history, the nation-state can prefigure history's end because, as David Lloyd writes, "the particularism of [nationalism's] contents, potentially in contradiction with the universalism of modernity, is subsumed in the formal congruence between its own narratives of identity, directed at one people, and the narrative of identity that universal history represents for humanity in general" ["Nationalisms" 178]. Lloyd goes on to note that the nation's intermediate status in this narrative--halfway between primitive tribalism and modernity's ever-deferred perpetual peace--accounts for nationalism's irreducibly double association with modernization and atavism. In consequence, the modernist paradigm continues to rule many skeptical or hostile accounts of nationalism, for so long as the nation-state is taken to supersede other political or social formations, the cosmopolitan critique fails to challenge "the fundamental philosophy of universal history that underwrites nationalism's inscription in modernity" ["Nationalisms" 177]. Indeed, both in the corporate media and in mainstream Western political discourse generally, nations and nationalisms are commonly treated as atavistic or progressive depending on the degree to which their behavior harmonizes with globalizing imperatives. That these imperatives emanate quite blatantly from Wall Street in no way seriously troubles the effectiveness of modernity as a narrative paradigm. 2Seeking to discredit universalizing narrative, much cultural criticism in recent years has exchanged cosmopolitanism and the abstract question of "nationalism" for an emphasis [End Page 58] on the contextual construction of national movements or identities. 3 This valuable body of work has sought to recover the particularity of cultural and socioeconomic circumstance, stressed the fundamental role of racism in colonialist contexts, and noted ways in which nationalist movements draw on or unleash forms of resistance that challenge representationalist politics. The pages that follow, however, remain focused on the nationalist fantasy proper to the discourse of modernity. Cultural critique can only profit from knowing as much as possible about the favored turns of the universal-historicist model, particularly since, as Lloyd and others have emphasized, this model is an aesthetic one that grants a world-historical role to "culture." The state, in a tradition that in its main lines runs from Schiller through Hegel and Matthew Arnold and is still very much alive today, represents the community to itself, thereby giving the community form and in a certain sense giving it an ethical imperative and a future: the state represents "our best self" [Arnold 99, passim], "the archetype of a human being" [Schiller 17], because it signifies the formal unification both of the citizen with the community and of the community with universal humanity. Because this unification is ideal rather than actual, it can be projected as the ethical terminus of history (that is, as the ideal of an accomplished modernity). The state's core mission thus becomes pedagogical: its job is to acculturate its subjects into citizens. The production of a docile citizenry thereby obtains an ethical aura and an aesthetic character, insofar as the artwork and the domain of aesthetic or "cultural" experience generally become... (shrink)

Hegel sees philosophy as the only rigorous science that does not have any presupposition, but he rejects the possibility of an absolute foundation for philosophy, instead maintaining that only the system as a whole can be free from all presuppositions. Hegel’s system lays claim to presuppositionlessness, not on the ground of any presuppositionless beginning, but rather as a holistic system of concepts in which inevitable presuppositions are made transparent and comprehended. This paper examines Hegel’s analysis of the concept (...) of immediacy and his critique of the foundationalist conception of philosophy. Although Hegel’s critique is targeted against his predecessors and contemporaries, it has important implications for Husserl’s phenomenology, which represents one of the most ambitious foundationalist projects in the history of philosophy. The final part discusses the later development of Husserl’s thought and his introduction of the concept of lifeworld in light of Hegel’s critique. (shrink)

Hegel, it has been claimed, conceives of truth as material. Such a conception of truth was far from dominant in the nineteenth century, and Hegel’s championing of it might be misinterpreted as indicating a willfully anachronistic, pre-Critical streak in his thought. I argue that this is not the case by exploring a principal motivating factor for Hegel’s position on truth. This factor is a problem concerning the general form of judgment—a problem that, for Hegel, precludes object-based correspondence from functioning as (...) truth. Far from being willfully anachronistic or pre-Critical, Hegel’s conception of truth proves to be intimatelylinked to and informed by Kant’s Critical project. (shrink)

현대의 역사철학자들의 일반적인 경향은 역사 형이상학의 부정이다. 무엇보다도 20세기의 참담하고도 끔찍한 역사적 사건들에 대한 역사적 반성을 하게 된 역사철학자들은 역사형이상학을 부정하는 경향이 강하다. 이들은 특히 헤겔의 세계사에 나타난 낙관적 결론과 역사적 현실에서의 무력함을 이러한 비판의 주된 대상으로 삼고 있을 뿐만 아니라 오히려 헤겔의 보편적 역사형이상학이 역사에 있어서 개별적 역사주체의 고통과 희생을 합리화시킬 수 있는 원인으로 지적하고 있다. 아도르노는 이러한 관점에서 헤겔의 역사철학을 비판하는 대표적인 철학자이다. 헤겔은 세계이성의 자기완성과 필연적 자유의 실현을 근본으로 하는 보편적 세계사를 제시하였고 이것이 절대적 진리라고 하였다. 그러나 (...) 아도르노는 이러한 헤겔의 역사철학의 귀결은 진실이 아닌 허위이며 보편과 절대적 동일성에 의해 강요된 화해라고 한다. 무엇보다도 헤겔은 개별자가 보편에 해소되어 목적을 위한 수단이 되는 세계사를 구성하고 있는 데 이러한 논리는 보편에 의해서 고통당하고 희생당하는 개인을 정당화하는 오류를 범하고 있다고 한다. 이 논문은 헤겔의 보편과 개별의 변증법과 아도르노의 부정의 변증법을 비교하여 이들의 역사철학적 의도를 살펴보고자 한다. 즉 보편에 의해서 개별이 해소되고 매개되어 세계사를 완성하고 완성된 인륜적 공동체를 이룬다고 하는 헤겔의 변증법과는 달리 보편과 개별이 긴장 관계에서 조화를 이루고 동일자와 비동일가 자유롭게 변증법적 관계를 이룬다고 하는 아도르노의 변증법과 역사철학을 비교하고자 한다. 이를 위해서 먼저 세계이성과 자유 그리고 필연성과 보편의 개념들의 변증법적인 관계에서 이루어지는 헤겔의 역사철학을 살펴보고 둘째로 헤겔의 체계와 역사철학의 형이상학을 비판하면서 헤겔의 역사철학적 귀결은 허위이고 오류임을 지적하고 오히려 이러한 헤겔의 역사철학이 20세기의 역사적 주체이자 개별자들이 역사의 보편성에 의해 억압당하고 희생당하게 하는 원인이라고 주장하는 아도르노의 역사철학을 살펴보고자 한다. 셋째로 결론으로서, 그럼에도 불구하고 역사철학적 전통이자 특징인 보편적 역사나 역사적 형이상학이 아직도 유효한가에 대해서 반성적 검토를 하고자 한다. (shrink)

This paper will analyse Hegel's discussion of the relation between family and civil society on the basis of Marx's insight into the discrepancy between Hegel's explicitly logical structure of presentation based on �essential relationships� and his implicitly historical structure of presentation based on �external necessities�. It is intended neither to resolve the dispute between Hegel and Marx nor to apply Marx's critique to passages of the Philosophy of Right that he did not have occasion to discuss. The (...) purpose of this paper is more specific. It will attempt to illustrate the conflict between Hegel's characterization of civil society as a moment of ethical life emerging from the family in a non-contradictory manner, and his characterization of civil society's opposition to, and transformation of, the family. (shrink)

Our task in this study, then, is to see what Hegel makes of Aristotle in unifying and interpreting his doctrine, to see how far ... some of the questions that are continually being raised about Hegel's purpose and meaning in the philosophy of mind.

The paper demonstrates that a detailed analysis of Hegel’s criticism of rationalist metaphysics in the “Vorbegriff” (Preliminary Conception) chapter of the Encyclopedia Logic can shed light on the following critical features of Hegel’s metaphysics: (1) advancing semantic holism as an alternative to semantic atomism; (2) renouncing the projection of a substance-attribute formal structure onto actuality; (3) dismissing sense perception as the source of conceptual content; and (4) rejecting dualist ontology.

In Phenomenology of Spirit (1806) Hegel is often held to have announced the end of history, where 'history' is to be understood as the long pursuit of ends towards which humanity had always been striving. In this, the first book in English to thoroughly critique this entrenched view, Eric Michael Dale argues that it is a misinterpretation. Dale offers a reading of his own, showing how it sits within the larger schema of Hegel's thought and makes room (...) for an understanding of the 'end of history' as Hegel intended. Through an elegant analysis of Hegel's philosophy of history, Dale guides the reader away from the common misinterpretation of the 'end of history' to other valuable elements of Hegel's arguments which are often overlooked and deserve to endure. His book will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students of Hegel, the philosophy of history, and the history of political thought. (shrink)

Sally Sedgwick presents a fresh account of Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy. She argues that Hegel offers a compelling critique of and alternative to the conception of cognition that Kant defended in his 'Critical' period, and explores Hegel's claim to derive from Kantian doctrines clues to a superior form of idealism.

I am calling attention at the outset to Hegel’s procedure in interpreting the thought of others not to suggest that he simply failed to represent their views, but rather to indicate that he invariably sets them down in the midst of his own systematic idealism and judges them in accordance with the adequacy of their response to questions posed by his own position. One consequence of this approach is that Hegel views a philosophical position not primarily in terms of its (...) own unifying intention, but from the standpoint of the Idea and his own logic of the Notion plus the assumption that this logic is working itself out through the history of thought. If we apply this principle to his treatment of Kant, it becomes clear that the central point of Hegel’s critique must be that Kant failed to hold fast to the actuality of reason and the force of the Idea because he opted for the primacy of the understanding and its knowledge of finite reality over all speculative thought. In short, Kant was attacked for subordinating what Hegel made paramount. In this sense the ultimate validity of Hegel’s critique of Kant is made to depend on the viability of Hegel’s own system. (shrink)

This paper argues for the contemporary significance of the ‘Critique of Violence’ by proposing a Benjaminian reading of two important analyses of the relationship between history, politics and the Rights of Man: Hegel’s account of the French Revolution and the concept of dissensus proposed by Jacques Rancière. For both Hegel and Rancière, the gap between right and reality – between the ideal of equality, for example, and the existence of concrete inequality – does not warrant a rejection of the (...) Rights of Man. Rather, the gap is a constitutive condition of law and political rights. From the perspective of Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’, however, these analyses serve to perpetuate a bourgeois legality, one that both Hegel and Rancière acknowledge can never be realized due to the constitutive discrepancy between right and reality. In preserving the promise of legal equality, these analyses preclude the possibility of a suspension or ‘absolution’ from law. This suspension of law is a task that Benjamin identified with the proletarian general strike, a strategy whose pure violence is supposed to secure what Benjamin described, enigmatically, as a ‘wholly transformed work’. Remarkably, however, the relationship between the suspension of law in a general strike and a total transformation of labour is never clearly defined in the ‘Critique’. This paper will develop an account of this relationship by pursuing the references to Marx’s critical theory of capitalism in Benjamin’s writings. (shrink)

Adorno's Aesthetics of Critique examines Theodor Adorno's mode of critique from the perspective of his aesthetics. This has two purposes. The first purpose is to determine the effect of the primary importance Adorno places on aesthetics in his philosophy as a whole and to determine how this primacy influences the way in which he reads the philosophical tradition. The second purpose is to understand the role of aesthetics in critical thinking generally and to reinvigorate Adorno's understanding of the subjective (...) and objective dimensions of critique. The ultimate aim is to promote new interpretations of Adorno and to reassert his relevance for constructing effective modes of critical thinking. The book proceeds through four main chapters that focus on four different dimensions of Adorno's thought: knowledge, history, culture, and art. The first chapter uses Adorno's aesthetic theory to re-read his interpretation of Kant's subject-object dynamic. This grounds the second chapter, on history, which proceeds through an analysis of Adorno's reading of Hegel. The third chapter uses the philosophical grounding of the first two to explore how knowledge and history interact within society as fundamental dimensions of "culture." The scope and meaning of culture and its relevance for critique form the primary focus of this chapter. The fourth chapter turns to art to highlight the relationship between the critical and artistic dimensions of aesthetics in order to facilitate a dialogue between them. This serves the purpose of asserting and outlining the relevance of aesthetics for critical thought in the humanities and social sciences, which forms the crux of the book. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Textual Problems The Trinitarian Structure within the Introduction to the Philosophy of History The Trinitarian Structure in History The Role of Race in History List of Abbreviations of Works by Hegel References.

Hegel’s philosophy of history is fundamentally concerned with how shapes of life collapse and transition into new shapes of life. One of the distinguishing features of Hegel’s concern with how a shape of life falls apart and becomes inadequate is the role that habit plays in the transition. A shape of life is an embodied form of existence for Hegel. The animating concepts of a shape of life are affectively inscribed on subjects through complex cultural processes. This paper (...) examines the argument Hegel puts forward in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History for why civilizations come to atrophy and examines the decisive role habit plays in this process. The paper concludes with a discussion of the way in which the central role of second nature in historical transitions and norm formation conflicts with Brandom’s account of norm formation in Hegel’s thought. (shrink)

Hegel's Philosophy of Right was his last systematic work and the most complete statement of his mature views on ethical and political philosophy. It explores the relationships between three distinct conceptions of human freedom: persons as possessing contract rights, subjects as reflective moral agents, and individuals as members of an ethical community. It strongly influenced the early Marx and with the rise of debates over liberalism and communitarianism in the latter half of the twentieth century. In this (...) volume an outstanding line up of contributors examine the nature and impact of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. A diverse array of topics is examined, ranging from Hegel's account of rights, freedom, the state and history to some hitherto relatively overlooked topics such as Hegel and Luther, art and nationality and Hegel and the market. Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Critical Perspectives on Freedom and History will be valuable reading for scholars of Hegel, nineteenth-century German philosophy, political philosophy and history of political thought. (shrink)

Despite the rapid growth of interest in Hegel among English-speaking philosophers, surprisingly little has been directed at Hegel's relationship toward Kant. This collection of essays by eleven eminent philosophers meets this deficiency by critically examining Hegel's attitude to Kant over a wide range of issues: the nature of space and time; the possibility of metaphysics, categories, and things-in-themselves; dialectic and the self; moral and political philosophy; aesthetics; the philosophy of history, and teleology. All the essays (...) provide channels to a fuller understanding of the forks of theoretical deviation between Hegel and Kant. (shrink)

Recently, philosophy of language has swept through the community of Hegel scholarship. Since the early 1980s, Hegel scholars, such as John McCumber, Willem De Vries, Rodney Coltman, John Russon, Frank Schalow, Irene Harvey, and Henry Sussman, have imputed to Hegel the notion that the problems of philosophy are problems of language. What these readings ignore is that theessential systematic obstacle in Hegel is representation, not language as such. Hence, any Hegelian resolution of philosophical problems involves the speculative overcoming (...) of representation, rather than the reformation of language, as is clear in the transition from “Revealed Religion” to “Absolute Knowing” in the Phenomenology. By tracing seriously the implications of the fact that the completion of revealed religion is “absolute knowing” and that the limiting form of revealed religion is representation, I will show that representation is the dominant problem throughout the Phenomenology. (shrink)

Hegel's Philosophy of History can be characterized as Eurocentric and one finds in it many problematic passages, and even racist statements, as well as a legitimization of colonialism which is presented as a means of education (Bildung). Nevertheless, this article argues that it is possible to reject such judgements and at the same time hold on to the basic intention of Hegel's theories of freedom and Bildung. While the concept of freedom as self-determination is certainly applied (...) in a Eurocentric manner by Hegel in his Philosophy of History, this concept is not Eurocentric at its core. To understand this ‘core’, one has to go back to Hegel's logic of the concept, which finally leads me to a concept of ‘concrete Bildung’. The struggles for self-determination of the colonized peoples must be understood in terms of a further development of the realization of the concept of freedom. If one wants to think Hegel's Philosophy of History meaningfully beyond Hegel's own time, one is inevitably led to the necessity of a liberation of the colonized, for there is a need for a further extension of the consciousness of freedom that actually is inclusive. This demand is contained in Hegel's thought itself, but it still remains abstract with him and must therefore be developed beyond him. (shrink)

Review of Boldyrev, I., Stein, S. et al.. Interpreting Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit: expositions and critique of contemporary readings. London: Routledge.

Kierkegaard presents his critique of a Hegelian philosophy of history in the works of his Climacus pseudonym, the Philosophical Fragments and the corresponding Concluding Unscientific Postscript. It has been contested whether he addressed his arguments toward Hegel directly. In this paper, I argue that these arguments are systematically pertinent to central issues both of Hegel’s as well as any other philosophical engagement with history. To make this point I proceed in three steps. First, the basic outlines of (...) Hegel’s philosophy of history are given concerning its exact subject matter, what the aim of history is, and whether the reason inherent in it allows us to conceive of historical events as necessary. Second, I will show that, though agreeing with Hegel on some points, Climacus holds that we can ascribe neither a determinist nor a conceptual kind of necessity to historical events. Finally, I will expand on Climacus’s account of radical metaphysical contingency and its ethical implications which prompt some objections against philosophy of history in general. (shrink)

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History and System represents the first contemporary volume on Hegel’s philosophy of history to be published in English. The editor notes that “with the possible exceptions of Augustine and Vico, no philosopher before Hegel had such a deep sense of the mutual penetration of history and philosophy as did Hegel. Historical reflection influenced his reading of other philosophers and philosophical reason penetrated his views of past events and eras.” Reflecting the best of Hegelian scholarship, the (...) papers here focus on the sources of Hegel’s philosophy of history, its internal structure and relation to other parts of his system, analyses of specific aspects of his philosophy of history, and its influence on subsequent thinkers. In its breadth and depth, the volume attests to the continued and growing importance of Hegel’s thought for contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

아렌트는 『정신의 삶』 전부터 헤겔 철학에 관심을 가지지만, 특히 『정신의 삶』에서 헤겔의 역사철학을 ‘탈신체화된 기이한 유령 춤’에 비유하며 비판적 입장을 강하게 표명한다. 아렌트에 의하면, 헤겔의 역사철학을 추동하는 세계정신이나 인류의 진보는 추상적이며 보편적인 개념이며, 이러한 개념은 역사의 무대에서 개인들을 꼭두각시들로 취급하면서 인간의 복수성을 희생하여 상정되는 가설이다. 또한, 헤겔의 역사철학은 ‘유령처럼 아무도 아닌 자’인 ‘단 하나의 세계정신’이라는 가정에 의존하며, 역사는 당위적으로 설정된 목적을 이루기 위해 세계정신이 자기 실현하는 결정론적 과정이다. 이 과정은 세계정신 혼자만의 가장 고독한 작업을 통해 진행되기에, 거기서는 실제 복수의 행위자들 (...) 사이의 상호 소통이 불가능하다. 이러한 아렌트의 헤겔 비판은 헤겔의 역사철학을 매우 근대적이라고 보는 관점뿐만 아니라, 정치적 행위에 대한 아렌트 고유의 문제의식에 기인한다. 전체주의 같은 역사적 현상을 세계사의 목적론적 진행에서 불가피한 것으로 간주할 경우, ‘예루살렘의 아이히만’과 같은 반인륜적 결과를 초래할 수 있다는 문제의식이 아렌트의 ‘반헤겔주의’에는 내재한다. 그러나 아렌트의 헤겔 비판은 핀카드처럼 헤겔의 역사철학을 다르게 해석하는 관점을 고려할 때 그 타당성을 의심할 수 있다. 더 나아가 오히려 헤겔의 상호 인정 개념 등을 통해 아렌트와 헤겔의 입장이 얼마나 서로 친근하며 유사한 문제의식을 공유하는지에 대한 추가 검토의 필요성도 제기될 수 있다. (shrink)

AT the time Strauss published Natural Right and History the state of the question of natural right was a mixture of oblivion and fitful restoration. Natural right had disappeared from the center of discussion in political philosophy for well over a century. No philosopher of the first rank had written a treatise on, or advocated the necessity of, natural right since the time of German idealism or perhaps since Rousseau. Kant more than any other had emptied "natural right" (...) of meaning--by asserting that the moral law must be a law of reason and not a law of nature. Naturrecht in the subtitle of Hegel's great treatise on right did not mean right derived from human nature or from nature as a norm or standard: right was to be sought in the conjunction of the rational and the historical. By the middle of the last century there arose a virtually unanimous agreement between the conservative right and the radical left: the question of right had to be decided on the plane of "history" and not by reference to "nature." The attack on natural right in its explicit form had begun with the critique of modern natural right by the great conservatives of "the historical school." It was completed by Nietzsche and Heidegger who traced the "nihilism" of the age to the continuing power of the belief in trans-historical or "eternal" truths, e.g., to the belief in natural right. (shrink)

The eurocentrism of Hegel's philosophy of history is well known. Hegel's reputation has not benefited from many of the claims in the Philosophy of History; such as the one that African history, having no development, has contributed nothing to world history. Because of the general lack of attention that Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit has received, it is little known that this eurocentrism is based, in part, on the racism of (...) the philosophy of subjective spirit. Only here does Hegel systematically treat the biological category of race. Reading through this section one can find passages about racial distinctions which seem initially to be rather ambivalent, but taken as a whole are decidedly racist. Much of what Hegel says about the �inferiority� of African culture and the �justification� for the slave trade finds its foundation here. This paper is an exhibition of the relevant passages of the �Philosophy of Subjective Spirit� and an attempt to link them to Hegel's other claims about African culture and the slave trade. I will argue that Hegel's philosophy of spirit is tainted by the unusual (for Hegel) causal role which he gives to a biological category, namely race. I will argue further that his philosophy of spirit is not necessarily racist, only contingently so, that is that his racism does not follow from any of his fundamental claims about spirit. Hegel's account of spirit makes his racism possible, not necessary. The source of his racism can be traced to the general ideology of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, understanding how Hegel could hold racist views is important for understanding features of his political philosophy. It shows both the problems of the Hegelian conception of person hood and exemplifies the conservative bias built into his method of political philosophy generally. (shrink)

Habermas has alleged: (1) that Hegel has given a social theory that is abstract and technical, separating theory from practice ; and (2) that the criticism Hegel exercises at times is compromised by his uncritical acceptance of modern western culture. Both allegations amount to the claim that in some way Hegel proscribes internal critique, a citizen’s critique of her own nation-state. However, this charge is based on a misunderstanding of the role that history plays in Hegel’s account, and the (...) difference as Hegel understands it between nations of antiquity and those modernity. Once these are properly understood, it is clear that Hegel advocates identification with a supranational modern culture for which national particularity is necessarily an object of criticism. (shrink)

This book is not a generalized essay on Hegel’s philosophy of history as the title seems to promise. It is rather an excellent exposition and interpretation of some of the main doctrines and assumptions of Hegel about the varieties of historical writing, mechanism and teleology, contingency and necessity. It also contains a discussion of the relation of Hegel to the covering law model of explanation. The first chapter is primarily an exposition and exegesis of Hegel’s discernment of the (...) varieties of historical writing in the long introduction to the Lectures. Although this section is generally successful, one of the burdens of Wilkins’ argument is that Hegel is not an a priori thinker, yet Hegel argues that the state is a necessary precondition to people having a history. Groups without a state lie "outside his plan." That such groups may be beyond his plan is appropriate, but that they can have no history needs to be critically evaluated in light of anthropological studies. A second difficulty with the exegesis centers around the almost complete neglect by Wilkins of the idea of providence in the Lectures and the notion of Christian religion. One can wonder whether a proper understanding of Hegel’s philosophy of history is complete without due consideration of both aspects. (shrink)

In this 1999 study, Beat Wyss provides a critical analysis of Hegel's theories of art history. Analogous to his philosophy of history, Hegel viewed the history of art in dialectical terms: with its origins in the Ancient Near East, Western art culminated in Classical Greece, but began its decline already in the Hellenistic period. Yet, as Wyss posits, art refuses its programmed demise. He highlights the political dimension of this contradiction, showing the implication of theories (...) which subordinate art to the will of absolute rule. Wyss follows his analysis of Hegel's theories with a discussion of the work of four modern successors - Nordau, Spengler, Sedlmayr and Lukacs - all of whom adapted Hegel's dialectical model, in an effort to demonstrate the central contradictions of twentieth-century aesthetics. (shrink)

The first part of the final section of Hegel's Science of Logic, the section on "The Idea", is titled "Life". Logic being the science of thought for Hegel, this section presents Hegel's account of the form of thought peculiar to thinking about living beings as living. Hegel's full account of this form of thought holds that a living being is (1) a functionally organized totality of members (2) that maintains itself in and through its environment (3) in (...) the manner of some particular species. I develop Hegel's account in critical conversation with Kant's more limited principle, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, for judging about internally purposive "natural ends" as beings in which every part is both means and end to every other. I argue that Hegel's view rationally develops from attempting to think through Kant's principle, retaining what is valuable in Kant's insights without treating the life sciences with skepticism. (shrink)

Philosophy of history is not a subject which has hitherto attracted much attention in this country. Preoccupation with the methods and achievements of the natural sciences, and distaste for the sort of rationale of history as a whole which Hegel and others offered under the title in the early nineteenth century, have served to make most British philosophers accord its problems only the most casual recognition. It is therefore all the more interesting to find an English writer (...) of unusual powers both of argument and expression, who was himself an historian of distinction in his special field, devoting a large part of his philosophical thinking to the problems of historical knowledge and their wider implications. Unfortunately, R. G. Collingwood was not able to begin the major work on philosophy of history, to writing which, as we are told in the introduction to the present book, he had looked forward for twenty-five years, until his powers were seriously affected by bad health, and he did not live to complete it. But though the full results of his thinking on the subject are lost, we are now able, thanks to the skilful work of his friend Professor T. M. Knox, to study what is in effect an extensive interim report on it. Professor Knox has produced The Idea of History largely on the basis of lectures which Collingwood prepared in 1936, supplemented by two essays already published which date from the same period and a certain amount of material from the unfinished Principles of History written in 1939. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is "that we can meaningfully speak of the task of the Phenomenology; that there is a single coherent argument running through its entirety; and that when properly understood, the Preface can be seen not only as complementary to the Introduction but as growing directly out of it". Specifically, W. wants to show that the "epistemological" and "historical" sides of the PhG are compatible in that the former is finally grounded in the latter. Theoretical-scientific consciousness is (...) not autonomous. History is the development of Geist through man’s work, strife, desires, thought; i.e., W. endorses a "humanistic interpretation" of "Spirit". That this is a "left-Hegelian" approach is clear. Although W. is careful to point out the deficiencies in Marx’s and Feuerbach’s critiques of Hegel, with respect to the foundational role of the "socially-historically conditioned aspect" of man, for example, we find that Marx and Hegel are in agreement. And we are told that Feuerbach’s conception of God is actually not so different from Hegel’s. For both, God is a kind of human "projection". W. defends this psychological concept as a "model for understanding Hegel’s view of religion," so long as it is remembered that this must be a "collective projection". These projections are not simply illusions since they reveal something true about human nature. But there is no transcendent Spirit for Hegel. To speak of Spirit as "absolute" is simply to refer to the transcendence of society to the individual. Thus the argument of the PhG in chapters 6 and 7 "could easily be described as atheism and communism," with the reservations that the "divine" exists in the form of man and that private property is not to be abolished. (shrink)

This paper explores a dimension of the contemporary western understanding of nature as it has been shaped by the thought of Hegel. Emblematic of a tradition that struggles to think nature on its own terms but which, more often than not, formulates it as the ground upon which human progress is built, Hegel’s philosophy sacrifices nature to spiritual progress. Orienting this study through Dennis J. Schmidt’s work on death and sacrifice in the dialectic, I trace Hegel’s formulation of the (...) natural to show how the denigration of nature plays into a larger pattern evident in the western tradition, one that that positions the natural as somehow “outside” the political and spiritual, thereby subjecting it to mischaracterization and misuse. I conclude with a call for a post-sacrificial understanding of the natural world in an effort to help challenge the destructive force inherited by this tradition. (shrink)

With Hegel’s metaphysics attracting renewed attention, it is time to address a long-standing criticism: Scholars from Marx to Popper and Habermas have worried that Hegel’s metaphysics has anti-individualist and authoritarian implications, which are particularly pronounced in his Philosophy of History, since Hegel identifies historical progress with reason imposing itself on individuals. Rather than proposing an alternative non-metaphysical conception of reason, as Pippin or Brandom have done, this article argues that critics are broadly right in their metaphysical reading of (...) Hegel’s central concepts. However, they are mistaken about what Hegel’s approach entails, when one examines the specific types of states discussed by the philosopher in his Philosophy of History. Even on a traditional metaphysical reading, Hegel is not only non-authoritarian; he also makes a powerful argument concerning freedom, whereupon the freest society involves collective oversight and the shaping of social structures so as to ensure that they benefit everybody. (shrink)